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Abstract
This dissertation investigates the history of the World Council of Indigenous Peoples (WCIP) 
and the broader movement of Indigenous internationalism. It argues that Indigenous 
internationalists were inspired by the process of decolonization, and used its logic to establish a 
new political identity. The foundation of the WCIP helped create a network of Indigenous 
peoples that expressed international solidarity between historically unconnected communities. 
The international efforts of Indigenous activists were encouraged both by personal experiences 
of international travel and post-secondary education, and by the general growth of international 
non-governmental organizations during the late twentieth century. The growing importance of 
international non-governmental organizations helped the WCIP secure funding from international 
developmental aid agencies, a factor which pushed the organization to increase its focus on 
apolitical economic development relative to the anti-colonial objectives which inspired its 
foundation. This dissertation examines how Indigenous international organizations became 
embroiled in the Cold War conflict in Latin America, and the difficulties this situation posed for 
both the WCIP and the International Indian Treaty Council. Finally, it examines how the 
prominence of the World Council faded, as major international bodies like the United Nations 
began to acknowledge the importance of Indigenous peoples, and as Indigenous organizations 
sought to participate directly in new international fora rather than contributing through the WCIP.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
This dissertation uses the World Council of Indigenous Peoples (WCIP)—founded in 
1975 and in continual operation until 1997—to investigate the topic of Indigenous 
internationalism, particularly organized Indigenous internationalism. By Indigenous 
internationalism, I mean the co-operation of different historically unconnected peoples on the 
basis of a shared quality of being Indigenous, and by organized, I mean formal relationships 
rather than loose networks of individuals. The subject is approached from two different fields 
of history that have rarely been connected in past scholarship: the history of Indigenous 
peoples,1 and the history of organized internationalism. It is perhaps not a surprise that these 
two areas of study have not commonly overlapped in historical scholarship. Not only are the 
two words—Indigenous and international—oxymoronic, but the birth of organized 
Indigenous internationalism is a relatively recent event. Nonetheless, by addressing the 
concerns of both historical fields, I feel this single study can help provide each with clues to 
some of the most important questions asked by each field's respective scholars. The 
dissertation will therefore assess the history of the WCIP, both as an Indigenous organization, 
and as an international one. 
This dissertation will argue that Indigenous internationalists, inspired by African anti-
colonial activism and Third-Worldism, applied the logic of decolonization to the situation of 
1 “Indigenous” is capitalized throughout this dissertation to make a distinction between the broader 
dictionary definition of the word (which might include “indigenous plants”) and its specific political 
connotation when adopted to describe peoples. Although the world “peoples” is sometimes also capitalized 
in the phrase “Indigenous Peoples” to draw attention to the group rights guaranteed to all peoples by 
various international documents and laws, this dissertation relies on the pluralization of “peoples” to make 
that same point. 
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all peoples whose lands had been invaded and whose right to self-determination had been 
withheld. The founders of the World Council used this definition to forge a new political 
identity through which Indigenous peoples could unite as a bloc. Beyond the formal 
organization itself, the World Council helped create a network of Indigenous peoples that 
expressed solidarity between otherwise unrelated communities. Indigenous activists were 
encouraged to organize internationally both by their personal experiences of international 
travel and post-secondary education, and by the general growth of international non-
governmental organizations during this period. This period of growth enabled the World 
Council to secure funding from various national governments and state-run international 
developmental aid agencies, a factor which pushed the organization to increase its focus on 
apolitical economic development relative to the anti-colonial objectives which inspired its 
foundation. Those member organizations from wealthier and more stable regions could help 
attract international attention to the frequently ignored violent oppression faced by 
Indigenous peoples in the Global South. The large populations of Indigenous peoples in 
Central and South America lent numerical strength to Indigenous peoples of North America, 
Europe, Australia and Aotearoa (who all make up small minorities within their nation states) 
but, owing to the WCIP's structure, they also came to dominate the organization's focus. The 
political situation in Latin America during the late twentieth century also drew the World 
Council into the larger Cold War conflict, a complex environment it was unable to navigate 
skillfully. As major international bodies responded to the demands of Indigenous 
internationalists, Indigenous organizations became less enamoured with the World Council, 
2
seeking instead to participate directly in new Indigenous fora created by the United Nations, 
and ultimately spelling the end of the WCIP.
While the dissertation is focused on the World Council of Indigenous Peoples, it also 
compares the WCIP to another organization (the International Indian Treaty Council – IITC), 
and investigates the broader issue of Indigenous internationalism as lived personal 
experience. The political discourse that was adopted by the World Council's founders, as well 
as the founders of the Treaty Council, requires that this work should also be placed in a third 
field of historical scholarship, the history of decolonization. Just as Indigenous 
internationalists challenged the division between Indigenous peoples and other decolonizing 
peoples, this dissertation critiques the removal of Indigenous history from the broader 
context of global colonization and decolonization. Although a complete analysis of anti-
colonial theory would be out of place, this introduction will provide readers with an overview 
of key concepts promoted by anti-colonial leaders which influenced the founders of the 
WCIP. Additionally, it will provide a brief summary of other relevant literature which adds 
context for this study, namely scholarship on the process of globalization and examinations 
of our modern system of global governance and organized internationalism.
1.1 Historiography
This dissertation makes an original contribution to the relatively limited scholarship 
on international Indigenous activism. The only historian to focus, in any significant way, on 
the World Council of Indigenous Peoples is Henry Minde at the University of Tromsø. His 
numerous chapters and edited collections provide much of the history of the organization, 
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though, understandably, he tends to focus on Sámi involvement.2 This dissertation 
complements his shorter works with additional information from interviews and archival 
research.
Ronald Niezen's The Origins of Indigenism provides a good if brief survey of the 
history of international Indigenous activity, and its final chapter provides a critical look at the 
ideas of “self-determination without succession” that the World Council of Indigenous 
Peoples would adopt. This dissertation shares Niezen's argument that the “fulfillment of the 
self-determination goals of indigenous peoples would constitute a completion of the process 
of decolonization through mechanisms that would not (or not necessarily) involve the 
creation of new nation-states.”3 As will be shown, however, the World Council's adoption of 
that goal meant its efforts challenged not only individual nation states, but also basic logic of 
the system of nation states itself. Such an enormous goal affected the World Council's 
success and level of support in the international arena, relative to the International Indian 
Treaty Council, which initially adopted the goal of more traditional independence for the 
Sioux Nation.
2 His works include, inter alia, “The International Movement of Indigenous Peoples: an Historical 
Perspective,” in Becoming Visible: Indigenous Politics and Self-Government: Proceedings of the 
Conference on Indigenous Politics and Self Government in Tromsø, 8-10 November, 1993, eds. Terje 
Brantenberg, Janne Hansen, and Henry Minde (Tromsø: University of Tromsø, Centre for Sami Studies, 
1995); “The Challenge of Indigenism : the Struggle for Sami Land Rights and Self-Government in Norway 
1960-1990,” in Indigenous Peoples: Resource Management and Global Rights Indigenous Peoples: 
Resource Management and Global Rights, eds. Svein Jentoft, Henry Minde, and Ragnar Nilsen (Delft: 
Eburon, 2003); “The Destination and the Journey: Indigenous Peoples and the United Nations from the 
1960s through 1985,” in Indigenous Peoples: Self-Determination, Knowledge and Indigeneity, ed. Henry 
Minde (Delft: Eburon, 2008). 
3 Ronald Niezen, The Origins of Indigenism Human Rights and the Politics of Identity (Berkeley: University 
of California Press, 2003), 194
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In Ken Coates' comparative history of Indigenous peoples, he acknowledges the 
influence of global political changes on the birth of an international Indigenous movement:
The recognition of the rights and aspirations of tribal societies did not 
emerge in a vacuum after World War II. The complaints of indigenous 
peoples were not new, nor was their desire to gain the attention of 
national governments. What changed – and this is profoundly 
important – was the international standing of ethnic minorities and 
the emergence of a fairly uniform condemnation of the philosophical 
underpinnings of colonization. The post-World War II preoccupation 
with human rights, decolonization and self-determination created a 
new political atmosphere, one sensitive to the rights of identifiable 
groups and more respectful of different cultures, values and 
traditions.4
This dissertation will look more closely at specific examples of the influence of the post-war 
process of decolonization on both Indigenous individuals and Indigenous international 
organizations. Coates' work also summarizes the feelings of Indigenous peoples overcoming 
their isolation through international meetings and co-operation:
It helped to discover that one's problems were part of an international 
pattern, that other indigenous peoples faced similar challenges, and 
that the broad effects of western industrialization and capitalism had 
marginalized the traditional owners of the land. Hearing descriptions 
of the historical origins and power of institutionalized racism and 
anti-indigenous sentiment provided a welcome explanation for 
problems with local newcomers. And while it was disturbing to learn 
of acts of genocide perpetrated against indigenous groups around the 
world, such information was ultimately empowering.5
Chapter Three of this dissertation will examine these kinds of thoughts and emotions in more 
detail in the context of the first global meeting of Indigenous peoples in 1974.
4 Ken S. Coates, A Global History of Indigenous Peoples: Struggle and Survival (New York: Palgrave 
MacMillan, 2004), 236-237.
5 Coates, 243.
5
 Anthony Hall's immense work, The American Empire and the Fourth World, surveys 
the history of Indigenous resistance to European and American imperialism, and also 
provides an analysis of the practical and theoretical sources that inspired George Manuel, the 
first President of the World Council of Indigenous Peoples, with the idea for such an 
organization.6 Most of these works rely heavily or exclusively on Douglas Sanders' The 
Formation of the World Council of Indigenous Peoples, George Manuel and Michael Posluns' 
The Fourth World and Peter McFarlane's Brotherhood to Nationhood.7 As described below, 
one of this dissertation's original contributions is its systematic assessment of the 
documentation created by the World Council, along with numerous personal interviews to 
provide a more detailed picture of the organization's foundations and activities.
Roxanne Dunbar-Ortiz's Indians of the Americas gives a good survey of activity 
related to Indigenous rights (by both Indigenous and non-Indigenous organizations), 
including brief summaries of the WCIP and IITC up to 1984, when the book was published.8 
Much of the book focuses on Indigenous relationships with the United States and Nicaraguan 
governments, rather than on Indigenous internationalism per se.
Although no academic studies focusing specifically on the WCIP have yet been 
published, the organization has been the focus of two unpublished Masters theses. The first 
was completed by Rise M. Massey of the University of British Columbia in 1986.9 Although 
6 Anthony J. Hall, The American Empire and the Fourth World (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 
2003.) 
7 Douglas E. Sanders, The Formation of the World Council of Indigenous Peoples (Copenhagen: 
International Work Group for Indigenous Affairs, 1977); Peter McFarlane, Brotherhood to Nationhood: 
George Manuel and the Making of the Modern Indian Movement, (Toronto: Between the Lines, 1993).
8 Roxanne Dunbar Ortiz, Indians of the Americas: Human Rights and Self-Determination (New York: 
Praeger, 1984).
9 Rise M. Massey, “The World Council of Indigenous Peoples: An Analysis of Political Protest” (MA Thesis, 
University of British Columbia, 1986).
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it gives an excellent overview of the strategies adopted by the World Council during its first 
decade, it is nonetheless a work of political science rather than history, and thus, asks 
different questions of its subject (primarily, the effectiveness of WCIP strategy) than does this 
dissertation. The second thesis was completed by Deirdre Duquette at the University of 
Victoria in 1993. While also a work of Political Science, it addresses some of the same topics 
addressed in this dissertation, particularly the influence of Canadian International 
Development Agency funding for the World Council, which I explore in Chapter Four.10
1.2 Precursors
The World Council of Indigenous Peoples is a useful subject of study partly because it 
exemplified a new level of organized Indigenous internationalism that far surpassed anything 
seen before. Nonetheless, a number of actors and organizations can be considered precursors 
to the World Council, and they provide important context for its establishment. Notable 
examples of non-Indigenous international anti-colonial solidarity can be found in Marcus 
Garvey's Universal Negro Improvement Association and the Pan-African congresses of the 
20th century. While they have received some scholarly attention, further work could approach 
these topics from the perspective of the history of internationalism rather than political 
history.11 This kind of scholarship is demonstrated in the work of Brent Hayes Edwards, 
which examines the loosely knit network forged across empires by men like the Trinidadian 
10 Deirdre Cynthia Duquette, “The World Council of Indigenous Peoples: The Study of an International 
Indigenous Organization” (MA Thesis, University of Victoria, 1993).
11 Colin Legum, Pan-Africanism: A Short Political Guide (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1965); Imanuel 
Geiss, The Pan-African Movement: a History of Pan-Africanism in America, Europe, and Africa (New 
York: Africana Pub. Co., 1974); Marika Sherwood, Origins of Pan-Africanism : Henry Sylvester Williams, 
Africa and the African Diaspora (New York : Routledge 2011)
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George Padmore and the French West African Tiemoko Garan Kouyaté.12 Indeed, recent 
work by John Maynard suggests that Garveyism had a substantial effect on Indigenous 
politics in Australia in the 1920s.13 These organizations, however, were largely based in a 
notion of shared ethnicity and geography, which, as I will demonstrate, was not the case for 
the WCIP.14
Nor was the concept of Indigenous internationalism in the 1960s and 1970s the first 
attempt by Indigenous peoples to seek international attention for their cause. There were 
many Indigenous delegations which sought audiences with imperial leaders.15 When their 
petitions to the crown failed during the 1920s, Māori political and spiritual leader T. W. 
Ratana16, and Haudenosaunee leader Deskaheh Levi General17 both attempted 
(unsuccessfully) to raise their concerns in the newest international forum, the League of 
Nations. Yet these men made no claim to represent a broad category of Indigenous peoples. 
Moreover, prior to the decolonization of Africa and Asia, there was little reason to consider 
the cases of Deskaheh and Ratana as something distinct from the other anti-colonial activists 
12 Brent Hayes Edwards, The Practice of Diaspora: Literature, Translation, and the Rise of Black 
Internationalism (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2003), 241-305.
13 John Maynard (University of Newcastle), “Marching to a Different Beat: The Influence of the International 
Black Diaspora on Aboriginal Australia,” Unpublished paper, courtesy of Ben Silverstein. 
14 Even the Manchester Pan-African Conference of 1945 did not include delegates from the Maghreb. George 
Shepperson, St. Clair Drake, “The Fifth Pan-African Conference, 1945 and the All African People's 
Conference, 1958.” Contributions in Black Studies: A Journal of African and Afro-American Studies 8:1:5 
(1986), 39, 49.
15 For more on these and other petitioners to the Crown, see Ravi de Costa, “Identity, Authority, and the 
Moral Worlds of Indigenous Petitions,” Comparative Studies in Society and History 48:3 (July 2006).
16 James Mcleod Henderson, Ratana: The Man, The Church, The Movement (Wellington: A.H & A.W. Reed 
in association with the Polynesian Society, 1963); Keith Newman, Ratana Revisited: An Unfinished 
Legacy (Auckland: Reed Books, 2006).
17 To date, the most detailed account of Deskaheh Levi General's time in Europe is Joëlle Rostkowski, “The 
Redman's Appeal for Justice: Deskaheh and the League of Nations,” in Indians and Europe: An 
Interdisciplinary Collection of Essays, ed. Christian F. Feest (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1989)
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who hoped for change from the League of Nations.18 One might argue, on the contrary, that it 
was the rejection of their petitions as “domestic issues” which helped formalize that very 
category as one distinct from other colonized groups.19 As will be shown, the very concept of 
“Indigeneity” is deeply rooted in the exclusion of certain peoples from the post-WWII 
process of decolonization.
Closer parallels might be drawn between the World Council and other attempts at 
forming transnational Indigenous organizations. Sḵwxwú7mesh activist Andy Paull attempted 
to establish a North American Indian Brotherhood (NAIB) in order to unite Indigenous 
peoples across the Canada-United States border.20 Paull's work was a direct influence on 
George Manuel, who later founded the WCIP.21 Manuel would go on to serve as president of 
the NAIB after Paull's death in 1959 until 1963.22 Steven Crum has written about a similar 
“Pan-Indian” organization, the League of North American Indians, founded in 1935 by 
Lawrence Twoaxe, a Kanien'kehá:ka man originally from Kahnawà:ke but living in 
California.23 The League gained members from both Canada and the United States, but 
according to Crum, Twoaxe
18 On the grown of anti-colonial nationalism during the interwar period, see Erez Manela, The Wilsonian 
Moment: Self-Determination and the International Origins of Anticolonial Nationalism (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2007).
19 Isabelle Schulte-Tenckhoff addresses the broader issue of the “domestication” of State-Indigenous relations 
in “Reassessing the Paradigm of Domestication: the Problematic of Indigenous Treaties.” Review of 
Constitutional Studies 4 (1998), 239 289.‐
20 See E. Palmer Patterson, “Andrew Paull and Canadian Indian Resurgence” (Ph.D. Thesis, University of 
Washington, 1962); Herbert Francis Dunlop, Andy Paull: As I Knew Him and Understood His Times 
(Vancouver: The Order of the O.M.I. of St. Paul's Province, 1989); and Hugh Shewell, “Jules Sioui and 
Indian Political Radicalism in Canada, 1943-1944,” Journal of Canadian Studies 34:3 (Fall 1999).
21 McFarlane, 50.
22 McFarlane, 57, 68. By this point, however, the NAIB seems to have been “North American” in name only, 
with its membership drawing entirely from Indigenous communities within the borders of the province of 
British Columbia. Manuel resigned in 1963 to encourage unity among the Indigenous organizations within 
that province. 
23 Steven Crum, “Almost Invisible: The Brotherhood of North American Indians (1911) and the League of 
North American Indians (1935),” Wicazo Sa Review 21:1 (Spring 2006), 49.
9
...wanted the League to become a Western Hemispheric organization 
with leaders from Canada, the United States, and Mexico and other 
Latin American countries. However, it never had actual Indian 
representation south of the Rio Grande because of the physical 
distance Mexican tribes would have had to travel. Nevertheless, some 
Indian leaders down south expressed a deep interest in the 
organization.24
Crum notes that the League has remained “almost invisible in twentieth-century Native 
American history,” largely because “for much of its existence, [it] barely functioned as an 
organization.”25 The organization's membership was primarily working class without the 
means to travel across the continent.26 Over time, it seems to have focused more on relations 
with the American government, and lost the participation of its members from Canada, 
before its final collapse in 1970.27 The World Council faced challenges owing to the physical 
distance between its members, but advances in technology made travel significantly cheaper 
and often altogether unnecessary, a change deeply enmeshed in the process of globalization 
addressed below. Certainly, Indigenous peoples have never been bound by the borders of 
modern nation states, and many have formed alliances and regional organizations that have 
transcended those borders, but for the most part, these are people who have shared historical 
and/or cultural ties, a shared connection to a specific physical landscape,28 or who share 
specific adversaries in the form of governments and legislation. In this way, they might be 
best compared with Pan-Africanist organizations mentioned above. The Indigenous 
24 Ibid., 49.
25 Ibid., 55, 49.
26 Ibid., 50
27 Ibid., 53-54.
28 The Arctic Peoples Conference of November 1973 is a notable attempt at a geographic but transnational 
framework. See Inge Kleivan, “The Arctic Peoples' Conference in Copenhagen, November 22-25, 1973,” 
Études/Inuit/Studies 16:1-2 (1992), 227-236.
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internationalism of the World Council, on the other hand, linked those with no historical or 
cultural ties, and no “shared space” of geography.
The trans-Atlantic influence of African politics and anti-colonial philosophy on the 
founders of the World Council of Indigenous Peoples and of the International Indian Treaty 
Council is also not without precedents. As early as 1921, a decision by the British Judicial 
Committee of the Privy Council (JCPC) in favour of Chief Oluwa for his title to lands in 
Lagos, Nigeria, inspired an organization called the Allied Tribes (of British Columbia, 
Canada) to make a similar (though unsuccessful) petition to the Privy Council.29 While the 
Allied Tribes clearly recognized the similarity in the two situations, it seems they had no 
intention (or means) to form an international organization based on that similarity.30 By the 
1960s, however, more sustained connections were possible. During that decade and the 
following one, many Indigenous activists around the world likely recognized the similarities 
in between their situation and that of the decolonizing nations of Africa. For instance, 
Howard Adams, a Marxist Métis scholar from St. Louis, Saskatchewan, Canada, used Third-
Worldist discourse in his 1975 book Prison of Grass, in which he discusses the 
“underdevelopment”, “decolonization,” and “liberation” of Canada and asserts that the 
29 Paul Tennant, Aboriginal Peoples and Politics: The Indian Land Question in British Columbia, 1849-1989 
(Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 1990), 101. For the Privy Council’s Oluwa decision, see 
Appendix II of William M. Geary, Nigeria Under British Rule (New York: Routledge, 1965). Bonny 
Ibhawoh offers a comparison between treaty-making in Africa and Canada in the 19th century, and touches 
upon the influences they had on each other. Bonny Ibhawoh, “Cultural Negotiations and Colonial Treaty-
Making in Upper Canada and British West Africa, 1840-1900,” Ife Journal of History 6:1 (2013). 
Certainly, non-Indigenous organizations like Aboriginal Protection Society, founded in 1837, was as 
interested in African “aborigines” as those living in Australia and the Americas. See William E. Unrau, 
“An International Perspective on American Indian Policy: The South Australian Protector and Aborigines 
Protection Society,” Pacific Historical Review 45:4 (1976). [519-538.]
30 It is noteworthy, however, that Andy Paull, the early Indigenous internationalist and mentor to George 
Manuel described above, was a prominent member of the Allied Tribes and its petition. It seems plausible 
that this idea of a shared situation with African tribes may have influenced (at least subconsciously) Paull's 
desire to form an international organization, which he passed down to George Manuel. Tennant, 101.
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“examples of Third World liberation struggles have also fostered...native nationalism” in 
North America.31 As the discourse of decolonization had been taken up and publicized by the 
Black Power movement in the United States, numerous examples of its impact on young 
Indigenous radicals in North America can surely be found,32 but the impact of anti-colonial 
thought on Indigenous intellectuals in South America has received far less attention. Jose 
Antonio Lucero has examined the powerful influence of Martinique-born anti-colonial writer 
Frantz Fanon on Fausto Reinaga, a revolutionary Indigenous intellectual from Bolivia. The 
latter's 1969 work, La Revolución India begins by quoting the entire final chapter of Fanon's 
The Wretched of the Earth, which insists that the colonized abandon mimicry of European 
culture, and look elsewhere for an alternative.33 Reinaga answers by proposing the idea of 
Indianidad, which Lucero compares to Aimé Césaire's concept of negritude, in that they both 
rejected European culture in favour of a culture rooted in the shared historical experiences of 
a people (Blacks in the case of Césaire and Indians in the case of Reinaga).34 In this way, 
Reinaga rejected the idea of differentiating between Indigenous nationalities, favouring a 
single Indigenous nationality that would comprise the majority of the Bolivian population, 
and ultimately “lead to a continental revolution of 'IndoAmerica.'”35 Reinaga accepted an 
invitation to attend the founding meeting of the International Indian Treaty Council in 1974, 
31 Howard Adams, Prison of Grass: Canada from the Native Point of View (Toronto: New Press, 1975), 175.
32 One description of this link can be found in Bryan Palmer, “Indians in All Tribes: the Birth of Red Power,” 
in Debating Dissent: Canada and the Sixties, eds., Gregory S. Kealey, Lara Campbell, and Dominique 
Clement (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2012). Howard Adams, for example was profoundly 
affected when hearing Malcolm X speak at Berkley.
33 Jose Antonio Lucero, “Fanon in the Andes: Fausto Reinaga, Indianismo, and the Black Atlantic,” 
International Journal of Critical Indigenous Studies 1:1 (2008), 14-15.; Fausto Reinaga, La Revolución 
India (La Paz: Partido Indio Boliviano, 1969); Frantz Fanon, The Wretched of the Earth (New York: Grove 
Press, 1963).
34 Lucero, “Fanon in the Andes,” 16-17.
35 Ibid., 18.
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but he did not have the financial means to make the trip to the United States.36 Although this 
dissertation is not able to fully document the important influence of Reinaga's ideas of 
indianidad and indianismo, it is certain that they had a significant impact, including beyond 
the borders of Bolivia.37 
This dissertation does not argue, therefore, that the WCIP was the only example of 
anti-colonial thought influencing the work of Indigenous activists. The founders of the World 
Council, however, did use the logic of decolonization as the basis for their organization, 
which helped to create a broad, even global definition of Indigeneity that differed from North 
American native nationalism or South American indianidad or indianismo. It was not 
bounded by culture, colour or region, but rooted in a shared political experience of invasion, 
colonization and subjugation. In this way, Indigeneity as defined by Indigenous 
internationalism has as much or more in common with the idea of Third-Worldism as it does 
with traditional systems of cultural, linguistic and kinship links between Indigenous peoples. 
On the other hand, the Indigenous internationalism was not simply the unaltered transplant of 
Third-Worldist ideas to new locations. The World Council adopted but also adapted, 
abandoning those conceptions that did not meet their needs and challenging those that 
threatened their values. The connections between Indigenous internationalism and Third-
Worldism, as well as the similarities and differences between the two movements, are 
explored more thoroughly in the second and third chapters respectively.
36 US National Archives, Central Foreign Policy Files, 1973-1976, Record Group 59: General Records of the 
Department of State, Electronic Telegrams, Film # D740128-0207, Document # 1974LAPAZ03292, 
correspondence from US Embassy in La Paz to US Secretary of State, 22 May 1974.
37 Jose Antonio Lucero, Struggles of Voice: The Politics of Indigenous Representation in the Andes 
(Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2008), 81-82.
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1.3 Third-Worldism
Because this dissertation will make frequent references to the influence of the Third 
World on Indigenous internationalists, it is worth spending some time explaining what is 
meant by that term. The term was coined by Alfred Sauvy who used it to set apart “those 
called, by the United Nations, the underdeveloped countries” from the great power blocs of 
the Capitalist West and the Communist East.38 Sauvy acknowledged that, much like the 
French Revolution's Third Estate, the ignored and exploited Third World might itself want to 
“be something.” Sauvy, however, gave no indication of what he thought the Third World 
wanted to be, except perhaps, not ignored or exploited. While the First and Second Worlds of 
his metaphor were defined by their East/West geographies and Communist/Capitalist 
ideologies, the Third World had neither a specific geography nor a clear ideology.
The 1955 Asian-African Conference in Bandung, Indonesia (organized by President 
Sukarno who had led his country to independence) might be considered the first international 
meeting of the Third World. Its list of delegates was limited, however, compared to Sauvy's 
definition of the Third World, as Latin American states were not included. Instead delegates 
to the Bandung Conference came primarily from those countries that had recently escaped 
(or were working to escape) the grasp of European empires, and this was their primary point 
of commonality. With participation from two distant continents, there was no presence of any 
shared ethnicity or culture, like had been seen in the Pan-African conferences mentioned 
above. According to historian Vijay Prashad, “[u]nity for the people of the Third World came 
from a political position against colonialism and imperialism, not from any intrinsic cultural 
38 Alfred Sauvy, “Trois Mondes, Une Planète,” L'Observateur, 14 August 1952. <http://www.homme-
moderne.org/societe/demo/sauvy/3mondes.html> Author's translation.
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or racial commonalities. If you fought against colonialism and stood against imperialism, 
then you were part of the Third World.”39 This definition, based in a shared history of 
imperialism, was purely political, but it allowed for unity between delegates whose politics 
and ideologies were otherwise antithetical. As such, it “found common currency among most 
of the delegates to the Bandung meeting, whether of the Left (China), the centre (India and 
Burma), or the Right (Turkey and the Philippines).”40
An analysis by Robert Vitalis asserts that the so-called “movement” of the Third 
World never became particularly united. Indonesia's Sukarno, China's Zhou Enlai, India's 
Jawaharlal Nehru, Egypt's Gamal Abdel Nasser, Ghana's Kwame Nkrumah and others each 
tried to dominate various agglomerations of (mostly) post-colonial states in ways that suited 
their own interests and ideologies.41 Vitalis specifically disputes the notion that the 1955 
Asian-African conference in Bandung, Indonesia led directly to the creation of a Non-
Aligned Movement, or any movement at all. He equally critiques any suggestion that Non-
Aligned Movement (NAM) was truly made up of members committed to Cold-War 
neutrality, evidenced in part by the participation of Cuba at the NAM's founding meeting in 
Belgrade in 1961.42 On the contrary, the meeting was designed by Nasser to undermine 
Sukarno's hopes for a second Asian-African Conference. A sequel to Bandung would have, 
by definition, excluded Nasser's ally Josip Broz Tito of Yugoslavia, and accepted the 
participation of a great number of countries hostile to Nasser's Egypt. Although the 1961 
39 Vijay Prashad, The Darker Nations: A People's History of the Third World (New York: New Press, 2007), 
34.
40 Ibid., 34.
41 Robert Vitalis, “The Midnight Ride of Kwame Nkrumah and Other Fables of Bandung (Ban-doong),” 
Humanity 4:2 (Summer 2013), 275-278.
42 Ibid., 272-274.
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Belgrade Conference would condemn imperialism, it was explicitly organized around “non-
alignment” rather than “anti-imperialism,” in part to allow Nasser and Tito to control the list 
of invitees.43 Nkrumah's efforts to organize the 1958 Conference of Independent African 
States was, on the contrary, designed to allow him to challenge Nasser's claim to the 
leadership of and vision for the Third World. Vitalis suggests that Nkrumah may well have 
seen Nasser's Egypt as a possible source of imperialism within Africa.44
With all these tensions between ideologically diverse actors, the Third World can 
hardly be said to have embodied a single ideology. Third-Worldism was never a single 
coherent idea or movement, but a cluster of disparate (sometimes conflicting) thoughts 
espoused by a range of activists and leaders with different interests and goals. Nonetheless, 
historian Mark Berger has attempted to pick out some commonalities. He lists four tenets 
shared by at least most leaders involved in the broad Third-Worldist movement:
1) the 'popular masses' in the Third World had 'revolutionary 
aspirations';
2) the fulfilment of these aspirations was an inevitable working out of 
history that linked pre-colonial forms of egalitarianism to the 
realisation of a future utopia;
3) the vehicle for the achievement of this transformation was a strong 
and centralised nation-state; and
4) in foreign policy terms these nation-states should form an alliance 
that would act collectively under the umbrella of various regional and 
international forms of political and economic co-operation, such as 
the non-alignment movement and the United Nations.45
43 Ibid., 273.
44 Ibid., 275-76.
45 Mark T. Berger, “After the Third World? History Destiny and the Fate of Third Worldism,” Third World 
Quarterly 25:1 (2004), 34n4.
16
What is relevant to this dissertation, however, are the key ideas from which Indigenous 
leaders seem to have drawn inspiration. These are items two and four from Berger's list 
above, namely a) the elevation of pre-colonial culture as a just and legitimate alternative to 
Western economic and political systems, and b) some degree of collaboration between 
colonized peoples at the international level to secure each other's liberation.46 When the 
following chapters refer to the influence of Third-Worldism, it is usually these two ideas that 
are being discussed.
Examples of this first element—the search for an alternative to Western political-
economic systems in local culture and history—include the work of Nehru, Sukarno and 
Nasser. Each of these men espoused his own nationalist/socialist theory, seeking to temper 
the Soviet model of socialism with elements required for their own national contexts. Such 
an alternative political-economic philosophy is perhaps best exemplified by Sukarno's 
conception of NASAKOM: Nasionalisme, Agama (religion) and Komunisme.47 Each of these 
leaders had what Berger calls a “complicated relationship” with socialism.48 Examples of the 
second element—anti-colonial collaboration—range from group statements made at the 1955 
Bandung conference “declaring that colonialism in all its manifestations is an evil which 
should speedily be brought to an end,”49 to the 1963 establishment of the Organization of 
46 The requirement of centralized government or even independent statehood was not necessarily adopted by 
Indigenous internationalists, nor were the demands for economic industrialization espoused by many Third 
World leaders.
47 Berger, 15-17.
48 Ibid., 20.
49 Bandung Final Communiqué, <http://franke.uchicago.edu/Final_Communique_Bandung_1955.pdf>
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African Unity with the eradication of “all forms of colonialism from Africa” included as one 
of its five espoused purposes.50
1.3.1 Nyerere, Ujamaa, and Internationalism
Tanzania's President Julius Kambarage Nyerere is a particularly good example of a 
post-colonial leader that both rejected Western political-economic systems in favour of one 
based in pre-colonial culture, and promoted the international collaboration of colonized 
peoples to bring about each other's liberation.51 As will be shown in subsequent chapters, 
Nyerere left a particularly strong mark on George Manuel, helping to inspire in Manuel a 
deep desire to organize Indigenous peoples internationally. For this reason, it is worth 
looking more closely at Nyerere's vision of Third-Worldism and Pan-Africanism. Nyerere 
was born in 1922 in the recently-established British League of Nations mandate of 
Tanganyika. After obtaining a teaching certificate in the nearby British colony of Uganda, he 
travelled to the United Kingdom where he earned a Master's degree in history and economics 
at the University of Edinburgh in 1952.52 The importance of this time in both a neighbouring 
African colony and in the colonial metropole in shaping his political views should not be 
underestimated. After his time in Uganda, he became secretary of the Tabora branch of the 
Pan-Africanist organization, the Tanganyikan African Association.53 In Edinburgh, he was 
deeply influenced by Fabian socialism, with its stress on the importance of reform, and 
50 Charter of the Organization of African Unity (entered into force Sept. 13, 1963) 
<http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/africa/OAU_Charter_1993.html>
51 The United Republic of Tanzania is the product of a 1964 merger between the independent states of 
Tanganyika and Zanzibar.
52 Incidentally, this made him the first Tanganyikan to earn any university degree. Guy Martin, African 
Political Thought (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2012), 98.
53 Thomas Molony, “Nyerere: The formative years” in Julius Kambarage Nyerere: Life Times Legacy. 
(London: First, 2009). <http://www.firstmagazine.com/DownloadSpecialistPublicationDetail.384.ashx>
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certainly would have gained a deeper understanding of the process of European 
colonization.54 Upon his return to Tanganyika, he formed the Tanganyika African National 
Union (TANU) in 1954. This process of international travel as a spark to both Pan-
Africanism and anti-colonial activism was relatively common throughout Africa, and as will 
be shown in Chapter Two, it was a process that was repeated to some degree by Indigenous 
activists some decades later.
Nyerere was particularly focused on establishing a philosophy or ideology to guide 
both TANU and African leaders in general. He came up with the concept of using Ujamaa 
(generally translated as “socialism” or “African socialism” but more literally meaning 
“familyhood” in Swahili) as the organizing principle for society.55 He made a strong 
distinction that his ideology was not a variant of European socialism, but instead, based 
entirely in pre-colonial traditions of equality and sharing. The Marxists' belief in the essential 
role of class struggle in life did not fit with his understanding of African community any 
more than did the focus on self-interest inherent to capitalism.56 Nyerere insisted he was not
...importing a foreign ideology into Tanzania and trying to smother 
our distinct social patterns with it. We have deliberately decided to 
grow, as a society, out of our own roots, but in a particular direction 
and towards a particular kind of objective. We are doing this by 
emphasizing certain characteristics of our traditional organization, 
and extending them so that they can embrace the possibilities of 
modern technology and enable us to meet the challenge of life in the 
twentieth century world.57
54 Martin, 98.
55 Julius Nyerere, Uhuru na Ujamaa : Freedom and Socialism, (Nairobi: Oxford University Press, 1968), 2.
56 Martin Odei Ajei, “Africa's Development: The Imperatives of Indigenous Knowledge and Values,” (Ph.D. 
dissertation, University of South Africa, 2007).
57 Julius Nyerere, Uhuru na Ujamaa, 2.
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Nyerere demanded a return to this sense of familyhood, and the rejection of selfish 
individualism, a quality he blamed on colonialism. Prior to the imposition of 
colonial/capitalist education, “an African could not think of himself apart from that 
community in which he lived.”58 While many Third World leaders would emphasize the 
importance of pre-colonial culture as a guiding principle for their post-independence 
societies, Nyerere's commitment was perhaps the most pure. Unlike Ghana's Kwame 
Nkrumah who wanted to temper Marxism with “African personality,” Nyerere saw the need 
for a wholly different ideology.59 As will be demonstrated in this dissertation, it was this 
complete rejection of European systems that would help guide the World Council of 
Indigenous People's approach to decolonization in its early years.
Although Nyerere was committed to bringing about a uniquely African social system 
in Tanzania, his interests lay far beyond his own national borders. Nyerere was a committed 
Pan-Africanist and internationalist. The same Arusha Declaration that laid out TANU's plans 
for the country also lists co-operation “with all political parties in Africa engaged in the 
liberation of all Africa” among the party's principle aims.60 It also commits the government to 
co-operate “with other states in Africa in bringing about African unity” and to “[work] 
58 Julius Nyerere, Africa Today and Tomorrow, 2nd edition (Dar es Salaam : Mwalimu Nyerere Foundation, 
2000), quoted in Evaristi Magoti Cornelli, “A Critical Analysis of Nyerere's Ujamaa: An Investigation of 
Its Foundations and Values,” (Ph.D. Thesis, University of Birmingham, 2012), 68-69.
59 Martin, 87-91. Nyerere was not necessarily successful with his vision, to say the least. P. L. E. Idahosa 
comments that TANU's policies “resulted in many features that are the opposite of what ujamaa was 
intended to achieve: forced villageization, the absence of participation coupled with alienation from the 
state, bureaucratization, increased class differentiations, low agricultural production and industry 
acquisition of most the state's development resources.” P. L. E. Idahosa, as quoted by Martin, 101. For a 
nuanced analysis of the legacy of Ujamaa both as a somewhat utopian ideology and as a practical attempt 
at economic development, see Bonny Ibhawoh and J. I. Dibua, “Deconstructing Ujamaa: The Legacy of 
Julius Nyerere in the Quest for Social and Economic Development in Africa,” African Journal of Political 
Science 8:1 (2003).
60 Julius Nyerere, “Arusha Declaration,” in Uhuru na Ujamaa, 232.
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tirelessly towards world peace and security through the United Nations Organization.”61 
Nyerere's commitment to Pan-Africanism is evidenced in his support for the Organization of 
African Unity (OAU), established in 1963. As its name suggests, the OAU was created “to 
promote the unity and solidarity of the African States” and “to eradicate all forms of 
colonialism from Africa.”62 At the organization's founding summit, Nyerere agreed to host a 
semi-autonomous OAU Liberation Committee, and personally provided the “most emphatic” 
response to its creation, insisting that “from now on our brethren in non-independent Africa 
should be helped by independent Africa....we are prepared to die a little for the final removal 
of the humiliation of colonialism from the face of Africa.”63 His words were followed with 
action. Following Ian Smith's Unilateral Declaration of Independence in November 1965, the 
OAU met in Addis Ababa and delivered an ultimatum to Britain, which was perceived as 
complacent about the threat of another “racialist minority government” in Africa.64 When 
Britain failed to take sufficient action on the issue, Tanzania (and Guinea) followed through 
ending diplomatic relations with the United Kingdom on 15 December, at a tremendous 
economic cost.65 Nyerere stressed, however, that Tanzania had no plans to leave the 
Commonwealth. While the severing of relations with Britain might cause strains within the 
Commonwealth, he insisted that his commitment to internationalism was demonstrated by 
honouring Tanzania's promises to the OAU. “If we are disloyal to the OAU,” he asked in a 
speech to Tanzania's National Assembly, “how can we be trusted to be loyal to the 
61 Ibid., 233.
62 “Charter of the Organization of African Unity” quoted in Zdenek Červenka, The Unfinished Quest for 
Unity: Africa and the OAU (London: Julian Friedmann Publishers, 1977), 12.
63 Červenka, 12.
64 Nyerere, “The Honour of Africa,” in Uhuru na Ujamaa: Freedom and Socialism, 117.
65 Ibid., 115.
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Commonwealth—or to the United Nations for that matter?”66 Nyerere's vision for Tanzania 
and Africa included a host of other ideas that would not connect so well with Indigenous 
internationalism, including his opposition to “tribalism” and his commitment to majority 
rule, but as will be seen, his concept of Ujamaa and his determined internationalism and 
solidarity would prove deeply inspirational.
1.4 Globalization
It would be negligent to examine an organization called the World Council of 
Indigenous peoples without addressing the issue of globalization, particularly when the 
organization operated during the same decades that the term became so prominent in public 
discourse. Although the relationship between globalization and the WCIP is not the explicit 
focus of this dissertation, it is a theme worth examining in some detail from the outset in 
order to understand the ways in which the organization was both part of and separate from 
the broader social trend.
Jan Aarte Scholte's detailed examination of globalization acknowledges that, even 
among the scholarly community, there are numerous and diverse definitions for the term. He 
summarizes what he sees as the five primary definitions of globalization 
(internationalization, liberalization, universalization, modernization, and the spread of 
supraterritoriality) before analyzing the usefulness of each.67 Globalization as 
internationalism suggests that the concept refers to increased cross-border relations between 
countries, particularly through economic trade and interdependence. Liberalization refers to a 
66 Ibid., 131.
67 Jan Aart Scholte, Globalization: A Critical Introduction, First Edition (Basingstoke: Mac Millan Press, 
2000), 14-17, 44-50.
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process whereby government imposed restrictions on movement (or people, products, etc.) 
are removed to create a more “open” global economy. Universalization describes a global 
“cultural synthesis” or homogenization of experience with the spread of ideas, techniques 
and products to every corner of the world. Globalization as modernization describes 
“westernization” or even “colonization,” or more specifically, the spread of rationalism, 
capitalism, industrialism and bureaucratism around the world, allegedly destroying the self-
determination of societies and states as it progresses. Finally, defining globalization as 
“deterritorialization” or the spread of “supraterritoriality” suggests that the world is 
undergoing a major reconfiguration whereby “social space is not wholly mapped in terms of 
territorial places, territorial distances and territorial borders.”68 While all of these processes 
may be occurring, Scholte insists that only the last one is a particularly useful definition, as 
the others either have synonyms, or are older, re-occurring processes not unique to the late 
twentieth century.69 According to Scholte, this “deterritorializing” globalization challenges 
the use of territorialism (“the practice of understanding the social world and conducting 
studies about it through the lens of territorial geography”) as the methodological basis of 
social research.70
When defined as the spread of supraterritoriality, globalization does not imply a 
process that has affected all people evenly. According to Scholte, “[u]niversality means being 
spread worldwide, while globality implies qualities of transworld concurrence and 
coordination... Universality says something about territorial extent, whereas globality says 
68 Ibid., 16.
69 Ibid., 50.
70 Ibid., 56.
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something about space-time relations.”71 Similarly, he makes a strong distinction between 
globality and internationality:
Whereas international relations are interterritorial relations, global 
relations are supraterritorial relations. International relations are 
cross-border exchanges over distance, while global relations are 
trans-border relations without distance... Internationality is embedded 
in territorial space; globality transcends that geography.72
Using Scholte's definition, there is certainly good reason to think that “Indigenous globalism” 
might be a better term to describe the World Council of Indigenous People than “Indigenous 
internationalism.” It was, as we will see, an organization at least theoretically open to 
membership regardless of distance or geography. Nonetheless, this dissertation will 
predominantly use the terms “international” and “internationalism” to describe the 
collaboration of Indigenous peoples around the world. The term is used in a way that is 
inclusive of activities and relationships that were not global or supraterritorial in focus or 
nature, as well as those that were. To some degree the growth of Indigenous internationalism 
is influenced by and connected to most, if not all, of the possible definitions mentioned by 
Scholte. This dissertation will question when and how Indigenous internationalism could 
accurately be described as global, in the sense of creating or using a supraterritorial space.
Scholte's examination also describes the effects of globalization on societies. Relevant 
to this study is his assertion that new supraterritorial communication technologies (as well as 
supraterritorial markets, production, and finance) have led to the creation of supraterritorial 
organizations and, to some degree, supraterritorial consciousness and solidarity.73 Although 
71 Ibid., 50.
72 Ibid., 49.
73 Ibid., 53-54.
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the World Council itself is not referenced in Scholte's work, he does address the broader 
movement of Indigenous internationalism specifically as part of a grouping he calls non-state 
“ethno-nations” (in contrast to “state-nations”). These “ethno-nations” (including “tribes”, 
“ethnic groups”, “Indigenous peoples” and “minorities”) do not challenge the principle of 
nationhood, but reproduce it in new ways.74 He asserts that globalization encouraged the 
growth or increased prominence of these “ethno-nations” in at least three ways:
1) The rise of supraterritoriality has “reduced the relative power of the state... to shape a 
nation to match its jurisdiction” which has effectively given “ethnic movements... 
more room to grow.”75
2)  Etho-nationalism has emerged partly in reaction to the increased intrusions of 
powerful new supraterritorial constituents (global companies, global financial 
markets, etc.). Scholte gives the examples of native Hawaiian reaction to increased 
global tourism, local reaction to the actions of global resource extraction 
corporations, and the North American Free Trade Agreement as the “immediate 
trigger for the Zapatista rebellion” in 1994.76
3) Finally, ethno-national movements have managed to utilize global communications 
technology and transnational forums for their own causes. He references worldwide 
74 Ibid., 167. Scholte himself references Morton Halperin, David Scheffer and Patricia Small, who briefly 
touch on issues of Indigenous peoples in one of the better comparative works on the modern movements 
for self-determination, Self-determination in the New World Order (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment 
for International Peace, 1992), as well as Franke Wilmer, The Indigenous Voice in World Politics: Since 
Time Immemorial (London: Sage Publications, 1993).
75 Scholte, 168.
76 Ibid., 168.
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meetings of Indigenous peoples, and also mentions that “air, telephone and computer 
networks” have allowed “the Navajo in America to aid the Saami in Scandinavia and 
the Cree in Canada to assist the Miskito in Central America.”77 This also includes the 
v“codification of indigenous peoples' rights in suprastate law” by the United 
Nations.78
Undoubtedly the first two effects help explain the rise of Indigenous activism, and the third 
describes (in part) what organizations like the World Council have done. This dissertation, 
however, will illustrate in a more practical sense how and explain why this third change came 
about. What motivated Indigenous groups to take action beyond their nation states, and what 
happened when they did so? Additionally, while Scholte acknowledges the creation of global 
consciousnesses and new supraterritorial identities, he provides only superficial investigation 
how this might work for “ethno-nations” deeply rooted in their territorial identities. If the 
global/local hybrid identities that he mentions are indeed occurring, the seemingly self-
contradictory term of “Indigenous internationalism” surely provides the ideal case study.
On a related note, the dissertation is quite consciously placed outside the context of 
any regional or national histories. Because the World Council's headquarters were established 
in Canada and it received a great deal of funding from the Canadian government, it certainly 
could be examined through the lens of Canadian political history. To do so, however, would 
diminish the significance (and in some cases, dominance) of Indigenous peoples from 
elsewhere in the world who participated enthusiastically in the organization. The World 
Council and the project of Indigenous internationalism was as much the product of their 
77 Ibid., 168.
78 Ibid., 168.
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national contexts as it was of the Canadian one. A study from the Canadian perspective could 
well be a valuable one, but it would ask significantly different questions than the ones raised 
in the following chapters. Perhaps more importantly, the WCIP was an international 
organization that challenged the system of nation states and sought to make political 
connections without regard for geographic location. It remains to be seen whether these goals 
made the World Council a “global” or “globalizing” organization, but to utilize a traditional 
“territorialist” approach is clearly inappropriate for such a study.
The multi-national, multi-cultural, multi-lingual nature of the organization also made 
it problematic to approach the work from the point of any one Indigenous culture at the 
expense of the others. The author has tried to use endonyms (the names used by peoples for 
themselves) and to use place names in the local Indigenous languages as much as possible, 
but the innumerable quantity of these (frequently understudied and nearly extinct) languages 
with complex and disputed orthographies makes this a difficult task.79 Any errors or 
omissions in this regard are not the result of carelessness or lack of respect.
This work is not simply concerned with international (or global) consciousness or 
communication between Indigenous people, but with the intersection between that 
communication and a specific element of the internationalism of the twentieth century, the 
international organization. Akira Iriye's Global Community (2002) charts the steady growth 
of international organizations, particularly non-governmental ones, since the late nineteenth 
century in an attempt to explain that growth and the effect it has had on modern international 
79 For the sake of consistency, I have italicized the names of all Indigenous peoples/ethnicities. except when 
used as part of an organization's name, in which case I use their own spelling. Direct quotations also 
include the spelling in the original document.
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relations. Iriye posits that the explosion of international organizations that occurred in the 
1970s was the result of the growth of international corporations and of the changing 
relationships between national governments and the societies they governed.80 To some 
degree, the creation of domestic civil societies gave birth to an international civil society that 
expanded particularly in the directions of “human rights, humanitarian relief, developmental 
assistance, environmental protection and cultural exchange.”81 As will be seen in subsequent 
chapters, the World Council of Indigenous Peoples was part of the global expansion of 
organized internationalism during the 1970s and 80s. In short, while this dissertation aims to 
examine the specific factors that led directly to the creation of Indigenous international 
organizations, it will also place their nascence in the broader context of the worldwide 
changes during the twentieth century.
1.5 Sources
As the history of the WCIP is relatively recent, I was able to rely on both archival and 
oral sources for my research. In terms of the former, the WCIP fonds at Library and Archives 
Canada (LAC) in Ottawa have been incredibly helpful. The organization's records were 
actually thrown out and almost literally ended up in the “ash heap of history”, before being 
recovered from a furnace room and eventually given a home at LAC.82 The fonds contain 53 
boxes of documents. Some of these documents were particularly useful to research (like 
meeting minutes and annual reports) but much of the documentation was less useful, such as 
announcements and promotional material sent to the WCIP by its member organizations, or 
80 Akira Iriye, Global Community: The Role of International Organizations in the Making of the 
Contemporary World (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 2002), 129-130.
81 Ibid., 134.
82 The task of reorganizing the documents for the fonds was completed by Zuzanka Kutena of Australia. 
Wayne Kines, personal interview, 28 October 2013; 
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invitations and programs for meetings attended by WCIP delegates but not organized by the 
organization itself. The greatest limitation of the fonds, however, is their temporal focus; they 
are overwhelmingly weighted toward the second decade of the World Council's life. World 
Council documents dated before 1980 are particularly rare within the fonds. If WCIP 
documents from that era still exist, it seems likely that they would have been kept by 
Canada's Assembly of First Nations (formerly the National Indian Brotherhood, NIB), as 
George Manuel was head of both organizations at that time. Through personal 
correspondence with the Assembly of First Nations, I learned that much of the NIB 
documentation had been microfilmed and placed in a resource centre. Unfortunately, when 
that resource centre was closed over a decade ago, all the material was hurriedly packed into 
boxes and placed in long-term storage without an inventory.83 It remains inaccessible to 
researchers.
Small amounts of information about the earlier period were accessible from a variety 
of other sources. Library and Archives Canada also provided access to certain files from the 
Canadian Department of External Affairs related to the WCIP. The Resource Centre of the 
Union of BC Indian Chiefs (UBCIC) also houses a number of key documents and access to 
Nesika (a short-lived UBCIC newsletter) through its online database of Indigenous news 
sources was occasionally quite helpful. The United Nations Archives in New York also hosts 
a small number of relevant documents related to the WCIP. Although the Norwegian National 
Archives in Oslo does not house documents useful to this research, its branch, the Sámi 
Archives in Kautokeino/Guovdageaidnu, contained a decent collection related to the Sami 
83 Dennis Borynec (Assembly of First Nations), personal correspondence, 9 February 2012.
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Council's participation in World Council business. Additionally, the Norwegian Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs and the Norwegian Agency for Development both have in-house archives 
that document their respective relationships with the WCIP, particularly during the 1980s. 
The University of New Mexico's Center for Southwest Research and Special Collections 
houses a significant collection of documents related to the International Indian Treaty 
Council that was also important to this study.
In terms of media coverage, the Southern Alberta Newspaper Collection at the 
University of Lethbridge hosts a digitized collection of Kainai News, a newspaper from the 
nearby Kainai Nation. Together with the Lethbridge Herald, it gave frequent coverage to the 
World Council, especially while the organization was based in Lethbridge. Larger American 
and Canadian newspapers also occasionally covered the WCIP. The newsletters of the 
International Work Group for Indigenous Affairs were also a good source of external (if not 
entirely neutral) information on the World Council. Back issues of the Federation of 
Saskatchewan Indian Nations' Saskatchewan Indian are archived online by the Saskatchewan 
Indian Cultural Centre.
Published autobiographies, including Roxanne Dunbar-Ortiz's Blood on the Border 
and Clem Chartier's Witness to Resistance, were an important source for my research into 
Indigenous internationalism during the Miskitu/Sandinista conflict.84 Peter McFarlane's 
biography of George Manuel, Brotherhood to Nationhood, was a particularly helpful 
introduction to the creation of the World Council.85 Manuel's daughter, Doreen Manuel, was 
84 Roxanne Dunbar-Ortiz, Blood on the Border: a Memoir of the Contra War (Cambridge, MA.: South End, 
2005); Clem Chartier, Witness to resistance: Under Fire in Nicaragua (Ottawa: Baico Pub., 2010).
85 Peter McFarlane, Brotherhood to Nationhood: George Manuel and the Making of the Modern Indian 
Movement, (Toronto: Between the Lines, 1993).
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kind enough to allow me access to eleven years of her father's unpublished diaries. With few 
omissions, he kept a daily record of his work for the National Indian Brotherhood, the World 
Council of Indigenous Peoples, and the Union of B.C. Indian Chiefs. The diaries provided 
insight into his inspiration and ideas more than any published report ever would, and perhaps 
even more than a personal interview would, if Manuel were still alive. They were, at times, 
emotionally difficult to read as he discussed the successes and challenges of the movement 
and his personal life. Nonetheless, this study is enormously richer because of their inclusion. 
Unfortunately, Manuel's diary from 1981 was missing when I accessed the others. It was 
unclear if it has been lost, simply misplaced, or never existed at all.
Finally, I undertook numerous personal interviews which provided essential 
information to understand the ideas behind Indigenous internationalism, the work of 
Indigenous international organizations, and the effect that work had on those involved. I 
interviewed twenty-one individuals in total, some of them multiple times. Three of these 
interviewees answered exclusively via email, but I spoke to the remaining eighteen either by 
telephone or, when possible, in person. While interviews varied in length, the fourteen 
interviewees that agreed to be recorded provided me with twenty-one hours of digital 
recorded interviews.86 Some of the information recorded, including some entire interviews, 
went beyond the scope of this dissertation and were therefore not included. There are, 
nevertheless, some notable gaps among the list of interviewees. Most regrettably, and despite 
my best efforts, I was unable to make contact with any Indigenous members of the World 
Council's executive council from Central or South America. When I could find contact 
86 Unfortunately, some of these interviews, while fascinating, concerned events that, for reasons of scope, 
could not be included in this dissertation. 
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information, my attempts to arrange interviews received no response. Although this does 
limit my understanding of their involvement, I hope my interviews with WCIP Secretariat 
staff (Indigenous and non-Indigenous) from both Central and South America have at least 
helped to fill this lacuna. There are other important testimonies that are also missing. Aslak 
Nils Sara represented the Sámi on the WCIP executive for most of the organization's 
existence, and was therefore the longest serving executive council member by quite a margin. 
Unfortunately, his death in 1996 made this impossible, so I have relied on interviews with 
other prominent members of the Sami Council, including Ole Henrik Magga and Leif 
Halonen. While I managed to contact Jimmie Durham (whom Roxanne Dunbar-Ortiz credits 
with the idea of the International Indian Treaty Council), he was unwilling to be interviewed 
for this study, as were other key members like Paul Chaat Smith and Bill Means. Luckily, 
Durham had given a number of other published interviews that touched on his experiences 
with the Treaty Council, and he also published collections that include his writing from that 
time, which gave me a better picture of his vision of the organization.87 Nonetheless, I was 
not able to undertake an extensive comparison between the World Council and the Treaty 
Council throughout the dissertation. I also tried unsuccessfully to arrange interviews with 
numerous other prominent people mentioned in the dissertation in connection with the World 
Council, such as Jacob Marule, Douglas Sanders, Irja Seurujärvi-Kari, and Leif Dunfjeld.
87 Durham's published writing collections include A Certain Lack of Coherence: Writings on Art and Cultural  
Politics (London: Kala Press, 1993) and Columbus Day: Poems, Drawings and Stories about American 
Indian Life and Death in the Nineteen-Seventies (West End Press, 1983). Interviews with him are included 
in Indian Summer in Geneva: Indigenous peoples of the Americas at the United Nations, Kisos Films 1986; 
Rhonda Meier, “Re-Membering the Colonial Present: Jimmie Durham's Serious Dance” (MA Thesis, 
Concordia University, 1999); Nikos Papastergiadis and Laura Turney, On Becoming Authentic: Interview 
with Jimmie Durham, Prickly Pear Pamphlet No.10 (Cambridge: Prickly Pear Press, 1996); Lucy R. 
Lippard, “Jimmie Durham: Postmodernist 'Savage,'”Art in America, 84:2 (Feb 1993)
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1.6 Chapter Summary
The body of this dissertation is broken up into seven chapters, all interconnected and 
ordered chronologically, but each also distinct in its focus. Chapter Two examines the 
prehistory of the WCIP and the IITC, and specifically, how the ideas to create these 
organizations were first formed in the minds of their founders. It charts the direct and indirect 
influence of anti-colonialism on Marie Smallface-Marule, George Manuel, and Jimmie 
Durham, and how these two organizations took Indigenous internationalism in very different 
directions.
Chapter Three examines the first preparatory meeting in Georgetown, Guyana in 
1974, a year before the first World Conference of Indigenous Peoples. It provides personal 
background for many of the World Council's key players and member organizations, and 
examines the social context which they share, to explain their similar motivations for 
overcoming isolation and forming an Indigenous international organization. The chapter 
argues that the working definition of “Indigenous” that they chose suggests a strong 
connection between their vision for Indigenous decolonization and Third-Worldist 
conceptions of decolonization. At the same time, the proposals they made for the future 
structure of the future World Council demonstrate the ways their anti-colonialism was quite 
different than that of the Third World.
Chapter Four traces the various sources of funding for the World Council and the 
effect these donors had on the organization's activities. As funding sources shifted from 
religious groups and foreign affairs departments towards those focused on International 
development, there was some pressure to adopt a greater focus on economic development at 
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the expense of earlier demands for decolonization and Indigenous sovereignty. The chapter 
examines the degree to which the World Council was able to resist this pressure, and the 
effect it had on the organization and its members.
Chapter Five looks at the case of Niillas Somby, a Sámi activist who sought asylum 
with North American Indigenous groups in the 1980s. While he crossed the Atlantic for his 
own personal reasons, Somby ended up assisting his hosts in their fight to assert sovereignty 
from the Canadian government. Although Somby did receive substantial (if unofficial) 
support from members of the World Council, this chapter focuses less on the organization 
itself, and more on the personal effects of the broader movement of Indigenous 
internationalism.
Chapter Six looks at WCIP and IITC involvement with the conflict between the 
Miskitu people and Nicaragua's Sandinista government during that country's Contra War of 
the 1980s. International Indigenous involvement created serious political fractures in both 
organizations. The investigation highlights the challenges of “neutral” international advocacy 
during the Cold War, and emphasizes the ways in which competing forces of imperialism 
continue to make Indigenous solidarity a problematic exercise.
Finally, Chapter Seven offers some insight into the collapse of the World Council in 
1997, and surveys where the movement of Indigenous internationalism went thereafter. It 
also connects the themes and ideas discussed in the dissertation, and makes suggestions for 
further research.
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Chapter 2 
Another Wave of Anti-Colonialism: 
The Origins of Indigenous Internationalism
The pressures on imperial powers to release their colonies to independence intensified 
during the first half of the twentieth century – so much so that most territories and peoples 
annexed into empires at the turn of the century would come to be ruled locally by the peoples 
indigenous to those lands by the 1960s. To examine an animated map of decolonizing Africa 
is to see a vast wave of changing colours across the continent.1 That wave of decolonization, 
however, continued on after surging through Africa. It changed shape and affected a far 
greater number and range of peoples than most early anti-colonial activists had imagined. It 
flowed over the legislative breakwaters that governments consciously included in United 
Nations resolutions to block its reach. Peoples who had been subject to processes of 
colonization (sometimes similar, sometimes quite different), but who, for a variety of 
reasons, fell outside the accepted definitions of “colonized peoples” came to identify with 
each other and recognized the similarities between their situations and those of decolonizing 
nations in Africa and Asia. This chapter will investigate how that first wave of decolonization 
informed and inspired (and to a lesser degree, directly aided) a subsequent wave of 
decolonization: Indigenous internationalism.
Undoubtedly, the struggles of “capital-i” Indigenous peoples, whether for basic 
human rights or for sovereignty, began long before the process of decolonization in Africa 
1 Nancy Jacobs and Rolando Peñate, “Animated Atlas of African History” 
<http://brown.edu/Research/AAAH/>, 8 February 2008.
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and Asia. The historical relationships between forces of colonization and Indigenous peoples 
around the world are unsurprisingly varied, but they all include some elements of resistance 
sustained over time. Given the definition that Indigenous peoples have maintained their own 
separate identity from colonizing people, some degree of continued resistance to assimilation 
is inherent to what makes a people Indigenous. The second wave of decolonization did not 
grow from silent, still water, but merely helped change the shape and pitch of resistance by 
combining, for the first time, the efforts of many otherwise unconnected peoples into one.
While most of this dissertation focuses on the history of an organization called the 
World Council of Indigenous Peoples (WCIP), this chapter will offer a comparison of its 
origins with those of another organization, the International Indian Treaty Council (IITC). 
While both groups were inspired by and in some cases directly aided by Third-Worldism (the 
broad international movement of Cold-War-era anti-colonial activism), the leadership of each 
group took ideas about international cooperation, national sovereignty and the importance of 
culture to national self-development, and applied them in new ways. Thus, Indigenous 
Internationalism was not a linear continuation of mid-20th century decolonization in a 
different setting, but a redirection adapted to suit different peoples. The leaders of this new 
wave of decolonization were sometimes wary, sometimes critical of their predecessors.
2.1 Third-Worldism and the World Council of Indigenous Peoples
Officially, the story of the World Council of Indigenous Peoples begins on the 
Tseshaht reservation on Vancouver Island, at the head of the 40-kilometre-long Alberni inlet, 
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near the town of Port Alberni, British Columbia, Canada. This small, rather isolated 
community typifies both the political and the more basic geographic meanings of the word 
indigenous. The Tseshaht Reservation is a community set aside by the Canadian government 
for a people who predate the European colonization of North America. The “aht” in the Nuu-
chah-nulth language means “people” and the “Tsesha” (or “Ċišaa”) refers to a nearby island, 
the reputed place of origin of the Tseshaht – they could hardly be more indigenous to the land 
on which they live.2 Yet in October 1975, Indigenous delegates from 19 different countries 
and four different continents travelled to this same community where they met and founded 
the WCIP.3
The meeting took over a year of preparation by a smaller group of organizers with 
support from other existing Indigenous organizations, but the idea of an international 
conference of Indigenous peoples began in the mind of George Manuel. Manuel was a 
Secwepemc man from the Neskonlith Indian Band, a government-registered “status” Indian 
in Canada, and in 1975, the head of Canada's National Indian Brotherhood (NIB)4. The NIB 
(which became the Assembly of First Nations in 1985) was still in its infancy, having been 
formed just a few years before Manuel was elected its national chief in 1970, yet during his 
2 “We are Tseshaht,” <http://www.tseshaht.com/history-culture/history>; Professor Jeff Corntassel of the 
Indigenous Governance Program at the University of Victoria is currently conducting an extensive oral 
history project, “An Oral History of the World Council of Indigenous Peoples,” investigating the impact of 
the 1975 World Conference of Indigenous Peoples on the people of Tseshaht. 
<http://web.uvic.ca/igov/index.php/oral-history-project>
3 The meeting itself took place in Maht Mahs, the local gymnasium, formerly part of the local Indian 
Residential School, which had only recently been handed over to the control of Tseshaht First Nation. 
Douglas E. Sanders, The Formation of the World Council of Indigenous Peoples (Copenhagen: 
International Work Group for Indigenous Affairs, 1977), 14. Ha-Shilth-Sa (newspaper), 4 December 1975. 
Jeff Corntassel, Chaw-win-is, and T’lakwadzi, “Indigenous Storytelling, Truth-telling, and Community 
Approaches to Reconciliation,” English Studies in Canada 35:1 (March 2009), 143.
4 Peter McFarlane's biography of Manuel gives an excellent account of his life. Brotherhood to Nationhood: 
George Manuel and the Making of the Modern Indian Movement (Toronto: Between the Lines, 1993).
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six years leading the organization, it increased in both prestige and power. George Manuel's 
growing awareness of the similarities in the situations of Indigenous peoples living in Canada 
with those living outside North America was sparked, in part, by a trip to the South Pacific. 
On the suggestion of Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau, Okanagan Liberal MP Len Marchand 
and Minister of Indian Affairs and Northern Development, Jean Chrétien, organized a tour of 
New Zealand, essentially to compare that country's policies for Māori people with Canada's 
Indian policy. As head of the NIB, Manuel was invited to join the delegation.5
The group left for New Zealand in March 1971, and Manuel experienced a trip that 
included both frustrating encounters with New Zealand's politicians and exciting, eye-
opening interactions with the Indigenous people living there in all-too-familiar 
circumstances.6 The countries' aboriginal policies did differ. New Zealand's parliament had 
four seats permanently set aside for Māori MPs, while in Canada, Marchand was the first 
Indigenous federal politician elected in the 20th century (his only predecessor, Louis Riel, had 
been hanged for treason in 1885). But George Manuel was struck by the great similarities in 
the social positions of peoples so far from each other geographically, yet who had 
experienced similar histories of colonialism. In a later report, he noted that a similar value-
system was being imposed by the state in both countries, and that the “psychological effects 
of this show up especially in the school system. Although the [Māori] drop-out rate is not as 
high as our 94%, it still shows that the present school curricula is destructive to a very great 
degree.”7 The parallels he saw between the Australian government's aboriginal policies (that 
country being the second destination in the tour) and his own seem to have strengthened one 
5 McFarlane, 156.
6 Ibid., 158.
7 Whitehorse Star, 27 May 1971.
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idea in his mind: the historic and ongoing experience of the British empire was something 
fundamental that these peoples shared with Indigenous peoples in Canada. “Just as much as 
the Maoris and the Aborigines,” he reported, “the Indian people in Canada are dark people in 
a White Commonwealth.”8
Yet it was the formal link of Commonwealth which had not only facilitated the tour, 
but perhaps made Manuel's mind more open to look for these social connections between 
Indigenous peoples. Sam Deloria, a member of the Standing Rock Sioux Tribe who served as 
the first Secretary General of the World Council of Indigenous Peoples, emphasizes this link 
as fundamental to basis of the WCIP, and something Indigenous activists from the United 
States, like himself, could not offer:
I think the historical perspective differences between the Canadian 
view and the British Commonwealth view, and our [American] view 
were what made the difference. I hate to speak up for the solidarity of 
a relic of the colonial era <laughs> but I think it's absolutely true. (...) 
His ability to reach out to the Spanish speaking nations was 
considerably reduced, not only because he didn't speak Spanish but 
because they didn't have that sense of family, and he sure as hell did 
with respect to the British Commonwealth.9
Thus, in the very same year that Britain lost control over the last three of its former 
territories in the Middle East (Qatar, Bahrain, and the Trucial Sheikhdoms), the Indigenous 
peoples in the Commonwealth's three remaining “White Dominions” may have first 
8 Report on the New Zealand and Australia tour by George Manuel, 1971, p15, quoted in McFarlane, 159. 
For a broader comparison of the respective policies of the countries Manuel visited, see Andrew Armitage, 
Comparing the Policy of Aboriginal Assimilation: Australia, Canada and New Zealand (Vancouver: UBC 
Press, 1995). The overlap between New Zealand and Canadian colonial policy was sometimes quite 
apparent; the Douglas Treaties, some of the few signed in George Manuel's home province of British 
Columbia, were based on land conveyance forms used by the New Zealand Company to purchase Māori 
lands. Hamar Foster, “The Saanichton Bay Marina Case: Imperial Law, Colonial History and Competing 
Theories of Aboriginal Title,” University of British Columbia Law Review 23:3 (1989), 629-236.
9 Sam Deloria, personal interview, 23 March 2012.
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considered working together in opposition to the perceived continuation of colonialism. What 
is perhaps more surprising in Manuel's report, however, is that feelings of solidarity already 
extended beyond Australia, New Zealand and Canada, or even the United States: “We share 
with the Maori and Aborigine, and I suspect also with many different African peoples, not 
only this common struggle but also the very real progress we have made in the past 
decade.”10 To explain what George Manuel believed Indigenous people in Canada shared 
with African peoples, and why this was on his mind at all in 1971, I turn to his (then recently 
hired) assistant, Marie Smallface-Marule.
2.1.1 Smallface-Marule and the Influence of African-Socialism
Raised on the Kainai Reserve in southern Alberta, Marie Smallface became active in 
Canadian Indigenous politics while studying sociology and anthropology at the University of 
Alberta in Edmonton from 1962-1966.11 She participated in the National Indian Council (a 
culturally-focused predecessor of the National Indian Brotherhood), and competed in its 1964 
Princess Pageant as the princess for Alberta. She became involved with the Canadian Indian 
Youth Council (1965) along with Cree leader Harold Cardinal, who would be elected as its 
president in 1966.12 She was active at the local Native Friendship Centre in Edmonton, and 
with the Indian Association of Alberta. While attending university, however, Smallface also 
joined a social group called “Club International” which had many members from the wide 
10 McFarlane, 160. My emphasis.
11 Marie Smallface-Marule, personal interview, 26 May 2011; Winnipeg Free Press, 9 Nov. 1971.
12 Marie Smallface-Marule, personal interview, 26 May 2011; Regina Leader Post, 13 Oct. 1966.
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array of international students at the University of Alberta.13 Club International held 
internationally themed dinners and hosted a variety of speakers, but most notably, it gave 
Canadian students the opportunity to meet other students from around the world. Smallface 
became friends with a number of African graduate students and became quite interested in 
the politics of decolonization. It was the University's Dean of Women, Mary Saretta Sparling, 
however, who first suggested that she join Canadian University Service Overseas (CUSO) to 
do work in Africa.14
Smallface began her first term with CUSO in 1966, working at a girl's camp in 
Zambia's Northern Province, near Lake Tanganyika, but later moved south to the capital, 
Lusaka. There she worked with an Indian official, evaluating Zambia's UNESCO-sponsored 
literacy program. At the time, Lusaka was a major centre for anti-colonial activism in 
Africa.15 Independent Zambia's first leader, President Kenneth Kaunda, adopted a philosophy 
of “African Socialism” (similar to that of Julius Nyerere in Tanzania, Zambia's north-eastern 
neighbour) and maintained an outward looking policy which supported decolonization and 
African liberation. Having gained independence in 1964, Zambia remained nearly 
surrounded by Africa's remaining colonial and Apartheid strongholds: Angola, Rhodesia, 
Mozambique, and South West Africa. While hesitant to allow foreign combatants inside the 
country (fearing an invasion by the White-supremacist regimes in Rhodesia and South 
Africa), Kaunda allowed a variety of anti-colonial organizations to base their headquarters 
13 Marie Smallface's social circle also contained members of Students for a Democratic Society, but the Club 
International became more important to her personally. Marie Smallface-Marule, personal interview, 26 
May 2011.
14 While a Nigerian friend from Club International suggested she try to find a placement in his country, this 
proved difficult or impossible, perhaps because of the 1966 military coup and the lead-up to the Nigerian 
Civil War. Marie Smallface-Marule, personal interview, 26 May 2011.
15 Marie Smallface-Marule, personal interview, 26 May 2011.
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out of Zambia and even set up a “Liberation Center” for their work in the Kamwala area of 
Lusaka.16 When Marie Smallface arrived in Lusaka, the city (and particularly the expatriate 
community) was filled with anti-colonial excitement. She made contacts with numerous 
activists and eventually married Jacob Marule, a member of South Africa's African National 
Congress who was working out of Lusaka.17 Moreover, Zambia's solidarity with foreign 
African liberation movements demonstrated the ability of those with some degree of power 
and independence to aid those with less. The country was also a prominent member of the 
international anti-colonial Non-Aligned Movement; Lusaka hosted the third Non-Aligned 
Movement conference in 1970, at which Kaunda was elected the organization's chairperson.18 
These policies may well have influenced Smallface-Marule's later expectations about the 
responsibilities of Indigenous peoples in wealthy countries with regards to their allies around 
the world in more desperate situations.
While abroad, she travelled to Tanzania and became particularly intrigued by 
Nyerere's ideas of “African Socialism.”
He accepted the fact of the communalism of most of their tribal 
nations. (...) He believed that you couldn't bring in Marxism to such 
nations of people, that you had to base their development on their 
own language, their own culture, their own heritage. That's where you 
develop... from there. To use their natural cooperation tendency to 
bring about change (...) building from the communities upwards as 
opposed to imposing...19
16 John Hatch, Two African Statesmen: Kaunda of Zambia and Nyerere of Tanzania (London: Secker & 
Warburg Ltd., 1976), 228-9; Andy DeRoche, “KK, the Godfather, and the Duke: Maintaining Positive 
Relations between Zambia and the USA in Spite of Nixon's Other Priorities,” Safundi: The Journal of 
South African and American Studies, 12:1 (January 2011), 97-121.
17 Marie Smallface-Marule, personal interview, 26 May 2011.
18 Hatch, 231.
19 Marie Smallface-Marule, personal interview, 26 May 2011.
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For Smallface-Marule, this respect for culture and tradition while pursuing decolonization 
held great promise for her own people as well, and she would soon help convince George 
Manuel of the importance of an equivalent Indigenous philosophy to guide his politics.
After two terms with CUSO and four years in Africa, Marie Smallface-Marule 
returned to Canada in the fall of 1970, while Jacob Marule spent time at the agricultural 
centre in Kentville, Nova Scotia. With a recommendation from Harold Cardinal, George 
Manuel agreed to hire Smallface-Marule to the small staff of the National Indian 
Brotherhood in Ottawa.20 She had the academic background that Manuel lacked, and held 
strong political ideals. They got along well; he would soon consider her “the backbone of the 
NIB”21 and, within a few years, his “closest political colleague.”22 In the acknowledgements 
to his Indigenous political manifesto, he specifically credits her as “the first person to be able 
to show me, from direct and personal experience, the close relationship and common bonds 
between our own condition as Indian people, and the struggles of other aboriginal peoples 
and the nations of the Third World.”23
Smallface-Marule also had acquired a number of contacts through CUSO, through her 
time in Africa, and through her husband, all of whom would continue to influence the 
political direction of her friend and employer, George Manuel. The Marules hosted regular 
parties at their home and invited Marie's co-workers as well as various guests from around 
the world, particularly African diplomats and students. Manuel mentions these parties in his 
20 Officially, Smallface-Marule was hired on as a secretary (in January 1971) since that was the only position 
for which the NIB had funding, but by April 1971, she was the Brotherhood's Executive Director. 
McFarlane, 129
21 George Manuel Diaries (hereafter GMD), 10 April 1972.
22 GMD, 1 February 1976.
23 George Manuel and Michael Posluns, The Fourth World: An Indian Reality (Don Mills, Ont.: Collier-
Macmillan, 1974), xv
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1971 diary, and although he does not explicitly state their effect on his political thinking, 
their growing influence is quite clear. In Manuel's report to the NIB General Assembly in 
July 1971, he makes references to African demands for Uhuru (freedom).24 For Manuel, 
African demands for decolonization now seemed relevant to his demands for Indigenous 
rights in Canada. Smallface-Marule (and the friends Manuel made through her) had begun to 
re-frame his political philosophy from the perspective of the blossoming “Third-Worldist” 
movement of the time. It may have been George Manuel's meeting with Māori activists that 
made him first consider the possibility of an Indigenous international organization, but it was 
Mbuto Milando, the Executive Secretary of the Tanzanian High Commission and a good 
friend of the Marules, who would suggest an appropriate context: the links of solidarity 
between Indigenous peoples could best be described as the “Fourth World.”25
The forging of these ideological connections only intensified after George Manuel's 
next international trip: in early December, he found himself with his assistant Ron 
Shackleton on a flight to Dar Es Salaam, Tanzania. Jean Chretien, Minister of Indian Affairs 
and Northern Development, had initially been invited as Canada's delegate to the tenth 
anniversary of Tanganyikan independence, but Smallface-Marule had worked her contacts in 
the High Commission to secure an extra place for Manuel.26 Chretien was forced to back out 
for unrelated reasons, leaving Manuel and Shackleton as Canada's sole official delegates, 
earning them VIP treatment in Dar Es Salaam. Like other guests, they were provided with a 
24 McFarlane, 134-135.
25 Manuel and Posluns, xvi. McFarlane, 160.
26 McFarlane, 108-119, 161. Chretien and Manuel had recently faced off over the former's controversial 1969 
White Paper which aimed to eliminate any special status for Indigenous people in Canada. Manuel had 
helped form the Union of British Columbia Indian Chiefs in response to the proposals, which were 
discarded in the face of strong opposition. Tanganyika, having achieved independence in 1961, united with 
Zanzibar to form Tanzania in 1974.
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show of Tanzanian developments since independence: exhibits on manufacturing, agriculture, 
and livestock; a “school display of gymnastics at the Dar Es Salaam National Stadium” 
featuring thousands of Tanzanian children; and an impressive military parade.27 They were 
invited to a presidential reception, where they first saw President Julius Nyerere as well as 
Zambia's President Kenneth Kaunda, and another reception hosted by local members of 
CUSO. Smallface-Marule believes that the “whole experience also cemented our friendship 
because [Manuel] realized all the things I'd said about my experiences there and my interests 
in Nyerere and his philosophies. His African socialist thoughts were something I held very 
dearly and George became very interested in that as well.”28 He would later acknowledge that 
he “did not really appreciate the identification between our [Indigenous] situation and that of 
the Third World Peoples... until I went to Tanzania.”29 On December 11, Manuel had a 
personal meeting with President Nyerere at his Presidential Palace in Oyster Bay, where he
...[i]nformed him that the Indians of Canada subscribe to the 1957 
statement of Nkrumah that Ghana's independence is incomplete until 
all of Africa is free and Nyerere['s] statement that Africans are not 
Europeans, cannot be Europeans, and do not want to be Europeans.30
The logic behind Manuel's choice of quotes to reference in his brief meeting is 
unmistakeable. Firstly, these were philosophies of African anti-colonialism, as expressed by 
two of its most formidable spokesmen, Ghanaian President Kwame Nkrumah and Tanzanian 
President Julius Nyerere.31 Secondly, however, Manuel must have felt these were the anti-
27 GMD, 7-9 December 1971.
28 Marie Smallface-Marule, personal interview, 26 May 2011.
29 Manuel and Posluns, 244. Manuel points out that his children had repeatedly tried to draw that connection 
for him, suggesting that a younger generation was perhaps more open to such a comparison.
30 GMD, 11 December 1971.
31 Under Kwame Nkrumah's leadership, the Gold Coast to be the first African colony to gain independence 
(as Ghana). He promoted not just Pan-African cooperation, but favoured the immediate liberation and 
union of all African states. Julius Nyerere helped lead Tanganyika to independence, and was also a staunch 
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colonial ideas which applied most directly to Indigenous peoples around the world. Like 
Africans, all Indigenous peoples had an obligation to help each other secure the self-
determination of their Indigenous brothers and sisters. Like Africans, Indigenous peoples 
rejected the assimilationist policies imposed upon them by colonial governments. That 
Nkrumah was referring to the obligation of the formally independent to aid others seeking 
such independence (a situation quite different from that of Indigenous peoples), and that 
Nyerere was referring to a non-alignment and alternative economic models rather than to a 
conscious rejection of cultural assimilation, is beside the point. Manuel had taken their ideas 
of decolonization and Third-Worldism and reformulated them into his own vision: a second 
wave of decolonization and the Fourth World.
George Manuel's visit made the front page of the national daily newspaper, The 
Standard, and the article makes his desires quite explicit. He asserts that the “the objectives 
of his movement are akin to those of Tanzania” and that a “reason for our visit is to consult 
with other members of the Third World and to learn from whatever they are doing to solve 
their problems.”32 Upon his return to Canada, Manuel spent time reading Nyerere's book, 
Uhuru Na Ujamaa (Freedom and Socialism), and commented in his diary that it “is very 
enlightening and I am getting many good ideas from it. They have identical problems as 
Indians.”33 His positive impression of Nyerere seems to have held firmly in his mind for quite 
Pan-Africanist, supporting liberation movements throughout Africa. His philosophy of “Ujamaa” 
attempted to create a new theory of socialism based in the communal practices he saw in the traditional 
societies of Africa. For brief biographies of both men, see Hakim Adi and Marika Sherwood, Pan-African 
History Political Figures from Africa and the Diaspora since 1787 (New York: Routledge, 2003).
32 “Canada Red Indians seek ties with us”, The Standard, 13 December 1971. McFarlane details the political 
fallout for Canada resulting from this interview and Manuel's other negative comments about the Canadian 
government while in Tanzania. McFarlane, 163-4.
33 GMD, 5 January 1972
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some time. Manuel's comments, following a family trip to the local drive-in cinema the 
following April, demonstrate both the personal relevance of his trip to Tanzania, and his 
ability to weave together different stories in his mind which could inform and inspire his 
political efforts:
I am very restless these days. So much is going through my mind. 
The show I seen [sic] last night “The Ten Commandments” at the 
Britannia Drive-In Theatre in Ottawa. The story of the show 
described how Moses freed his people the Hebrews from the 
Egyptian bondage. The story described the deep belief he had that no 
man should be a slave or servant to another, no matter what color of 
skin he had as long as he is a human being. It brought memories back 
of my visit in Tanzania, East Africa with President Julius Nyerere and 
his philosophy that no man should be subjected by another no matter 
for what purpose. It also reminded me of how the white race has 
subjected the Indians of North America and all the people of the 
world to slavery and oppression. We are fighting back and will 
continue.34
Rodrigo Contreras, who would later work with the WCIP, remembers George Manuel's 
lasting impression of the visit. Manuel's inspiration by and keen affinity for Nyerere 
contrasted with his disappointment with other leaders in Africa.35 This is confirmed in 
Manuel's diary entries—as late as 1975, he writes:
34 GMD, 8-9 April 1972. In his book on the Third World, Vijay Prashad notes the strong influence that Julius 
Nyerere had on George Manuel, but points out that the influence was not so strong in reverse: “Nyerere's 
consideration for this Canadian Native leader did not extend to the Barabaig, a cattle-herding clan of the 
Datoga community, who moved across Tanzania at will. In 1968 Nyerere's regime removed the Barabaig 
from their homelands. It was the kind of displacement that had become commonplace in the South, and it 
is precisely what had spurred the independent political organizing among those who would seize on the 
category of the indigenous, join the WCIP, and work through the channels opened up by the UN.” Vijay 
Prashad, The Poorer Nations: A Possible History of the Global South (London: Verso, 2012), 124.
35 Rodrigo Contreras, personal interview, 3 June 2010.
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I went to Carleton University. I lectured political science students 
from Trinidad West Indies on my political observations of the Third 
World liberation freedom fighters who have become nationalist 
bourgeoisie in their respective countries, excepting Julius Nyerere 
[of] Tanzania. I had some of the students up in arms, but I held my 
own with no problem.36
Nearly a decade after his trip to Africa, George Manuel had maintained his faith in Nyerere
 and gave a 20-day tour of British Columbia's Indigenous peoples to Anthony Hokororo, 
Acting High Commissioner of Tanzania in March 1982. In a diary entry recorded on that trip, 
he muses, 
The Indians of BC and the Tanzanian people have a common history 
of being colonized by the English. Our experience of being exploited, 
deprived, leaves the scars of poverty. Our common struggle for 
freedom from poverty for a common purpose is the idea of exchange 
of our people.37
George Manuel's growing friendship with Marie Smallface-Marule and her husband 
Jacob also seems to have provided an ongoing reminder of the links between African anti-
colonialism and Indigenous peoples' struggle. This connection was expressed implicitly in his 
diary the day after a party at the Marules' home in March 1972. Manuel records reading 
about the African National Congress and describing the “waning political strength of 
Imperialism due to the committed resistance of anti-imperialists all over the world, including 
North American Indians, as part of the oppressed race by Imperialist philosophy and 
principal.”38
36 GMD, 30 June 1976.
37 GMD, 2-21 March 1972.
38 GMD, 19 March 1972.
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2.1.2 International Support for a Growing Network of Indigenous Peoples
George Manuel's links with the international community grew enormously during his 
trip to Sweden for the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment in June 1972, 
where he served as an adviser to the Canadian Government delegation.39 Smallface-Marule 
had secured Manuel's invitation through James MacDonald, head of the Canadian Labour 
Congress. Manuel attended partly out of concern that environmental destruction was “a threat 
to the very existence of the culture and way of life” of Indigenous peoples, but also to 
promote Indigenous rights in Europe and with all members of the United Nations.40 After 
arriving in Stockholm, Manuel learned that there were “a number of Indians from both 
Canada and the United States but [they] are not organized together. They are here 
individually presenting their local problems to an international conference.”41 He managed to 
meet with some Hopi delegates from Oraibi, Arizona, but was disappointed in his failure to 
co-ordinate the “Indian program” with the American Indians attending the conference.42 He 
did, however, make other contacts.
Jacob Marule, who was also in Stockholm, arranged two meetings for Manuel at local 
embassies. First, he met Tanzanian Michael Lukumbuzya (who was then serving as 
Ambassador to Sweden but would soon become the High Commissioner to Canada) and 
39 Owing partly to a boycott of the UNCHE Stockholm Conference by the Soviet bloc, leaders of “Third 
World” governments took a particularly prominent role, contesting Western critiques of industrial 
development as environmentally damaging. Adil Najam, “Developing Countries and Global Environmental 
Governance: From Contestation to Participation to Engagement,” International Environmental 
Agreements: Politics, Law and Economics 5:3 (2005), 307-309. Manuel not only attended Indian Prime 
Minister Indira Gandhi's speech which claimed that “poverty is the worst form of pollution,” but also 
witnessed the “extreme heated debate” and the clear lines of conflict, nothing that “Third World” delegates 
“appear to be the only ones pushing for and debating for amendments.” Unfortunately, his thoughts on the 
content of the debate were not recorded in his diary. GMD, 8 & 14 June 1972.
40 McFarlane, 166.
41 GMD, 4 June 1972.
42 GMD, 6 & 10 June 1972.
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discussed “the political development of the third world.”43 Manuel also visited the Chinese 
Embassy, and talked about a possible NIB Executive Council tour of the People's Republic of 
China.44 Certainly, his interest in Third-Worldism and the leaders of the Non-Aligned 
Movement remained strong, but it was a surprising alliance with locals that may have helped 
broaden his understanding of the word “Indigenous.” A Copenhagen-based organization of 
anthropologists, the International Work Group for Indigenous Affairs (IWGIA), together with 
a Swedish journalist helped organize a meeting between Manuel and some Sámi people in 
Northern Sweden. A seven-seat propeller plane took him 1,000 km north to the Sámi 
community of Rensjön, where he was greeted by Chief Johan Kuhmunen and others. They 
agreed to “exchange legal and political information on aboriginal rights” and to participate in 
the planning of an International Indigenous Peoples Conference.45 If the pale, often blonde, 
Sámi were to be involved, then international Indigenous politics could not be framed as a 
simple issue of “race”—it was about domination by outsiders, regardless of skin colour. This 
connection is certainly reminiscent of shift of the pre-war Pan-Africanists towards 
participation in the meetings of Afro-Asian Peoples Solidarity Organization or the Non-
Aligned Movement in the 1950s and 60s, and the realization of a shared experience of 
imperialism across imperial, ethnic, or geographic boundaries. In his history of that 
movement, Colin Legum notes that Black Pan-Africanists “found political expression in 
associations with peoples of other colours and indeed, also with Europeans who have been 
43 GMD, 11 & 13 June 1972.
44 GMD, 13 June 1972
45 GMD, 8 & 9 June 1972. Also present for the trip were Manuel's assistant, Jamie Deacey; Gun Leanders, 
the journalist who helped arrange the trip, Ake Malmstrom: and a legal consultant for the Saami, Tomas 
Cramer. McFarlane, 166-9.
50
willing to identify themselves with their struggle for emancipation.”46 Or as Kofi Baako, 
Ghana's Minister of Defence, stated in discussing Nkrumahism, “Anti-Imperialism knows no 
colour.”47 While there is no evidence that Manuel consciously modelled his own movement 
after this mindset, it seems reasonable that it may have affected him. Manuel's continued 
relationship with African diplomats, and most recently,  with Chinese ones, may well have 
encouraged Manuel to put aside any biases he may have had, and look for allies where other 
Indigenous activists had not.
This budding idea of an International Indigenous Peoples Conference received quite a 
mixed response from “First World” allies. Both Leftists and academics (and especially leftist 
academics) were quite supportive, perhaps none more so than Helge Kleivan of the 
International Work Group for Indigenous Affairs. When IWGIA was formed at the 38th 
International Congress of Americanists, most of its members were concerned with the violent 
atrocities then being committed in South America at that time.48 Helge Kleivan, a Norwegian 
anthropologist and, from 1973 onward, a professor of Eskimology at the University of 
Copenhagen, had been instrumental in setting up the organization, and sought to encourage 
anthropologists to take on a greater role in advocacy for the peoples they studied.49 In 
46 Colin Legum, Pan-Africanism: A Short Political Guide, (New York: F. A. Praeger, 1965), 41.
47 Ibid., 41.
48 The press release announcing the organization's establishment mentions the “wholesale extermination of 
Indian tribes” in Brazil, the bombing of Indian villages in Peru, the decimation of the Bari people and Yuko 
peoples near the Colombia-Venezuela border. Dalh also mentions that a 1963 massacre of Cinta Larga 
people in Matto Grosso, Brazil, only made public in 1967, was particularly upsetting to its founding 
members. Jens Dahl, IWGIA: A History (Copenhagen : IWGIA, 2009), 22-24.
49 Dahl, 22-25, 31. For more on the fight of a difference generation of anthropologists (including Franz Boas, 
Ashley Montagu and Claude Levi-Strauss) to mobilize within the United Nations to oppose the use of race 
as a scientific category, see Elazar Barkan, The Retreat of Scientific Racism: Changing Concepts of Race 
in Britain and the United States Between the World Wars (Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press, 
1993), and Michelle Brattain, “Race, Racism, and Antiracism: UNESCO and the Politics of Presenting 
Science to the Postwar Public,” The American Historical Review 112:5 (December 2007).
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association with fellow professors Peter Aaby and Robert Petersen, he helped organize the 
1973 Arctic Peoples' Conference. Sámi, Dene, and Inuit peoples from various countries 
within the Arctic region gathered in Copenhagen in November, and for some, it was Kleivan 
that introduced them to the idea of capital-i Indigenous peoples.50 On 16 June 1972, 
following the UN Conference on the Human Environment, George Manuel travelled to 
Copenhagen and met with Helge Kleivan to discuss the possibility of organizing a World 
Conference of Indigenous Peoples the following year. Receiving an enthusiastic response, 
Manuel met with Kleivan again the following day to begin planning.51 IWGIA would later 
help host the second preparatory meeting for the conference, would negotiate financial 
support for the conference itself,52 and when the WCIP nearly collapsed from bankruptcy in 
its first few years, IWGIA again helped negotiate crucial funding.53
From Copenhagen, Manuel travelled to London, England where he met with Colonel 
J. R. Patrick Montgomery of the Anti-Slavery Society.54 In his diary, Manuel noted that the 
Anti-Slavery Association was planning a conference of its own on the issue of Indigenous 
peoples, and Montgomery suggested there should not be a duplicate effort. Others that 
became involved with the conference, including Marie Smallface-Marule, Rodrigo Contreras 
50 Dahl, 38
51 GMD, 16-17 June 1972.
52 In the form of a “small grant from the Swedish International Development Agency (SIDA).” Dahl, 30.
53 In this case, the funding came from Norway. Marie Smallface-Marule, “A Tribute to Helge Kleivan,” 
Library and Archives Canada (hereafter LAC), WCIP Fonds, 9349, (hereafter WCIPF), Vol. 20.21, WCIP 
Newsletter (February 1984), 1.
54 A 1909 merger between the British and Foreign Anti-Slavery Society (established in 1839) and the 
Aborigines' Protection Society (established in 1837), resulted in a new organization which, by 1972, was 
officially called the Anti-Slavery Society for the Protection of Human Rights. Since 1990, it is known as 
Anti-Slavery International. Suzanne Miers, Slavery in the Twentieth Century: The Evolution of a Global 
Problem (Walnut Creek, CA: AltaMira Press, 2003), xvii. For more on the Aborigines' Protection Society, 
see Kenneth D. Nworah, “The Aborigines' Protection Society, 1889-1909: A Pressure-Group in Colonial 
Policy,” Canadian Journal of African Studies / Revue Canadienne des Études Africaines, Vol. 5, No. 1 
(1971).
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and Sam Deloria, remember Manuel's oral account of the meeting as somewhat more 
irritated. “Their colonial attitudes toward him were really annoying to George,” recalls 
Smallface-Marule. “They basically told him that we weren't capable of organizing such an 
event, that really, they should do it for us.”55 Sam Deloria remembers being told that the Anti-
Slavery Society said they “had it all under control, so since the Indigenous peoples were 
totally lacking in organizational skill, [Manuel] should just go home and rest assured that 
everything was taken care of. He accepted that with some amusement and proceeded 
ahead.”56  At his next stop in Geneva, Switzerland, Manuel met with representatives of the 
World Council Churches (WCC) to discuss the possibility of the NIB seeking Non-
Governmental Organization (NGO) status at the UN, and to seek support for a World 
Conference of Indigenous Peoples. They felt the possibility of NGO status was excellent, and 
offered to “go as far as co-sponsor the [conference] and absorb a large share of the cost.”57
Certain Canadian and American groups were helpful as well. Manuel met regularly 
throughout the 1970s with Pat Kerwin and Jim MacDonald of the Canadian Labour 
Congress, who helped provide support for Manuel's vision of Indigenous internationalism.58 
Marie Smallface-Marule's CUSO contacts were also useful; a friend from the organization 
55 Marie Smallface-Marule, personal interview, 26 May 2011.
56 Sam Deloria, personal interview, 23 March 2012.
57 The representatives were American Rev. Dwain C. Epps and Nawaz Dawood. Dawood seems to have 
studied at the University of Dar Es Salaam, Tanzania, which might explain his presence as a contact, or it 
could be coincidence. GMD, 19 June 1972. The WCC had already endorsed the idea of Indigenous 
liberation by supporting the 1971 Declaration of Barbados for the Liberation of the Indians, the result of an 
anthropological conference (organized by the Ethnology Department of the University of Berne) in 
Bridgetown, Barbados, 25-30 January 1971. Roxanne Dunbar-Ortiz, Indians of the Americas: Human 
Rights and Self-Determination (London: Zed, 1984), 60. For a collection of symposium papers and the 
Barbados Declaration itself, see Walter Dostal (ed.), The Situation of the Indian in South America: 
Contributions to the Study of Inter-Ethnic Conflict in the Non-Andean Regions of South America (Geneva: 
World Council of Churches, 1972).
58 Diaries of George Manuel, 1971-1976
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had married an Ecuadorian (Rodrigo Contreras) who was requested to help with translations 
and seeking Indigenous contacts in Central and South America.59 Contreras continued 
working with the WCIP, on and off, for most of its existence. University of British Columbia 
law professor Douglas Sanders was also incredibly supportive and helpful. In October 1974, 
Manuel attended a Third World Peoples Conference, organized by the Commission on Justice 
and Liberation of the US National Council of Churches, that seemed to have further 
influenced his thoughts on neo-colonialism.60
2.1.3 Support from the Third World
Third-Worldist leaders were perhaps limited by their ability and interests from 
offering large-scale support for this second wave of decolonization, but there was some 
amount of practical support, particularly through the United Nations system. In August 1972, 
the General Assembly of Manuel's National Indian Brotherhood officially endorsed the idea 
that the organization should seek NGO status with the United Nations Economic and Social 
Council (ECOSOC).61 The timing could not have been better. In 1965, the ECOSOC Sub-
Commission on the Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities had launched 
the “Special Study on Racial Discrimination in the Political, Economic, Social and Cultural 
Spheres” and a resulting report by Special Rapporteur Hernan Santa Cruz included a chapter 
on discrimination against Indigenous populations.62 This led the Sub-Commission to request 
59 Marie Smallface-Marule, personal interview, 26 May 2011. Rodrigo Contreras, personal interview, 3 June 
2010.
60 GMD, 30 September – 2 October 1974.
61 Doug Sanders, The Formation of the World Council of Indigenous Peoples, 11. At the same meeting, the 
NIB agreed to sponsor an “Indigenous Peoples World Conference.” The application to gain ECOSOC 
status for the NIB was, from the beginning, completed with the intention of transferring that status to an 
Indigenous international organization, should one be created in the future. GMD, 10 Aug. 1972.
62 José Martínez Cobo et al, “Study of the Problem of Discrimination Against Indigenous Populations,” Part 
I, Chapter I, 12. United Nations, Economic and Social Council, Sub-Commission on Prevention of 
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a more extensive “Study of the Problem of Discrimination Against Indigenous Populations” 
in 1971. Although it came to be known as the Martínez Cobo Report, much of the writing 
was done by Augusto Willemsen-Díaz, a young lawyer from Guatemala who had also written 
the aforementioned chapter in Hernan Santa Cruz's report.63 While working on the study, 
Willemsen-Díaz came to realize the lack of Indigenous representation at the UN, including in 
the Sub-Commission that had launched an investigation into their situation, and struggled to 
convince Indigenous leaders to participate at the UN.64 It was into this environment that the 
NIB was submitting its bid for NGO status, the first application from an Indigenous 
organization, and delegates from the Third World rallied in support.
In February 1974, when George Manuel appeared at an ECOSOC meeting in New 
York to defend his organization's request, he recalls in his diary that he was
...questioned harshly by developed nation representatives on our 
reasons for our application for membership. There was a very heavy 
debate with the developed nation’s delegates rejecting our application 
and with the Third World Nations strongly debating on our behalf and 
supporting the view that we were the only ones that could possibly 
represent our unique problems...65
Discrimination and Protection of Minorities. 
<http://undesadspd.org/IndigenousPeoples/LibraryDocuments/Mart%C3%ADnezCoboStudy.aspx>
63 Augusto Willemsen-Díaz, “How Indigenous Peoples’ Rights Reached the UN,” in Making the Declaration 
Work: The United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, eds., Claire Charters and 
Rodolfo Stavenhagen (Copenhagen : IWGIA, 2009), 17.
64 Willemsen-Díaz, 20.
65 GMD, 6 February 1974. He received written confirmation that the NIB had been granted roster status on 
13 June 1974. According to Rodrigo Contreras, Manuel became skeptical of the minimal advantages that 
were gained by ECOSOC roster status, and looked forward to gaining the status of the Palestinian 
Liberation Organization, which had been awarded a special observer seat in the UN General Assembly in 
November 1974. When he was told roster status gave him “a window” to the United Nations, Manuel 
replied, “No, I want to [enter] by the door.” Rodrigo Contreras, personal interview, 3 June 2010. At the 
founding WCIP conference in 1975, Sam Deloria cynically pointed out that the NIB shared roster status 
with such lowly organizations as the International Federation of Pedestrians (1971) and the International 
Federation of Beekeepers' Associations (1972). Ha-Shilth-Sa (newspaper), 4 December 1975.
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Occasionally, support from the Third-Worldist movement was even more direct. In July 
1973, IWGIA was invited to host the first preparatory meeting for the conference, but instead 
that first historic meeting took place in Georgetown, Guyana.66 Why was the first global 
meeting of Indigenous Peoples organized in Guyana? The country's foreign policy at the time 
was well suited to fostering a second wave of anti-colonialism. After the country gained 
independence, Guyana's first Prime Minister, Forbes Burnham, had pushed through a series 
of measures to identify his government more clearly with the Non-Aligned Movement. In 
1972, in preparation for hosting the first Conference of Foreign Ministers of Non-Aligned 
Countries, a group of Wai-Wai were hired to build a 55ft-tall version of their traditional 
thatched roof hut (benab) in the centre of Georgetown. Known as the Umana Yana, the 
building would serve as a venue for both the Non-Aligned Conference, but also for the WCIP 
preparatory meeting two years later. That the Guyanese government had mobilized the 
country's Indigenous population as a symbol of an anti-colonial philosophy in 1972 may help 
explain the desire to support the foundation of an Indigenous international organization.
The Guyanese High Commissioner to Canada at the time, Robert Moore, was a friend 
of Marie Smallface-Marule and he seemed agreeable to hosting a preparatory meeting in 
Georgetown. The country's Foreign Minister, Shridath Ramphal, (soon to be Secretary-
General of the Commonwealth of Nations) was also involved early on.67 Smallface-Marule 
was sent to Guyana in the fall of 1973 to negotiate the arrangements, and while the results of 
her trip were “positive in every respect” they were now faced with the task of securing the 
66 Dahl, IWGIA, 40.
67 Smallface-Marule also visited Columbia and Ecuador to seek out Indigenous contacts for the meeting. 
Smallface-Marule, personal interviews, 26 May 2011; 13 June 2012; GMD, 8 August 1973.
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necessary funding for the preparatory meeting.68 Later in December, Smallface-Marule and 
Manuel visited the Tanzanian High Commission in the hopes of a meeting with President 
Muammar Gaddafi to secure funding, but this seems to have been for the NIB rather than for 
the World Council.69 Again the following month, an NIB think tank meeting proposed that 
they should “contact and solicit support from third world countries” for a hypothetical 
Canadian Indian nation.70 No explicit talk of seeking financial support from Third-Worldist 
leadership for an international Indigenous meeting appears on record, but if such funding had 
been provided to the NIB, it seems likely that Manuel would have spent it on his 
international vision as well.71 
Instead, they turned to the Canadian Department of Indian Affairs and Northern 
Development. The NIB received a poor response, possibly because relations were somewhat 
strained at that point over a “nasty letter the Hon. Jean Chretien, Minister of DIAND wrote 
and hand delivered to [Manuel]” after a speech Smallface-Marule had delivered in Toronto 
criticizing the Canadian government.72 Stu Igliasias, the Special Assistant to Hugh Faulkner 
(then Secretary of State for Canada), was more impressed with the plan for a conference, yet 
government funding was still not secured.73 Eventually, it was church groups, including the 
World Council of Churches, that would pay for the Georgetown meeting.74 Although the bulk 
of funds came from these religious organizations, the meeting received enthusiastic support 
68 GMD, 28 November 1973.
69 GMD, 20 December 1973.
70 GMD, 10 January 1973.
71 After the meeting had occurred and the WCIP had been established, however, Manuel, Smallface-Marule, 
and others did meet with a Mohammad Maharume to discuss “the possibility of funding the World Council 
of Indigenous Peoples from one or some of the Arab countries.” GMD, 6 March 1976
72 GMD, 5 & 15 December 1973.
73 GMD, 6 December 1973.
74 Sanders, The Formation of the World Council of Indigenous Peoples, 12. A thorough investigation of 
funding for the World Council appears in chapter 3 of this dissertation.
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from numerous Guyanese government officials, including opening speeches by the Ministers 
of Interior Affairs and Economic Development, a tour of Indigenous areas led by Philip 
Duncan, an Indigenous Minister of State, and a reception by Prime Minister Burnham.75 
Notably, the Guyanese government housed all the visiting delegates and observers at the 
Pegasus Hotel, directly across the street from the Umana Yana hut mentioned above, which 
served to host some of their meetings.76
After the founding WCIP conference, the World Council's executive tended to focus 
on Indigenous rights without frequent references to decolonization in Africa or Asia, the 
Non-Aligned Movement or Third-Worldism. Yet the World Council leadership seems to have 
recognized that the plans for a New International Economic Order (NIEO)—a Third-Worldist 
vision for an international system of trade that ostensibly favoured “developing 
countries”77—were not necessarily consistent with the interests of the world's Indigenous 
peoples.
Developing countries, once colonies of the technological and 
industrial powers, have become the consumers of the future and seek 
to institute a second industrial revolution by ravaging tribal areas to 
which indigenous peoples have been moved. The last frontier on 
earth is now the last home and territories of indigenous peoples.78
In 1979, WCIP delegates presented a paper at the Northwest Regional Conference on the 
Emerging International Economic Order, which proposed modifications to the NIEO to 
75 GMD, 5-12 April 1974. Duncan would visit Canada later that year and was hosted by Indigenous 
leadership in Ottawa and Winnipeg. GMD, 26-31 July 1974.
76 Marie Smallface-Marule, personal interview, 13 June 2012; GMD, 5-12 April 1974.
77 For a critical examination of the NIEO and its ideas of industrial development and international aid, see 
Gilbert Rist, The History of Development: From Western Origins to Global Faith, 3rd Edition (New York: 
Zed Books, 2008), 143-150.
78 Center for World Indigenous Studies (hereafter CWIS), Chief George Manuel Library and Fourth World 
Documentation Project (hereafter CGML), WCIP et al., “The New International Economic Order: A 
Promise or Peril for the Indigenous Peoples of the World” (Presented at Northwest Regional Conference on 
the Emerging International Economic Order, Seattle, Washington, USA, 29-31 March 1979)
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guarantee Indigenous sovereignty, land and resource rights.79 This new wave of 
decolonization had begun to distinguish itself from the first.
2.2 Third-Worldism and International Indian Treaty Council
The other major international Indigenous group, the International Indian Treaty 
Council, was quite different from the WCIP, likely because it had a rather different 
beginning. It roots lie in the radical American Indian Movement, which was founded in 1968 
and focused its attention on local protests against the American government and the Bureau 
of Indian Affairs.80 It was Jimmie Durham, an unregistered Tsalagi sculptor living in Geneva, 
Switzerland, who brought an international focus to AIM in the mid-1970s.
Durham had been an Indigenous activist in the Southwestern United States in the 
1950s and early 1960s, but described himself as “'a naive resister,' not knowing how or what 
to resist.”81 Discharged after a brief stint in the US Navy but losing hope in the progress of 
his efforts as an activist, he moved to Europe in 1968.82 He enrolled in L'Ecole des Beaux 
Arts in Geneva and his wife worked for the World Council of Churches, but he spent a great 
deal of time socializing with UN workers and delegates.83 Among these delegates were those 
79 CWIS, CGML, WCIP et al., “The New International Economic Order: A Promise or Peril for the 
Indigenous Peoples of the World” (Presented at Northwest Regional Conference on the Emerging 
International Economic Order, Seattle, Washington, USA, 29-31 March 1979). In 1982, three South 
American representatives of the WCIP also participated in an incredibly long-titled “Seminar on the 
Effects of the Existing Unjust International Economic Order on the Economies of the Developing 
Countries and the Obstacle that this Represents for Implementation of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms” in Geneva. LAC, WCIPF, Vol. 7.3, “Quadrennial Report of the WCIP to ECOSOC, 1981-1984” 
pg 2
80 See Paul Chaat Smith and Robert Allen Warrior, Like a Hurricane: the Indian Movement from Alcatraz to 
Wounded Knee (New York: New Press, 1996).
81 Rhonda Meier, “Re-Membering the Colonial Present: Jimmie Durham's Serious Dance” (MA Thesis, 
Concordia University, 1999), 10.
82 Jimmie Durham. Columbus Day: Poems, Drawings and Stories about American Indian Life and Death in 
the Nineteen-Seventies (West End Press, 1983), 5.
83 Meier, 11. Roxanne Dunbar-Ortiz, personal interview, 24 September 2010. Unfortunately, none of the 
interviews or writings that Durham has published includes the name of this wife in Geneva or her precise 
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representing African liberation organizations; Durham associated with Amílcar Cabral 
(African Party for the Independence of Guinea and Cape Verde), members of the African 
National Congress (ANC) and the South-West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO) and 
other African nationalists.84 It was through this contact with anti-colonial activists that 
Durham was struck by the obvious comparison: AIM was also a decolonization movement 
and the United States was a colonizer.85 In the early 1970s, his analysis was clearly conscious 
of anti-colonial struggles: “We are, by every criterion, colonized nations of people, whose 
culture is not Western.”86
Following the armed conflict between AIM members and US law enforcement at 
Wounded Knee in 1973, the United States' National Council of Churches sent Durham and 
his wife to visit the Pine Ridge Reservation and investigate how they might help.87 As AIM 
members saw it, it was the international attention that Wounded Knee received which helped 
prevent more violence by the US government. “We got telegrams and letters of support from 
all over the world at the same time which helped to raise our awareness that there were other 
people struggling to free themselves from some form of colonization.”88 With this in mind, 
Durham pitched the idea pitched the idea of an international Indigenous non-governmental 
role at the World Council of Churches. 
84 Roxanne Dunbar-Ortiz, “How Indigenous Peoples Wound Up at the United Nations,” in The Hidden 
1970s: Histories of Radicalism, ed., Dan Berger (Rutgers University Press, 2010), 123; Nikos 
Papastergiadis and Laura Turney, On Becoming Authentic: Interview with Jimmie Durham, Prickly Pear 
Pamphlet No.10 (Cambridge: Prickly Pear Press, 1996), 25.
85 Roxanne Dunbar-Ortiz, personal interview, 24 September 2010.
86 Jimmie Durham, “American Indian Culture: Traditionalism and Spiritualism in a Revolutionary Struggle,” 
in A Certain Lack of Coherence: Writings on Art and Cultural Politics (London: Kala Press, 1993), 13. 
Durham's emphasis.
87 Roxanne Dunbar-Ortiz, personal interview, 24 September 2010
88 Indian Summer in Geneva: Indigenous peoples of the Americas at the United Nations, Kisos Films 1986.
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organization to members of AIM, who agreed to organize a conference with this intended 
purpose.
The resulting International Indian Treaty Conference was held from 8-16 June 1974 at 
the Chief Gall Resort, a small motel, conference centre and campground on the Standing 
Rock Sioux Indian Reservation.89 The meeting included a number of prominent guest 
speakers, including Princeton professor of international law Richard Falk, and South African 
expatriate anti-apartheid lawyer and Amnesty International board member Joel Carleson.90 
While AIM spokesmen had previously announced an expectation of 2,000 participants for the 
conference, the exact number that arrived and from where they came is difficult to surmise.91 
An article in the Billings Daily Gazette on the second day of the conference mentions that 
about 200 people had arrived the first day but Durham asserts the total attendees was around 
four thousand.92 Media access was restricted by police, who also set up road blocks and 
recorded license plates in the area during the first day of the conference.93 The geographic 
origin of the guests does not seem to have been published in any public source.94 The official 
89 Chicago Tribune, 9 June 1974; David Hauser, The Only True America: Following the Trail of Lewis and 
Clark, (Lincoln, NE: iUniverse, 2000), 151.
90 Billings Daily Gazette, 9 June 1974. Associated Press, 12 June 1974. For more on Carlson, see his 
obituary: New York Times, 4 December 2001.
91 Chicago Tribune, 9 June 1974.
92 Jimmie Durham, “An Open Letter on Recent Developments in the American Indian 
Movement/International Indian Treaty Council,” in A Certain Lack of Coherence, 52; Billings Daily 
Gazette, 9 June 1974.
93 Billings Daily Gazette, 9 June 1974; The News and Courier, 9 June 1974.
94 Dunbar-Ortiz mentions the presence of “intensely radicalized Mapuche Indian exiles from Pinochet's 
Chile.” The quantity and geographic origin of international attendees is described very differently by other 
scholars but I have found no reputable contemporary source that offers a detailed account the geographical 
areas of participation. Roxanne Dunbar-Ortiz, Blood on the Border (Cambridge, MA: South End Press, 
2005), 34.
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declaration from the conference asserts only that delegates “represented 97 Indian tribes and 
Nations from across North and South America.”95
2.3 A Different View of Decolonization and Internationalism
Needless to say, the first International Indian Treaty Conference was a very different 
affair than the first World Conference of Indigenous peoples. The meeting was less formal 
and more radical; it was overshadowed by a hostile police presence; and participation does 
not appear to have extended beyond the Americas. Born of the conflict between AIM's 1960s 
American radicalism and the US government's Counter Intelligence Program, the Treaty 
Council had a far more militant edge than the World Council, and it was far more focused on 
the issues of the United States. The IITC was initially meant to serve as the international 
wing of AIM, not as an independent organization. The Treaty Council's immediate goal was 
to pursue “independent nation status for the Sioux nation (as defined in the 1868 US-Sioux 
Treaty).”96 The official declaration from the 1974 conference, announced that the IITC would 
set up offices in Washington, D.C. and New York city in order to use “the international forces 
necessary to obtain the recognition of our treaties” and to serve as an information source 
“concerning issues, developments and any legislative attempt affecting Native Nations by the 
United States of America.”97 At least initially, the organization made little pretence of 
representing Indigenous peoples outside the USA.
The founders were not unsympathetic to the concerns of other Indigenous peoples 
however, and they expected their main strategy to yield positive results elsewhere: “the 
95 International Indian Treaty Council, “Declaration of Continuing Independence by the First International 
Indian Treaty Council at Standing Rock Indian Country, June 1974” <http://treatycouncil.info/about.htm>
96 Dunbar-Ortiz, Indians of the Americas, 33.
97 IITC, “Declaration of Continuing Independence.”
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presence of one Indian nation in the UN system would set the necessary precedent for 
others.”98 The founding declaration also calls for the end of “all colonial governments” and 
pledges “assistance to all other sovereign people who seek their own independence.”99 A 
statement of solidarity with “the colonized Puerto Rican People in their struggle for 
Independence” is likely a nod to Third-Worldism, despite the fact that Independence was also 
being sought from the United States in that case.100 Subsequent IITC conferences included 
guests from liberation organizations like the Zimbabwe African National Union, and a 
representative of the pro-independence Puerto Rican Socialist Party.101 Durham's knowledge 
of and interest in Third Worldism needed time to spread throughout the Treaty Council's 
membership.
Nevertheless, the goal was to make use of the international system, and the language 
and ideas of decolonization, to achieve specific goals related to the United States.  Durham 
felt the Council's goal was “to find a way for the Indians of the two Americas to work 
together without forming an organization.”102  He was wary, however, of anything more than 
expressions of solidarity with other Indigenous peoples, particularly outside the Western 
hemisphere, which he worried might cost him the support of the Third World.
Then there began to be the idea of Fourth World People. I saw it as 
one of the most urgent things to fight. We were not for indigenous 
rights; we were not for indigenous peoples; we were not for Fourth 
World peoples – we were only for the rights of say, the Cherokee 
Nation or the Iroquois Confederacy as a nation of people. As soon as 
98 Dunbar-Ortiz, Indians of the Americas, 34.
99 IITC, “Declaration of Continuing Independence.”
100 Ibid.
101 Dunbar-Ortiz, Blood on the Border, 35.
102 Lucy R. Lippard, “Jimmie Durham: Postmodernist 'Savage,'”Art in America, 84:2 (Feb 1993), 65. My 
emphasis.
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we allowed ourselves to be connected to indigenous peoples 
worldwide, we would have lost any support from the African 
countries that we needed in the UN. They didn't want to hear about 
their own indigenous people in their own countries, they 
automatically would say: “this is part of some primitivism that 
England has put all of us in. (...) Part of our decolonization process is 
to get away from that primitivism.” That's what all the African 
countries were on about in the sixties and seventies. To get away from 
tribalism and to get away from people as defined as part of the land. I 
was afraid we would lose that support completely...103
Durham was undoubtedly influenced by the first wave of decolonization, and aimed to use its 
successes to work towards a second wave, starting in the “internal colonies” of the United 
States. Yet he chose to adopt the rhetoric and philosophies of the movement only so far as 
they were of practical benefit, but placed his hope in the international area as the best chance 
to achieve Indigenous decolonization. The increased number of post-colonial states in the UN 
General Assembly had created a substantial power shift in that arena. Durham would stress 
this latter point with Treaty Council members, encouraging bridge-building with members of 
the Non-Aligned Movement, who held a majority at the UN, rather than with Western 
States.104 Perhaps more realist than idealist, he was willing to put on a variety of faces to gain 
the allies he needed at the UN and the support he needed at home:
I said this to this group and this to that group, trying to get someone 
to be on our side. I got known as a kind of Soviet style communist for 
a while, just because I saw the Soviets were willing to help us in the 
UN in a certain way. They controlled a lot of little parts of the UN. 
They really needed to know that what we wanted was socialism in the 
US and not decolonisation of the Cherokee nation. So, to them I said, 
“yes of course, our problem is class in the US, absolutely, there's no 
question, we don't want a thousand independent little nations, with 
our own passports and our own post offices.” I wasn't lying, that isn't 
what we want, 300 independent little groups of people, because the 
103 Papastergiadis and Turney, 14.
104 Roxanne Dunbar-Ortiz, personal interview, 24 September 2010.
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US would just crush us. (...) By saying that to the Russians and the 
Poles, they became my best buddies. Then the Africans would ask 
about decolonisation. We would say, “yes here's our treaty we are 
some sort of independent nation, here the US has colonised us and we 
want to be independent of the US, we have the right and here is the 
treaty that proves we are some sort of independent nation just like 
you!” Then I would go back to the reservations, this reservation says 
it wants total independence from the US, the other one says – they 
want some tractors. I say, “yes, that's our struggle, our struggle is 
tractors!”
The strategy worked and the international community rallied to support the 
organization. On 10 February 1977, the IITC became the first Indigenous organization to 
secure “Category II” consultative status at ECOSOC, years before the WCIP would gain that 
privilege.105 The organization, mused Durham that year, might later apply for UN General 
Assembly non-member observer status, a category he described as being granted “to new 
countries...which have applied for membership and to liberation movements which look like 
they are winning something and/or which have the political backing from many countries.”106 
Indigenous scholar Vine Deloria Jr. notes that “Durham did a remarkable job for the Treaty 
Council,” obtaining “sympathetic hearings for the Indian cause” from various United Nations 
member-states and forming friendships  “with numerous staff people on the committees and 
subcommittees that were part of the vast United Nations administrative apparatus.”107 He 
suggests that the Treaty Council's origins in and focus on the United States may well have 
105 University of New Mexico Center for South West Research (hereafter UNMCSWR), Roger A. Finzel 
American Indian Movement Papers, MSS 711 BC, Box 2, Folder 21, NGO/5, Committee on NGOs, 371st 
Meeting, United Nations Press Release, Committee Grants United Nations Consultative Status to Five 
Non-Governmental Organizations, 10 February 1977. Dunbar-Ortiz, Indians of the Americas, 33. While the 
WCIP effectively took over the National Indian Brotherhood's roster (observer) status soon after it was 
founded, it would not gain its own Category II status until 1981. Personal correspondence, ECOSOC Civil 
Society Network, 19 June 2012.
106 Jimmie Durham, “United Nations Conference on Indians,” in A Certain Lack of Coherence, 28.
107 Vine Deloria, Jr., Behind the Trail of Broken Treaties: An Indian Declaration of Independence (Austin: 
University of Texas Press, 1985), 267.
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aided the organization: the “United Nations could hardly shunt aside an aggressive 
organization which sought to represent the indigenous peoples of the most powerful nation 
on earth.”108 
It seems likely that the Treaty Council's politics were more appealing to Socialist and 
Third-Worldist members of the UN, and international human rights organizations, than those 
of the WCIP. Membership in the World Council was based on national organizations, 
generally those recognized by state governments, like the National Indian Brotherhood in 
Canada, the National Congress of American Indians in the United States, or the Nordic Saami 
Council in Scandinavia. This left the World Council open to accusations of collusion with 
Western governments. Durham himself would accuse federally-recognized “tribal 
governments” in the United States of being, “[i]n the classic Third World model... a 'puppet' 
group of élites... completely subservient to the federal government.”109 As Sam Deloria sees 
it, “the scholarly community seemed pretty much in agreement that these guys [state-
recognized Indigenous leaders] were sellouts, and the real Indians, the good Indians were the 
Treaty Council and AIM.”110 He sees the choice of the international human rights community 
to favour the IITC as one based in paternalistic or racist expectations:
the other groups fit more into the kind of Indians they were looking 
for – they wore feathers and they talked about the “four-leggeds” and 
they fit the spiritual mascot model that the world human rights 
community really wanted in Indigenous people.111
108 Ibid.
109 Jimmie Durham, “An Open Letter on Recent Developments in the American Indian 
Movement/International Indian Treaty Council,” in A Certain Lack of Coherence, 48.
110 Sam Deloria, personal interview, 23 March 2012.
111 Ibid.
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Conversely, however, it may have been Durham's personal connections to diplomats 
and NGO leadership in Geneva which won their hearts. An associate from the Treaty 
Council, Roxanne Dunbar-Ortiz asserts that “Jimmie was unique in that he was trusted and 
people [in Geneva] knew his politics... so he had some connections and they gave him the 
green light.”112 Durham himself felt that his time in Geneva and the connections he had made 
there taught him to speak the language of the international community which gave the IITC 
such an advantage: “I knew the vocabulary to speak. If I hadn't known it...I couldn't have 
gotten anywhere.”113 For Durham, the struggle was to convince those within the UN system, 
as well as general Third-Worldist opinion, that the IITC's claims were legitimately subject to 
international law. He felt “Indigenous people” was just “a nonsense phrase” to describe 
“colonized people who are not officially colonized according to the UN standards of who is 
colonized.”114 The UN standards he referred to are likely those contained in the “UN 
Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples (Resolution 
1514)”, adopted in December 1960. This statement specifically promised that “[a]ll peoples 
have the right to self-determination; by virtue of that right they freely determine their 
political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development.”115 This 
would seem to provide a precedent for Indigenous self-determination, had it not been quickly 
restricted by Resolution 1541 which defined a colony as “a territory which is geographically 
separate... from the country administering it” – the so-called “blue water” or “salt water” 
112 Roxanne Dunbar-Ortiz, personal interview, 24 September 2010.
113 Papastergiadis and Turney, 25.
114 Indian Summer in Geneva: Indigenous peoples of the Americas at the United Nations, Kisos Films 1986
115 UN Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples General Assembly 
Resolution, 1514 A/RES/1514 (XV).
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thesis.116 And perhaps for this reason, Durham never felt that he could fully convince African 
ambassadors to the UN that Indigenous peoples could or should gain UN General Assembly 
status as independent states. In the end, he found more support from the American and 
European left, groups he consciously courted.117
In April 1976, the Treaty Council convinced the United Nations' NGO Committee on 
Human Rights' Sub-Committee on Racism and De-colonization to hold a conference for 
Indigenous peoples of the Western Hemisphere. The IITC itself organized the “International 
NGO Conference on Discrimination against Indigenous Populations in the Americas” in 
Geneva for September 1977. Although the conference itself was a great success, 
uncomfortable situations were created, not just for World Council delegates (who were made 
to feel decidedly unwelcome), but also for Jimmy Durham.118 Organizers had attempted to 
secure international trips for delegates, following the meeting, to promote Indigenous rights 
around the world. Most of the funding came from the Eastern Bloc countries and from strong 
socialist parties in Western Europe.119 Despite opposition, Russell Means was adamant that he 
would accept an invitation from Idi Amin to visit Uganda. This lead Durham to resign from 
the IITC immediately prior to the conference, fearing for his reputation and that of the Treaty 
116 This longstanding principle was unsuccessfully opposed in the 1950s by Belgian delegates to the UN who 
suggested (in what became known as the “Belgian thesis” that there was no reason to limit self-
determination to overseas territories. Although the authors asserted concern for the rights of Indigenous 
peoples, one author, Ferdinand Van Langenhove, would later acknowledge that the thesis was a tactic to 
divert criticism of overseas colonies. Patrick Thornberry, “Self-Determination, Minorities, Human Rights: 
A Review of International Instruments,” The International and Comparative Law Quarterly, Vol. 38, No. 4 
(Oct. 1989), 874; “UN General Assembly Resolution Defining the Three Options for Self-determination 
General Assembly Resolution 1541,” A/RES/1541(XV).
117 Durham, A Certain Lack of Coherence, vii-viii. Durham seems to have had, however, a decent working 
relationship with Salim Ahmed Salim, Tanzania's ambassador to the UN during the 1970s, a prominent 
supporter of the Non-Aligned Movement, and later, Secretary-General of the Organization of African 
Unity. Papastergiadis and Turney, 13-15.
118 GMD, 23 September 1977.
119 Roxanne Dunbar-Ortiz, personal interview, 24 September 2010.
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Council “in the eyes of progressive African leaders.”120 Although Durham did go back to run 
the Treaty Council from its New York office, his return was short lived. Because of AIM's 
insistence on “grassroots” style of organizing and disdain for state-recognized tribal 
governments, it lacked the organized base structure that the WCIP could rely on. From 
Durham's point of view, this became a serious liability when, “[b]ecause of the poor level of 
organization and lack of political development in AIM at its base, the international work [of 
the IITC] became too large a part of the Movement's focus.”121 Feeling disillusioned from 
political infighting, a lack of support from below, and the ever more determined personal 
attacks from the US government, he resigned from the organization in 1979.122
2.4 Contrasting Visions of Indigenous Internationalism
To draw useful lessons from the examination of these two organizations, we must 
question whether what they were doing in the mid-1970s was really new. To some degree, it 
was not new at all. In both Canada and the United States, there had always been Indigenous 
leaders who saw their peoples as separate from nation states that surrounded them. Certainly, 
the IITC's effort to seek UN membership for the Sioux Nation had very similar precursors. As 
noted in the introduction, Deskaheh had asserted in the 1920s that the Haudenosaunee were a 
sovereign people. While noting that they were not formally requesting it, he declared that 
they were “ready to accept for the purpose of this dispute, if invited, the obligation of 
membership in the League of Nations.”123 In August 1956, Howard Barrett, Sr. (Tribal 
120 Roxanne Dunbar-Ortiz, Blood on the Border, 38.
121 Durham, “An Open Letter,” 53.
122 Durham, “An Open Letter,” 46-56; Lippard, 65.
123 Levi General, “To the Government of Her Majesty the Queen of the Netherlands,” quoted in Ronald 
Niezen, “Recognizing Indigenism: Canadian Unity and the International Movement of Indigenous 
Peoples,” Comparative Studies in Society and History 42:1 (2000), 124.
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Chairman of the Confederated Coos, Lower Umpqua and Siuslaw) formally requested 
admittance to the United Nations, arguing that, because the United States had failed to ratify 
their 1855 treaty, any land contained in that document remained unceded.124 Yet the IITC 
offered differences in basic strategy, rather than goals. What Jimmie Durham realized was 
that
we had to go about international work much more strategically. We 
had to organize. We had to find the most stupid bureaucratic ways 
that is acceptable to the United Nations to the body of nations, to 
make an entry into international affairs. The only thing that was new 
to us was making that bureaucratic effort, making the organizational 
effort to spend years finding out how to be effective in international 
affairs.125
For Durham, the first wave of decolonization had simply cleared a path for future 
secessions by Indigenous peoples to form independent states. At best, it could provide much 
needed allies in the Third World from whom assistance might be gained. In the 1980s and 
90s, however, the Treaty Council broadened its vision and came to rely far more on other 
Indigenous allies. This may well have resulted from the increased space made available in the 
international arena by the United Nations Working Group on Indigenous Populations (UN-
WGIP), established in 1982. Durham's position shifted too after he left the organization as 
well; by 1985, he seemed more open to the idea of a formal alliance of Indigenous nations, 
and described dreams of...
...making a real organization of Indian nations...like the Organization 
of African States... that would work together economically. (...) What 
people are now learning in Nicaragua could be very useful to us in 
124 David R.M. Beck, “'Standing out here in the surf': the termination and restoration of the Coos, Lower 
Umpqua and Siuslaw Indians of Western Oregon in historical perspective.” Oregon Historical Quarterly 
110:1 (Spring 2009), 6.
125 Indian Summer in Geneva, Kisos Films, 1986.
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Bolivia or in the United States. And of course in the international 
workings, it can be more effective as we continue working together.126
The vision espoused by the World Council, however, was quite different from the 
start. Marie Smallface-Marule and George Manuel were, in some ways, more idealistic than 
Durham. They imagined the WCIP representing the concerns of all Indigenous peoples at an 
international level, as an advocate for their Indigenous rights (whether within a nation state 
or independently)127. This vision proved an even greater intellectual challenge for the United 
Nations. The UN is based on a system where the rights of specific peoples are advocated for 
by the nation states which represent them. To have an explicitly non-state actor like the 
World Council demanding a place to advocate for Indigenous peoples is to fit a square peg in 
a round hole—it challenges the UN's basic framework of world order. As mentioned earlier, 
Manuel had his sights on UN General Assembly non-member observer status, a special 
category afforded only to the special cases of the Palestinian Liberation Organization and the 
Vatican. Furthermore, from early on, the WCIP was promoted the idea of full legal 
sovereignty for Indigenous peoples without (necessarily) independence. The World Council 
insisted the rights to self-determination afforded them the right to be neither nation-states nor 
ethnic minorities:
Instead of 'national minorities' indigenous groups are separate and 
distinct peoples surrounded by nation-states. (...) As distinct peoples, 
indigenous groups must become recognized as a significant part of 
the global dialogue concerned with setting world priorities and the 
settlement of intergroup controversies.128
126 Indian Summer in Geneva, Kisos Films, 1986. Oddly, George Manuel became more determined in his 
demands for complete sovereignty for Indigenous peoples during the 1980s. LAC, WCIPF, Vol. 1.7, 
Transcript of WCIP Executive Council Meeting, 9-13 December 1983.
127 Rodrigo Contreras, personal interview, 3 June 2010.
128 Union of British Columbia Indian Chiefs Resource Centre (herafter UBCICRC), World Council of 
Indigenous Peoples Submission to the Preparatory Committee for a New International Strategy for the 
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While the right of all peoples to sovereignty was accepted by the United Nations system in 
principle, the idea that it could be asserted in this way by Indigenous peoples (whose territory 
often crosses state borders) would pose a serious threat to the international stability for which 
the United Nations aims.129
Despite these substantial differences between the two organizations and their visions, 
there are nonetheless enough similarities to suggest they are part of the same movement or 
wave, and that they both owe an intellectual debt to the first wave of decolonization. Firstly, 
both organizations can clearly trace their origins to Indigenous activists living overseas in 
centres for anti-colonial activity: Lusaka in the case of Smallface-Marule and Geneva for 
Jimmie Durham. These were foundational experiences for both of these individuals, and 
would be reflected in the ideas of both organizations. Secondly, Smallface-Marule, Manuel 
and Durham all formalized their efforts into broad, strategic organizations for Indigenous 
sovereignty, not formally affiliated with a single group or a single issue. This made the 
Indigenous internationalism different from the past international efforts of Deskaheh or T.W. 
Ratana, which proved to be short-lived and wholly unsuccessful. It meant a state government 
could no longer deny the legitimacy of these voices in the international arena by framing 
their interests as purely domestic issues. Finally, both organizations relied heavily on support 
from international NGOs like IWGIA, but placed much of their hope in the United Nations as 
an arbiter of justice. During the 1960s and 70s, the efforts made by Third-Worldist leadership 
in the UN looked incredibly fruitful—they largely controlled the General Assembly and 
Third United Nations Development Decade, 1980.
129 It may have been an awareness of the British Commonwealth and its nuanced conceptions of sovereignty 
and autonomy which made this alternative vision seem more plausible to Manuel and Smallface-Marule 
than it might have been to Durham.
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many of the UN's important sub-organizations. The promise for Indigenous peoples to share 
in this power was a tremendous attraction upon which both the World Council and the Treaty 
Council placed their hopes.
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Chapter 3
Out of Isolation: 
The 1974 Preparatory Meeting in Georgetown Guyana
To the peoples of Guyana, to the peoples of the world represented here today, we 
extend our warmest and most sincere greetings to you all. We who are self-
appointed representatives of Maori Youth today offer our very best wishes to this 
Conference and to the hopeful results which we enlighten ourselves with as being 
of dire importance for the betterment of Mankind. We regret that our presence with 
you all today is a physical impossibility. However, we are already deep within the 
hearts of a number of people present here today and we remain consoled in the 
knowledge that our Elder Dr. Rangi Walker will extend to you all not only this but 
also our love and unison on the many things that we all hold so dear—the love of 
our Ancestral Lands, the respect, love and comfort of our elders and the abundantly 
rich cultures which are indeed our most indigenous rights. Kia kaha kia toa kia 
manawanui. [Be strong, be brave, be lion-hearted.]
 – Letter from Maori Youth Council, 19741
Although it was small in size, the World Council of Indigenous Peoples' first 
preparatory meeting in Georgetown, Guyana (8-11 April 1974) is worthy of deeper 
investigation for several reasons. First, it was the first multi-regional meeting of Indigenous 
peoples. Although notably preceded by at least one other major multinational meeting of 
Indigenous peoples, the Arctic Peoples Conference held at Copenhagen in 1973 (with 
delegates from Alaska, Greenland, Northern Canada, and the Nordic Countries), that meeting 
was obviously regional in focus.2 While the Georgetown meeting lacked participation from 
every major region of the World, it did involve attendees from the four corners of the earth, 
with delegates from Australia, Canada, Greenland, New Zealand, Norway, the United States, 
1 Library and Archives Canada (hereafter LAC), R219 Department of External Affairs fonds (herafter EAF), 
45-13-3-7, Part I, International Preparatory Meeting of the Indigenous Peoples' Conference, 8-11 April 
1974 (hereafter Georgetown Transcript).
2 For more on that conference, see Inge Kleivan, “The Arctic Peoples' Conference in Copenhagen, 
November 22-25, 1973,” Études/Inuit/Studies 16:1-2 (1992), 227-236.
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and (to some degree) Colombia. Second, in many ways, the meeting determined the 
structure, focus, and discourse of the World Council of Indigenous Peoples when it was 
founded the following year. The definition of “Indigenous,” the required qualities of future 
delegates, and the general approach to Indigenous politics at a global level were decided in 
Georgetown. Finally, on a more practical level, the meeting’s detailed transcript provides one 
of the earliest sources which outlines the aims and desires of the delegates for the future of 
Indigenous internationalism. This chapter describes the personal backgrounds of the 
delegates who met in Georgetown, and analyzes their commonalities and sources of 
inspiration, the conclusions they reached, and the plans they made. A comparison between 
Third-Worldist anti-colonial leaders and these early Indigenous internationalists suggests that 
the similarities in backgrounds between the two groups encouraged them to arrive at similar 
answers about the nature of their oppression and propose similar solutions. Both groups 
understood colonialism in largely the same way, and resolved to attack it using analogous 
tactics. Both groups fought to secure collective rights, rather than just individual human 
rights. Nonetheless, the broader nature of Indigenous internationalism and the minority status 
of most Indigenous peoples required the future World Council to go further that the Third-
Worldists by challenging the Westphalian system of nation states rather than simply 
attempting to join it.
3.1 The Delegates and their commonalities
Official delegates to the preparatory meeting in Georgetown included George Manuel 
(Secwepemc of Canada; National Indian Brotherhood of Canada), Ranginui “Rangi” J. 
Walker (Te Whakatōhea Māori of New Zealand; Maori Council), Angmalortok Olsen (Inuit 
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of Greenland, Denmark; Pekatigit Kalatdlit / The Greenlandic Association), Phillip “Sam” 
Deloria (Standing Rock Sioux of the United States; National Congress of American Indians), 
Aslak Nils Sara (Sámi of Norway; Nordic Sami Council of Sweden, Finland and Norway), 
and Peter “Gary” Williams (Gumbaynggirr of Australia; Aboriginal Legal Service). There 
were also twelve official observers from Canada and Guyana, and a number of other staff in 
attendance.3 
The delegates were quite varied in their political experience, but their level of 
education was fairly consistent. Walker's involvement in Māori affairs was, by his own 
3 The six observers from Canada were Victor Adolph (Union of British Columbia Indian Chiefs), Forrest 
Walkem (Union of British Columbia Indian Chiefs), Dr. Ahab Spence (Manitoba Indian Brotherhood), 
Andrew Delisle (Indians of Quebec Association), Rev. Ernest Willie (Anglican Church of Canada), and 
Mrs. Jean Goodwill (Nēhiyaw; working with Canadian Secretary of State; daughter of John Tootoosis, a 
prominent Nēhiyaw political leader). Canadian observers came at their own expense, in some cases paying 
out of their own pockets. It appears that some participated in both formal and informal discussions to some 
degree, but their comments are generally not recorded in the transcripts. The seven observers from Guyana 
were the Honourable Philip Duncan, (from the Wapishiana tribe of the Rupununi, member of Parliament 
since 1964 at the age of 21, Parliamentary secretary for Amerindian Affairs for some time, now Regional 
Minister for Rupununi Region); Dick Laurentino (a Macushi village councillor from St. Ignatius Village); 
Theresa La Rose (an Arawak Catholic nun and welfare officer for Amerindian Affairs from the Moruca 
reserve); David Brooks, (Indigenous village captain or Touchaus, from Panima); Gertrude Fitzpatrick 
(Guyana's only female Touchaus, from Kwebanna in the North West District); Patrick Norton (Touchaus 
from River's View, and community development worked attached to the Ministry of Co-operatives and 
National Mobilization); and Eugene Stoby, (an Arawak Member of Parliament, also from the Moruca 
reserve). Guyanese government attendees included Dr. Ptolemy Reid (Deputy Prime Minister), and Miss 
Sheila King a Senior Liaison Officer and organizing secretary for the Council on the Affairs and Status of 
Women in Guyana. It seems there was some controversy over the meeting within the Guyanese 
government, as Minister of National Development, Kenneth King, bowed out of his agreed role as opening 
speaker in opposition to the meeting. Also present were staff members of the National Indian Brotherhood 
also present included Fr Guy Lavallée (seconded from the Canadian Catholic Organization for 
Development and Peace), Clive Linklater (Executive Director of the N.I.B., who chaired much of the 
meeting), Marie Smallface-Marule, and Douglas Sanders. While Jean Goodwill is listed with observers in 
the meeting's official press release, in the meeting minutes Marie Smallface-Marule describes her as being 
a temporary member of the NIB staff for the purposes of the conference. The Guyanese government also 
provided reporting staff from the Parliament Office and the Appeal Court of Guyana, and a photographer 
from the Guyana Information Services. Aside from Clive Linklater and Andrew Delisle, none of the 
observers or staff members made any comments that appear in the transcript, though they may have 
participated in the (unrecorded) discussion groups during the meeting and certainly, in informal discussions 
in the evenings. LAC, EAF, 45-13-3-7/Part I, Georgetown Transcript;  LAC, EAF, 45-13-3-7/Part I, 
Georgetown Transcript; LAC, EAF, 45-13-3-7/Part I, letter from Ormond W. Diaz (Canadian High 
Commissioner in Guyana) to Undersecretary of State for External Affairs, Ottawa, 26 April 1974.
76
description, “relatively recent.”4 Born in 1932, he had become a secretary of the Auckland 
Maori District Council in 1969, and a member of the New Zealand Maori Council in 1970. 
Also in 1970, he had completed his Ph.D. in Anthropology at Auckland University, and was 
working at the Centre for Continuing Education there, liaising between the Māori and 
Pakeha communities.5 While introducing himself on the first day of the conference, Walker 
made a point of distinguishing himself from the “truly radical” activists, describing himself 
instead as a “conservative person...concerned to see that our country does not produce any 
strife or any trouble.”6
Despite his description of Māori politics being split between the radical and 
conservative, Walker’s critique may be less concerned with the potential for social upheaval 
than on the basic conceptions underlying the movement. In July 1973, his “Kōrero” editorial 
column in the New Zealand Listener compared the New Zealand Maori Council to the 
NAACP in the United States, a “conservative body dedicated to achieving its aims by 
persuasion,” and contrasted it with “radical Maori groups” such as Nga Tamatoa, which 
might claim broader allegiance if calmer voices are ignored. But Walker specifically 
describes the “radicals” as “decultured Maoris who have dipped into Marxist and Black 
Power literature.”7 His own analysis seems to root Māori problems in the historical injustices 
of colonialism and assimilation policy, rather than in colour prejudice or the material 
4 LAC, EAF, 45-13-3-7/Part I, Georgetown Transcript.
5 Waitangi Tribunal, “Professor Ranginui Walker” <http://www.justice.govt.nz/tribunals/waitangi-
tribunal/about/tribunal-members/professor-ranginui-walker> (2014) On the Auckland Maori District 
Council, Walker served alongside Dr. Pat Hohepa, whom George Manuel had met on his tour of New 
Zealand in 1971. LAC, EAF, 45-13-3-7/Part I, Georgetown Transcript.
6 LAC, EAF, 45-13-3-7/Part I, Georgetown Transcript. Walker failed to mention, however, that he had 
personally organized the Young Māori Leaders Conference where Nga Tamatoa had been founded. 
Ranginui Walker, Nga Tau Tohetohe (Auckland, N.Z.: Penguin, 1987), 12.
7 My emphasis. Walker, Nga Tau Tohetohe, 96-97.
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inequality of the class system. Thus, he asserted, a greater respect for “the traditional cultural 
base of the Maori” in search of decolonization was a better tactic than the “radical” race-
based politics of African-Americans. 8
Olsen was born in Qaanaaq, Greenland but moved to Denmark in 1937 at the age of 
ten.9 At that time, he spoke not a word of Danish. He continued his education to become an 
electrical engineer, married, and lived in Copenhagen before joining the Inuit organization 
Pekatigit Kalatdlit.10 At the time of the conference, he was serving as its Chair, as well as a 
representative on the Land Council in Greenland (Grønlands Landsråd). In The Last Kings 
of Thule, Jean Malaurie describes Olsen as “representative of the Greenlandic 
intelligentsia.”11
Williams was by far the youngest of the group. He was not yet 30 years old, and he 
had spent much of his life living on the Bellwoods Aboriginal Reserve in Nambucca Heads, 
New South Wales.12 In 1963, he was one of the first two Indigenous students to enrol at 
Sydney University, and would join the 1965 Australian “Freedom Ride” for Indigenous 
rights.13 Nevertheless, Williams described his participation in Indigenous politics as “rather 
marginal” until 1970. Since then, he had supported the Aboriginal Tent Embassy in Canberra, 
8 Walker, Nga Tau Tohetohe, 98.
9 In some documents, Olsen's given name is written as Angmalortoq rather that Angmalortok, but the latter 
seems to be more common. LAC, EAF, 45-13-3-7/Part I, Georgetown Transcript.
10 Pekatigit Kalatdlit (the Association/Society of Greenlanders) was founded by anthropologist Svend 
Frederiksen in the late 1930s. Limited further information is available in: Erik Beukel, “A New Policy on 
Greenland in the Pipeline: Danish and Greenland Initiatives, 1945-1950” in Phasing Out the Colonial 
Status of Greenland, 1945-54: A Historical Study, eds., Erik Beukel, Frede P. Jensen, and Jens Elo Rytter 
(Copenhagen: Museum Tusculanum Press, 2010), 428. 
11 Jean Malaurie, The Last Kings of Thule: With the Polar Eskimos, As They Face Their Destiny, (originally 
published in French in 1976), English Translation, (London: Jonathan Cape, 1982), 425-427.
12 The Georgetown meeting minutes erroneously describe him has having spent time living on reserve in 
America. Dawn 12:5 (May 1963), 11. <http://www1.aiatsis.gov.au/dawn/docs/v12/s05/13.pdf>
13 John Cleverly and Janet Mooney, Taking Our Place: Aboriginal Education and the Story of the Koori 
Centre at the University of Sydney (Sydney University Press, 2009), 29-32.
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helped found the Aboriginal Legal Service in Redfern, and become the head of that 
organization as well as the Aboriginal Medical Service.14
Deloria, in his 30s, had completed his undergraduate degree (in 1964) and most of a 
law degree at Yale, before taking up the position of director at the American Indian Law 
Centre at the University of New Mexico.15 He attended the meeting representing the National 
Congress of American Indians (NCAI), the National Tribal Chairmen's Association (NCTA), 
and Americans for Indian Opportunity.16 The NCAI was by far the oldest, largest and most 
powerful pan-tribal organization in the United States. Although its membership was strictly 
from the elected governments of federally recognized tribes, the increased involvement of 
militant Native Americans from off reserve in the NCAI caused some leaders to fear a 
takeover and form a new organization, the NTCA, in 1971.17
Aslak Nils Sara, age 40, had earned a degree in Chemistry from the University of 
Oslo in 1969, after which he worked with the Norwegian Department of Environment.18 It 
14 LAC, EAF, 45-13-3-7/Part I, Georgetown Transcript. It was in the early 1970s that urban Indigenous 
activists in the Redfern neighbourhood of Sydney began to launch their own programs and services to 
address their needs, the Aboriginal Legal Service and Aboriginal Medical service being two of the most 
important examples. See Kay Anderson, “Savagery and Urbanity: Struggles over Aboriginal Housing, 
Redfern, 1970–73” in Settlement: A History of Australian Indigenous Housing, ed., Peter Read (Canberra: 
Aboriginal Studies Press, 2000), 130-143.
15 Yale Daily News, 10 November 2005. <http://yaledailynews.com/blog/2005/11/10/deloria-64-champions-
native-american-rights/> While Deloria's mood during the proceedings was frequently jocular—musing, 
for instance, on the possibility of the C.I.A. taking high altitude photographs of delegates from U2 spy-
planes—his legal background was clearly quite helpful in analyzing and formulating resolutions for the 
group. LAC, EAF, 45-13-3-7/Part I, Georgetown Transcript.
16 LAC, EAF, 45-13-3-7/Part I, Georgetown Transcript.
17 Notably, both organizations opposed the American Indian Movement’s occupation of Wounded Knee in 
1973. Hazel Whitman Hertzberg, “Indian Rights Movement, 1887-1973,” in Handbook of North American 
Indians, Vol. 4, ed. Wilcomb E. Washburn (Washington: Smithsonian Institution, 1988), 321-22.
18  Bjorn Aarseth, “Aslak Nils Sara” in Norwegian Encyclopedia (Store Norske Leksikon), 
<http://snl.no/.nbl_biografi/Aslak_Nils_Sara/utdypning  > . Among Sara’s classmates in Oslo was Nils-
Aslak Valkeapää, a prominent Finnish Sámi artist and political leader who would also attend the first World 
Conference of Indigenous Peoples in 1975. Jukka Nyyssönen, “‘Everybody recognized that we were not 
white:’ Sami Identity Politics in Finland, 1945-1990,” (Ph.D. Thesis, University of Tromsø, 2007). Sara's 
studies were not limited to Chemistry—he also took courses in “philosophy and other things... He knew 
much about the history of ideas and that kind of thing.” Ole Henrik Magga, personal interview, 5 April 
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was in that capacity that he and George Manuel had first met in Stockholm during the first 
United Nations Conference on the Human Environment in 1972.19 He attended the 
Georgetown meeting representing the Sami Parliament in Finland, the Association of 
Swedish Samis, the Association of Norwegian Samis (which he had directed from 1968-71), 
and the Association of Norwegian Reindeer Herders. At the time of the meeting, he was 
serving as Director of the Nordic Sami Institute, which had opened the previous fall.20 
A two-person Colombian delegation led by Manuel Trino Morales (Guambía of 
Colombia; Consejo Regional Indígena de el Cauca), had made it as far as the Pegasus Hotel 
in Georgetown but was unable to attend the meeting; they lacked proof of a yellow fever 
vaccination “and so were quarantined and returned home as expeditiously as possible.”21 
George Manuel’s protests to the Guyanese government on behalf of the expelled delegates 
were ignored.22 Whether the Yellow Fever threat was, in this instance, a serious concern or 
merely a convenient pretence to remove politically problematic guests who might endanger 
Guyana's relationship with nearby Colombia is unclear.23 
2013.
19 Aslak Nils Sara, “Oppdagelsen av oss selv og verden” in Becoming Visible: Indigenous Politics and Self 
Government, Terje Brantenberg, Janne Hansen and Henry Minde (Tromsø: Centre for Sami Studies, 1995), 
p5; and Henry Minde, “The Challenge of Indigenism: The Struggle for Sami Land Rights and Self-
Government in Norway, 1960-1990” in Indigenous Peoples: Resource Management and Global Rights, 
eds., Svein Jentoft, Henry Minde and Ragnar Nilsen (Delft: Eburon, 2003), 81-83. It is unclear from the 
records if Sara and Olsen knew each well other before attending the meeting in Georgetown, but they had 
both attended the International Arctic Peoples Conference held at Copenhagen in 1973, so it seems likely.
20 LAC, EAF, 45-13-3-7/Part I, Georgetown Transcript.
21 LAC, EAF, 45-13-3-7/Part I, letter from Ormond W. Dier (Canadian High Commission, Georgetown) to 
Secretary of State for External Affairs, Ottawa, 26 April 1974.
22 George Manuel Diaries (hereafter GMD), 8 April 1974.
23 Colombia's Horecio Calle (Consejo Regional Indígena de el Cauca) was also listed as an official observer 
in the meeting’s documents. LAC, EAF, 45-13-3-7/Part I, Georgetown Transcript; LAC, EAF, 45-13-3-
7/Part I, letter from Ormond W. Diaz (Canadian High Commissioner in Guyana) to Undersecretary of State 
for External Affairs, Ottawa, 26 April 1974; LAC, EAF, 45-13-3-7/Part I, International Preparatory 
Meeting of the Indigenous Peoples Conference, Official Delegates List; George Manuel Diaries, 5-12 April 
1974. Trino Morales did successfully attend the second preparatory meeting in Copenhagen the following 
year. For more on Morales, see Christian Gros and Trino Morales, ¡A mí no me manda nadie! : historia de 
vida de Trino Morales, (Bogotá D.C.: Instituto Colombiano de Antropologia e Historia, 2009.) 
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When examining the biographies of the delegates, what is perhaps most striking is the 
level of education at the table. With George Manuel as the sole exception, everyone had at 
least some amount of post-secondary education. Most would have been among the first 
generation of Indigenous peoples in their home countries to reach that stage of study. Any 
formal education increases one’s ability to effectively communicate an argument in ways the 
non-Indigenous can understand, but post-secondary education in particular may well have 
shaped the ideas of these delegates in specific ways. Post-secondary education, at least at that 
point, was generally available only in large urban centres so attendance would have forced 
Indigenous students to leave their home communities. For Deloria, the experience of being 
the only Native American in his class at Harvard encouraged him to seek out other 
Indigenous people in Connecticut, and engage politically beyond his Sioux community.24 As 
mentioned above, it was Gary Williams’ move to Sydney that helped prompt his political 
activism, setting up organizations for any urban aboriginals in the city. Olsen states that it 
was only in succeeding to live “down there [in Denmark] … that I discovered that I could be 
of use to my people.”25 While George Manuel did not, himself, have much education, a later 
conversation with Sámi activist Niillas Somby suggests he recognized its usefulness as a tool. 
In the early 1980s, Somby's younger brother Ánde was studying law, as was Manuel's son 
Arthur. Somby was somewhat skeptical of “all this so called high-level education,” worried it 
might “lead us faster into... the Western system.”26 Manuel asserted that, so long as these 
young people do not lose touch with their culture, their post-secondary education enable 
24 Yale Daily News, 10 November 2005. <http://yaledailynews.com/blog/2005/11/10/deloria-64-champions-
native-american-rights/  > 
25 LAC, EAF, 45-13-3-7/Part I, Georgetown Transcript.
26 Niillas Somby, personal interview, 3 April 2013.
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them to understand Western systems and, thus, to “make connections and adapt their way of 
working to the decolonization of [Indigenous lands].”27
The impact of post-secondary education and its surrounding experience is strikingly 
reminiscent of the process that had occurred in Africa not long before. A great number of 
anti-colonial leaders (including Kenya’s Jomo Kenyatta, Guinea-Bissau’s Amílcar Cabral, 
Tanzania's Julius Nyerere, and Ghana’s Kwame Nkrumah) had studied abroad, only to return 
home not just politicized, but increasingly supportive of Pan-Africanism. Within the French 
Empire, a great number of post-independence leaders had all studied at the same school, 
l’École normale supérieure William Ponty in today’s Senegal.28 The school did not exist to 
educate future academics—its diploma was invalid outside of Africa—but to train African 
civil servants. Nonetheless, students were instructed in language, mathematics, natural 
sciences and sciences humaines, and they absorbed important lessons about the universal 
nature of French Republicanism, secularism and modernity that would influence their later 
political careers.29 Even among those who did not pursue an education, simply the experience 
of living and working in the metropole could foster a stronger affinity to one’s colonial peers 
from other regions. They recognized that the oppression their people faced was not unique, 
27 Niillas Somby, personal interview, 3 April 2013. Manuel's ideas here suggest a willingness to use “the 
discourses of the West against the West,” a technique that Robert Fernández Retamar describes as 
“Calibanism” referencing Shakespeare's The Tempest in which Caliban replies to Prospero, “You taught me 
language, and my profit on't / Is, I know how to curse: the red-plague rid you, / For learning me your 
language. (Act 1. Scene 2,) William Shakespeare, The Tempest (Hertfordshire: Wordsworth Classics, 
1994), quoted in Jose Antonio Lucero, “Fanon in the Andes: Fausto Reinaga, Indianismo, and the Black 
Atlantic,” International Journal of Critical Indigenous Studies 1:1 (2008), 14, 22n; Roberto Fernández 
Retamar, Todo Caliban (San Juan, Puerto Rico: Ediciones Callejón, 2003).
28 These included including Félix Houphouët-Boigny of Côte d'Ivoire, Modibo Keïta of Mali, Hamani Diori 
of Niger, Hubert Maga of Benin (Dahomey), Mamadou Dia of Senegal, and Maurice Yaméogo and Daniel 
Ouezzin Coulibaly of Burkina Faso (Upper Volta). Abou Abel Thiam, “Retour à William-Ponty,” Jeune 
Afrique, 8 September 2003.
29 Tony Chafer, “Education and political socialisation of a national-colonial political elite in French West 
Africa, 1936-47,” The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History, 35 (3), 442-446.
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but consistent (albeit not identical) throughout the empire, and even across different empires. 
This knowledge helped them formulate a deeper critique of imperialism as a system (rather 
than just focusing on local injustices) and wield it more effectively in solidarity and even 
cooperation with each other. The 1936 election victory of the French Popular Front, with its 
Socialist promises of universal liberty and equality, and a reformist vision for the empire, was 
also an important influence at least on anti-colonial leaders from French Africa.30 It was not 
only their education, but also the political environment in the metropole during their youth 
which shaped these men's post-colonial vision.
With the Indigenous delegates in Georgetown, it seems that, much like the pattern of 
previous anti-colonial activists, it was not only their education but also the broader 
contemporary political discourse which influenced them; in this case, it was the discourse of 
the Third-Worldists and the anti-colonial internationalist “New Left” which they encountered 
during their studies. Ole Henrik Magga, an associate of Aslak Nils Sara's, suggests the 
“student spirit” of Paris' May 1968 had a deep influence him and other Sámi students in 
university at the time: “You had to analyze things, and you should be able to change things. It 
was your duty to do something.”31 In his analysis of the internationalization of Sámi activism, 
historian Henry Minde writes that
[t]his change of attitude towards the Sami as an indigenous people 
reflected the changing ideological climate that took place in the youth 
culture of the western world, especially in university environs... An 
increasing number of young Sami people began to study at the old 
universities in the south throughout the 1960s and 1970s, in Norway 
as well as Sweden and Finland. A new generation of Sami politicians 
were inspired by ideas of equality and the right of self-determination, 
30 Chafer, 446-449. 
31 Ole Henrik Magga, personal interview, 5 April 2013.
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such as those set down in declarations of human rights and 
conventions, and those expressed in conflicts in the Third World....32
Minde further notes that in 1969, a collection of articles was published in Oslo entitled 
Nordisk nykolonialisme. Samiske problem I dag (Nordic Neocolonialism: Sámi Problems 
Today), clearly indicating that academics were beginning to draw links between the situation 
in Norway and those of the Third World. 33 Gary Foley, a friend of Gary Williams, states in 
an essay on his own political involvement at the time that, in Sydney, he and Williams “were 
starting to encounter new people and new ideas.”34 Heather Goodall describes this new input 
as “diverse groupings of young people who sometimes called themselves 'New Left', but who 
might just as well associate themselves in Australia with the anarchist, libertarian 
traditions.”35 Foley acknowledges that they were “'influenced by the anti-colonial movements 
in India and Africa' and writers like Frantz Fanon, Jean Paul Sartre and Albert Camus,” who 
criticized the inherent racism and violence of European empires.36 The ideas of the “New 
32 Henry Minde, “The Challenge of Indigenism,” 80. For more on the impact of education on young Sámi in 
the 1970s and '80s, see Harald Eidheim, “Ethno-Political Development among the Sami after World War II: 
The Invention of Selfhood,” in Sami Culture in a New Era: The Norwegian Sami Experience, ed. Harald 
Gaski (Karasjohka: Davvi Girji OS, 1997), 38-39; and Greta Roland, “A University in the 'Fourth World': 
The Self-Determination of the Norwegian Saami,” Dialectical Anthropology 18:1 (1993).
33 Henry Minde, “The Challenge of Indigenism,” 79.
34 Gary Foley, “Black Power in Redfern 1968 – 1972”, 
<http://www.kooriweb.org/foley/essays/essay_1.html> (The Koori History Website, 2001).
35 Heather Goodall, Invasion to Embassy: Land in Aboriginal Politics in NSW, 1770-1972 (Sydney, Allen and 
Unwin, 1996), as quoted in Foley, “Black Power in Redfern.”
36 Heather Goodall, Invasion to Embassy, as quoted in Foley, “Black Power in Redfern.” Frantz Fanon's two 
most notable works are Black Skin, White Masks (New York: Grove Press, 1967) which examines the 
psychological effects of colonialism and racism, and The Wretched of the Earth (New York: Grove Press, 
1963), to which he adds the further analysis of the effects of decolonization. Among Jean-Paul Sartre's 
numerous writings on the subject of colonialism, his 1956 article on French Algeria contends that simply 
improving the economic and social lives of the colonized without addressing the inherent political 
inequality of colonialism will never yield real results. “Colonialism is a System,” in Colonialism and 
Neocolonialism (New York: Routledge, 2001), 9-19. Albert Camus' position as an anti-colonial figure has 
been deeply contested over time. The most recent contribution to the debate is from David Caroll: Albert 
Camus the Algerian: Colonialism, Terrorism, Justice (New York: Columbia University Press, 2007).
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Left” and other strains of student/youth activism during the 1960s and '70 were vital in 
shaping the approach of this generation of Indigenous leaders around the world.
Many of the Indigenous delegates at Georgetown had been shaped by their education, 
their experiences in urban centres, and by the ideas of the Third World anti-colonialism that 
permeated the student circles around the world during the 1960s and '70s. In much the same 
way as similar experiences had affected African anti-colonial activists, these influences 
encouraged Indigenous activists to look outside the confines of their own national situation, 
and to evaluate what Indigeneity meant at a global rather than a local level. Like the students 
in French colonial Africa, they took seriously the ideals espoused by another political 
movement (in this case, the Third World rather than the Popular Front) and built their plan 
with those ideals in mind. Third-Worldism and Indigenous Internationalism grew out of 
similar circumstances, and as we will see, both movements sought to overcome oppression in 
similar ways.
3.2 Overcoming Isolation
While education and life in their respective metropoles had connected these delegates 
both with their Indigenous brethren within their countries and with new political discourses 
of anti-colonialism, what remained lacking was a solid connection with other peoples in 
similar circumstances. Both Olsen and Williams, from islands on opposite sides of the globe, 
commented on a similar feeling of isolation. “We are very interested in this conference 
because it has dawned upon us,” said Olsen, “that even though we sit in the far corner of the 
world, there is a movement through the whole world of ideas and of peoples...”37 Williams 
37 LAC, EAF, 45-13-3-7/Part I, Georgetown Transcript.
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echoed this feeling of remoteness, and a need for better communication with other 
Indigenous peoples: “[In] Australia we are pretty much isolated and anything that happens in 
another part of the world concerning aboriginal peoples reaches us a long while after the 
event has happened.”38 The feeling of isolation, however, was partly the result of history and 
political domination, not just geography. The process of colonization had, in some cases, 
separated families across state borders, segregated interrelated communities onto reserves, 
and impeded traditions of cooperation and sharing within nations. Looking just within the 
United States, the International Indian Treaty Council's Jimmy Durham argued that American 
Indians were struggling “to break out of isolation.”39 The advances in technology of the late 
nineteenth and twentieth centuries not only facilitated peoples to overcome geographical 
isolation, but they also enabled them to form alliances with others which would help them 
overcome political isolation as well.40
Indigenous Australians’ lack of consistent communication with other Indigenous 
peoples may be partly responsible for the nature of their political mobilization until that 
point. The influence of African-American activism on Indigenous Australians, by contrast, 
had a long history,41 and by the 1960s, the Koori of South East Australia increasingly saw 
parallels between the urban poverty and racism they faced with the situation in the United 
States. Self-identification on the basis of race/colour (“Black Australians”) seems more 
common about Indigenous activism in Australia than elsewhere, leading to the copying of 
38 LAC, EAF, 45-13-3-7/Part I, Georgetown Transcript.
39 Jimmie Durham, “American Indian Culture: Traditionalism and Spiritualism in a Revolutionary Struggle,” 
in A Certain Lack of Coherence: Writings on Art and Cultural Politics (London: Kala Press, 1993), 12-13.
40 These “others” might include related groups and historical enemies within a region, as well as those with 
whom there was no previous contact at all.
41 See John Maynard, Fight for Liberty and Freedom: The Origins of Australian Aboriginal Activism 
(Canberra: Aboriginal Studies Press, 2007).
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both tactics and goals from the American Civil Rights movement (in the form of Freedom 
Rides for civil rights) and African-American radicalism (in more militant action, and protests 
against police brutality).42 Gary Foley describes the influence of African-American troops on 
Rest and Recuperation leave in Australia from the Vietnam War, who “gravitated toward the 
Sydney Black community in Redfern.”43 While the rise of the American Indian Movement 
and Red Power would certainly have made the Australian news, Redfern activists were 
equally aware of the work of the Black Panthers as they were of the Occupation of Alcatraz, 
and that Eldridge Cleaver’s Soul on Ice was as popular as Dee Brown’s Bury My Heart at 
Wounded Knee.44 This may have contributed to Indigenous Australians placing more 
emphasis on the eradication of racism relative to Indigenous rights to land or self-
determination than did Indigenous peoples elsewhere.45
In his closing comments at the meeting, Walker declared:
42 Inter alia, see: Kathy Lothia, “Moving Blackwards: Black Power and the Aboriginal Embassy,” in 
Transgressions: Critical Australian Indigenous Histories, eds. Ingereth Macfarlane and Mark Hannah 
(Canberra: Australian National University E-Press and Aboriginal History Inc., 2006), 19-34. Perhaps 
unsurprisingly, the Red Power movement in the United States was also influenced by African-American 
activism and actively used the discourse of both skin colour and race. Some elements of race-based 
ideology have appeared in Central and South America as well. For Fausto Reinaga's use of race in his ideas 
of Indianidad, see Lucero, 16-17.
43 Foley, “Black Power in Redfern.”
44 Heather Goodall, Invasion to Embassy, as quoted in Foley, “Black Power in Redfern.” The influence of 
African-American activism was not limited to Australia. Ole Henrik Magga was struck by the painful 
similarities with life in Sápmi when reading James Baldwin's The Fire Next Time. Ole Henrik Magga, 
personal interview. In the 1971 edition of his influential book, Greetings from Lapland, Sámi activist Nils-
Aslak Valkeapää makes comparisons between Sámi life and the life of 19th century African-American slave 
Nat Turner, though in the 1978 edition, after having attended the World Conference of Indigenous Peoples, 
he acknowledges, “I could easily have taken an Indian as an example, instead of Nat Turner...[but]...at that 
time it was better to talk about negroes than Indians.” Nils-Aslak Valkeapää, Greetings from Lappland: 
The Sami – Europe's Forgotten People, translated by Beverly Wahl (London: Zed Press, 1983), 110. 
Nonetheless, these types of comparisons certainly do not seem to have been as common as they were in 
Australia.
45 Both the particular historical and modern circumstances of Indigenous relations with Australian settler 
society likely provide as much if not more explanation for this political orientation. Moreover, Heather 
Goodall has done excellent work in complicating the dichotomy between civil rights and land rights in 
Australia, emphasizing that both were considered important by Indigenous activists. Heather Goodall, 
Invasion to Embassy, 311-312.
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This is an historic occasion; it is time that we came together and 
shared our thoughts, shared our common problems, because we fight 
our lonely battles in our own lands but sometimes the battle seems to 
be insurmountable and when we meet together and find that we have 
much in common, we go back to our respective countries with 
renewed vitality to take up the struggles, the cause of indigenous 
peoples.46
Beyond the meeting in Georgetown, it was the possibility of a larger World Conference of 
Indigenous Peoples, and the idea of a permanent organization of Indigenous Peoples that 
delegates hoped would overcome that sort of geo-political isolation.47 They were coming to 
the same realization that had struck George Manuel during his trips to New Zealand, 
Australia and Sweden.48 Most Indigenous peoples might be small minorities in their own 
countries, but if they united, they could create a larger and more powerful bloc.49 In his 
opening address, George Manuel suggested that international connections are simply the 
logical extension of his political experience, moving from the organization of his own 
community, to the provincial, and then national level.50 Walker described the theoretical 
power given to Māori through their assigned parliamentary seats, but narrates how Māori 
efforts to criticize racism within New Zealand at the United Nations were hampered by 
domestic partisan politics. He hoped that creating an international Indigenous organization 
would finally give Māori “an international voice.”51 
Every delegate could see the advantages of such an organization, even Olsen who 
asserted that the people of Greenland were in a good position relative to other Indigenous 
46 LAC, EAF, 45-13-3-7/Part I, Georgetown Transcript.
47 LAC, EAF, 45-13-3-7/Part I, Georgetown Transcript.
48 LAC, EAF, 45-13-3-7/Part I, Georgetown Transcript.
49 Those rare Indigenous peoples who were not minorities in their respective states, but were economically 
and politically marginalized by the local non-Indigenous elite nonetheless, naturally also stood to gain 
from international attention to their oppression.
50 LAC, EAF, 45-13-3-7/Part I, Georgetown Transcript.
51 LAC, EAF, 45-13-3-7/Part I, Georgetown Transcript.
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peoples: “We are progressing politically and we are so far ahead now that we are beginning 
to discuss home rule.”52 He acknowledged this might make some wonder if Greenlanders had 
anything to gain from such an organization, but “on the other hand, it is so that we want to 
break our isolation and also we know that we have a lot to learn. Also we know that we have 
had disasters happen to our culture and want to find our way back again. This we cannot do 
unless we have contact with our brethren across the borders.”53 Delegates imagined that an 
international organization could function partly as information clearing house to disseminate 
information between Indigenous peoples and overcome this isolation.54
Eventually, a resolution was proposed by Walker and passed unanimously. It declared:
That an international Conference of Indigenous Peoples be held for 
the purpose of:
1) The meaningful exchange of information (organizational, legal, sociological 
and cultural, etc.) to strengthen voluntary associations of indigenous people in 
various countries to:
a) reduce the possibility of physical and cultural genocide;
b) combat racism;
c) ensure political, economic and social justice;
52 LAC, EAF, 45-13-3-7/Part I, Georgetown Transcript. Regarding the term “home rule,” in The American 
Empire and the Fourth World, Anthony Hall notes Manuel's frequent use of the terms “responsible 
government” and “home rule” in his book The Fourth World. The former, says Hall, had been used to 
describe constitutional self-government within the British Empire, whereas the latter was used for “more 
limited forms of decolonization” in places like Indian and West Africa. By referencing both, Manuel 
presented Indigenous “aspirations for decolonization as a manifestation and extension of the same urges 
motivating colonized peoples throughout Europe's overseas realms, including those liberal-minded 
Canadians who have been encouraged to celebrate the constitutional evolution of their own country 'from 
colony to nation.'” Anthony J. Hall, The American Empire and the Fourth World (Montreal: McGill-
Queen's University Press, 2003), 287.
53 LAC, EAF, 45-13-3-7/Part I, Georgetown Transcript.
54 LAC, EAF, 45-13-3-7/Part I, Georgetown Transcript.
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d) establish and strengthen the concept of indigenous and cultural 
rights;
2) The consideration of the feasibility of a permanent International 
organization of Indigenous peoples;
3)That there continue to be meaningful exchange of information between 
the representatives at this meeting.55
Immediately noticeable is the fact that the phrase “meaningful exchange of 
information” is used twice: the conference should itself serve as a venue for the exchange of 
information, but even if a permanent organization was not created, attendees should continue 
that exchange of information independently.56 Perhaps more importantly, the purposes of 
such an exchange are also made explicit, and they are primarily political in nature and 
focused on collective rights. The individual human right to security from violence might be 
implied, but it is a collective right to security from genocide that is prioritized. Similarly, 
racism might impact an individual but it is an act perpetrated against a group. Indigenous and 
cultural rights are clearly collective rights. Thus, the initial statement of this first global 
meeting of Indigenous peoples is clearly expressing a desire for collective rights rather than 
the individual rights generally guaranteed by the post-war consensus on human rights. 
Furthermore, while economics and society are mentioned, it is in the context of economic 
and social justice not economic or social development. These are goals to overcome the 
55 LAC, EAF, 45-13-3-7/Part I, Georgetown Transcript.
56 Keck and Sikkink suggest the use of “information politics” by “transnational advocacy networks” is most 
effective when local testimony (about human rights abuses, for example) are combined with technical and 
statistical information, and diffused abroad. These same advocacy networks are able to use this information 
as part of “leverage politics” whereby more powerful members of the network mobilize to hold up states to 
public scrutiny or shaming. This is, in to no small degree, the role the World Council would play. Margaret 
E. Keck and Kathryn Sikkink, “Transnational advocacy networks in international and regional politics,” 
International Social Science Journal 51:159 (March 1999), 95-97. 
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historically and politically derived structural problems of Indigenous peoples through 
political empowerment (“the strengthening of voluntary associations”), rather than to find 
technical solutions for people lacking sufficient employment, housing, infrastructure or 
healthcare.57
An evident parallel exists with the 1955 Afro–Asian Conference (Bandung, 
Indonesia), held to organize opposition to imperialism and colonialism. While that meeting's 
Final Communiqué was far more supportive of economic development, it also “condemned 
racialism as a means of cultural suppression,” stressed the need for cultural rights (including 
the right to study in one's own language), and promoted global cultural co-operation between 
colonial peoples.58 European colonization had not only suppressed national cultures, it had 
prevented communication and co-operation between the peoples of Africa and Asia, but 
delegates at Bandung were “animated by a keen and sincere desire to renew their old cultural 
contacts and develop new ones in the context of the modern world.”59 As stated, European 
colonization had, at least in some cases, similarly divided Indigenous peoples with imposed 
borders and forcibly isolated them on reservations. As regional and national organizations 
had grown, these old lines of communication had been restored, but the planned international 
conference would provide Indigenous peoples with an opportunity to develop new contacts 
which had never before existed. At very least, lines of communication between Indigenous 
peoples would be kept open so that none would remain isolated. Perhaps most importantly, 
however, the Afro-Asian Conference supported the principle of self-determination not simply 
57 The World Council's shifting approach to economic and social development is addressed in more detail in 
Chapter 4 of this dissertation.
58 “Final Communiqué of the Asian-African conference of Bandung” (24 April 1955), 
<http://franke.uchicago.edu/Final_Communique_Bandung_1955.pdf>
59 “Final Communiqué of the Asian-African conference of Bandung.”
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as a human right, but as “a pre-requisite of the full enjoyment of all fundamental Human 
Rights.”60 With this prerequisite, the delegates intended to challenge assertions by European 
colonial powers that human rights could be respected in colonial settings under foreign 
subjugation.61 Delegates in Georgetown provided clear examples of the result when 
individual civil rights were formally granted to colonial peoples but whose collective rights 
to self-determination had not been acknowledged. In the future, they hoped to involve others 
who had been afforded neither individual civil rights nor collective sovereignty rights. Just 
like the delegates at Bandung, they resolved to overcome their isolation and to demand their 
collective rights and those of Indigenous peoples everywhere. Having arrived at similar 
conclusions about their oppression as had Third World anti-colonialists, they also proposed a 
similar solution: an international alliance (this time for Indigenous peoples) to secure 
collective rights for all, including the right to self-determination.
3.3 Definition
Sam Deloria was the first to propose arriving at a definition of Indigenous groups, so 
as to decide who might attend the conference. Given Olsen's comments about the generally 
positive state of affairs in Greenland, however, he proposed that,
...we may want to develop these definitions in such a way as to get at 
them as societies or cultures and not defining them as victims of 
oppression, that is, there may be indigenous peoples in some 
circumstances throughout the world who do not feel that they are 
victims of oppression or feel that their relationship with their own 
Government is satisfactory and I think that that should not operate to 
discourage them from attending the Conference because by the 
60 “Final Communiqué of the Asian-African conference of Bandung.”
61 Roland Burke, Decolonization and the Evolution of International Human Rights (Philadelphia: University 
of Pennsylvania Press, 2010), 35-58.
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example that they are able to set they may be able to help lead the 
way and show some useful example to other peoples.62
The door was to be left as wide as possible, and at Gary Williams' suggestion, it was accepted 
that the definition they reached would be purely for the purposes of the first world 
conference. Those delegates attending the larger meeting would be allowed to redefine 
“Indigenous” for the purposes of a permanent organization if they so wished.63
Deloria and Walker recommended the use of the term “Indigenous People” over 
“Aboriginal People” and came up with the following definition, which was accepted by the 
others:
The term 'Indigenous People' refers to people living in countries 
which have a population composed of differing ethnic or racial 
groups who are descendants of the earliest populations living in the 
area and who do not, as a group, control the national government of 
the countries within which they live.64
This definition was intentionally broad so as to avoid proscribing the attendance of 
wanted groups, though Deloria acknowledged that “it may cover more than are 
appropriate.”65 Henry Minde has suggested that this definition is a clear nod to the Sámi.66 
Certainly, it does not exclude them on the basis of skin colour, geography or their much 
longer relationship with a settler society, but there is little reason to expect that it would 
include any of these factors—such a definition might exclude many others as well. The 
definition is explicitly political not cultural. As Douglas Sanders notes in his account of the 
meeting, this definition does not define Indigenous peoples as a mere ethnic minority; 
62 LAC, EAF, 45-13-3-7/Part I, Georgetown Transcript.
63 LAC, EAF, 45-13-3-7/Part I, Georgetown Transcript.
64 LAC, EAF, 45-13-3-7/Part I, Georgetown Transcript.
65 LAC, EAF, 45-13-3-7/Part I, Georgetown Transcript.
66 Henry Minde, “The Challenge of Indigenism,” 84-85.
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ignoring relative population size left the door open to Indigenous peoples of several Central 
and South American countries who make up a majority or near majority of their national 
population, yet were politically marginalized.67 Nor does it define Indigenous peoples based 
on any shared ethnic, cultural, economic or social traits (a shared belief in “closeness to the 
land”, for instance, did not figure in here).68 It defines them instead by their relationship with 
settlers. It is this definition which draws the strongest connection between Indigenous 
internationalism and pre-existing forms of International anti-colonialism. Your culture, your 
family line, your ethnicity, or your language might make you Secwepemc, Sioux, Māori or 
Sámi, regardless of your relationship with others; but according to the definition accepted in 
Georgetown, it is a shared history of invasion, colonialism or outside settlement and a shared 
experience of marginalization which made you Indigenous. It was, if anything, only a 
broadened definition of anti-colonial Third-Worldism. 
At the same time, the definition did not restrict membership to those who had been 
subject to European colonization. The International Indian Treaty Council, by contrast, had 
done effectively that by limiting its focus to Indigenous Peoples of the Western 
Hemisphere.69 While the issue was not discussed in Georgetown, this theoretically allowed 
67 Douglas E. Sanders, The Formation of the World Council of Indigenous Peoples (Copenhagen: 
International Work Group for Indigenous Affairs, 1977), 12.
68 It is worth contrasting this definition with the one employed by the International Labour Organization's 
1957 Indigenous and Tribal Populations Convention, which defines Indigenous people according to their 
social and economic conditions (being “less advanced” than the rest of the national community) and to the 
degree to which they live “in conformity with the social, economic and cultural institutions” as they were 
at the time of contact. ILO Convention 107: “Convention concerning the Protection and Integration of 
Indigenous and Other Tribal and Semi-Tribal Populations in Independent Countries” 
<http://www.ilo.org/ilolex/cgi-lex/convde.pl?C107> The Georgetown definition is quite close to the 
working definition adopted in 1972 for ECOSOC's “ Martínez Cobo Report.” For an analysis of the latter, 
see Henry Minde, “The Destination and the Journey: Indigenous Peoples and the United Nations from the 
1960s through 1985,” in Indigenous Peoples: Self-determination, Knowledge, Indigeneity, ed. Henry 
Minde (Delft: Eburon Academic Publishers, 2008), 56-58. 
69 See Chapter Two, page 62-64.
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for the participation of populations in Asia and Africa. No Indigenous peoples from either of 
these continents were represented at the founding conference in 1975, but there were some 
efforts to connect with groups in the U.S.S.R, China and other parts of Asia.70 This omission 
was officially for “practical reasons,” in areas where the division between Indigenous and 
non-Indigenous was perhaps less apparent.71 Sam Deloria asserts that it was not from a lack 
of “interest in those areas, but we figured it would be biting off more than we could chew” in 
the early days of the organization.72 No African tribal groups would ever join the World 
Council, but some in-roads would eventually be made in Asia. At the World Council's 1977 
General Assembly, delegates from Australia were given a mandate to organize a Pacific 
Regional Council, which would include Indigenous peoples of Australia, Aotearoa (New 
Zealand), Papua New Guinea, the Polynesian Islands and the Ainu of Japan.73 On the final 
day of the 1981 WCIP General Assembly in Canberra, observers from Asia (including Ainu 
from Japan, as well as representatives from Thailand and India) addressed the delegates.74 By 
the time of the 1990 General Assembly, the World Council's many regional branches 
included the Pacific Asia Council of Indigenous Peoples (PACIP) directed by Pōkā Laenui 
(Hayden Burgess) of Hawaii. PACIP claimed membership throughout Asia, but there is little 
evidence these organizations played a serious role at the World Council at all, aside from 
70 Sanders, The Formation of the World Council of Indigenous Peoples, 13.
71 Sanders, The Formation of the World Council of Indigenous Peoples, 13. The division between colonizer 
and colonized is not actually very straightforward. The WCIP seems to have simply chosen to ignore the 
problematic of including, for example, Canadian Métis with heritage from both camps. Moreover, the 
widespread intermarriage between European settlers and Indigenous peoples throughout Central and South 
America during the colonial period makes a contemporary distinction between the two somewhat arbitrary 
as well.
72 Sam Deloria, personal interview, 23 March 2012.
73 LAC, EAF, 45-13-3-7/Part I, Dave Monture, "Notes on the Second General Assembly of the World 
Council of Indigenous Peoples," 24-27 August 1977.
74 IWGIA Newsletter 27 (June 1981), 5. 
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Laenui's consistent contributions.75
Anti-colonial leaders meeting at Bandung had sought to create a large network of 
allies to support the rights of the colonized to self-determination. But whereas Third World 
anti-colonial leaders had seemingly accepted (whether out of intimidation by certain Western 
powers or out of concern for their own state sovereignty) the “salt-water thesis” which 
defined colonies as geographically separate from their colonizers, the anti-colonialism of 
Indigenous internationalism challenged that legal limitation. It aimed to create a new network 
which supported the rights of self-determination for those subject to “internal colonization” 
as well.76 And although Third-Worldist leaders had seemingly limited their definition of 
colonialism to the actions of European powers, the delegates in Georgetown were open (at 
least in principle in the long term, if not in practice in the short term) to alliances with those 
who had been “colonized” by non-European powers as well.
3.4 Structure
Technically, it was delegates at the larger international conference in 1975 who set the 
formal structure of the eventual World Council of Indigenous Peoples. Yet it was those 
75 A report from PACIP listed member organizations from India, Burma, Bangladesh, Taiwan, Guam, 
Australia, Aotearoa/New Zealand, Kanaky/New Caledonia, French Polynesia, West Papua, East Timor, the 
Republic of the South Moluccas (in exile), Sri Lanka, Saipan, Palau and Hawaii, as well as informal 
contacts in Japan, the Marshall Islands, Micronesia, and the Philippines. LAC, WCIP Fonds, 9349 
(hereafter WCIPF), Vol. 4.8, Report of PACIP Membership, 30 July 1990. There was even some discussion 
of organizing the seventh WCIP General Assembly in either the Philippines or India, but the executive 
council eventually decided on Xelajú (Quetzaltenango), Guatemala instead. LAC, WCIPF, Vol. 13.5, letter 
from Donald Rojas (WCIP, President) to Prof A.K. Kisku (Indian Council of Indigenous and Tribal 
Peoples, Secretary General), 26 June 1992.
76 For more on the concept of “internal colonization” see: Pablo Gonzalez Casanova, “Internal colonialism 
and national development,” Studies in Comparative International Development 1:4 (1965); Rodolfo 
Stavenhagen, “Classes, colonialism, and acculturation,” Studies in Comparative International 
Development 1:6 (1965); Michael Hechter, Internal Colonialism: The Celtic Fringe in British National 
Development, 1536-1996 (Berkley: University of California Press, 1975); and Menno Boldt, “Social 
Correlates of Nationalism: A Study of Native Indian Leaders in a Canadian Internal Colony,” Comparative  
Political Studies 14 (July 1981).
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meeting in Georgetown who set the rules that determined who was to be invited to the 
conference, which undoubtedly had a profound influence on the later organization. In terms 
of accreditation, the group agreed that three delegates should be accepted from each country 
with an Indigenous population, selected, where possible, by a recognized representative 
national body. When no such organization existed, delegates could be selected on the basis of 
population size, geographic region within their country, and tribal affiliations.77 For the 
planned international organization, a policy paper approved by delegates suggested that “full 
membership” only be awarded to groups forming a “recognized representative national 
body”, whereas groups from those countries without one be awarded merely “associate 
membership” and Indigenous people without any organized body be awarded “observer 
membership.”78 
Deloria acknowledged that the definition of a “recognized representative national 
body” was problematic, but accepted that no better phrasing had been proposed.79 The 
requirement lent itself well to most of the delegates in Georgetown. Manuel's National Indian 
Brotherhood was not only an association of leaders of bands recognized by the Canadian 
government, but it was also funded primarily by that government itself.80 The Maori Council, 
which Walker was representing, was actually created by the government of New Zealand, as 
part of the 1962 Maori Welfare Act.81 Greenland's Provincial Land Council, for which Olsen 
77 LAC, EAF, 45-13-3-7/Part I, Georgetown Transcript.
78 LAC, EAF, 45-13-3-7/Part I, Georgetown Transcript.
79 LAC, EAF, 45-13-3-7/Part I, Georgetown Transcript.
80 Peter McFarlane retells much of the early history of the National Indian Brotherhood and the reasons for 
its structure in Brotherhood to Nationhood: George Manuel and the Making of the Modern Indian 
Movement, (Toronto: Between the Lines, 1993).
81 In 1979, this act was renamed the Maori Community Development Act. 
<http://www.legislation.govt.nz/act/public/1962/0133/latest/whole.html> See also, R. J. Walker, “The 
Genesis of Maori Activism,” The Journal of the Polynesian Society 93:3 (1984), 275.
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was an elected representative, was similarly the creation of the Danish government where it 
had an official advisory role.82 Although Williams was not personally affiliated with it, 
Australia also had a national organization, the National Aboriginal Consultative Committee 
which had been set up by the Whitlam government in 1973 with an advisory capacity.83 The 
National Congress of American Indians was, theoretically, financially independent but its 
membership was only made up of federally recognized American Indian tribes. Sweden, 
Norway and Finland each had at least one national Sámi organization; these had differing 
relationships with their respective state governments, but the umbrella Nordic Sami Council 
(established in 1956) was largely independent.84 Given this background, the use of the word 
“recognized” might appear to suggest that the WCIP preferred official state recognition of an 
organization for members, but this was certainly not the case. Both individuals and 
organizations without any state sanction were welcomed as members of the organization.85 At 
the founding meeting in 1975, for instance, numerous attendees were determined to avoid 
any publicity as their participation placed them at personal risk from state violence. At least 
one delegate, Constantino Lima, was imprisoned upon his return to Bolivia.86 Rather, 
82 The Grønlands Landsråd (alternatively translated as Provincial Council or Land Council) was the result of 
a 1950 amalgamation of two regional councils which dating back to 1911. See Axel Kjær Sørensen 
“Greenland: From Colony to Home Rule” in Ethnicity and Nation Building in the Nordic World, ed., Sven 
Tägil (Carbondale, Illinois: Southern Illinois University Press, 1995), 85-105.
83 Quentin Beresford, Rob Riley: An Aboriginal Leader's Quest for Justice (Canberra: Aboriginal Studies 
Press, 2006), 122-123. The succeeding government of Fraser restructured the committee as the National 
Aboriginal Conference in 1977, which formally affiliated itself with the WCIP in 1979. UBCIC Resource 
Centre (hereafter UBCICRC), Ross (Jirra) Moore, A Report on the Organization of the 3rd General 
Assembly W.C.I.P., 27 April-2 May 1981, Canberra, Australia.
84 Henry Minde provides an excellent synthesis of the development of Sámi national and international 
organizations in “The Making of an International Movement of Indigenous Peoples” Scandinavian Journal  
of History, 21:3 (1996), 221-246.
85 As will be seen in Chapter Six, however, the World Council did effectively refuse membership to armed 
organizations.
86 Constantino Lima, a WCIP delegate and member of MINK'A was arrested on 23 June 1976. Following 
international appeals, he was released on 18 March 1977 and exiled. He immediately travelled to Canada 
International Work Group for Indigenous Affairs Newsletter No 15 (September 1976), 2, and No. 18 
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“recognized representative” seems to have meant recognized by the conference organizers as 
representative, but the specific means to make such a judgement were never spelled out.  
Nevertheless, state-recognized and funded organizations (like the National Indian 
Brotherhood) were certainly not excluded from membership. Since few (if any) countries 
have only a single homogenous Indigenous group, the World Council's preference for 
national organizations effectively gave preference to organizations that were secular and 
“pan-tribal” in their membership, and formal modern political organizations in their structure. 
Whether this was done for the sake of simplicity, or because of the biases of the delegates, it 
must have seemed logical to structure representation at the conference along similar lines. 
This tendency, however, had the potential to cause political tensions in various contexts, 
between those that favoured “traditionalist” structures and those willing to adopt “modern” or 
“western” organizational structures. Such divisions had already been a source of hostility in 
the United States, between the NCAI and the American Indian Movement, but it was a point 
of conflict elsewhere too. The tension between younger, more radical Sámi activists like 
Ánde Somby, and Aslak Nils Sara's generation was also largely about basic organizational 
structures: 
If you make up a copy of a more Norwegian institution then you get a 
lot of shortcuts. The budget routines and the work routines and all 
this framework area already in place... so you don't have to reinvent 
the wheel... But then you can have this other approach, [which says] 
that embedded in the Norwegian [structures] there are Norwegian 
values...87
(August 1977).
87 Ánde Somby, personal interview, 25 February 2013.
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In contrast, Sam Deloria points out that, whatever their faults, the members of NCAI 
could at least claim to have been formally elected by those they claimed to represent, 
whereas other activists were often self-appointed representatives.88 Nevertheless, that 
delegates from countries with this level of national organization would seek to form an 
international organization is likely not a coincidence. As mentioned above, Manuel saw a 
logical progression in Canada from local, to provincial, to federal organizations which ended 
with an international organization. Both the Sámi and Greenland's Inuit had already sought 
transnational regional connections with the Arctic Circumpolar Conference and the Nordic 
Sami Council; for them it was only an additional step to form an even broader international 
organization.
The decision to use the boundaries of nation states at all, instead of traditional 
cultural/ethnic ones, seems somewhat strange for Indigenous people who expressly 
questioned (if not challenged) the legitimacy of state borders and insisted on the right to self-
determination as peoples. While this incongruity was not discussed in Georgetown, it was 
surely a compromise for the sake of practicality, as acknowledged later in a study of WCIP 
membership.89 The Sámi of Scandinavia, the only group of countries represented by a single 
delegate at Georgetown, would later be the only group to apply to the World Council as 
single organization representing multiple countries, the Nordic Sami Council. The Sami 
Council was exceptional, however, in that it represented the only Indigenous people with the 
World Council, “whose territory extends over more than one state where there are no other 
Indigenous populations within those states” and because of this, their unique arrangement 
88 Sam Deloria, personal interview, 23 March 2012.
89 LAC, WCIPF, Volume 16.23. Douglas Sanders, “Discussion Paper on Membership and Representation 
Within the World Council of Indigenous Peoples,” 19 July 1982.
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“did not affect the representation of any other Indigenous population.”90 The issue was raised 
again in the early 1980s, when both the Haudenosaunee (a confederation of Indigenous 
nations spanning the US/Canadian border) and Nishnawbe Aski Nation (a smaller 
confederation of nations, all located within a northern region of the Canadian province of 
Ontario) both requested representation at WCIP general assemblies.91
In the analysis of the WCIP's legal consultant, the advantages of representation by 
state were clear. First, states are “the recognized units of international law” and the bodies 
with the most power to “affect the lives of Indigenous peoples.”92 By contrast, finding a 
definition for “people,” “nation” or “tribe” acceptable to all participants would likely prove 
impossible. Secondly, because Indigenous peoples have typically organized sub-state or 
state-level political organizations, those Indigenous peoples living in multiple countries often 
lack a supranational body to represent them as a single people.93 The decision to organize the 
World Council's representation by state also kept the number of member organizations 
relatively low (ensuring general assemblies would be of a manageable size), and helped 
ensure that members would be large enough to enable their participation at the international 
level. Finally, the World Council's report on its membership structure asserts that most 
Indigenous peoples were seeking “self-determination within the existing structures of States” 
rather than full independence.94 Had the members of the World Council been strictly seeking 
90 Ibid., 3-4.
91 Ibid., 5. See the Haudenosaunee formal request for membership in LAC, WCIF, Vol. 16.24.
92 LAC, WCIPF, Vol. 16.23. Douglas Sanders, “Discussion Paper on Membership and Representation Within 
the World Council of Indigenous Peoples,” 19 July 1982, 5-6.
93 Douglas cites notable exceptions such as the Mapuche (Chile and Argentina), the Kuna/Tule (Panama and 
Colombia), the Papago/Tohono O'odham (United States and Mexico), and the Blackfoot/Niitsítapi (United 
States and Canada). Ibid., 6.
94 Ibid., 3-4.
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secession from states (as the International Indian Treaty Council did for the Sioux Nation95), 
they would have logically sought representation according to the nation they hoped would 
form a new state. But instead of seeking the traditional rights of statehood for Indigenous 
peoples, they were seeking alternative rights, which at times overlapped with the rights of 
states and in other ways superseded them. At the subsequent preparatory meeting in 
Copenhagen (16-18 June 1975), Sam Deloria would emphasize that Indigenous demands for 
self-determination were conceived as a challenge to the idea of complete sovereignty for 
states. He asserted that, “in general terms what we are moving towards...is the fact that the 
concept of national sovereignty is limited and that one limitation on the concept of national 
sovereignty is the existence of indigenous people...we have the right to maintain our political 
existence.”96 Paradoxically, the desire to challenge the state-based framework of the 
international arena meant using that framework as basis for their system of membership.
Delegates in Georgetown agreed that the advance documentation to be provided at the 
conference should be modelled on United Nations requirements. It was further suggested that 
each country's delegates should submit a report on the situation of Indigenous peoples from 
their home country, possibly seeking help with statistics from the United Nations.97 This 
suggests not only a clear identification with the United Nations, but an acknowledgement of 
the information being compiled for ECOSOC's Martínez Cobo report. By contrast, Augusto 
95 See Chapter Two, page 62.
96 Sanders, The Formation of the World Council of Indigenous Peoples, 13.
97 One of the sub-committees formed at the meeting also recommended that the planning of the conference be 
broken up between a coordinating committee (made up of staff in the host country) and a policy board 
(comprising of the present delegates with the possible addition of new members from other countries). 
Another sub-committee committee recommended that the executive of a new organization might be rotated 
between countries, or that the world might be divided, regionally, into three or four sections. A 
combination of these ideas was later adopted as the structure of the World Council, with a local secretariat 
at a central office in Canada, and an executive committee of elected representatives. LAC, EAF, 45-13-3-
7/Part I, Georgetown Transcript.
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Willemsen-Díaz, the primary author of the aforementioned report, was invited to observe the 
preparatory meeting in Georgetown (and was keen to accept), but the UN Human Rights 
Division would not permit him to attend. As Willemsen-Díaz later recalled, his superiors 
“stated that the process was by no means a clear one, and that it was not known what results 
would be obtained nor whether there would be complaints against UN member states, in 
what terms, and that it was not appropriate for members of the General Secretariat to 
participate in this kind of meeting.”98 After the founding of the World Council of Indigenous 
Peoples, the United Nations would eventually become more supportive of its goals.
3.5 Conclusion
The proceedings of this preparatory meeting tell us a great deal about the origins of 
the World Council of Indigenous Peoples, and about its historical significance as an 
organization, even before it undertook any practical actions. The World Council did not arise 
spontaneously, but was a product of its era, framed by the ideological and political events 
experienced by its organizers. The delegates in Georgetown were the early leaders of a new 
generation of Indigenous peoples. For the most part, their educational backgrounds had 
equipped them not only with the skills required to organize and lead an international 
movement, but also the outward-looking viewpoint necessary to make such a movement 
seem worthwhile. Although the influence of Third-Worldism was the strongest with George 
Manuel, many of the others had already begun to borrow ideas from the decolonization 
movement and apply them to their own national settings.
98 Augusto Willemsen-Díaz, “How Indigenous Peoples' Rights Reached the UN” in Making the Declaration 
Work: The United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, eds., Claire Charters and 
Rodolfo Stavenhagen (Copenhagen: International Work Group for Indigenous Affairs), 20-21.
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The historical parallels between these leaders and the generation of Third World 
leaders who had fought for decolonization (and, in some cases, Pan-Africanism) demonstrate 
that, beyond direct influence, the two groups were forced to grapple with many of the same 
questions. Both groups looked to find the best way to overcome geographic distance and 
cultural difference in order to co-operate for a common cause. Both groups sought to 
reinforce the international norm that guarantees the collective right of peoples to self-
determination. Although both groups sought to carve out a space for themselves within the 
international system, the Third-Worldist leaders fought against imperialism and colonialism, 
but not the basic nation-state structure of the Westphalian system. The World Council, by 
contrast, sought the right to self-determination in a way never envisioned by the Western 
leaders who built the United Nations.
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Chapter 4
Striking a Better Balance? 
Indigenous Internationalism and the “Anti-Politics Machine”
The delegates at the preparatory meeting in Georgetown recommended that the larger 
world conference should take place one year later, and that it should be hosted in Canada 
owing to the resources available to the National Indian Brotherhood.1 In the meantime, the 
organizers met for another preparatory meeting from 16-18 June 1975 in Copenhagen, and 
once again immediately preceding the conference itself (26-31 October 1975).2 At the 
Copenhagen meeting, Marie Smallface-Marule suggested the name for the planned 
organization—the World Council of Indigenous Peoples—to follow the style of the World 
Council of Churches.3 The Tseshaht First Nation, centred on a reserve located near Port 
Alberni, British Columbia, hosted the conference, which was attended by fifty-two delegates 
from nineteen countries.4
1 Library and Archives Canada (hereafter LAC), R219 Department of External Affairs fonds (herafter EAF), 
45-13-3-7, Part I, International Preparatory Meeting of the Indigenous Peoples' Conference, 8-11 April 
1974 (hereafter Georgetown Transcript).
2 The Copenhagen preparatory meeting was a meeting of the “policy board” mentioned above on page 102, 
footnote 97. It was attended by Neil Watene (Maori of Aotearoa/New Zealand); Julio Tumiri Apaza 
(Aymara of Kollasuyu/Bolivia); Trino Morales (Colombia); Charles “Chuck” Trimble and Sam Deloria 
(Oglala Lakota and Standing Rock Sioux of United States); Aslak Nils Sara (offically representing 
Norway, Sweden and Finland); Robert Petersen and Angmalortok Olsen (Greenland); and George Manuel. 
Bent Østergaard (IWGIA and the United Nations Association of Denmark), Hans Pavia Rosing 
(Greenlandic Committee of International Cooperation), Robert Petersen (Copenhagen University) and 
Helge Kleiven (Copenhagen University and the International Work Group for Indigenous Affairs) also 
contributed to the arrangements of the meeting. Douglas E. Sanders, The Formation of the World Council 
of Indigenous Peoples (Copenhagen: International Work Group for Indigenous Affairs, 1977), 13-14. 
Marie Smallface-Marule, Vicky Santana, and Ricardo Contreras attended as National Indian Brotherhood 
staff members. Peter McFarlane, Brotherhood to Nationhood: George Manuel and the Making of the 
Modern Indian Movement, (Toronto: Between the Lines, 1993), 200. The meeting took place at 
Christiansborg Castle and guests were formally welcomed by Prime Minister Anker Jørgensen. Robert 
Petersen, personal correspondence, 14 May 2012 and 20 February 2014.
3 McFarlane, 201.
4 The countries represented included Argentina, Australia, Bolivia, Canada, Colombia, Ecuador, Finland, 
Greenland (Denmark), Guatemala, Mexico, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Norway, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, 
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The inspiration of the conference delegates was clear. The structure of the poetic 
Solemn Declaration, adopted at the conference, is unmistakably anti-colonial. It begins with 
a description of pre-colonial life:
We glory in our proud past:
when the earth was our nurturing mother,
when the night sky formed our common roof,
when the Sun and Moon were our parents,
when all were brothers and sisters,
when our great civilizations grew under the sun,
when our chiefs and elders were great leaders,
when justice ruled the Law and its execution.5
The paragraph, which seeks to unite all those varied peoples represented, uses 
vaguely spiritual language but naturally leaves out any specific details which might not apply 
equally, for instance, to the Māori, the Sámi or the Secwepemc with their different customs 
and beliefs. While the description is perhaps meant to evoke a connection to nature 
frequently (and often quite correctly) claimed by and ascribed to Indigenous peoples, there is 
nothing here that could not be proclaimed with equal pride by any civilization on earth, 
including Europeans. It is rather the succeeding paragraphs that set apart the conference's 
represented peoples from others around the world with a historically focused “before and 
after” comparison. They describe the brutal experience of invasion and colonization; their 
Sweden, the United States (including Hawaii) and Venezuela. Beyond the delegates representing these 
countries, there were also 135 observers, 25 members of the press and 54 staff members. Sanders notes that 
Tseshaht was “one of the most prosperous Canadian Indian Bands.” Sanders, The Formation of the World 
Council of Indigenous Peoples, 14-15. Following the Guatemalan earthquake a few months later on 4 
February 1976, Tseshaht members “sent a considerable amount of money to their Indian brothers in 
Guatemala.” International Work Group for Indigenous Affairs Newsletter No 14 (March 1976), 3.
5 Sanders, The Formation of the World Council of Indigenous Peoples, 17.
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determination to maintain their way of life, their culture, and their memory; and finally, their 
continued marginality despite their resolute assertion of peoplehood:
Then other peoples arrived:
thirsting for blood, for gold, for land and all its wealth,
carrying the cross and the sword, one in each hand,
without knowing or waiting to learn the ways of our worlds,
they considered us to be lower than the animals,
they stole our lands from us and took us from our lands,
they made slaves of the Sons of the sun.
However, they have never been able to eliminate us,
nor to erase our memories of what we were,
because we are the culture of the earth and the sky,
we are of ancient descent and we are millions,
and although our whole universe may be ravaged,
our people will live on
for longer than even the kingdom of death.
Now, we come from the four corners of the earth,
we protest before the concert of nations
that, “we are the Indigenous Peoples, we who
have a consciousness of culture and peoplehood
on the edge of each country's borders and
marginal to each country's citizenship.”
And rising up after centuries of oppression,
evoking the greatness of our ancestors,
in the memory of our Indigenous martyrs,
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and in homage to the counsel of our wise elders:
We vow to control again our own destiny and
recover our complete humanity and
pride in being Indigenous People.6
While wrapped in romantic language, the final three paragraphs emphasize the delegates’ 
collective aspirations. They wish to collaborate with Indigenous Peoples globally (“from the 
four corners of the earth”) to work not at the level of (sub-)national governments but in the 
international arena (“before the concert of nations”), to (re-)claim their right to self-
determination as peoples (“to control again our own destiny”).
These themes likely originated from statements made in the five workshops scheduled 
during the conference.7 The workshops focused on the formation of a World Council of 
Indigenous Peoples (global collaboration); representation at the United Nations (international 
arena); the retention of cultural identity (ongoing maintenance of culture and memory); the 
retention of land and natural resources (self-determination or at least autonomy); and social, 
economic and political justice.
The Solemn Declaration is explicitly political. Noticeably missing from its six stanzas 
are demands for basic improvements in healthcare or standard of living. The “before and 
after” contrast emphasizes justice rather than development, and although the economic issues 
were a partial focus of one of the five workshops, they were framed within the category of 
6 Sanders, The Formation of the World Council of Indigenous Peoples, 17-18.
7 Guy Lavallée, a Métis priest who helped organized the conference, remembers it involving “a lot of group 
work... a lot of late night sessions and meetings... until the wee hours of the morning.” Guy Lavallée, 
personal interview, 15 July 2012. 
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economic justice not economic development. Demands for “economic justice” implicitly 
historicize inequality and assign responsibility (to some past injustice), whereas the discourse 
of “economic development” tends towards an ahistorical and apolitical explanation for the 
same inequality. When the World Council was established, it clearly espoused the former 
view, wherein colonial encroachment on Indigenous sovereignty and the economic poverty of 
Indigenous populations are considered deeply entwined, not the latter, in which those issues 
are framed as largely unrelated. This emphasis followed the model of those Third World 
leaders who demanded that the international community “be awake to history” and make 
changes in its power structures “in the spirit of justice, not charity.”8
This chapter will also use the theme of “before and after” (though not in such a stark 
contrast) to demonstrate how a succession of subtle changes within the World Council shifted 
the organization's emphasis away from demands for justice and sovereignty towards efforts at 
technical development, whether economic, health, social, or otherwise. This change reflected 
the interests of the World Council's primary sources of funding, but was also influenced by 
global shifts in political discourse surrounding development and by the difficulties the WCIP 
faced in securing alternate funding as a result of the global political environment created by 
the Cold War.
4.1 The Anti-Politics Machine
In his 1990 monograph, The Anti-Politics Machine, James Ferguson examines the 
process of “development” in Lesotho. His study was explicitly designed not to evaluate the 
successes or failures of the project as defined by the development community, but to cast an 
8 Vijay Prashad, The Darker Nations: A People's History of the Third World (New York: The New Press, 
2007), 102-3.
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anthropologist's eye on the institutions and their effects on the country.9 According to 
Ferguson, development work was always framed as purely technical, and therefore, the focus 
of development planners and workers was consistently on what could be done to help in a 
purely technical capacity. This focus rendered local idiosyncrasies and political dynamics 
invisible, favouring technical analyses which could be applied universally to push 
“undeveloped” countries along a single standardized path of modernization. Thus, 
development workers represented Lesotho as “…a country with a geography, but no history; 
with people, but no classes; values, but no structure; administrators, but no rulers; 
bureaucracy, but no politics. Political and structural causes of poverty in Lesotho are 
systematically erased and replaced with technical ones…”10 Moreover, this development 
ethos limited any action or support to that which was technical and apolitical:
An analysis which suggests that the causes of poverty in Lesotho are 
political and structural (not technical and geographical), that the 
national government is part of the problem (not a neutral instrument 
for its solution), and that meaningful change can only come through 
revolutionary social transformation in South Africa has no place in 
“development” discourse simply because “development” agencies are 
not in the business of promoting political realignments or supporting 
revolutionary struggles.11
For Ferguson, the “instrument effect” of development was “the suspension of politics 
from even the most sensitive political operations” and the creation of an “anti-politics 
machine.”12 Although several academics have examined the effect of this “anti-politics 
9 James Ferguson, The Anti-Politics Machine: “Development”, Depoliticization, and Bureaucratic Power in  
Lesotho (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1994), 17-21. Thanks to Scott Rutherford for 
suggesting this book.
10 Ferguson, 66.
11 Ferguson, 68-69.
12 Ferguson, 256.
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machine” in other geographic settings,13 this chapter will consider its effects on an 
international organization, the World Council of Indigenous Peoples, with a constituency that 
was unified only in political (anti-colonial) terms.
4.2 Funding the WCIP: The Growth of Development Funding
Before examining the effects of development funding on the World Council, it is 
worth tracing the organization's funding sources from its very beginnings to look for trends 
and patterns that can be mapped onto WCIP policy shifts. Prior to the first World Conference 
of Indigenous Peoples in 1975, there were two international preparatory meetings in 
Georgetown, Guyana14 (in 1974) and in Copenhagen, Denmark in the spring of 1975. Despite 
the leadership of George Manuel (head of Canada's National Indian Brotherhood at the time) 
in initiating these meetings, neither appears to have received funding from the Canadian 
government.
The Government of Guyana officially hosted and provided administrative support for 
the first preparatory meeting15 but most of the conference's costs were paid for by the 
Anglican Church of Canada, the Canadian Catholic Organization for Development and Peace 
(CCODP), Oxfam Canada and the World Council of Churches. These funds were largely the 
result of work done by Guy Lavallée, a Métis priest (Missionary Oblates of Mary 
13 Vasudha Chhotray, The Anti-Politics Machine in India: State, Decentralization and Participatory 
Watershed Development (London: Anthem Press, 2011); Michael McQuarrie, “From backyard revolution 
to backyard reaction: protest, development and the anti-politics machine in Cleveland, 1975-2005,” (Ph.D. 
Dissertation, New York University, 2007); Joseph Tordella, “The anti-politics machine revisited: the 
accommodation of power and the depoliticization of development and relief in rural India,” Working Paper 
Series, 43 (London: Development studies institute, London school of economics and political science, 
2003).
14 This meeting was described in considerable detail in Chapter Three above.
15 United Nations Archives (hereafter UNArch), Consultative Arrangements and Relations with the World 
Council of Indigenous Peoples (hereafter UNWCIP), S-0446-0286-0001, WCIP Questionnaire for 
ECOSOC Status, 1978.
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Immaculate) from St. Laurent, Manitoba. Lavallée studied at the Sacred Heart Scholasticate, 
a seminary in Lebret, Saskatchewan during the early 1960s, and was deeply influenced by the 
decisions of the Second Vatican Council (1962-1965). This renewal of the Catholic Church 
included the promulgation of “The Pastoral Constitution on the Church in the Modern 
World” (Gaudium et Spes) which “challenged Catholics not to divorce religion from their 
cultural, social, and political engagement with the world, but rather to promote justice as 
integral to the Church’s mission.”16 This pronouncement motivated Lavallée to help improve 
the lives of Indigenous people: “As a Catholic priest, my motivation was coming from that 
Vatican II Council, to get involved in the world. The Church has no business being centred 
on itself. It has to be involved.”17 In 1971, he was hired to manage the “Indians of Canada 
Pavilion” (still functioning after Montreal's Expo '67), where he organized a large celebration 
attended by several prominent Indigenous leaders from across the country.18 George Manuel 
was evidently impressed with Lavallée's handling of the event, and convinced him to arrange 
his own secondment from the Oblate mission office to the National Indian Brotherhood, in 
order to raise funds for the planned Georgetown meeting.19
16 Peter Ernest Baltutis, “Forging the Link Between Faith and Development: The History of the Canadian 
Catholic Organization for Development and Peace, 1967-1982” (Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Saint 
Michael’s College and the Historical Department of the Toronto School of Theology, 2013), 46.
17 Guy Lavallée, personal interview, 15 July 2012.
18 Ibid. While Lavallée was not involved in its initial design, the “Indians of Canada Pavilion” has a 
fascinating history of its own. See Myra Rutherdale and Jim Miller, “'It’s Our Country': First Nations’ 
Participation in the Indian Pavilion at Expo 67,” Journal of the Canadian Historical Association 17:2 
(2006).
19 Lavallée's salary for his fund-raising work at the NIB was paid with a personal donation from a fellow 
Oblate priest who was teaching at the University of Ottawa and was supportive of the project. The first task 
Manuel assigned Lavallée was to lead a group of First Nations dancers on a tour of Germany in 1972. The 
tour was arranged by German-Canadian social clubs based in Kitchener, Ontario. Guy Lavallée, personal 
interview, 15 July 2012, and personal correspondence, 10 February 2013.
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Lavallée contracted the CCODP and arranged a meeting with its director Jacques 
Champagne, who did not require much convincing to support the initiative: “We hadn't 
spoken 10 seconds [when] he took out his cheque book and gave us $25,000. That was the 
beginning. We never looked back.”20 The support from the CCODP is not particularly 
surprising, given that the organization was founded in direct response to Gaudium et Spes (a 
statement crafted with significant input from the Canadian bishops who attended the Second 
Vatican Council).21 Although they established the organization with an official intention to 
pursue economic development, members of CCODP were also influenced by the ideas of 
“liberation theology” and social justice espoused at the Second General Conference of the 
Latin American Episcopate that met in Medellin, Colombia in 1968.22 With this inspiration, 
the rights of Indigenous peoples eventually became one of the main focuses of the CCODP. 
For the organization's 1979-80 Share Lent campaign, it even produced an educational kit 
entitled “The Rights of Indigenous People to Shape their own Destiny.”23
Other Christian denominations were also going through a period of renewal and were 
keen to support the WCIP. The World Council of Churches' (WCC) Fourth Assembly in 
Uppsala in 1968 had agreed on a statement in opposition to racism, and urging churches to 
become “actively concerned for the economic and political well-being of exploited groups...” 
and to “make economic and educational resources available to underprivileged groups for 
20 Guy Lavallée, personal interview, 15 July 2012.
21 “Of the sixteen documents promulgated by Vatican II, none had greater Canadian content that Gaudium et 
Spes. The Canadian bishops made seventeen interventions during debates on this document, by far the 
most Canadian comments on any discussion at the council.” Baltutis, 50-51.
22 Ibid., 228-230.
23 Ibid., 223.
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their full participation in the social and economic life of their communities.”24 The resulting 
WCC Program to Combat Racism disbursed over four million dollars to liberation 
movements around the world during the 1970s.25 As mentioned in a previous chapter, George
 Manuel had met with their representatives in 1972 and, as promised, the organization served 
as a major sponsor of the preparatory meeting in Georgetown.26
While Lavallée preferred to work behind the scenes rather than as a political 
spokesperson, he would not divide politics from religion, echoing the sentiment of Gaudium 
et Spes: “People who claim that politics and religion don't work together... don't understand 
what religion is, let alone politics. Those two are intertwined just like your blood and bones 
in your body.”27 He attended the Georgetown preparatory meeting, after which he was tasked 
with securing financial support for the planned conference. He made a three-week fund-
raising trip to eight European countries in 1974 to solicit funds from various religious and 
24 Baldwin Sjollema, “The World Council of Churches: Policies and Programmes in Support of the 
Liberation Struggle in Southern Africa,” in The UN-OAU Conference on Southern Africa, Oslo, 9-14 April 
1973: Papers and Documents, eds. Olav Stokke and Carl Widstrand (Uppsala: Scandinavian institute of 
African studies, 1973), 26. Martin Luther King had been scheduled to deliver the keynote address for the 
conference, but was assassinated a few weeks earlier. He was replaced by Uganda's Pan-Africanist 
President Kenneth Kaunda, who used the occasion to decry “the impact of apartheid and colonial rule in 
southern Africa.” Both the assassination and the replacement speech likely encouraged the anti-racist, anti-
colonial mood of the delegates. Claude Emerson Welch, “Mobilizing Morality: The World Council of 
Churches and its Programme to Combat Racism, 1969-1994,” Human Rights Quarterly 23:4 (November 
2001), 873.
25 Among others, these included “UNITA, the MPLA and GRAE in Angola; the PAIGC of Guinea-Bissau; 
FRELIMO of Mozambique; SWAPO of Namibia; the Luthuli Memorial Foundation of the ANC of South 
Africa; and ZANU and ZAPU of Zimbabwe.” Welch, 866, 883n59.
26 George Manuel Diaries (hereafter GMD), 19 June 1972. One of those representatives, Dwain Epp, would 
also chair the press conference George Manuel would give at the UN in New York following his 1979 fact-
finding trip to Chile to investigate the situation of Mapuches. GMD, 3-4 July 1980.
27 Guy Lavallée, personal interview, 15 July 2012. Over the life of the World Council, several members of the 
organization's executive (George Manuel included) had complicated relationships with both Christianity 
and their particular Indigenous spirituality. It may be partly for this reason that, as mentioned in the 
preceding chapter, the WCIP defined “Indigeneity” on a strictly political/historic basis rather than on 
cultural traits—as the Indigenous relationship with religion remained unresolved. No solution to this issue 
was required in order to move forward on the issue of Indigenous rights.
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secular charities, as well as trips to meet with private foundations in the United States.28 By 
May 1975, the conference organizers had managed to raise $87,000.29
The second preparatory meeting in Copenhagen was hosted by the International Work 
Group for Indigenous Affairs (IWGIA), an association of concerned anthropologists based in 
Denmark.30 The IWGIA also made a donation while the conference was being planned, but 
suggested the organizers hold back the money in reserve in case the meeting led successfully 
to the creation of a new Indigenous organization, which would need core funding itself. 
When delegates at Tseshaht formed the World Council of Indigenous Peoples, this seed 
money was the only real funding the organization had for its first two years.31
In addition to religious and private organizations, significant funding for the World 
Conference of Indigenous Peoples in 1975 came from government ministries, but not from 
national government development agencies. Hugh Faulkner, the Secretary of State for 
Canada, decided at the last minute to provide $15,848.32 Here George Manuel's personal 
skills were likely of primary importance. Faulkner had experience working with Manuel on 
“Citizenship Programs... directed at helping First Nation Reserves, etc. to develop 
leadership”33 and described him as “the best leader [the National Indian Brotherhood] ever 
28 Lavallée would later attend the conference before returning to his work as a parish priest. Guy Lavallée, 
personal interview, 15 July 2012.
29 McFarlane, 201.
30 IWGIA managed to secure a small grant from the Swedish International Development Agency, which they 
used to pay for the meeting. Jens Dahl, IWGIA: A History (Copenhagen: IWGIA, 2009), 30.
31 UNArch, UNWCIP, S-0446-0286-0001, Report on WCIP Funding Difficulties, 31 May 1978.
32 Financial figures are listed in Canadian dollars unless otherwise noted. Library and Archives Canada 
(hereafter LAC), R219 Department of External Affairs fonds (hereafter EAF), 45-13-3-7, Part I, 
correspondence from External Affairs to Canadian Embassy in Stockholm, 4 November 1975.
33 In 1950, Canada's Indian Affairs Branch and its Citizenship Branch had been united under the Department 
of Citizenship and Immigration, which provided Citizenship Programs to encourage the assimilation of 
both immigrants to Canada, and its original inhabitants. In 1966, Indian Affairs was merged into the 
Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Development and Citizenship Branch was moved to the 
Secretary of State. The Citizenship Branch, however, continued to run programs for Status Indians. See 
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produced in my years in Ottawa. He advanced the cause with quiet determination, integrity 
and huge intelligence. I had great respect and complete trust in him...”34 Faulkner was the 
only non-Indigenous person invited to speak at the 1975 conference, where he delivered a 
welcome speech.35 An internal memo to the Canadian Embassy in Stockholm acknowledges 
Canada's surprise at the size of the Danish and Norwegian contributions (about $18,000 each, 
in addition to travel grants). The Swedish and Finnish governments also gave travel grants to 
delegates.36 The precise reason behind the generous support from Denmark and Norway is 
unclear, but they might have been successfully lobbied by the International Work Group for 
Indigenous Affairs' Helge Kleivan, a prominent Norwegian anthropologist working in 
Denmark. All contributed funds for the conference totalled over $183,000.37
As long as Manuel was the President of both the National Indian Brotherhood and the 
WCIP, the two organizations could easily share the NIB's office in Ottawa, as well as its 
resources. He decided, however, not to run for re-election as NIB President in 1976, so the 
World Council—teetering on bankruptcy by the end of that year—began to look for a new 
home.38 In March 1977, the WCIP moved its offices to the University of Lethbridge, under 
the directorship of Marie Smallface-Marule. She had recently taken up a teaching position 
there, and the University offered to let her run the WCIP out of the newly established Native 
Heidi Bohaker and Franca Iacovetta, “Making Aboriginal People ‘Immigrants Too’: A Comparison of 
Citizenship Programs for Newcomers and Indigenous Peoples in Postwar Canada, 1940s–1960s,” 
Canadian Historical Review 90:3 (September 2009); Leslie A. Pal, Interests of State: The Politics of 
Language, Multiculturalism, and Feminism in Canada (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1995).
34 Hugh Faulkner, personal correspondence, 3 May 2012.
35 Hugh Faulkner, personal correspondence, 3 May 2012. Sanders, The Formation of the World Council of 
Indigenous Peoples, 15-16.
36 LAC, EAF, 45-13-3-7, Part I, correspondence from External Affairs to Canadian Embassy in Stockholm, 4 
November 1975.
37 Deirdre Cynthia Duquette, “The World Council of Indigenous Peoples: The Study of an International 
Indigenous Organization” (MA Thesis, University of Victoria, 1993), 61.
38 GMD, 24 Dec 1976.
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American Studies department. Once again, religious groups provided funds to keep the 
organization going. The Anglican Church's Primates World Relief and Development Fund 
and the CCODP both provided some basic funding for operating costs in 1977, enough for 
Smallface-Marule to hire two students to assist in her work.39
The World Council received more substantial support for the Second General 
Assembly in 1977 in Kiruna, Swedish Sápmi. The Nordic countries made significant 
contributions, especially Norway. Along with two other bodies of the Canadian state (the 
Secretary of State and the Department of Indian Affairs), the Canadian International 
Development Agency (CIDA) made its first donation; each contributed about $20,000 to pay 
for Canadian and Third World delegations to attend.40 But in less than a year, the organization 
was again nearing bankruptcy with $45,000 of debt, most of it left over from the Kiruna 
conference the previous year. As of 1978, the organization had never had permanent salaried 
staff – it was run by two short term employees and volunteers. A shortage of permanent 
translators or Spanish-speaking staff made it difficult to communicate with member 
organizations in Latin America.41 This may have helped increase concerns that the 
organization was being dominated by Canadians, and was not paying enough attention to the 
Indigenous peoples of Central and South America.42 Any such concerns seem to have been 
quieted when delegates at the Third General Assembly (1981) in Canberra passed a 
resolution to create two Vice-President positions (with one effectively reserved for a delegate 
39 Union of British Columbia Indian Chiefs Resource Centre (herafter UBCICRC), WCIP, Four-Year Report 
(1977-1981); UNArch, UNWCIP, S-0446-0286-0001, WCIP Financial Statements, 30 Sept 1977.
40 LAC, EAF, 45-13-3-7, Part I, Memorandum from Marantz to Midwinter, 18 Aug 1977.
41 Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs Archives (hereafter NFAA), 26.8/54 Beskyttelse av innfodte 
folkeslag (Protection of Indigenous peoples) fonds (hereafter BIF), Binder 5, letter from George Manuel to 
Thorval Stoltenberg (Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs), 20 January 1978.
42 This concern was first raised at the founding conference in 1975, likely owing in part to the organizing 
staff and location of the conference. Duquette, 62-3.
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from Central or South America) and elected a new president, José Carlos Morales (Boruca 
from Costa Rica).43 Morales later would comment on his own surprise about the small offices 
and sparse staff of the WCIP Secretariat in Lethbridge. “Member countries often have a 
different idea of the WCIP headquarters. They think of it as a big place employing many 
people... Now I can tell member organizations how the secretariat works and the limitations 
and the problems they face.” He also emphasized, however, that the “stable political climate” 
in Canada provided the WCIP with a good working environment.44
With help from IWGIA, Smallface-Marule made a tour of Northern Europe in 1978 to 
solicit financial support for the World Council. She met with a variety of potential funding 
sources, and with Ole Henrik Magga of the Nordic Sami Council to prepare funding 
applications to Nordic governments.45 In 1979, Norway's Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
(NMFA) gave the organization the first substantial support it would receive for core funding: 
300,000 NOK (about $66,000) from its emergency fund. That year, the ministry had 
established a group of senior civil servants from all the Nordic countries to communicate on 
the issue of Indigenous peoples.46 At a meeting in December 1979, Knut Sverre (the NMFA's 
Special Adviser on Human Rights), asserted that his country was committed to working with 
Indigenous peoples because Norway had its own Indigenous people, and because Indigenous 
peoples were the international community's “stepchild” in that they lacked a real advocate at 
43 This position was made explicit in a formal amendment to the charter in 1984. Duquette, 66. An updated 
version of the charter, showing the amendments can be found in LAC, WCIPF, Vol. 5.09, 
44 Lethbridge Herald, 15 September 1981.
45 UBCICRC, WCIP Four-Year Report (1977-1981).
46 Henry Minde, “The Destination and the Journey: Indigenous Peoples and the United Nations from the 
1960s through 1985”, in Indigenous Peoples: Self-determination, Knowledge, Indigeneity, ed. Henry 
Minde (Delft: Eburon Academic Publishers, 2008), 67
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the international level.47 While these civil servants were supportive of the promotion of 
Indigenous rights in principle, some raised concerns that Nordic state backing might be 
poorly received by other governments that considered the matter a domestic concern and 
resented Nordic support for the WCIP (or IWGIA) as interference in their internal affairs. 
There was, however, general agreement among attendees that, because the World Council 
was the organization the Sámi had joined, this committed the Nordic countries to the WCIP 
to some extent.48 
The money from Norway also came with a promise of renewal the following year if 
funding from the Canadian government could also be secured.49 This may have helped 
convince CIDA, which decided to lend its support, agreeing the following spring to a 
contribution of $200,000 over two years. CIDA renewed this funding and continued to 
provide it, although somewhat unevenly, until the end of the organization in 1979. Figure 1 
depicts CIDA funding overlaid with the total funding the organization received. CIDA's 
donations consistently made up the overwhelming majority of the organization's funding, 
often over 90% but normally in the 75-90% range.50 The support of religious organizations 
47 This is surprisingly early for Nordic governments to be recognizing the Sámi as an Indigenous people. 
Official recognition would not come until much later. NFAA, BIF, Binder 6, Minutes of Nordic Council 
Senior Officials Meeting for the Promotion of Indigenous Peoples' Interests, Oslo, 6 December 1979. 
Author's translation, with assistance from Terje Lilleeng at the Centre for Sami Studies at the University of 
Tromsø.
48 Other members of the group were supportive, but somewhat concerned that the promotion of Indigenous 
rights around the world would not be well received by some countries that considered the matter a 
domestic concern and might consider Nordic support for the WCIP (or IWGIA) to be interference in their 
internal affairs. NFAA, BIF, Binder 6, Minutes of Nordic Council Senior Officials Meeting for the 
Promotion of Indigenous Peoples' Interests, Oslo, 6 December 1979.
49 UBCICRC, WCIP Four-Year Report (1977-1981).
50 Duquette provides a table with strikingly different figures for the 1989-1994 period, which suggest that 
CIDA's contribution made up as little as 14.73% of the World Council's total budget in 1992 and less than 
20% in 1990 and 1992. Her data seems to have been culled, however, from the WCIP's budget proposals to 
CIDA which depicted the World Council's hopes rather than its financial reality, and encouraged the 
agency to believe other sources of core funding would be found to minimize long-term dependence. The 
data in this chapter's graphs are taken from the actual financial records of the WCIP, and the tremendous 
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did not end in the 1970s. Over the five-year period between 1986 and 1991, the CCODP 
alone provided the World Council with over $175,000.51 Through the 1970s and 1980s, 
WCIP presidents would continue to meet with WCC representatives who would provide 
occasional funding.52 Nevertheless, the financial support from those organizations was 
dwarfed by the contributions from CIDA. It seems only reasonable to assume that this level 
of government funding, and dependence on that funding, might have had some effect on the 
World Council and its policies. To explain the degree of its “depoliticizing” effect, however, 
it is worth first investigating why CIDA provided this funding in the first place.
reliance on CIDA funding is backed up with CIDA's own analysis. Duquette, 101. LAC, WCIPF, Vol. 
31.14, CIDA, Financial Risk Assessment Report (Stage 1), February 1995.
51 LAC, WCIPF, Volumes 10.17, 33.3, 34.6, 34.9, and 34.10, WCIP Financial Statements for 1986 – 1991.
52 GMD, 19 March 1976 & 18 September 1977; LAC, WCIPF, Vol. 32.1, correspondence from Julie Vergara 
(WCIP) to James Mutambirwa (WCC), 20 May 1988; LAC, WCIPF, Vol. 32.2, Cheque from WCC for 
WCIP, 23 November 1987; LAC, WCIPF, Vol. 28.8, letter from Vergara (WCIP) to Reber and Mutambirwa 
(WCC), 6 January 1988; LAC, WCIPF, Vol. 32.1, letter from Vergara (WCIP) to Pityana (WCC) 14 Nov 
1988; LAC, WCIPF, Vol. 22.8, letter from Vergara (WCIP) to Sindab (WCC), 17 April 1989. The WCC's 
focus on Indigenous peoples would continue to grow. At its Sixth Assembly in Vancouver, Canada in 1983 
(attended by WCIP Vice-President Melillan Painemal), it would make a formal statement on land rights for 
Indigenous people. LAC, WCIPF, Vol. 29.21, WCIP Newsletter 4, Feb. 1984. Its Seventh Assembly in 
Canberra was greatly influenced by the issues of Indigenous peoples in Australia. Welch, 907. The WCC 
and the associated US National Council of Churches (NCC) were supportive of the International Indian 
Treaty Council as well. The IITC was provided with a very affordable rental arrangement for its first New 
York offices, subletting from the NCC in the Church Center For the United Nations, directly across from 
the UN Headquarters. Roxanne Dunbar-Ortiz, personal interview, 24 September 2010. This positive 
relationship may have deteriorated, however, after Jimmie Durham's departure from the organization in 
1979. In 1981, AIM denounced all Christian churches as “an arm of colonization and imperialism” and 
claimed that they “extort over $60,000 a year in rent alone from [AIM], the [IITC], and the Survival 
Schools located in Minneapolis and St. Paul, Minnesota. University of New Mexico Center for South West 
Research (hereafter UNMCSWR), Tonantzin Land Institute Records, MSS 666, Box 21, Folder 2, 
American Indian Movement Press Release Information Package, 10 December 1981.
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Fig 1: Financial support for the WCIP53
53 WCIP End of Year Financial Statements have been collected from UNArch, UNWCIP, S-0446-0286-0001, (1977, 1979); NFAA, BIF, Binder 5 (1978), 
Binder 9 (1980-81), Binder 12 (1983); LAC, WCIPF, Volumes 10.17 (1986), 34.9 (1987), 34.6 (1988-89), 33.3 (1990), 34.10 (1991-96). Financial 
statements for the fiscal years of 1975, 1976, 1982, 1984, 1985 have not been located. For the former two, levels of total income are estimates based on my 
interview with Guy Lavallée. Complete data for 1985 was included in the 1986 Financial Statement for perspective. In 1981, the WCIP was awarded a two-
year promise of $452,666, and likely received $210, 618 in the first year (1982). This is reflected in the graph, but the total budget or spending for that year 
is unknown. For 1984, the graph has been left blank due to lack of information. It is clear that the WCIP received $50,000 from CIDA in January 1984 as a 
temporary measure until a larger contract was finalized. LAC, WCIPF, Vol. 10.11, letter from Smallface-Marule (WCIP) to Leger (CIDA), 20 February 
1984. 
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4.3 Was CIDA an Anti-Politics Machine?
If, as James Ferguson suggests, the Canadian International Development Agency was 
(or was part of) an “anti-politics machine,” why did they fund an overtly political 
organization like the World Council which had shown little or no interest in economic 
development? CIDA rejected Marie Smallface-Marule's request for funding for the 1975 
conference. The agency's NGO division asserted that the application had “received very 
careful consideration here and in the Department of External Affairs” and claimed to be 
“most sympathetic to the aims and objectives of the Conference” but rejected it nonetheless. 
The rejection letter included a copy of CIDA guidelines, suggesting it might be useful if the 
National Indian Brotherhood decided to undertake a “development project” in the future, 
which would fall “within the mandate of CIDA which could form the basis of cooperation.”54 
While the specific reasons for the rejection are not addressed, this seems to imply that CIDA 
would not support the World Conference because it was purely political in nature, and so the 
letter encouraged a turn towards international development work which was apolitical and 
could therefore qualify for funding under CIDA's mandate.
But this stand contradicted the announcement made by External Affairs Minister 
Mitchell Sharp just a year earlier, in October 1974, that CIDA “would receive requests for 
funds for freedom groups in Namibia, Rhodesia, the Portuguese territories and South Africa” 
and that their aid policies would demonstrate “where we stand on the issues of racist and 
colonialist injustices.”  Sharp explicitly rejected the idea that this kind of aid should be 
54 LAC, EAF, 45-13-3-7, Part I, letter from Bateman (CIDA) to Marule (WCIP), 4 Nov 1975. Possibly 
because the conference was being organized by the National Indian Brotherhood, a Canadian Non-
Governmental Organization (NGO), correspondence occurred with CIDA's NGO branch, not the agency's 
newly formed (1972) International NGO branch.
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avoided out of concern that it might be considered “interference in other countries' affairs.”55 
Apparently, the Canadian government was happy to provide aid to political opposition 
groups when a state's policies were in fundamental disagreement with those of Canada, and 
even adopt the rhetoric of anti-colonialism when doing so. CIDA's mandate, it seems, was 
able to expand significantly given the right political conditions.
The right political conditions to secure CIDA funding arrived for the World Council, 
as mentioned above, in 1979. This shift was likely due to the influence of Canada's new 
Secretary of State for External Affairs, Flora McDonald. As a Conservative Member of 
Parliament, McDonald had served as the opposition critic for Indian Affairs and built up a 
good relationship with George Manuel. When she came to power with Joe Clark's new 
minority government, she wrote a determined letter prodding CIDA to provide financial 
support to the World Council and pointing out the fact that Scandinavian governments 
already had begun to do so.56 The agency jumped into action, sending John McRae, the head 
of its International Non-Governmental Organization (INGO) division, to Lethbridge to assist 
Smallface-Marule with the paperwork, and an agreement was settled a few months later in 
early 1980.57
How could an international development organization like CIDA justify providing 
$200,000 of support for a political organization based in Canada? Judith Moses (External 
55 Montreal Gazette, March 20, 1974; Windsor Star, March 20, 1974
56 While McDonald mentioned funding from “several Scandinavian countries,” to my knowledge, the WCIP 
had only received core funding from Norway. LAC, EAF, 45-13-3-7, Part I, letter from Flora MacDonald 
to Martial Asselin (Minister of State for CIDA), 26 Sept. 1979. David Morrison notes that MacDonald 
generally “voiced strong support for the work of NGOs and a desire to increase their funding.” David R. 
Morrison, Aid and Ebb Tide: A History of CIDA and Canadian Development Assistance (Waterloo, Ont: 
Wilfrid Laurier University Press, 1998), 158.
57 UBCICRC, WCIP Four-Year Report (1977-1981).
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Affairs, Development and Export Financing Policy Division) advocated in support of the 
contribution, and provided a long list of reasons.58 She emphasized a desire to allow cross-
fertilization between domestic development and development in Third World nations: “As 
purveyors of foreign aid with technical domestic experience we are in a position to portray 
our experiences in a '...world laboratory...' context abroad and contribute to development 
experience domestically.”59 She also stated that 
Canadian indigenous people can be regarded as ambassadors for 
Canada's domestic and international intention to address human rights 
issues in concrete terms. Canada's domestic human rights record with 
indigenous people, while by no means perfect, is perhaps 
unparalleled in world terms...60 
This, she contrasted with allegations of cultural genocide in other countries. So in this case, 
CIDA funding would hardly be anti-political. Rather, it would be quite the opposite; the 
agency was using Canadian-Indigenous relations to promote political change elsewhere.
Moses also argued that “[m]ore radical North American Indian groups are competing 
for international attention” and that Canada had “a responsibility to support moderate 
indigenous groups willing to work with governments rather than pass the responsibility by 
default to more radical groups to dominate world development of indigenous groups.” And 
furthermore, “[t]he political, economic and social alienation of indigenous people in some 
countries makes them particularly vulnerable to extreme solutions of the sort proposed by 
more radical groups.”61 This seems to be a clear reference to the (militant) American Indian 
Movement's international wing, the International Indian Treaty Council (IITC). The Treaty 
58 LAC, EAF, 45-13-3-7, Part I, letter from Moses to Morden, 28 Nov 1979.
59 Ibid.
60 Ibid.
61 Ibid.
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Council had received ECOSOC consultative NGO status in 1977 and hosted a major United 
Nations Conference on Indians in the Americas the same year in Geneva. Moses was 
suggesting that the Canadian government should try to undercut the IITC's global 
prominence, even if that wasn't the World Council's intention. Incidentally, members of the 
IITC suspected as much or even worse. An article in the Treaty Council's newsletter entitled 
“Our Enemies Are Trying to Confuse Us” accused the American government of trying to 
undermine their organization by intentionally setting up “parallel organizations” (including 
the WCIP) “which look good, and always have lots of money.”62 Finally, Moses argues at the 
same time, that the WCIP could potentially reach some of the most oppressed people in the 
world, but she tellingly uses the terms “NGO projects” and “NGO operations” without 
explicit reference to economic or technical development. All of these points suggest that, 
whatever mandate External Affairs set out for CIDA, the ministry could and did support 
political organizations when Canada's political interests were served.
Moses, however, was born on the Six Nations reserve, and her family ties may have 
coloured her approach to Indigenous internationalism.63 Not everyone at External Affairs was 
so keen to support the World Council. The following year, Verona Edelstein (Director of 
United Nations Social and Humanitarian Affairs Division of External Affairs) informed 
CIDA that the WCIP
...appears to be undergoing an evolution of particular interest to the 
Government of Canada. Should the current WCIP leadership persist 
in its pursuit of an international campaign against the Constitutional 
Proposals of the Government as an over-riding priority, we might 
62 UNMCSWR, Roger A. Finzel American Indian Movement Papers, MSS 711 BC, Box 2, Folder 21, Treaty 
Council News 1:9 (December 1977).
63 Bradford Times, 9 October 2008.
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wish to re-assess the degree of support, or indeed the appropriateness 
of continued support for this organization.64 
The WCIP had supported the Union of British Columbia Indian Chiefs' attempt to take its 
complaints about the aforementioned Canadian constitutional proposals to the United Nations 
where its representatives met with Issoufou Saidou-Djermakoye, Under-Secretary-General 
for Political Affairs, Trusteeship and Decolonization.65
Perhaps in response, an Ad-Hoc Working Group on Indigenous Peoples was formed 
early in 1981 by twelve members of External Affairs Canada, CIDA, the Department of 
Indian and Northern Development to discuss Canadian support for the WCIP. There was 
particular concern about a press report issued by the WCIP in New York that “identified self-
determination as a WCIP objective (in the decolonization sense)” and “included comments to 
the effect that Canada has no right to question Soviet or other abuses of human rights 
internationally.”66 Such comments, argued Edelstein, were a threat to Canadian interests 
abroad. She noted that the WCIP was “a valuable NGO” so long as it remained “primarily 
interested in North-South questions,” but suggested that efforts should be made to discourage 
politicized debate about Indigenous peoples at the United Nations. Apparently CIDA funds 
64 LAC, RG22, 45-D140-W1 Part I, letter from Edelstein (External Affairs Canada, United Nations Social 
and Humanitarian Affairs Division) to McRae (CIDA), 16 Dec 1980. For more on Indigenous international 
efforts to pressure the Canadian government in 1980, see Barbara Perry, “The role of popular mobilizations 
in the struggle for the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms,” Crime, Law and Social Change 22 
(1995), 202-203; and Douglas Sanders, “The Indian Lobby and the Canadian Constitution, 1978-82,” in 
Indigenous Peoples and the Nation State: 'Fourth World' Politics in Canada, Australia and Norway, Social 
and Economic Papers No. 14, ed. Noel Dyck (St. John's, Newfoundland: Institute of Social and Economic 
Research, Memorial University of Newfoundland, 1985).
65 Apparently they were “somewhat disappointed with [Saidou-Djermakoye's] démarche as they were 
reminded that the Secretariat is bound to deal with member states, and that the UN takes decisions only in 
response to proposals by member states.” LAC, EAF, 45-13-3-7, Part II, Background Notes for the 
Minister of External Affairs, World Council of Indigenous Peoples, 17 February 1981
66 LAC, EAF, 45-13-3-7, Part II, Minutes of the 6 January 1981 meeting of the Ad-Hoc Working Group on 
Indigenous Peoples, 3 February 1981. Others at the meeting, including John McRae of CIDA, felt that the 
Press Release should not be taken too seriously as “it was clearly the handiwork of Marie Marule who was 
occasionally carried away in her statements and positions.”
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could legitimately be used to fund political organizations, so long as the politics benefited 
Canada. If and when these organizations started to criticize or embarrass the Canadian 
government, the recipients of CIDA funds were suddenly expected to avoid the political and 
focus on economic development.
CIDA administrators defended the World Council in that meeting and attendees 
eventually agreed that it was premature to contemplate interrupting funding to the WCIP 
(which would, in any case, serve to greatly antagonize the organization). It was noted, 
however, that if the Canadian government ever became “totally disenchanted” with the World 
Council, the best course of action would be to communicate that assertion to other friendly 
governments who also provided financial support to the organization.67 In other words, 
Canada would not simply cease to provide funding, but would work to ensure that other 
governments did likewise. The financial and diplomatic support provided by CIDA was not 
threatened by the World Council's nature as a political organization per se, but that support 
could be threatened depending on which particular political positions its leadership chose to 
adopt.
CIDA grew more supportive of the WCIP in the early 1980s, after Ronald Leger 
became head of the INGO division. As CIDA was concerned with international development 
and the INGO division was set up to support international organizations, the mix of delegates 
elected to the WCIP's Executive Council appears to have helped the World Council's 
chances. Leger asserts that the WCIP was helped not only by the fact that it had “a broad 
southern membership, but in addition it was initiated and headquartered in Canada as was 
67 LAC, EAF, 45-13-3-7, Part II, Minutes of the 6 January 1981 meeting of the Ad-Hoc Working Group on 
Indigenous Peoples, 3 February 1981. 
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[sic] a few other INGOs.”68 Thus World Council's combination of Canadian and “Third 
World” membership helped make it appealing to CIDA. Moreover, there were changes at the 
INGO division in the early 1980s that made the WCIP a good fit. According to Leger, “CIDA 
became more welcoming to the World Council following a greater focus of the INGO 
division's mandate on institutional building...in four priority areas: 1) Population and basic 
health 2) the environment and human settlements; 3) Basic education and Training; 4) 
Human Rights, community and social communication and Policy Dialogue and Third World 
exchange.”69 WCIP's main goals must have been close enough to a match, particularly to this 
final priority area, to help convince CIDA to provide funding.  The synchronicity between the 
WCIP's need and CIDA's decision to support these kinds of INGOs was no coincidence. The 
tremendous growth of NGOs during this decade (from 2,795 in 1972 to 12,686 in 1984, 
according to the Union of International Associations70) included a great flowering of civil 
society organizations that focused on the very same issues that CIDA was prioritizing.71 
During the 1970s, numerous prominent NGOs were founded to focus on human rights 
(Human Rights Watch, 1978), the environment (Greenpeace, 1970-72), international 
exchange (International Student Exchange Program, 1979), health (Médecins Sans 
Frontières, 1971) and population issues (Centre for Development and Population Activities, 
1975).72 The WCIP's interest in all of these topics not only allowed it to attend and make 
68 Ibid. Nevertheless, part of CIDA's support for international organizations was their ability to “offer a link 
with Third World NGOs that have no Canadian affiliates.” Sarah Kambites Mukebezi, “Non-Governmental 
Organizations as partnering agencies: A Case Study of the Relationship between Canadian NGOs with 
CIDA and Kenyan Local Groups,” (Ph.D. Thesis, McGill University, 1995), 95.
69 Ronald Leger, personal interview, 10 July 2013 and personal correspondence, 20 February 2013.
70 Akira Iriye, Global Community: The Role of International Organizations in the Making of the 
Contemporary World (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 2002), 129.
71 In his chapter on this period of growth for NGOs, Akira Iriye provides nearly the exact same list of issues 
as the most important ones for new organizations. Iriye, 126-156.
72 Ibid.
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presentations at an array of conferences, but also made it an ideal organization for CIDA to 
support. While other development agencies may have made grants to international 
organizations, “CIDA took a more comprehensive approach to the issue, and was one of the 
few agencies with a specific mechanism accessible to an international NGO.”73 The new 
focus provided, therefore, a fairly unique opportunity for the World Council to gain 
consistent core funding as a civil society organization (and for its member organizations), 
rather than for one-off technical development projects.
In early 1983, after the end of its 1980-82 grant to the World Council, CIDA was 
again debating future funding for the WCIP. At CIDA's Project Review Committee, “several 
concerns were raised about continued CIDA support. WCIP's objectives were seen as more 
international than developmental and therefore not under CIDA's mandate. Other questions 
were raised about political sensitivity...”74 A memo from CIDA President Margaret Catley-
Carlson in November 1983 sought cabinet approval for a substantial increase in funding for 
the WCIP. The memo states that from 1979 to 1983 (~4 years), CIDA had contributed a total 
of $735,166 “towards general institutional support and their regional activities in Central and 
73 The INGO division made up a small proportion of CIDA's total overseas development assistance, with its 
spending peaking at $37 million in 1992-3. Ian Smillie et al, “Partners or Contractors? Official Donor 
Agencies and the Direct Funding Mechanisms: Three Northern Case Studies - CIDA, EU and USAID,” 
Occasional Papers Series No: 11; NGOs and Official Agencies: Partnership or Contracting in 
Development? Case Studies from Canada, the European Union and U.S.A. (Oxford: International NGO 
Training and Research Centre, February 2009), 14.
74 LAC, RG22, 45-D140-W1 Part I, letter from Rivington (CIDA) to Cowie (Indian and Northern Affairs), 18 
Aug. 1983. The source of these concerns is not mentioned in the Rivington's letter. Notably, a response 
from Indian and Northern Affairs supported the view of Moses, mentioned above, that the WCIP was 
boosting the image of the Canadian government: “while it lies within the mandate of the WCIP to criticize 
the implementation of Canadian policy regarding indigenous peoples, the WCIP will be more likely to use 
Canada's achievements in this area as an example for evaluation by the rest of the world. The Council, in 
its dealings with Third World indigenous groups, will probably promote their development following the 
lines of the Canadian model and may encourage them to lobby their governments for CIDA assistance.” 
LAC, RG22, 45-D140-W1 Part I, letter from McDowell (Indian and Northern Affairs) to Rivington 
(CIDA), 12 September 1983.
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South America.”75 WCIP had further support from the Nordic Council and Australia, and 
requested $1.1M over two years, which was described as about 25% of WCIP's total 
budget.76 Catley-Carlson acknowledged that the WCIP's activities to that point had been 
“mainly international workshops, conferences and networking” and that certain WCIP 
activities might be outside acceptable parameters “especially as they relate to the promotion 
of their general objective in international fora.”77 As well as several WCIP executive council 
meetings and general assemblies, representatives of the World Council had attended 
numerous other international events related to Indigenous culture, Indigenous rights, anti-
racism, women's rights, human rights and various other topics.78 Yet Catley-Carlson also 
75 LAC, RG22, 45-D140-W1 Part I, Memo to Minister from Catley-Carlson, “CIDA seeking cabinet approval 
to negotiate an approval-in-principle to fund WCIP to provide money to member organizations for the 
purpose of development in Latin America,” 18 Nov. 1983.
76 Ibid. The Australian government provided approximately AUD $90,000 to the planning committee of the 
third WCIP General Assembly in Canberra. LAC, RG22, 45-D140-W1 Part I, correspondence from 
Canadian High Commission in Canberra to External Affairs Canada, 5 Dec. 1980. The World Council staff 
may have not disclosed the precise nature of the financial support, as CIDA did encourage organizations to 
seek alternative sources of core funding. The Australian funding was not mentioned in the WCIP's annual 
financial statement of March 1981. NFAA, BIF, Binder 9, WCIP Financial Statement, 31 March 1981. 
Unfortunately, the annual statement for 1982 is missing from the WCIP fonds at Library and Archives 
Canada, so it is difficult to know how the Australian funding was formally reported to CIDA.
77 LAC, RG22, 45-D140-W1 Part I, Memo to Minister from Catley-Carlson, “CIDA seeking cabinet approval 
to negotiate an approval-in-principle to fund WCIP to provide money to member organizations for the 
prupose of development in Latin America,” 18 Nov. 1983.
78 Between 1977 and 1981, the World Council had organized eight meetings of its executive council, two 
general assemblies (Kiruna in 1977 and Canberra in 1981), a cultural exchange between Canada and 
Argentina (1978), and a four-day workshop for the Congress of Americanists (Vancouver, 1979). Its 
representatives had attended, among other events, the first two CORPI general assemblies (Panama, 1977 
and Mexico, 1981), the first two Inuit Circumpolar Conferences (Alaska, 1977 and Greenland, 1980), the 
Second Barbados Conference (1977), the first National Congress of Indians of Ecuador (Sucua, 1977), the 
International NGO Conference on Discrimination against Indigenous Populations in the Americas 
(Geneva, 1977), the UN Conference Racism and Racial Discrimination (Geneva, 1978), the Northwestern 
Regional Conference on the Emerging New International Economic Order (Seattle, 1979), the Davvi 
Šuvva Festival (Gárasavvon, 1979), the founding CISA conference (Ollantaytambo, 1980), the World 
Conference on the UN Decade for Women (Copenhagen, 1980), an NGO conference during the UN 
Special Session on Development (New York, 1980), an International NGO Conference on Indigenous 
Peoples and the Land (Geneva, 1981), and several other UN meetings. In 1979, George Manuel had 
represented the World Council on the Ad-Hoc Committee of the Canadian Inter-Church Committee on 
Human Rights in Latin America's fact-finding mission to Chile. UBCICRC, WCIP Four-Year Report 
(1977-1981). In 1982, the organization had been represented at the 38th Session of UN Commission on 
Human Rights (Geneva), the World Assembly of First Nations (Regina), and the first UN Working Group 
on Indigenous Populations (Geneva). LAC, WCIPF, Vol. 29.21, WCIP Newsletter, December 1982.
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pointed out that the increased level of funding would allow the World Council to develop its 
institutional capacities so as to enable the organization to “strike a better balance between its 
development objectives and its advocacy role.”79 In other words, increasing the level of 
funding would allow (or encourage?) the World Council to make economic development a 
larger priority. 
It could be that Catley-Carlson was simply “selling” the increase in funding to her 
political superiors with the idea that it would push the World Council toward a greater focus 
on economic development, but she does specify that the increase would 
...require special efforts [from the WCIP] over the next two years to 
strengthen its development programming capabilities at headquarters 
and at the regional levels in the Americas. (...) [a]n evaluation will be 
carried out in [Fiscal Year] 1984/85; satisfactory progress to meet the 
development objectives...will be a pre-requisite to further CIDA 
funding.80
In fact, much of CIDA's funding to the WCIP did go toward to development in South and 
Central America. In 1977, Indigenous delegates in Panama formed a regional branch 
organization of the World Council for Central America, CORPI.81 Indigenous peoples of 
79 LAC, RG22, 45-D140-W1 Part I, Memo to Minister from Catley-Carlson, “CIDA seeking cabinet approval 
to negotiate an approval-in-principle to fund WCIP to provide money to member organizations for the 
prupose of development in Latin America,” 18 Nov. 1983.
80 Ibid.
81 The organization, founded during a Panama City conference between 24-28 January 1977, was initially 
known as the Consejo Regional de Pueblos Indígenas (México, Centro-América y Panama). LAC, WCIPF, 
Vol. 3.12, 
Calendario Del I Congreso Internacional Indígena de Mexico, Centroamérica y Panama, 24-28 de Enero de 
1977; LAC, WCIPF, Vol. 3.12, Summary of CORPI Executive Council meeting, 5 April 1977. Armando 
Rojas Smith (Misksitu, Nicaragua) would serve as its first president, with José Carlos Morales (Boruca, 
Costa Rica) as secretary general, and Eleazar López Hernández (Zapoteca, Mexico) as treasurer. Morales 
would go on to serve as President of the WCIP (1981-1984), and then Vice-President under Clément 
Chartier. In 1981, the organization began to use the name Coordinadora Regional De Pueblos Indios 
instead. This decision was likely made at the second CORPI General Assembly 4-7 March 1981 in the 
P'urhépecha community of Cheran Atzicurin in Michoacán, Mexico. See LAC, WCIPF, Folder 3.13 
(CORPI Second General Assembly, 4-7 March 1981).
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South America followed in 1980, meeting in Peru to form their own branch organization, 
CISA.82 A substantial amount of the financial support the WCIP received was simply 
transferred to these Central and South American branches. A memo from External Affairs 
Canada in 1985 explicitly stated that, while Canada did support the World Council through 
CIDA, 
...[the] major part of CIDA's contribution is simply rechannelled by 
WCIP to Indigenous organizations which have undertaken 
development projects in [the Latin American] region. Funding for 
administrative elements of WCIP work is written into agreement with 
CIDA only to the extent that these are related to development 
activities in Latin America.83
Because the INGO division's mandate had always been focused on funding programs in the 
Third World, Ronald Leger asserts that it was the very existence of these regional branches 
that encouraged CIDA funding for the WCIP.84
The Norwegian Agency for Development (NORAD) took a slightly different 
approach. It considered supporting the World Council with core funding in 1978, but backed 
away, with a statement that it could only be involved in supporting development. In the early 
1980s, NORAD signed contracts to provide funding to CISA and CORPI directly, rather than 
allowing the World Council or (and this would become a source of tension) the Nordic Sami 
Council to be involved. The decision to focus on these branch organizations in “developing” 
regions enabled NORAD to restrict its funds, at least in theory, to specifically development-
82 The Consejo Indio de Sud America was formed at a meeting in Ollantaytambo, Peru from 27 February-3 
March 1980. NFAA, BIF, Binder 7, Primer Congreso Indio Sudamericano, 27 de Febrere al 3 de Marzo 
1980. The meeting received $30,500 in matching funds from CIDA. LAC, EAF, 45-13-3-7, Part I, 
correspondence from External Affairs Canada to Canadian Embassy in Lima, 14 Dec. 1979.
83 LAC, RG22, 45-D140-W1 Part I, correspondence from External Affairs Canada to Canadian High 
Commission in Canberra, 3 December 1985.
84 Ronald Leger, personal interview, 10 July 2013 and personal correspondence, 20 February 2013.
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related projects.85 In January 1984, NORAD transferred NOK 509,700 (approximately US 
$68,880) to CISA to disburse to local organizations for three development projects: a cultural 
centre in Argentina (Centro Kolla); a cultural and leader training program for Aymara and 
Quechua in Peru (Asociacion Civil TEA) and a leader training program in Chile (El 
Surco/Ad-Mapu).86 The “leadership training” was intended to include “technical, economical 
and social aspects” in order to develop “agriculture, stock raising and industrial sectors” at 
the local level. Later that year, NORAD provided funding for additional projects in South 
America, including the publication of a book on traditional medicine, and the creation and 
strengthening of agricultural co-operatives (in Peru and Bolivia).87
Members of the World Council and its regional branches, however, were hardly 
unaware of this push from NORAD and CIDA away from critical political statements and 
towards “apolitical” economic development. On the contrary, there is evidence, detailed 
below, that many recipients of this financial support knew exactly what the aid agencies had 
in mind, and did their best to evade it. 
85 Oddly, however, NORAD did provide substantial financial support for a Geneva office of the World 
Council to interact with UN activities there. According to the contract, however, this office was to be 
organized and staffed by the Nordic Sami Council. As Henry Minde points out, Sámi delegates rarely used 
the World Council as a platform to criticize their own national governments. Henry Minde, “The 
International Movement of Indigenous Peoples: an Historical Perspective,” in Becoming Visible: 
Indigenous Politics and Self-Government, eds. Terje Brantenberg, Janne Hansen, and Henry Minde 
(Tromsø: Centre for Sámi Studies, 1995), 24. The Geneva office, however, was short-lived. It was set up in 
August 1984, under the control of Aslak Nils Sara's sister Gunhild Sara for a few months until Leif 
Dunfjeld was appointed as its director. It was closed down in late 1986. NFAA, BIF, Binder 20, Leif 
Dunfjeld, “Rapport til Nordisk Samerad Fra World Council of Indigenous Peoples Liasonkontor i Geneve” 
(Report to Sami Council from WCIP Geneva Office), 24 July 1986; LAC, WCIPF, Vol. 10.20, WCIP 
Executive Council Meeting Minutes, 2-4 September 1987
86 Norwegian Agency for Development Archives (hereafter NORADA), 443.1 Private Organizations Fonds 
(hereafter POF), DUH 1364, 83-3474 Støtte til kulture sentra og lederopplæring, fase I (Support for 
cultural centers and leadership training, phase I), Contract between The Norwegian Agency for 
International Development (NORAD) and Consejo Indio de Sud America (CISA), 2 January 1984.
87 NORADA, POF, DUH 1364, 83-5201 Pakke II, div. prosjekter, Peru, Bolivia (Package II, div. Projects, 
Peru, Bolivia), letter from Johannessen and Eie (NORAD) to CISA, 1 Oct 1984.
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4.4 Resistance to the Anti-Politics Machine
Indigenous leaders were quite conscious of the threat of intrusion by funding agencies 
and the risks that influence posed to the “Fourth World” movement. As George Manuel 
noted, “most funding agencies prefer to impose their own aid programs and fail to recognize 
the fundamental need of the poor to control their own development and the impossibility of 
such control without their own organizational development and means.”88 The retention of 
Indigenous political control and an emphasis on Indigenous sovereignty were key elements in 
the World Council's mandate. As such, the World Council and other Indigenous leaders found 
strategic “wrenches” to toss into the “anti-politics machine.” These included alternative 
sources of funding to, direct confrontation with, and creative subversion of governmental 
development agencies.
4.4.1 Resistance: Alternative Funding
The implications of financial support from different actors were discussed by 
delegates at the preparatory meetings in Georgetown and Copenhagen. Lavallée remembers 
that, initially, there was serious reticence to accepting any direct government support which, 
it was feared, might limit the organization's independence.89 Sam Deloria also recalls concern 
at the Georgetown preparatory meeting over his suggestion that money might be secured 
from the Ford Foundation and other corporate foundations. The Canadian delegates in 
particular were worried about accepting money from, in Deloria's words, the “corporate 
monster.”90 He recalls, however, that a delegate from Colombia (likely Trino Morales) 
responded defiantly: “I feel confident that I'm going to do what my job is, what my mission 
88 UNArch, UNWCIP, S-0446-0286-0001, Report on WCIP Funding Difficulties, 31 May 1978.
89 Guy Lavallée, personal interview, 15 July 2012.
90 Sam Deloria, personal interview, 23 March 2012.
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is, and in so doing, I would take money from the Devil himself. But if you guys can't trust 
yourselves then, by all means don't take money from the Ford Foundation.”91 That seemed to 
resolve the issue, and the Ford Foundation did eventually provide a grant of $4000 in 1976 
which enabled seven WCIP representatives to attend the annual United Nations NGO 
conference in Geneva Switzerland that year.92
The World Council did, however, make an effort to search for alternate and more 
politically acceptable sources of financial assistance. As mentioned above, Manuel sent Guy 
Lavallée on a fund-raising tour through continental Europe, including the Vatican.93 Manuel 
approached the ILO in Geneva in 1972 and met personally with a staff member, Cedric 
Hennis, to request support both for his bid for ECOSOC observer status and for the first 
World Conference of Indigenous Peoples.94 He was told that the organization was “not 
interested in embarrassing the Canadian government.”95 In 1975, Manuel sought advice on 
funding from Kalman Kaplansky, Canadian delegate to the International Labour Organization 
and requested help from James Wilson of the Minority Rights Group in the United 
Kingdom.96 Marie Smallface-Marule and George Manuel also sought funding from newly 
independent African states with anti-colonial ideologies. Their close contacts with senior 
diplomats in Ottawa from Tanzania, Cuba and Barbados and other anti-colonial countries 
91 Ibid. This conversation must have occurred in hotel, in the days previous to the conference, if Trino 
Morales was present, as he was deported before the formal conference started. See Chapter 2, page 80.
92 Ford Foundation Archive, Central Index cards. Thanks to Lucas Buresch of the Rockefeller Archive Center 
for sending me this information. Sami Archives (hereafter SA), Nordic Sami Institute Fonds (hereafter 
NSIF), Series Db (Organization) 043, 4 (Ark 2.10.1), George Manuel, Report on the WCIP, 20 January 
1977.
93 GMD, 4 June 1974; Guy Lavallée, personal interview, 15 July 2012. This trip was followed up by George 
Manuel's meeting with Klaus Bohr of the West German Embassy in 1976. GMD, 9 April 1976.
94 GMD 21-22 June 1972
95 McFarlane, 170.
96 GMD, 7 November 1975 and 20 June 1975.
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seemed a reasonable place to start.97 In 1973, they had already put forward a vague effort to 
seek funding from Muammar Gaddafi, the Libyan ruler and fervent anti-imperialist.98 In 
March 1976, Manuel and Smallface-Marule met with one Mr. Mohammed Maharume who 
promised to “put us in contact with Arab funding representatives.”99 In 1978, Manuel 
travelled to Havana with Marie Smallface-Marule's husband Jacob Marule to solicit support 
from the Cuban government. In Manuel's own words, 
I am here to seek financial aide for the WCIP because the so-called 
free world (Imperialists) is not willing to financially assist me 
develop an organization tool for the world Indigenous oppressed, 
deprived, starving and being murdered people that I want to help 
through a peaceful leadership organization development program 
through which they, Indigenous peoples, can help themselves. [sic]100
None of these efforts led directly to financial support for the World Council. George Manuel 
seemed particularly disappointed that the Cubans would not be convinced, but at the same 
time, he does not seem totally surprised:
They want to dig deep into our past and into our motives for the 
future and assess whether we are friends or foes, before they decide, 
whether they should or should not give us support. But then all the 
political camps we have visited have taken this same response to our 
appeal for help from them.101
Governments around the world—even those of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM)
—were deeply influenced by Cold War politics. Most members of the NAM did have close 
ties with one side of the American-Soviet conflict, and many held an ideological view of 
global politics.  The World Council fit poorly within that framework, particularly in the Latin 
97 Marie Smallface-Marule, personal interview, 13 June 2012
98 GMD, 20 December 1973
99 GMD, 6 March 1976.
100 GMD, 15 January 1978.
101 GMD, 16 January 1978.
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American theatre. The organization could not be trusted to support left-wing or right-wing 
governments in Central or South America, because its role was to stand between those 
governments (regardless of their political orientation) and Indigenous peoples. Although 
Third World internationalism in Africa might have been, as Vijay Prashad suggests, 
“internationalist nationalism” distinct from European nationalism and uninterested in forcing 
the cultural assimilation of Indigenous peoples and other ethnic minorities, Latin American 
nationalism was much more of the European sort.102 Nor were Indigenous peoples generally 
supportive of the kinds of modernization and industrialization proposed by Third World 
leaders,103 Indigenous people's lack of statehood made them not just non-aligned, but 
unalignable, at least not over the long term. This outsider quality made the WCIP a risky bet 
for any government during the polarized environment of the Cold War. 
The World Council maintained some contact with the Non-Aligned Movement 
through a Tanzanian diplomat. Mwinamila (Michael) Lukumbuzya was High Commissioner 
in Sweden when George Manuel first met him in 1972 while attending the UN Stockholm 
Conference on the Human Environment. At that first meeting—again arranged by Jacob 
Marule, who was also in Stockholm at the time—they discussed “the possibility of our 
International Indigenous peoples conference” and “the political development of the 3rd 
world.”104 Lukumbuzya later became High Commissioner to Canada, maintained contact with 
Manuel, and even paid a visit to the WCIP Secretariat in Lethbridge, but with his death from 
102 In fact, Benedict Anderson locates the origins of modern nationalism in the Americas, particularly South 
and Central America. Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism 
[Revised Edition: 1991] (New York: Verso, 1983), 47-66.
103 See the World Council's reaction the proposals for the New International Economic Order below.
104 GMD, 6 and 11 June 1972. 
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cancer in 1981, the Fourth World lost its strongest ally in the Third World.105 While the World 
Council's connections in the Third World never provided any substantial funding for the 
organization, they did provide (as detailed below) a source for ideological inspiration and 
vocal criticism of both imperialism and “neo-imperialism.”
Efforts at raising funds from the American government or private American funding 
agencies were not particularly successful either, though attempts were made on several 
occasions. The NIB and World Council made several fund-raising trips to the United States, 
and tried to enlist the help of Kanien'kehá:ka Chemical Engineer Andy Anderson, founder of 
the American Indian Science & Engineering Society. George Manuel was convinced that 
AIM and the International Indian Treaty Council were more successful at securing funding 
than the more liberal private agencies because of their political profile.106 Deloria, likewise, 
points out that both the scholarly and international communities were dismissive of federally-
recognized and elected Indigenous leaders (represented by the NCAI in the United States, 
and the NIB in Canada) whom AIM had successfully framed as “sell-outs.” Prominent 
“progressive” actors were convinced that “the real Indians, the good Indians, were the Treaty 
Council, and AIM, and anybody with feathers on.”107 The World Council's basic membership 
structure might not have met left-wing and liberal expectations for Indigenous radicalism 
either. The WCIP allocated membership to national organizations representing Indigenous 
peoples in each nation state, rather than to “traditional” tribal units which appear more pure, 
less tainted by colonialism. Deloria implies that this critique impacted the World Council's 
105 Marie Smallface-Marule, personal interview, 26 May 2011; LAC, WCIPF, Vol. 17.29, letter from W. G. 
Manyfingers to Eugene Steinhauer (Indian Association of Alberta), 15 Sept. 1981.
106 GMD, 18 May 1978. 
107 Sam Deloria, personal interview, 23 March 2012.
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general level of acceptance at the United Nations. Certainly, the fact that the WCIP only 
gained “Category II” consultative status at ECOSOC in 1981 (whereas the IITC had had it 
since 1977) would not have helped convince early potential donors of the organization's 
global significance. It might be for this reason that the World Council, with its more 
conservative image, failed to gain more support in the United States, but the ultimate source 
of this deficiency remains unclear. The Inter-American Foundation, an agency of the US 
government, initially promised $150,000 of core funding. When the funds failed to arrive, 
Manuel wrote and called until finally receiving an answer: the people the organization would 
be funding were too politically involved to receive funding, so the application was rejected.108 
Another application to the Ford Foundation around the same time was rejected on similar 
grounds: “[t]hey said there was too much political groups [sic] in South and Central America 
and we can't fund them. ”109 Perhaps the reputation of the WCIP was too radical for some 
private donors, and not radical enough for others. Moreover, Ronald Leger (CIDA) suspects 
that the World Council “never had sufficiently enthusiastic support from USA Native 
American organizations (like the National Congress of American Indians) to garner funding 
from US government agencies” which, as he recalls, “rarely supported any organization 
unless it had a strong American component or support.”110 And so the organization came to 
depend heavily on the one aid agency that was willing to take the chance of providing regular 
core funding: CIDA. In 1984, a proposal by Ossie Cruse, a member of the WCIP Executive 
Council representing Australia's National Aboriginal Congress, suggested that the World 
108 LAC, WCIPF, Vol. 10.7, Transcript of WCIP Executive Council Meeting, Lethbridge, Alberta, 9-13 
December 1983. 
109 Ibid.
110 Ronald Leger, personal correspondence, 20 February 2013.
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Council should consider moving its headquarters to Geneva to encourage financial 
contributions from outside Canada.111 The World Council did set up a small office in Geneva, 
but perhaps a formal relocation would have placed their CIDA funding at risk.112 At any rate, 
the organization's headquarters remained in Canada throughout its life.
4.4.2 Resistance: Critique and Confrontation
While the World Council did grow to include certain elements of traditional 
“development” in its plans and programs, the initial steps in that direction were taken in ways 
that either implied a critique or openly criticized the “anti-politics machine.” The World 
Council’s goals always consisted of both economic and political elements. George Manuel 
asserted that “[s]elf-government, even on its grandest level, without an economic base simply 
creates the economic colonialism we are witnessing throughout much of Asia and Africa.”113 
He and Smallface-Marule sought an alternative route that would allow true independence, 
and they believed that such a route had been followed in Tanzania.
Manuel and Smallface-Marule had been deeply influenced by the philosophy of Julius 
Nyerere, whose concept of “Ujamaa” (or “African Socialism”) offered one of the most 
cohesive alternatives to the industry-focused, aid-dependent conceptions of development.114 
After his 1971 trip to Tanzania, Manuel had read from Nyerere's Uhuru na Ujamaa 
(Freedom and Socialism) which contains Nyerere's formal statement on economic 
111 Duquette, 89.
112 Ibid., 89.
113 George Manuel and Michael Posluns, The Fourth World: An Indian Reality (Don Mills, Ont.: Collier-
Macmillan, 1974), 204.
114 Gilbert Rist, The History of Development: From Western Origins to Global Faith, 3rd Edition (New York: 
Zed Books, 2008), 123-139.
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development, the 1967 Arusha Declaration.115 Nyerere's concept of “self-reliance” or “auto-
centred development” was that an alternative to capitalism or state-centred socialism could 
be based in traditional communal life rather than on Rostowian or Marxist modernization 
theory, both of which assumed that all societies should (or would inevitably, in the case of 
Marxism) progress through the same linear economic stages that European societies had.116 It 
criticized these plans for development as too reliant on foreign aid (“Gifts and loans will 
endanger our independence”) and industrialization (“We have put too much emphasis on 
industries”).117 Just as the Third-Worldist Movement favoured cooperation between its 
members, Nyerere favoured “concentric circles” of self-reliance to promote African unity.118 
It is therefore unsurprising, given Manuel's interest in maintaining Indigenous cultural and 
political sovereignty and building worldwide cooperation, that he was drawn to Ujamaa and 
critical of Western-led economic development.
George Manuel's diary shows the degree to which he adopted Nyerere's language and 
adapted the latter’s ideas to the circumstances and cultures of Indigenous peoples in North 
America and around the world. Sometimes the references are more overt, like Manuel's 
confident assertion that his formulation of an “ideology for North American Indian Socialism 
115 GMD, 25 January 1972.
116 Bonny Ibhawoh and J.I. Dibua suggest that, in practice, Ujamaa had much in common with Fabian and 
Marxist socialism, and suffered from the same weakness as other Western development initiatives (a 
paternal attitude toward peasantry and the acceptance of Western standards of living as a goal. Bonny 
Ibhawoh and J. I. Dibua, “Deconstructing Ujamaa: The Legacy of Julius Nyerere in the Quest for Social 
and Economic Development in Africa,” African Journal of Political Science 8:1 (2003) 61-63. For more on 
Nyerere's broader political vision, see the introduction to this dissertation. Gilbert Rist's chapter “Self 
Reliance: The Communal Past as a Model for the Future” in The History of Development might present an 
overly rosy depiction of Nyerere's actions, but it provides an excellent summary of his basic concepts. Rist, 
123-139.
117 Julius Nyerere, Uhuru na Ujamaa : Freedom and Socialism, (Nairobi: Oxford University Press, 1968), 
239-250.
118 Rist, 83-85, 127.
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will thrive and progress, regardless of the struggle in Indian generations yet to come into 
being. This idea will survive and weather the attack of Europeans.”119 Other times, it is more 
subtle, like a public lecture about “developing Indian unity on the basis of Indian philosophy 
of the spirit of sharing. The White Man’s colonial philosophy breeds greed and hate amongst 
mankind.”120 Describing the work of writing his book, “The Fourth World,” he states “I am 
interested that my political theories develop a political, social and economical and cultural 
philosophy that will incite a united direction and objective of the Indian people towards 
cultural, political and economic independence.”121 While Manuel may have hoped that his 
book would offer such a philosophy, the completed work is primarily a historical account of 
colonialism in North America and the contemporary relationship between Indigenous peoples 
and the Canadian government. The book offers very little concrete description of the future 
Manuel would like to see, but he does describe his visit to Africa and state that “Tanzania is 
the closest example to my understanding of the way that Indian people want to develop 
[with]a structure and style and economic organization that allows the whole community to 
share in...good things, and to decide which are the higher priorities in moving” forward.122 He 
emphasizes, however, that Nyerere had, after achieving formal political independence, used 
“the tools of sovereignty...to begin to build their nation.” In Tanzania, he saw the hope that 
“there were ways modern technology can be adapted to traditional values.”123 For instance, 
Manuel points out that Tanzania's “decision to postpone the development of a national 
119 This is a clear adaptation of Nyerere's goal of culturally appropriate African Socialism. GMD, 14 July 
1974. My emphasis.
120 Manuel's description of his speech at the National Canadian Indian Women’s Conference in Saskatoon. 
GMD, 24 March 1972.
121 GMD, 19 October 1972.
122 Manuel and Posluns, 246.
123 Ibid., 244.
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television network had been made in order to leave the limited funds available free to 
develop eight local radio networks that could accommodate all the local languages.”124 Thus, 
Manuel's experiences in Tanzania encouraged him to believe that sovereign Indigenous-led 
development, guided by the right philosophy, could benefit society without creating a 
disparity of wealth and power, and without promoting cultural assimilation. In contrast to 
Tanzanian development, Manuel expresses his criticism of economic development by the 
Canadian state: “I attended Economic Development group for a short while and found the 
discussions were on the [Indian Affairs Bureau's] Economic Development Policy frame 
work, which is a farce. The Indians' will to develop their own framework, which will meet 
their criteria and needs.”125 But he feels Nyerere's concept of self-reliance would benefit 
Indigenous peoples elsewhere as well: “We must help the Indians of Mexico and Guatemala 
implement and achieve their desire for self-determination. Self-reliance through self-help 
actions collective [sic].”126 
George Manuel's references to Nyerere and Third-Worldism are perhaps more 
common in the year after his return from Tanzania, but they continue to appear throughout 
his political career. In 1978, speaking to students at the University of British Columbia, he 
declared that the Canadian government and the Canadian people were forcing Indigenous 
peoples to align “more and more with the Third World Community. I told them we would 
alliance [sic] ourselves with the Third World Nations if we did not get satisfactory co-
operation from you as white Canadians and your governments.”127 While Manuel rarely 
124 Ibid., 244-5
125 GMD, 12 April 1972. Later that year, he again criticizes the IAB Economic Development Program, 
describing it as “designed from the top in isolation from any philosophy.” GMD, 14 November 1972.
126 GMD, 19 October 1982.
127 GMD, 10 May 1978. According to his diary, Manuel received a standing ovation for this lecture.
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commented on international news in his diaries, in an entry from May 1980, Manuel remarks 
on the death of Josip Broz Tito, who “introduced the Non-Aligned Nations Organization by 
founding the first meeting in Belgrade, Yugoslavia.”128 As late as 1982, a decade after his 
meeting with Nyerere and reading of Uhuru na Ujamaa, Manuel still stresses in his diary the 
importance of “self-reliance within the framework of the ideology of socialism and the 
Indian beliefs of communalism.”129 This tremendous influence clearly left Manuel believing 
that economic development for Indigenous peoples  would only be sustainable it was 
included in a larger package of political change, led by Indigenous peoples themselves, and 
orchestrated in harmony with traditional culture.
Delegates at the Second General Assembly of the World Council (Kiruna, Swedish 
Sápmi, 1977) recognized Indigenous peoples' need for technical and scientific information, 
but did not request it in the form of “technical development” programs organized by state 
governments, but rather, in the form of exchange between the Indigenous populations of 
different countries. They equally expressed a need for economic assistance, but attendees 
requested “funds for Indigenous Peoples...to be used for agrarian and natural resources 
development” and “subsidies from governmental or international economic institutions 
through the granting of long term [sic] credit at low interest.”130 The World Council was 
opposed neither to the use of natural resources nor to economic change; on the contrary, it 
128 GMD, 3 May 1980. Tito actually died the following day, so Manuel must have recorded this entry later and 
confused the date. Another rare example includes this comment from 5 November 1976: “I am very 
interested in the racist armed political struggle that is taking place in Rhodesia between the racist Prime 
Minister Ian Smith and the Black people who are the majority and own the country of Rhodesia.”
129 GMD, 10 March and 2 August 1982. In the later case, he makes these (quoted) comments in a discussion 
with Chen Yongling, a visiting Chinese scholar from Beijing's Central University of Nationalities. Manuel 
may have continued to reference Nyerere and other Third-World leaders after 1982, but if he continued to 
record diaries after that year, I do not have access to them.
130 UBCICRC, World Council of Indigenous Peoples, WCIP Presentation to the United Nations, “The Political 
Development of Indigenous Nations into the International Systems,” 35 June 1981.
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supported both with the condition that Indigenous peoples were in control of the use of their 
own resources and economies. These are demands for support for greater economic 
sovereignty, not state or external intervention. In the early 1980s, the WCIP Charter's 
requirements for membership were amended to emphasize the importance of self-
determination to the organization and the link between political sovereignty. Whereas in 
1975, the charter had only required “a national organization... representative of Indigenous 
peoples of any given country”131 the new charter required that members be national 
organizations “representative of Indigenous Peoples of the county whose objectives are to 
further their economic self-sufficiency and to attain self-determination.”132
The 1979 WCIP application for CIDA funding states that the project's specific 
objective is to help establish and strengthen regional offices of the World Council. These 
branches would thereafter have the strength to publicize their regional problems to the 
international community “especially in the context of [the] New International Economic 
Order,” to negotiate directly with their governments for control over land and resources, and 
to contact international agencies for assistance with development projects.133 That the New 
International Economic Order (NIEO) is referenced is telling. The highly politicized 
approach to global economic disparity was proposed in 1974 by the United Nations 
Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), a body dominated by the Non-Aligned-
Movement countries. The main tenets of the NIEO supported economic growth in the Third 
131 UNArch, UNWCIP, S-0446-0286-0001, Charter of the World Council of Indigenous Peoples, Enacted 31 
October 1975, Amended 26 August 1977.
132 This change seems to have been made at the Third General Assembly (1981) in Canberra, but archival 
documents and secondary sources make no mention of when the change was made. LAC, WCIPF, 5.09, 
Charter of the World Council of Indigenous Peoples, Amended 1987.
133 NFAA, BIF, Binder 7, “WCIP Project Number 337-60/W24-2, Regional Councils Development, 
Supplementary Information,” 1979/80.
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World both through the expansion of international trade and through increased financial aid 
from the First World, but at the same time, they accused foreign investment and First-World-
led development projects of undermining state sovereignty in the Third World.134 At the time, 
many observers considered the NIEO to be expressing the “revolt of the Third World” but 
Gilbert Rist suggests it was just the opposite: “In reality...its aim was to realize a long-
standing dream of world capitalism: that is, to ensure continuing growth of the system as a 
whole by better integrating the peripheral countries.”135 The WCIP's formal comment on the 
NIEO, also from 1979, seems to echo this critique, depicting the promotion of increased 
industrial development within the proposal as a combined threat to Indigenous peoples and 
their lands. 
Developing countries, once colonies of the technological and 
industrial powers, have become the consumers of the future and seek 
to institute a second industrial revolution by ravaging tribal areas... 
The last frontier on earth is now the last home and territories of 
indigenous peoples. For indigenous peoples throughout the world, the 
U.N. Declaration on the Establishment of a New International 
Economic Order could mean their ultimate and final destruction...136
At the same time, as the NIEO seemingly presented a window of opportunity in which the 
international economic system be renegotiated and reshaped, the WCIP also suggested it 
could be a sign of hope if Indigenous peoples' rights to sovereignty were respected:
134 Rist, 149.
135 Rist, 150. Vijay Prashad, however, continues to insist that the 1973 United Nations General Assembly 
resolution on the New International Economic Order was “the highest point of the Third World Project” 
and charts the decline of Third-Worldism from that point onward. Vijay Prashad, The Poorer Nations: A 
Possible History of the Global South, (London: Verso, 2012), 3. 
136 Center for World Indigenous Studies, Chief George Manuel Library and Fourth World Documentation 
Project, WCIP et al., “The New International Economic Order: A Promise or Peril for the Indigenous 
Peoples of the World” (Presented at Northwest Regional Conference on the Emerging International 
Economic Order, Seattle, Washington, USA, 29-31 March 1979)
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Indigenous populations must become a part of the global dialogue on 
the new international economic order, with guarantees for their 
protection and right of self-determination. Each state must be willing 
to recognize indigenous territories and the separate and distinct rights 
of tribal populations. (...) The World Council of Indigenous Peoples 
must be recognized as the official international organ representing the 
voice of indigenous peoples worldwide, and a formal governmental 
seat within the United Nations must be established to provide 
indigenous representation by appointment of the World Council of 
Indigenous Peoples.137
Given this critical yet somewhat hopeful view of the NIEO, the World Council was 
requesting funds from CIDA in order to strengthen its regional branches so that they would 
be better able to fight against the programs for economic development which failed to 
recognize their sovereignty.
In March 1983, while CIDA was deciding whether to review the World Council's 
funding, Marie Smallface-Marule decided to confront the agency more directly with her 
views on the interconnected nature of political empowerment and economic development. 
She was teaching at the University of Lethbridge at the time, and had assigned her students 
readings from Perpetuating Poverty, a book by Roger Carty, Virginia Smith and the Latin 
American Working Group (LAWG) that was deeply critical of CIDA, the Bretton Woods 
institutions, and international development programs generally. She decided to include the 
work's explicit critique, quoting it verbatim, in her request for funding. Her letter emphasized 
the need to promote North-South Solidarity, but also to encourage aid which does not remove 
political aspects of work:
...the new goal for aid giving—and other criterion for selecting aid 
partners—should be the advancement not merely of 'basic needs', but 
the more encompassing fulfillment of 'basic rights'...political content 
137 Ibid.
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cannot be eliminated from aid giving because authentic development 
is always a political process as much as an economic and social one... 
(We would like to see that) the politics which guide Canadian aid 
would be those of solidarity with oppressed people and their struggles 
for political and economic liberation.138
Smallface-Marule's decision to launch this head-on attack against the “anti-politics 
machine” may well have contributed to the year-long delay before CIDA renewed their 
contract, but she made it clear that the World Council would not simply abandon its political 
ideals in exchange for annual funding. By the time the next round of funding arrived in the 
spring of 1984, however, the World Council had moved its headquarters to Ottawa and 
Smallface-Marule was no longer involved. There is some evidence, however, that this 
critique by the WCIP (and presumably, by other organizations) might have had an effect on 
CIDA in the long term. In the mid-1990s, WCIP administrator Ricardo Contreras reported 
that the push for the removal of politics from developmental work had weakened “with 
greater understanding on the part of agencies such as CIDA that democratic and human rights 
development is tied to economic and social development.”139
4.4.3 Resistance: Subversion and Circumvention
The requirements of CIDA funding placed significant demands on the World 
Council's administration. In addition to the detailed proposal, WCIP staff were required to 
138 LAC, RG22, 45-D140-W1 Part I, correspondence from WCIP to CIDA, Concluding Remarks, 28 March 
1983. The WCIP document quotes Carty and Smith somewhat inaccurately, but not in such a way as to 
distort the original meaning. Robert Carty, Virginia Smith and the Latin American Working Group, 
Perpetuating Poverty: The Political Economy of Canadian Foreign Aid (Toronto: Between the Lines, 
1981), 167. Criticism of the IMF and World Bank is especially notable given the World Bank's “Tribal 
Peoples and Economic Development” policy statement of 1982. A more thorough criticism of the World 
Bank policy, in the form of a paper by John H. Bodley, was included in the February 1984 WCIP 
Newsletter, itself edited by Smallface-Marule: LAC, WCIPF, Vol. 29.21, John H. Bodley, “The World 
Bank Policy: Criticisms and Recommendations,” WCIP Newsletter 4 (1984-02), 14-19.
139 Duquette, 96.
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provide CIDA with regular progress reports, audited annual financial statements, and other 
documentation.140 There was consistent pressure from CIDA to seek funding elsewhere (so 
that the WCIP would not be overly reliant on Canadian funds) and to apply funding to 
development projects, yet NORAD steadfastly insisted on funding only the World Council's 
regional branch organizations for development programs. In the end, one of these problems 
was used creatively to solve the other. In a World Council executive meeting, Smallface-
Marule acknowledged that in her applications to CIDA, she was including development-
project funding from NORAD and other organizations designated solely for CORPI and 
CISA in the World Council's sources of income.141 This made CIDA's contribution look like a 
smaller percentage of the total WCIP budget, even if CIDA's budget made up the 
overwhelming majority of the World Council's core funds, and made development projects 
look like a much larger percentage of the World Council's total budget. The funds from 
NORAD never passed through the WCIP headquarters at all, yet the South and Central 
American organizations were technically branches of the World Council.
Indigenous peoples in Central and South America also tried to subvert and circumvent 
the “anti-politics machine.” Among the South American development projects NORAD 
sponsored in 1984 was a cultural centre in Argentina (Centro Kolla). Centro Kolla's contract 
described planned training in “music, song, language, history and of agricultural and 
handicraft products, arrangements of traditional feasts and ceremonies, etc.”142 This seems 
140 In return, however, they could hardly be depended upon to deliver funding on schedule. Since they needed 
to review financial reports from one quarter before providing funding for the following quarter, cash flow 
problems were endemic. LAC, WCIPF, Vol. 10.7, Transcript of WCIP Executive Council Meeting, 
Lethbridge, Alberta, 9-13 December 1983.
141 Ibid.
142 NORADA, POF, DUH 1364, 83-3474 Støtte til kulture sentra og lederopplæring, fase I (Support for 
cultural centers and leadership training, phase I), Contract between The Norwegian Agency for 
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rather apolitical and therefore acceptable to NORAD. Yet Centro Kolla's year-end report 
reveals interests that go far beyond the merely cultural: “This year, Centro Kolla...established 
new strategies to project indianity as a political alternative, capable to re-structure our 
existence of colonized people by rebuilding our history...and replevy our personality and 
dignity of being autonomous people, sovereign and true owners of the land we stand on 
[sic].”143 The Centre organized a conference focused on “the reality of the present indian 
nations, with their history development, and the effects over their development, a millenary 
peoples, of the western colonization[sic].” It launched “an indianist campaign together with 
CISA's advisor, Salvador Palomino, through the Toba communities... and through Pilagás and 
Mantacas communities...”144 It commemorated the death of Tupaj Amaru—leader of an 
eighteenth century Indigenous uprising against the Spanish in Peru—with a “replevin march” 
through the main streets of Buenos Aires.145 Possibly under the guidance of CISA leaders, 
Centro Kolla's project proposal had consciously avoided the political, yet once NORAD had 
transferred the funds, the Indigenous organization had shifted its emphasis towards land 
rights and sovereignty. In Chile, the NORAD-funded Ad-Mapu leadership training program 
was likely proposed with the best of intentions, but as their final report states, the received 
funds were diverted to more pressing political concerns:
International Development (NORAD) and Consejo Indio de Sud America (CISA), 2 January 1984.
143 NORADA, POF, DUH 1364, 83-3474, Centro Kolla, Chronological Report of Activities in 1984.
144 Ibid.
145 Ibid. Tupaj Amaru is more commonly known as Túpac Amaru II (1742 – 1781). The WCIP does not seem 
to have made much use of historical Indigenous rebellions in its own advocacy work, perhaps lacking 
events or figures with significance to all Indigenous peoples around the world. It did, however, invest a 
great deal of effort in commemorations of the 500th anniversary of Columbus' landing, and as early as 
1988, criticized any planned celebrations of the anniversary. LAC, WCIPF, Vol. 13.12, Nordic Sami 
Council, Report on International Conference and VI General Assembly of WCIP; LAC, WCIPF, Vol. 
29.22, WCIP Newsletter 1 (1988).
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...other more demanding needs arose which altered the original plan... 
the current government decreed, with law No. 2568, the creation of 
administrative machine with the express purpose of taking a census of 
indigenous communities of Chile for their immediate division, so 
putting an end to the communitarian way of life of the Mapuches... It 
was therefore of vital importance to direct available financial 
resources, which until then had been in the Mapuche coffers for 
training, to tackle the legal problem.146
Similarly, CIDA- or NORAD-sponsored budgets for the World Council and its branch 
organizations included terminology and technical jargon under the heading of “development” 
that suggest clever semantic evasion of the “anti-politics machine.” Significant allocation 
areas with titles like “organizational strengthening,” “human resources development,” and 
“regional evaluation” look innocent enough, but could just as easily be spent on political 
work as anything technical or economic without any actual clear breaches of contract.147 
From Leger's description, the INGO Division's policies seem somewhat ambiguous. He 
asserts that CIDA “emphatically did not fund political work, but it did provide funds for the 
'institutional strengthening' of civil society organizations that engaged, among other things, in 
public awareness of their organisations [sic] mission.”148 Apparently, this could include 
organizations that were quite explicitly political in nature. This loop-hole provided the World 
Council and its regional branches with the possibility to channel funds to overtly political 
uses. Moreover, because the bulk of the funding that the World Council received from other 
agencies could not be used for core funding, it often went to pay for the organization's 
regular General Assemblies, which were largely if not exclusively political meetings. CIDA, 
146 NORADA, POF, DUH 1364, 86-1882 Ad-Mapu kultur sentra, Chile, Mapuche Cultural Centres' Financial 
Report on the Project “Training Mapuche leaders of Chile,” February 1986.
147 LAC, WCIPF, Vol. 33.5, WCIP Income for 1 April 1990 to 31 March 1991. Marie Smallface-Marule, 
personal interview, 16 June 2013.
148 Ronald Leger, personal interview, 10 July 2013.
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by contrast, preferred not to fund General Assemblies, and according to Donald Rojas, this 
was because CIDA was “afraid that their funds will go towards political activities in 
countries of which Canada has friendly relations.”149 Since the alternative core funding was 
not available, the WCIP administration did its best to spend the money it received from CIDA 
on the true goals of the organization whenever possible.150
4.5 The Effects of Effects Development Aid Agency Funding
4.5.1 Effects: The Growth of Development Work
Whether or not it was really CIDA's goal to encourage the World Council to strike a 
“better” balance between economic development and political work, this was the end result. 
During its first years, the WCIP spent very little time or money on anything that would be 
considered development work. One notable exception might be the funds it helped raise to 
contribute to an emergency fund for victims of the February 1976 earthquake in 
Guatemala.151 Even then George Manuel's attitude about the purpose of development came 
through in his report: 
At the time the money was turned over...no concrete plans had been 
made to expend the funds, but the indigenous people plan action 
when they have the resources... However, several ideas were already 
being voiced – for example, a communal house that would serve to 
unite the people and facilitate consciousness-raising and awareness of 
149 LAC, WCIPF, Vol. 10.17, WCIP Executive Meeting Minutes, 3 October 1986.
150  At the 1979 Nordic meeting of senior officials, there were mixed feelings about advent of Canadian 
support for the WCIP. While it seemed to lend the organization credibility and sustainability, attendees also 
worried that the World Council might become “Canada-dominated.” NFAA, BIF, Binder 6, Minutes of 
Nordic Council Senior Officials Meeting for the Promotion of Indigenous Peoples' Interests, Oslo, 6 
December 1979.
151 In one of the WCIP's poorest years, it managed to donate $8,257 to the Kaqchikel community of Tecpán. 
SA, NSIF, Db 043, 4 (Ark 2.10.1), George Manuel, Report on the WCIP, 20 January 1977.
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present day situations. The indigenous language could be taught there 
to the children...152
In her analysis of the World Council, Deidre Duquette notes that in the mid-1980s 
“the WCIP began...to look seriously at development activities.”153 The following graph 
indicates that once CIDA sponsorship started, official development spending (including all 
transfers to CORPI and CISA) averaged 30-50% of the annual budget. From 1979 until at 
least 1983, much of this money may well have gone to “organizational strengthening.” After 
all, the World Council had political reasons to support the growth of these regional branches 
as well. But there is evidence that CIDA's funding influenced the WCIP to adopt 
development as a fundamental part of its work.
152 SA, NSIF, Db 043, 4 (Ark 2.10.1), George Manuel, Report on the WCIP, 20 January 1977.
153 Duquette, 93.
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Fig 2: Financial support for the WCIP and CIDA spending on “development”154
154 For sources, please refer above to the footnote 53 (below Fig. 1) on page 121.
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A Tri-Annual report presented at the WCIP Fourth General Assembly in 1984 initially 
describes the organization's objectives as being split between political and economic 
objectives, neither section mentioning the issue of “self-determination” or “sovereignty.”155 
Later in the document, it is asserted that “the focus of the indigenous people of the world 
must be firmly fixed on the goal of self-determination” but that the WCIP must work toward 
this goal through “practical and realistic endeavors” and “must allow pragmatization and not 
rethoric [sic] to guide its activities.”156 George Manuel's espoused hope for an Indigenous 
ideology or philosophy was slowly being rejected. In 1987, the World Council's Five Year 
Plan of Action split a description of the organization's “areas of work” equally between 
“Socio-Economic Development” and “Intergovernmental Relations and Human Rights.”157 
While not wholly divorced from claims to sovereignty, the plan's stated goal for socio-
economic development is that it should “lead to self-determination in the long term.”158At its 
founding, the WCIP had demanded international recognition of Indigenous peoples' inherent 
right to self-determination on the basis of history and justice (and perhaps economic 
development as a basis for future self-sufficiency). It now prized economic development as 
its immediate goal, believing it would eventually create an environment which could enable 
self-determination.
A special workshop, entitled “The Indian Peoples Facing Development,” was 
organized immediately prior to the Fifth WCIP General Assembly in July 1987.159 The 
155 NFAA, BIF, Binder 14, Tri-Annual Report of the WCIP, September 1984.
156 At one point, the report even describes self-determination as an “unfolding process,” an unclear and rather 
moderate characterization of the organization's end goal. Ibid.
157 LAC, WCIPF, Vol. 1.14, WCIP Five Year Plan of Action (1987-1992), October 1987.
158 Ibid.
159 The workshop was organized in the community of Ollantaytambo from 4-9 July 1987, while the General 
Assembly took place from the 11-17 July, in Lima, Peru. LAC, WCIP, Vol. 34.6, Report on The 
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participants were primarily delegates or Indian leaders of the base organizations of CORPI 
and CISA, but also included consultants from CIDA  and other technical teams who 
implemented development projects.160 The reports from the meeting demonstrates a 
complicated view of development. Delegates specifically emphasized the rejection of 
“Western models imposed by the Nation-States in development projects for Indian Peoples,” 
and asserted that the “Western system of development does not offer humanity concrete 
models. With its merchantilist [sic] and warfaring technologies, it leads Man to immediate 
and/or gradual self-destruction, because of its disrespect for the close relationship between 
Man and Nature.”161 Yet the General Assembly formally accepted that it was “necessary...to 
admit at the same time that such values as their communitarian and collective nature, must be 
adapted to the demands of the modern economy and the institutional influence of the 
bureaucratic apparatus of the Nation-State.”162 Economic development was again a means to 
promote self-sufficiency with Indigenous self-determination, hopefully, as an end result. The 
assembly acknowledged that "this political goal requires a material base" and recommended 
"the establishment of working relations with financial organisms [sic], economic entities of 
the Nation-State and financial institutions in general."163 The members organizations of the 
World Council International were still determined to demand their right to self-determination, 
but financial and development assistance was now explicitly accepted as a necessary step to 
achieving that right.
Development Program: Coordination, Administration and Implementation of the V General Assembly of 
the WCIP (August 1987).
160 Ibid.
161 SA, Oslo Sámiid Searvi Fonds (PA-1002/E/L0013), [Report on WCIP] V General Assembly.
162 Ibid.
163 Ibid.
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In 1986/7, former WCIP Vice-President Melillan Painemal and former CISA 
Treasurer Juan Lincopi Contreras made formal allegations of financial mismanagement and 
even corruption in CISA, prompting a series of audits by NORAD and CIDA.164 The auditors 
had difficulty giving complete reports because the financial documentation by CISA and its 
member organizations was so poor. They did not suggest personal embezzlement, but they 
did state that the member organizations had not followed standard accounting practices, and 
in at least a few cases, they had spent money on projects not included in their contracts.165 
NORAD temporarily suspended any further applications from CISA, and eventually 
terminated the contracts for seven of twenty-three projects (demanding the full or partial 
repayment of funds by CISA), and threatened to terminate an additional four unless certain 
contract demands were met. Additionally, CISA was denied indefinitely the right to manage 
any third-party-operated projects sponsored by the agency.166 In its official statement on the 
audits, NORAD further argued that 
...the building and consolidations of organizations...has received too 
much attention...NORAD wishes to minimise the risk of seeing itself 
involved in politics....The principle objectives will be poverty 
alleviation... NORAD, as a development agency neither can nor will 
participate in politics as such, whether this refers to the internal 
164 Painemal and Lincopi were both members of the Mapuche Cultural Centre (Ad-Mapu) in Temuco, Chile. 
By request from the World Council, CIDA launched an express and limited audit of CISA. NORAD hired 
Arthur Anderson and Co, Chartered Accountants, to undertake a more extensive audit, which was actually 
carried out by Coleridge y Asociados, which represented Arthur Anderson in Lima. NORADA, POF, DUH 
1364, CISA Folder, correspondence from Bredde (NORAD) to CISA, 22 April 1987; NORADA, POF, 
DUH 1364, CISA Folder, correspondence from CISA to Toreng (NORAD), 10 March 1987; NORADA, 
POF, DUH 1364, 86-1882 Ad-Mapu kultur sentra, Chile, letter from Lincopi, Flores and Painemal (CISA) 
to Leger (CIDA), 28 March 1987; NORADA, POF, DUH 1364, CISA Folder, letter from Sørensen 
(NORAD) to CISA, 13 May 1988; NORADA, POF, DUH 1364, CISA Folder, Record of Proceedings of 
the Extraordinary Assembly of the Indian Council of South America (CISA), 4-8 March 1987.
165 NFAA, BIF, Binder 23, correspondence from Cooper (Arthur Andersen & Co Auditors, Lima) to Drake 
(Arthur Andersen & Co Auditors, Oslo), 20 April 1987.
166 NORADA, POF, DUH 1364, CISA Folder, letter from Sørensen (NORAD) to CISA, 13 May 1988.
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politics of indigenous organisations or politics at the national level in 
the respective nation-states.167
The same year, CIDA funding for the World Council dropped dramatically (visible in 
Fig. 2 between 1987 and 88) for reasons poorly explained by WCIP documentation. Before 
the funding for 1987 had been announced, President Donald Rojas was already pessimistic. 
At an Executive Council meeting in September/October 1986, he stated that 
CIDA will fund less than last time – probably $300,000 for CORPI 
and CISA with 15% for Secretariat. CIDA cannot justify more for 
administration in Ottawa. CIDA does not want to deal with General 
Assemblies...CIDA is now development only; support from External 
Affairs and Indian Affairs will be requested.168
More substantial funding resumed in 1989 and 1990. The most noticeable difference between 
the annual financial audits before and after the drop is an explicit statement on the 
transferring of funding to the regional branches. Prior to 1989, each year's budget listed an 
amount allocated to the regional branches, and published auditor's reports of amounts that 
were “committed to affiliated organizations in Central and South America in accordance with 
the World Council's agreement with CIDA.”169 From 1989 onwards, this note no longer 
appears in the audit reports and the annual budget no longer allocates funds directly to CISA 
or CORPI. In 1989, however, a substantial sum (33% of the World Council's total budget) 
was being designated to a totally new category: “socio-economic development.”170 For the 
rest of the organization's life, between a third and half of the total budget would go toward 
167 LAC, WCIPF, Vol. 6.14, letter from Sørensen (NORAD) to various parties, 13 May 1988.
168 LAC, WCIPF, Vol. 10.17, World Council of Indigenous Peoples, Executive Meeting, 3 October 1986.
169 LAC, WCIPF, Vol. 10.17, WCIP Financial Statements, 31 March 1986; LAC, WCIPF, Vol. 34.9, WCIP 
Financial Statements, 31 March 1987. This seemingly formal requirement to transfer funds to CISA and 
CORPI is sharply at odds with Ronald Leger's recollection of CIDA's relationship with the World Council. 
Ronald Leger, personal interview, 10 July 2013.
170 LAC, WCIPF, Vol. 34.6, WCIP Financial Statements, 31 March 1989.
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this category. It appears as though CISA and CORPI were cut out, and the World Council 
leadership began to spend funds directly on development. Whether through momentum or by 
direction from CIDA, the WCIP continued to fund development projects for the rest of its 
existence. Throughout the 1980s, there was a substantial increase in international non-
governmental organizations focused on economic development.171 To some degree, the World 
Council may simply have been following this broader trend in civil society.
Through the 1990s, funding for socio-economic development remained steady, but 
projects related to economic, educational and health development took a greater share of the 
World Council's attention, relative to political issues like the UN Declaration on the Rights of 
Indigenous Peoples. In February 1990, the World Council set up a Regional Technical Office 
(OFITER) in San Jose, Costa Rica to “provide technical assistance to indigenous 
communities and organizations in the region for the elaboration, financing and monitoring of 
development projects.”172 The World Council's report on program support from CIDA in 
1990 lists development projects in Mexico (cattle husbandry), Guatemala (handicrafts), 
Nicaragua (transportation), and Costa Rica (commercialization project for basic grains, and a 
water system project).173 A proposal for a WCIP Development Program made in 1990 
allocated the largest part of its budget to Socio-Economic development, with nearly half a 
million US dollars to be spent on agriculture, and another two hundred thousand on cattle-
raising, fishing, mining work and artisanal work.174 The WCIP Tri-Annual Report for 1990-
171 Iriye, 172-174.
172 LAC, WCIPF, Vol. 31.1, WCIP Interim Report to CIDA for Programme Support, November 1990. Plans 
were made to open additional offices of a similar nature in other regions, but were never carried out. The 
WCIP ended its support for OFITER in 1995. Duquette, 95-96.
173 Ibid.
174 LAC, WCIPF, Vol. 30.27, Proposal for Financial Requirements: Summary of the General Plan of 
Development of the Indigenous Peoples Drawn Up by the World Council of Indigenous Peoples (1990-
1991).
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93, provides an overview of the organization's activities under the categories of Environment, 
Cultural/Intellectual Property (mostly focused on opposition to the Human Genome Project), 
Education, Socio-Economic Development (including consultation with the World Bank and 
European Economic Community), Health (in co-operation with the Pan-American Health 
Organization, Human Rights and Peace Processes.175 The organization's interests had 
broadened dramatically. In the mid-1990s, the World Council became increasingly involved 
with Wayne Dunn's “Apikan Network,” a Canadian organization specializing in economic 
development partnerships for Indigenous peoples around the world. Certainly, the World 
Council continued to defend Indigenous rights in international fora. Its representatives 
participated in the United Nations Working Group on Indigenous Peoples' efforts to develop 
a UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples; in consultations with the International 
Labour Organization on its Convention 169; in support for the Organization of American 
States' efforts to write a juridical document on Indigenous rights; and in events related to the 
500th Anniversary of Columbus' arrival in the Americas, and the 1993 International Year of 
Indigenous Peoples.176 These efforts led to substantial results but economic development 
projects, health promotion, and other less overtly political activities took up an increasing 
amount of the WCIP's energy. In 1995, the WCIP went so far as to describe itself in at least 
one document as an “international indigenous run development agency.”177
175 LAC, WCIPF, Vol. 6.2, WCIP Tri-Annual Report (1990-1993).
176 WCIP involvement with the ILO and United Nations Working Group on Indigenous Populations is 
discussed in greater detail, albeit briefly, in the next chapter. LAC, WCIPF, 5.11, Executive Report of the 
World Council of Indigenous Peoples (September 1990 - December 1991), March 1992. The World 
Council received substantial funding from the Spanish government in connection with the quincentenary, 
but most of these funds went towards development projects managed by the Regional Technical Office in 
Costa Rica. Duquette, 101-2.
177 Duquette, 106. Emphasis added.
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4.5.2 Effects: Anti-politics and internal conflict
As well as encouraging development work, consistent funding from these aid 
agencies affected World Council delegates as they planned political actions. As mentioned 
above, George Manuel and Marie Smallface-Marule were aware of this influence, and their 
concerns came out in executive meetings when formulating policy as well. During a meeting 
in Lethbridge, George Manuel lamented the situation in Central American countries, where a 
substantial majority of the population was Indigenous, but they faced harsh government 
violence nonetheless. Guatemala should be, said Manuel, “a number one priority for all 
indian people of the world...they've been murdered by the thousands every day...they have 
only one alternative...and that one alternative is for self-determination.”178 Everyone at the 
meeting agreed, but Ossie Cruz of Australia worried that if the WCIP really “took a stand in 
Bolivia [or] Guatemala” the organization's budget would surely be cut. 179
This conflict between strong political action and secure funding was particularly well 
illustrated after World Council President Clément Chartier's controversial clandestine trip 
into Nicaragua in January 1986, aided by militant Miskitu guerillas fighting the Sandinistas, 
the left-wing government already besieged by the US-backed CONTRAS.180 When Chartier 
returned to Canada, he was stripped of his powers by fellow members of the WCIP 
executive. The executive was upset with Chartier for a variety of reasons, but Vice-President 
Donald Rojas pointed specifically to the fact that many funding agencies in North America 
and Europe were supporters of (or at least sympathetic to) the Sandinistas—the same 
178 LAC, WCIPF, Vol. 10.7, Transcript of WCIP Executive Council Meeting, Lethbridge, Alberta, 9-13 
December 1983. 
179 Ibid.
180 These events are explained in much greater detail in Chapter Six of this dissertation.
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agencies that were funding Indigenous organizations in Central and South America. Rojas 
Maroto “had information” that these agencies were “questioning the continued financial 
support” of these organizations because the position of the WCIP suggested it was merely 
“another instrument of the U.S.”181 As Nicaragua was only one of many countries where 
Indigenous people were in very serious danger of violence, it was “necessary to review 
where our actions... seriously jeopardize the financial security of our organizations.”182 At a 
later meeting of the Executive Council in February 1987, Donald Rojas asserted that “CIDA 
cut its program to the WCIP after more than $50,000 was allocated to the Nicaragua situation 
(more than was originally agreed to by CIDA).”183 
Immediately following the ouster of Chartier, the Vice-Presidents divided their 
responsibilities for the organization, with Donald Rojas focussing on “Economic and Social 
Development,” while Pōkā Laenui would be in charge of “Advocacy.”184 They hired an 
independent consulting company to examine the World Council's organizational structure and 
make recommendations based upon feedback from member organizations and CIDA's 
assessments of the WCIP, CORPI and CISA. Among the proposed changes was the 
suggestion to split the World Council into two largely separate institutions: an advocacy 
program and a development foundation. The interim report’s authors reasoned this would 
“minimize the conflict between fundraising for development activities and engaging in what 
are considered 'political' activities. Both programs would concentrate in fundraising with 
181 LAC, WCIPF, Vol. 10.6, Report for WCIP by Donald Rojas (Maroto) “La situation de Nicaragua y la 
comision de reunification de la familia misquitia,” 1986. Translated from Spanish by the author.
182 Ibid.
183 LAC, WCIPF, Vol. 3.6, WCIP Executive Council Meeting Summary, 17 February 1987. If Rojas is correct, 
this may help explain the sharp drop in CIDA funding between 1987/88 mentioned above.
184 LAC, WCIPF, Vol. 12.5, First Nations Consultants Inc., “World Council of Indigenous Peoples: Research 
and Interim Report on the Organizational Structure,” (Section 3.0), July 1986.
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institutions which favour their programs without risk of being seen to collaborate with other 
institutions that are not like-minded.”185 Another report, presented two years later, also 
suggested that a structural “separation of economic activities and functions from political 
ones” should be implemented in the short term.186 These kinds of proposals, while never 
adopted, could suggest an interest in suppressing the political aspects of the organization to 
ensure funding, but they could equally demonstrate a desire to ensure the survival of political 
aspects despite the growth in development activities. Yet, it stands to reason that if executive 
members were so conscious that their sources of funding could be affected by their political 
activity, this issue must have subconsciously affected their range of action as well. There is 
little evidence that members of the World Council were actually altering their political 
beliefs (i.e. their commitment to decolonization and self-determination) but these conflicts 
and proposed structural changes suggest that there was a certain willingness to balance the 
organization's political basis against an apolitical public image more acceptable to 
international development agencies.
Even before Chartier's removal from power, the conflict over funds also caused a 
great deal of tension within the leadership of the organization. In the spring of 1984, the 
WCIP offices were moved from Lethbridge to Ottawa and the Secretariat staff from 
Lethbridge were let go. The decision had been a struggle; first made at an Executive 
Committee meeting in August 1983, it was hotly debated again at another Executive 
Committee meeting in Lethbridge the following December. Aslak Nils Sara complained that 
185 LAC, WCIPF, Vol. 12.5, First Nations Consultants Inc., “World Council of Indigenous Peoples: Research 
and Interim Report on the Organizational Structure,” Appendix I, July 1986.
186 NFAA, BIF, Binder 25, Julio C. Tresierra, “World Council of Indigenous Peoples at a Critical Juncture,” 
April 1988.
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the Secretariat was not as good as it needed to be to support the growing work of the WCIP. 
George Manuel insisted that any problems with the Secretariat were a result of poor funding, 
not of incompetence. Sara denied that he was criticizing the Secretariat, but suggested the 
decision-making procedure was unclear. He questioned the level of power the Secretariat had 
to determine WCIP policy and focus, rather than the actual decisions of the Executive 
Council. José Carlos Morales went further, stating that he had 
...heard criticisms from other organizations and from our organization 
about the Secretariat...Our member organizations are 
demanding...that the Secretariat or the Executive Council should be 
doing more...[There] has been a general consensus of the other 
member organizations that Lethbridge is not the best location for the 
Secretariat...we have to think of a better place where the office can 
function and respond better to the demands of the member 
organizations.187
Whatever the source of these concerns, the Secretariat countered with its own 
complaints, focused largely on the politics of fund-raising. In March 1984, the WCIP 
Secretariat submitted a list of recommended financial policies which chastised President José 
Carlos Morales and Vice-President Melillan Painemal for “raising funds for their national 
organizations or what appears to be personal projects under the name of the WCIP without 
providing any information about the projects, funding sources approached, funds received 
and financial reports and without prior Executive Council approval.”188 The same document 
alleges that “grants from the Norwegian Foreign Office to the WCIP Secretariat and 
channelled through the Nordic Sami Council have not been received in full and no 
information has been provided about the use of the amounts withheld, nor the authority under 
187 LAC, WCIPF, Vol. 10.7, Transcript of WCIP Executive Council Meeting, Lethbridge, Alberta, 9-13 
December 1983. 
188 LAC, WCIPF, Vol. 10.9, WCIP Recommended Financial Policies, March 1984.
164
which expenditures were made.”189
Less directly, but more sharply, George Manuel lent his support to Marule when he 
provided a news release to a native newspaper in Norway which directly criticized the 
growing influence of development funds on the organization's leadership. He accused 
“selfish Indians” of serving as “willing puppets of the very governments and multi-national 
corporations who most want to neutralise and re-direct the emerging energies of the Fourth 
World.”190 The press release targeted those who “dangle beads and mirrors before the 
impoverished delegates from Central and South America,” baiting them with “international 
conferences, international travel, scholarships and small grants supplied by unsuspecting 
charitable organizations or by state governments who want to gain influence on the WCIP.” 
Manuel warned these alleged conspirators that the WCIP “is not for sale. In the next six 
months it will return to its original spirit and intent. It will return to a leadership dedicated to 
the liberation of indigenous peoples everywhere.”191 It is unclear at whom exactly George 
Manuel was aiming these barbs—he might have been critical of the Nordic Sami Council or 
of the Central and South American council members or both—but he clearly worried the 
involvement of financial aid was weakening the ideological roots of the organization.
4.6 Global Shifts: Third World in Decline, Institutionalization of NGOs in 
Ascent
Manuel was certainly exaggerating the threat to the World Council. Indigenous 
sovereignty rights, the most contentious of the World Council's goals, continued to preoccupy 
189 Ibid.
190 “No Room for Selfish Indians in WCIP,” Kainai News, January 1984 (No. 2).
191 Ibid. At the first Executive Council Meeting after the office had moved to Ottawa, the council members 
made a resolution to “send a letter to George Manuel asking for clarification of the press release.” LAC, 
WCIPF, Vol. 10.10, WCIP Executive Council Meeting (26-30 March 1984) Resolutions.
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the organization's leadership throughout its existence. Manuel's prophecy of a change within 
six months proved correct: Métis leader Clément Chartier was elected World Council 
President at the September 1984 General Assembly in Panama. Chartier was an associate of 
Manuel and at least as politically driven. His youth and his past involvement in the Native 
Youth Association of Canada may explain his more rebellious traits. Yet as will be shown in a 
subsequent chapter, Chartier's presidency was relatively short lived. Once Smallface-Marule 
and Manuel had left the organization, the World Council lost its most important sources of 
philosophy or ideology to guide its activities. Perhaps it made little difference, though, since 
Manuel's “Fourth World” philosophy had itself lost its most important inspiration: a strong 
Third-Worldist movement.
The World Council came into being during the last great push of the anti-colonial 
Third World during the 20th century. In the 1970s, Third-Worldist leadership was buoyed with 
substantial international investment. The Cold War had long encouraged international 
development assistance in the Third World “often described alongside the arms race and the 
space race as part of a Cold War trifecta.”192 Following the 1973 oil crisis, substantial OPEC 
profits were invested in Western banks, creating a surplus of funds that was reinvested 
elsewhere, particularly in Africa. Third World leaders used this wealth to continue demands 
for an end to imperialism and a correlative respect for the sovereignty of smaller nations, and 
for economic justice: a redistribution of global wealth along more equitable lines. “This 
political militancy,” states Rist, “went together with a critique of Westernization as an 
ethnocidal project responsible for the failures of 'development' – hence the hopes placed in 
192 Nick Cullather, “The Third Race,” Diplomatic History 33:3 (June 2009), 511.
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novel initiatives of 'autocentred development' and the defence of indigenous populations, 
especially in Latin America and Australia.”193 Yet this movement crested and declined while 
the World Council was in its earliest days. Although the New International Economic Order 
had been viewed with real suspicion by Indigenous leaders, its challenge to the existing 
international order provided some space for them to add their own Indigenous critique. This 
opportunity was washed away during the 1980s, under the culture of conservatism and 
structural adjustments promoted by Margaret Thatcher and Ronald Reagan, even before the 
collapse of the Soviet Union194 Neo-liberals skillfully used the Bretton Woods institutions as 
its “sharp rapiers” to kill the “Third World Project.”195 Without Third World allies, and by the 
1980s, lacking even a source of ideological strength to root itself in, the World Council of 
Indigenous peoples had little choice but to accept the terms CIDA laid out.
The World Council was not the only NGO to feel the effects of financial dependence 
on CIDA. In his historical analysis of the agency, David Morrison notes that the growth of 
core program funding to organizations resulted in a shift in the relationship between 
government and the voluntary sector.196 Government agencies were being influenced by the 
demands of NGOs to focus on human resource development over industrial projects, but 
“NGOs have subjected themselves to the discipline of the project format...[and] have become 
more institutionalized.”197 The shift did not need to be a stark or sudden one to make an 
impact. The “anti-politics machine” did its work slowly but steadily, with changes arising 
193 Rist, 174
194 Cullather, 512; Rist, 171-73.
195 Prashad, The Poorer Nations, 47.
196 Morrison, 164-5.
197 Tim Broadhead and Brent Herbert-Copley, Bridges of Hope: Canadian Voluntary Agencies and the Third 
World (Ottawa: North South Institute, 1988), 70, quoted in Morrison, 265.
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more from the basic structures of CIDA and NORAD than from any wilful effort to influence 
the World Council.
4.7 Conclusion
If CIDA staff were seriously intent on deterring the WCIP from taking an active 
political role, they failed miserably at their task. The World Council never abandoned its 
political direction to become a primarily development-focused organization. But to look for a 
complete reversal of ideology is to over-simplify the “anti-politics machine.” The Canadian 
government used its foreign development funds, in part, as a soft-power means to achieve 
realist aims, and where those aims overlapped with WCIP activities, there was no need to 
discourage a political focus. It is quite possible, on the contrary, that a great number of CIDA 
employees did indeed sympathize with the World Council's anti-colonial vision, but were 
restricted from supporting it by the mandate and structure of the agency. Only by 
encouraging the World Council to do some amount of development work could they justify 
funding the organization at all.
It would not be difficult for the World Council and its regional branches to justify the 
acceptance of such requirements to their members, the vast majority of whom did indeed 
grow up facing poor health, a lack of quality sanitation or other infrastructure, and few 
economic opportunities. Owing to the organizational structure of the WCIP, where 
delegations were divided up by country, Indigenous peoples of Central and South America 
quickly came to dominate the membership numerically speaking. It should not be surprising 
that these members would be more interested in development projects than Indigenous 
peoples in Canada, the United States, or Nordic countries. Additionally, their direct conflicts 
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with Third World leaders may have made them less keen on Third-Worldist philosophies. 
Certainly, the Miskitu-Sandinista conflict belied any illusion that a sovereign left-leaning 
government would treat Indigenous peoples with respect.
Once the World Council incorporated elements of technical development activities 
into its program, it came to depend on funding from governmental aid agencies. 
Development work would therefore sustain the organization, and while the results delivered 
might be piecemeal, they would be more immediate and demonstrable than a political 
struggle for sovereignty at the United Nations. The “anti-politics machine,” therefore, was 
not so much a conscious effort to discourage anti-colonial politics. It was, and is, a structural 
by-product of development theory which holds that quality of life can be achieved solely 
through technical improvements without political change.
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Chapter 5
“Indigenous Peoples Can Have Foreign Policy”
Niillas Somby and Indigenous Internationalism in Practice
Throughout its existence, but especially during the 1980s, the World Council of 
Indigenous Peoples made significant contributions to new international legal standards. At 
the WCIP's Second General Assembly in 1977, delegates condemned the International 
Labour Organization's (ILO) Indigenous and Tribal Populations Convention 107 (1957). 
They resolved that the convention “did not involve Indigenous peoples and in fact would 
continue oppression of Indigenous People wherever concerned” and demanded that the 
WCIP “be totally involved at all levels when International instruments are to be drafted.”1 In 
response to this and other similar criticisms from other Indigenous groups, the ILO's 
governing body called for a Meeting of Experts to discuss the revision of the convention. 
Although the ILO traditionally works as a tripartite organization (involving governments, 
employers and labour leaders), the meeting of experts that occurred in September 1986 took 
the innovated step of inviting one Indigenous organization to participate in its discussions: 
the World Council of Indigenous Peoples. Pōkā Laenui of Hawaii, Vice-President of the 
WCIP, was sent as the organization's representative.2 A resolution at the fifth WCIP General 
Assembly (July 1987) urged the ILO to make significant revisions to the convention,3 and the 
1 Union of British Columbia Indian Chiefs Resource Centre (herafter UBCICRC), World Council of 
Indigenous Peoples Assembly, Second General Assembly, Kiruna, Sweden, 24-27 September 1977, 
Resolutions
2 Library and Archives Canada (hereafter LAC), World Council of Indigenous Peoples Fonds (hereafter 
WCIPF), Vol. 42.13, Pōkā Laenui, ILO Report: First Discussion on Convention 107, 1988.
3 LAC, WCIPF, Vol. 42.11, letter from Lee Swepston (ILO) to Donald Rojas Maroto (WCIP), 24 September 
1987.
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World Council organized multiple consultation workshops throughout Central and South 
America in 1989,4 before the revisions were finally completed as ILO Convention 169. 
At the WCIP Third General Assembly (May 1981), there was substantial discussion 
of the creation of international law regarding Indigenous rights, with the circulation of both a 
concept paper and a Draft International Covenant.5 Through consistent participation in the 
United Nations Working Group on Indigenous Populations (since its establishment in 1982), 
WCIP delegates encouraged the formal settings of international standards for Indigenous 
rights.6 The Working Group's Chairperson-Rapporteur, Erica-Irene Daes, attended the WCIP 
Fourth General Assembly (September 1984) where she participated in a thorough 
consultation on Indigenous rights, resulting in the World Council's 17-point Declaration of 
Principles.7 This document, along with another draft declaration of principles proposed by the 
Indian Law Resource Center, the Four Directions Council, the National Aboriginal and 
Islander Legal Service, the National Indian Youth Council, the Inuit Circumpolar Conference 
4 LAC, WCIPF, Vol. 42.25, Report on Consultation Workshops Convened by the World Council of 
Indigenous Peoples Regarding Convention 107 of the International Labour Office [sic], 1989. Lee 
Swepston (Assistant to Director of the ILO's International Labour Standards Department) would later 
thank the leadership of the WCIP “for helping us translate an ideal of indigenous participation in 
international standard-setting into at least a partial reality.” LAC WCIPF, Vol.13.12, VI WCIP General 
Assembly, Comments by ILO, August 1990
5 Center for World Indigenous Studies, Chief George Manuel Library and Fourth World Documentation 
Project, WCIP, The Need for International Conventions, A World Council of Indigenous Peoples Concept 
Paper, April 1981; LAC, RG22, 45-D140-W1 Part I,, Draft International Covenant on the Rights of 
Indigenous Peoples, 28 April 1981
6 LAC, WCIPF, Vol. 7.3, Quadrenial Report of the World Council of Indigenous Peoples, Submitted to the 
Economic and Social Council of the United Nations, 1 November 1984, and WCIP Report of Activities 
Concerned with the United Nations from 1984 to 1987 pursuant to ECOSOC Resolution 1296, 31 March 
1988; 
7 Erica-Irene Daes, “The Contribution of the Working Group on Indigenous Populations to the Genesis and 
Evolution of the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples” in Making the Declaration Work: 
The United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, eds., Claire Charters and Rodolfo 
Stavenhagen (Copenhagen: International Work Group for Indigenous Affairs), 49. Daes notes that the Sámi 
in particular, “under the very able leadership of the late [Aslak Nils] Sara from Kautokeino, insisted that a 
declaration, or even a convention should be proposed for adoption by the UN.”
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and the International Indian Treaty Council, would form the basis of the later United Nations 
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples.8
Despite the importance of these international legal contributions, the World Council 
also helped bring about other more subtle changes. This chapter, therefore, will use one 
particular story—Niillas Somby's adoption by Indigenous nations in North America—to 
demonstrate the ways the World Council worked as a personal network rather than just as a 
formal organization. It will focus on the personal changes among Indigenous activists created 
by these global connections rather than on the general changes in government policies 
demanded by the World Council. It will describe the ways in which Indigenous cultures and 
spiritualities could intersect and overlap with politics at the level of the individual through 
this personal network, even when the World Council's unity was based primarily on a 
respectful but secular understanding of Indigeneity. The official role of the WCIP is almost 
peripheral to this particular story, but it highlights the ways in which the World Council was 
important beyond its most overt actions, because it promoted a new global understanding of 
Indigenous solidarity. Indigenous activists “on the ground” were willing to take up this 
understanding and cooperate innovatively for their mutual benefit.
5.1 It All Started with a Joik
To understand Niillas Somby's transnational story requires substantial context, even 
for a Sámi audience more familiar with his history, and it begins at the 1975 World 
Conference of Indigenous Peoples. Among the many delegates at the conference was a Sámi 
8 Daes, 49; UN Working Group on Indigenous Populations, “Report of the Working Group on Indigenous 
Populations in its fourth session: Chairman/Rapporteur: Mrs. Erica-Irene A. Daes,” UN Doc 
E/CN.4/Sub/1985/22 (27 August 1985), Annex II, III and IV.
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man named Nils-Aslak Valkeapää. Valkeapää, who went by the professional name of 
Áillohaš, was a prominent artist, writer and singer of joiks, a traditional form of Sámi song, 
and he would come to serve as an important cultural ambassador for the Sámi people. At the 
1975 conference, there was some skepticism about the presence of Sámi delegates. As Sam 
Deloria remembers it, a murmur went around the room asking, “Why are they here? They're 
white people.”9 For those delegates from places where the subjugation of Indigenous people 
was made apparent, on a day to day basis, by the different skin tones of those in power and 
those not, the light skin and even blond hair of members of the Sámi delegation immediately 
called their Indigeneity into question. Attempts were made to explain their presence, but 
according to Sámi delegates, the matter was fully resolved only when Áillohaš rose and 
presented a joik, which convinced everyone that the Sámi were indeed Indigenous.10 The 
anecdote demonstrates the importance of cultural exchange to the political alliance being 
formed by the World Council, but the forum also provided important contacts for future 
cultural exchange which helped form a larger international network of Indigenous artists and 
activists supportive of each other's work.
After the 1977 WCIP General Assembly, when Valkeapää was elected the 
organization's first cultural coordinator, he worked with others to organize the first 
9 Sam Deloria, personal interview, 23 March 2012.
10 Helge Kleivan, a Norwegian anthropologist from the International Work Group for Indigenous Affairs, also 
helped by explaining the similar historical experience of Sámi people. Henry Minde, “The Challenge of 
Indigenism: The Struggle for Sami Land Rights and Self-Government in Norway, 1960-1990” in 
Indigenous Peoples: Resource Management and Global Rights, eds., Svein Jentoft, Henry Minde and 
Ragnar Nilsen (Delft: Eburon, 2003), 85. Jukka Nyyssönen, “‘Everybody recognized that we were not 
white’ : Sami Identity Politics in Finland, 1945-1990” (Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Tromsø, 2007), 
214-217. Ole Henrik Magga, personal interview, 5 April 2013. According to Sam Deloria, when a Sámi 
delegate explained that he was not an Indian, but that his people also had a history of oppression, their 
general social status was poor, and their land was threatened by the Alta hydroelectric dam, a Peruvian 
guest waited for the translation to finish and then exclaimed, “Well, then... you're Indians!” Sam Deloria, 
personal interview, 23 March 2012.
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international Indigenous cultural festival.11 The Davvi Šuvva festival (literally, Breeze from 
the North) of 1979 was very well attended, with thousands of participants from across Sápmi 
gathering in Gárasavvon for six days.12 The editor of Samefolket magazine asserted that, 
“without WCIP and the contacts that were made, this festival could not have been possible.”13 
It presented Indigenous performers from North and South America alongside Sámi ones, as 
well as a certain number of other groups that would more likely be cast as “ethnic 
minorities.” During the opening ceremony, Hans Pavia Rosing (WCIP Executive Council 
member from Greenland and soon to be first president of the Inuit Circumpolar Conference), 
declared his hope “that this festival will prove to be a means in our struggle through the 
Council of Indigenous People [sic]. I sincerely hope that we will gain much from this festival 
in our future work for indigenous peoples all around the world.”14 Certainly, the festival 
allowed for a proud reclamation of disparaged and even prohibited elements of Indigenous 
cultures from around the world, a strong political statement against the assimilationist logic 
11 Kathleen Osgood Dana, “Áillohaš the Shaman-Poet and his Govadas-Image Drum: A Literary Ecology of 
Nils-Aslak Valkeapää,” (Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Oulu, 2003), 69. Valkeapää had previous 
experience organizing festivals, as he had helped begin an annual music concert in Guovdageidnu, inviting 
Sámi musicians and joikers to perform which would grow into the annual Sámi Easter Festival, including 
the Sámi Grand Prix song contest. Synnøve Angell, “Davvi Šuvva 1979: Being Sámi, Becoming 
Indigenous: Vocal and Musical Manifestation of Sámi and Indigenous Movement,” (MA Thesis, University 
of Tromsø, 2009), 4. Sami Archives (hereafter SA), Nordic Sami Institute Fonds (hereafter NSIF), Series 
Db (Organization) 003, Sámiráđđi (Ark2.2), Box 62, Folder 17, letter from George Manuel to Nordic Sami 
Council, 29 September 1977.
12 Angell, 7. Sápmi (sometimes translated as Samiland) refers to the totality of Sámi lands, spanning across 
Norway, Sweden, Finland, and Russia. Because the subjects of this chapter insist on the Indigenous 
sovereignty of their lands in opposition to the “occupying” nation states, the author respectfully uses their 
Indigenous terms and avoids using the names of those nation states to describe Indigenous lands whenever 
possible.
13 N. G. Labba, “Davvi Šuvva – urbefolkningarnas kulturfestival En fest for folkets brödraskap” Samefolket 8 
(1979), translated and quoted in Angell, 7. George Manuel sent Dave Monture of the National Indian 
Brotherhood to the festival as the designated WCIP representative. George Manuel Diaries (hereafter 
GMD), 22 June 1979.
14 Angell, 56-57. At the 1977 General Assembly in Kiruna, delegates decided that, for the purposes of the 
WCIP, Kalaallit Nunaat (Greenland) and Sápmi should form a single region and alternate representatives 
on the Executive Council. Rosing was elected the first such representative. Robert Petersen, personal 
correspondence, 14 May 2012.
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of colonialism.15 Events promoting Indigenous cultural exchange heightened feelings of a 
shared identity among Indigenous peoples and encouraged international solidarity in the long 
term. As will be seen, such sentiment was integral to the Niillas Somby's international 
adoption, but the Davvi Šuvva festival also contributed to his story in at least two other small 
but specific ways; initially, it helped inspire him and other Sámi activists with a new protest 
strategy, and later, it was the starting point in a series of personal connections that began 
Somby's transatlantic journey.
5.2 The Hunger Strike
The audience at Davvi Šuvva included two Sámi brothers from the Deatnu area of 
Finnmark in Norwegian Sápmi, Niillas and Ánde Somby. Both had participated in large 
protests against the planned Alta Hydroelectric Project, which had, in less than two years, 
escalated from the first ever use of banners by Sámi activists to the point of a blockade of 
construction crews at the narrowest point between the river and the mountain.16 The elder 
brother, Niillas, attended a presentation by ethnic Kurds (visiting from Sweden) who 
compared their people to the Sámi, as both groups had their populations split between four 
countries.17 Somby was interested to learn that Kurds in Stockholm were using a hunger 
15 In her analysis of the festival, Synnøve Angell quotes Edward Said, who insists that culture is an important 
tool of resistance movements, “a way of fighting against extinction and obliteration. Culture is a form of 
memory against effacement.” David Barsamian and Edward W. Said, Culture and Resistance: 
Conversations with Edward W. Said (Cambridge, MA: South End Press, 2003), 159, quoted in Angell, 83.
16 Harald Eidheim, “Ethno-Political Development among the Sami after World War II: The Invention of 
Selfhood,” in Sami Culture in a New Era: The Norwegian Sami Experience, ed. Harald Gaski (Karasjohka: 
Davvi Girji OS, 1997), 48. This blockade and the protest encampment came to be known as nullpunktet or 
Zero Point. For more on the Hydroelectric Project and the reasons for opposition, see Robert Paine, Dam a 
River, Damn A People? Saami (Lapp) Livelihood and the Alta-Kautokeino Hydro-electric Project and the 
Norwegian Parliament (Copenhagen: IWGIA, 1982).
17 Kurds do not generally identify as Indigenous but they were still invited to attend the festival. Angell, 57, 
94.
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strike to protest against the attacks on Kurds in both Iraq and Iran.18 After the Alta protesters 
were subjected to mass arrests in mid-September, Niillas and a number of other frustrated 
Sámi activists decided to borrow the idea they had learned from the Kurds at Davvi Šuvva. In 
October, a group of them (including Niillas Somby) travelled to Oslo and formally 
announced that they were starting their own hunger strike, the first in Norwegian history,19 
camped out at Eidsvolls Plass next to the Parliament buildings.20 The hunger strikers were 
taking quite a radical step by the standards of both Sámi and Norwegian societies,21 and at 
first, they received little if any formal support from any Sámi organization. Even Niillas' 
brother Ánde, in Oslo for school, initially voted with the Oslo Sami Association (Oslo 
Samiid Searvi) not to support the hunger strike, fearing that Norwegians would respond 
negatively and simply allow the participants to starve to death.22 Niillas Somby recalls that 
one of the main figures of the Nordic Sami Council (a WCIP member organization) sent out a 
negative press release that accused the hunger strikers of casting shame upon all of Sápmi.23 
An important boost came from across the Atlantic. According to Somby, “the strongest 
support, morally, was [Cree musician] Buffy Sainte-Marie. She came here and she was 
already then a very famous singer. When she turned up outside our door... Of course, it gave 
18 Niillas Somby, personal interview, 3 April 2013; Angell, 72. Unfortunately, I have been able to find almost 
any information on the delegates or this protest and its precise purposes.
19 Ánde Somby, “The Alta-Case: A Story About How Another Hydroelectric Dam-Project Was Forced 
Through in Norway,” Indigenous Affairs, 3-4 (June/December 1999), 58.
20 The number of hunger strikers is commonly given as seven, but Somby insists there were actually more 
participating. Niillas Somby, personal interview, 3 April 2013.
21 The Alta protests, generally, have been described as “one of the most dramatic political confrontations in 
Norway in the post-war period” and the hunger strike was a particularly dramatic moment within the larger 
protests. Svein S. Andersen and Atle Midttun, “Conflict and Local Mobilization: The Alta Hydropower 
Project 1,” Acta Sociologica 28:4 (1985), 320.
22 Ánde Somby, personal interview, 25 February 2013. He eventually changed his mind and supported the 
protestors in various ways, including serving as an editor of Charta 79, a supportive newsletter inspired by 
“Charter 77,” the public statement of civil and human rights circulated by Czechoslovak dissidents. Ánde 
Somby, Curriculum Vitae, http://www.jus.uit.no/ansatte/somby/cvandeENG.htm
23 Niillas Somby, personal interview, 3 April 2013.
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us lots of power, but it also woke up society. So that was very good support.”24 Afterwards, 
they began to get letters of support from other Indigenous organizations around the world, 
but Norway's national Sámi organizations never officially supported the hunger strike. The 
Sámi rights movement was largely united in their opposition to the hydroelectric project, but 
was increasingly divided on protest tactics. Nevertheless, on October 15, the Norwegian 
government agreed to postpone construction of the dam and investigate the matter further. 
The hunger strike had lasted less than a week, yet it achieved significant results.
In January 1980, however, the government decided to proceed with development, and 
protests resumed. The conflict continued through 1981, when police began another (and 
much larger) series of mass arrests, protesters began another hunger strike in Oslo, and a 
group of Sámi women occupied the office of the newly elected Prime Minister Gro Harlem 
Brundtland.25 In the face of the government's continued hostility toward protestors, the 
encampments at the site were disassembled in January 1982. On February 26, a unanimous 
Supreme Court decision upheld the right of the state to build the dam: “The Court did not 
consider the Saami living in the area affected by the project to be an indigenous people under 
the terms of International Common Law, for it was clear that the regulation area in Alta was 
under Norwegian jurisdiction.”26 For Niillas Somby, the decision was a slap in the face: 
I was young and also naive and I thought justice is justice, and has to 
be, because this land always had belonged to us and Norwegians 
haven't even used that land. It's been used for reindeer herding...from 
24 Niillas Somby, personal interview, 3 April 2013.
25 Ánde Somby, personal interview, 25 February 2013.
26 “Appendix: IWGIA Press Release: The Finding of the Supreme Court of Norway” in Robert Paine, Dam a 
River, Damn A People? Saami (Lapp) Livelihood and the Alta-Kautokeino Hydro-electric Project and the 
Norwegian Parliament, 98
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time immemorial. How can they just say that, “Okay, it's over, we'll 
do whatever we want with it because it's under our state?”27 
Although the movement against the dam project seemed to be collapsing, Somby's 
accumulated frustration pushed him toward a new level of determination. He would 
challenge the Norwegian power apparatus, and not allow the government to have the last 
word.28
5.3 A Hard Statement
 Having experimented with different forms of theatrical demonstrations with minimal 
results, some Sámi activists formed what Somby calls a “hard group” and decided to make a 
“hard statement.”29 If the hunger strike had not won Somby many friends within the 
established Sámi organizations, his next action would place him even further beyond the pale. 
Not long after the Supreme Court decision, Somby and a radical Sámi activist named John-
Reier Martinsen chose a bridge over the Fallijohk (Tverrelva) River, part of the service road 
to the planned power plant, which would be the focal point for their demonstration.30 On the 
night of 19 March, they were scheduled to travel there by snowmobile with two sticks of 
dynamite and some flares. While there is some debate about their intentions, Somby insists 
that it was never in their minds to actually blow up the bridge with such a small amount of 
dynamite. They wanted to make a show with loud explosions and flashes of light, to signal to 
the government where the protests might go “if you take it further.”31 Somby knew they did 
27 Niillas Somby, personal interview, 3 April 2013.
28 Lars Martin Hjorthol, Alta – kraftkampen som utfordret statens makt (Oslo: Glydendal akademisk, 2006) 
159.
29 Niillas Somby, personal interview, 3 April 2013.
30 Hjorthol, 159; Niillas Somby, personal interview, 3 April 2013. More details from Martinsen's perspective 
can be found in his published book: Brua: ei fengselsdagbok (Deatnu: Jargalæddji, 1983).
31 Hjorthol, 160; Niillas Somby, personal interview, 3 April 2013.
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not have the resources to fight the Norwegian state in actual combat. On the other hand, he 
knew that members of the Storting (the Parliament of Norway) were preoccupied with Cold 
War fears of Soviet intervention (owing especially to their shared border) and worried that 
the Sámi might have allies behind the Iron Curtain. As Somby recalled, “they could easily 
arrest us, the whole of Sápmi if they wanted, but they were very scared if there were other 
bigger groups behind, that were supporting us. And that string we played on.”32 Somby was 
able and willing to exploit those concerns without needing any actual Soviet allies for the 
work, although Martinsen had a history of involvement with Norway's Marxist-Leninist 
Workers' Communist Party (AKP). Indeed, the chief of the Police Surveillance Agency for 
northern Norway, Helge Claussen, was quite convinced (at least for a time) that the KGB had 
assisted Martinsen and Somby in their plans.33
The demonstration did not go as planned. First, the old snowmobile arranged for 
Somby and Martinsen would not start on the night in question. After some time, another 
uninvolved young man was convinced to drive the two activists to the bridge on his own 
snowmobile. When they arrived, the driver waited at a distance to indicate that he was not 
involved.34 Somby and Martinsen placed the explosives under the bridge, having already 
connected them to alarm clocks so they would explode at 5 A.M.35 The middle of March in 
Finnmark, however, is very cold and Martinsen noticed the battery for one of the clocks had 
frozen. Somby had a fresh, warm AA battery in his pocket to use as a substitute, but when he 
32 Niillas Somby, personal interview, 3 April 2013. 
33 Hjorthol, 162. The willingness of Indigenous actors to either ignore Cold War concerns, or even make 
practical use from them, is further examined in the following chapter.
34 Niillas Somby, personal interview, 3 April 2013.
35 Hjorthol, 160; Niillas Somby, personal interview, 3 April 2013.
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removed the old battery from the clock, it detonated the explosives right in front of him.36 
Somby felt a hard kick and flew through the air and remembers thinking “Oh, that was the 
end of my life.”37 He landed in the snow, and experienced what he describes as... 
...the nicest moment in my life so far. There were lots of different and 
very nice colours, very nice smells, and all relaxed. And there was a... 
I don't know if it was a human or what it was, but it was something 
there, beside me. This being was just waving very very good waves. 
And I remember, I was lying there and thinking, “And people are so 
scared of death!” 
Before long, however, Martinsen intruded into this beautiful experience, shaking 
Somby to see if he was still alive. He used Somby's scarf to stop the substantial bleeding 
from the wound to his upper arm, then with help from the driver, loaded him onto the 
snowmobile's sled and drove full speed toward Alta.38 Somby recalls feeling fear at the speed 
at which they were travelling and the fishtailing motion of the sled. Eventually, they reached 
a hut beside the road, and roused a drunken man inside. Martinsen yelled to the driver to 
leave for his own safety, and managed to convince the man from the hut to drive them to the 
hospital in his car, despite his state of intoxication. On the way, Martinsen reassured Somby 
that the staff members at Alta's health centre were legally obliged to maintain confidentiality, 
though as he learned later, the police were called immediately upon their arrival. The men 
were taken by air to the hospital Tromsø. Doctors there amputated half of Somby's left arm, 
and spent five hours trying, unsuccessfully, to save the vision in his left eye.39
36 Niillas Somby, personal interview, 3 April 2013.
37 Ibid.
38 Niillas Somby, personal interview, 3 April 2013.
39 Ibid.
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5.4 Investigations and Tricks
When Somby awoke in the hospital, he was surrounded by police. His 
communication with the outside world was greatly restricted, and even doctors were closely 
monitored.40 The room was full of flowers, but the police had seized all the attached cards.41 
The police had quickly realized what Martinsen and Somby had done, and now they wanted 
the whole story. Most importantly, says his brother Ánde who visited him in the hospital, 
they wanted to know the name of the snowmobile driver who got away:
The police were there and it was the big question that everybody was 
asking...Niillas and John-Reier they had been caught, but there were 
three people...and they were very curious who the third person was. I 
sort of joked there. I said to Niillas that he has to teach the police the 
Third Man song, from the [Carol Reed] movie: Dat de doo de doo, de 
doo!42
While his brother recovered, Ánde travelled to Kárášjohka where he discovered that 
the members of the Police Surveillance Agency had already searched Niillas' home. 
Realizing he and others were likely under surveillance, he hatched a plot to photograph and 
discover the identities of five undercover police officers, who he believed were sitting in the 
lounge at the local hotel. With the help of friends, a picture was taken, and after some minor 
argument with the men who were upset at being photographed, the camera and film was 
secured without much conflict. Ánde realized that these officers had failed to recognize him 
either from his political activities in Oslo or as the brother of the man whose home they had 
just searched: “Thereby, I knew that their systems are not efficient at all. It's possible to beat 
them. And that piece of information became very important later on in the story...”43
40 Ibid. A young leftist doctor, Mads Gilbert, made a brief appearance to reassure Somby. 
41 Hjorthol, 160-161.
42 Ánde Somby, personal interview, 25 February 2013.
43 Ibid.
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Niillas was transferred to prison where he was charged with section 148 of the 
Norwegian Penal Code for those who cause “fire, collapse, explosion, flood... which may 
easily result in loss of human life or extensive destruction of another person's property.”44 It 
carries a maximum sentence of twenty-one years of imprisonment. Terrified of spending the 
next two decades in prison, convinced the courts would not treat him fairly, and not being 
granted bail in the mean time, Somby looked for an escape: “I had to trick them to get out 
from jail before the court case.”45
First, Somby stopped eating the meals provided to him. There was fruit available 
from a sort of kiosk, so he purchased and ate one orange per day and drank only water. He 
was unsure if anyone had even noticed, until one day, the prison director came for a chat. 
Their conversation was friendly at first, but then by a stroke of good luck for Somby, 
someone began working on the water pipes connected to the drain in his cell. He reacted, 
asking the director what was going on: “What are these guys doing? Do I have to stop 
drinking water?”46 Somby remembers that the director became angry, upset that his prisoner 
would accuse him of attempting murder. Yet Somby had heard from another prisoner that two 
men had escaped from the jail and had never been found. He used this information to back up 
his case, theatrically musing that the two men had not actually escaped, but were perhaps 
dead and hidden somewhere, implying that the prison staff had killed them. The director 
stormed out, and Somby suspected he was making some progress in convincing his captors 
that he was going insane.47
44 “General Civil Penal Code,” <www.ub.uio.no/ujur/ulovdata/lov-19020522-010-eng.pdf >
45 Niillas Somby, personal interview, 3 April 2013.
46 Ibid..
47 Ibid.
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Soon Somby was met by a psychologist who wanted to talk about his refusal to eat. 
He accused her of working with the authorities to trick him, rather than trying to help him, 
and at any rate, he insisted (more out of principle than necessity) that he should be afforded 
help by someone who could speak his Sámi language.48 The Sámi community is small 
enough, however, that the authorities must have had difficulty finding a Sámi-speaking 
doctor that he did not know personally. The psychologist was followed the next day, to 
Somby's surprise, by a Sámi friend from a village near to his own, who was now working as 
a doctor in Tromsø.49 According to Somby, the doctor suspected the inmate's clever tactic and 
encouraged him. He suggested that Somby claim the guards were trying to poison him, and 
specifically to indicate hallucinations; to tell them he saw someone injecting poison into his 
oranges while they thought he was sleeping, and then to give up eating all together. He 
warned Somby to be careful, however, not to start believing his own stories.50 The following 
day, Somby took the next step. During a brief period while his cell door left open, he threw 
his oranges out into the corridor. The guard arrived and insisted he pick up the oranges. 
I went out to the corridor, and then I kicked the orange there and it 
exploded on the roof. And I am not a very aggressive person, but then 
I had to play that... I am shouting and saying, “Pick up your poisoned 
oranges yourself! Don't you think I saw you guys were spurting 
poison in them?!” [laughter] And then they took me into the cell and 
locked the door. I didn't hear anything about oranges again.51
Before long, a man from the Åsgård Psychiatric Hospital in Tromsø arrived and took 
Somby to the hospital every day for lunch at the canteen, encouraging him to eat. Eventually, 
48 Ibid.
49 This doctor had even participated in the hydroelectric dam protests. Norwegian authorities were apparently 
unaware, unconcerned, or simply unable to find a Sámi-speaking doctor who did not oppose the 
construction of the dam. Niillas Somby, personal interview, 3 April 2013.
50 Ibid.
51 Ibid.
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Somby was told that the psychiatric hospital had been corresponding with the Minister of 
Justice, who had decided to let him out until the court case out of concern for his mental and 
physical health. They had, recalls Somby, considered moving him to the mental hospital but 
feared his paranoia would simply follow to the new location. He was shown the letter 
containing the decision, then returned to the prison to await his release.52 
When he arrived at the prison, there were two police officers waiting for him, one of 
them Sámi. Not realizing Somby had already been informed of his impending release, they 
offered him a deal: Tell us the name of this third person who was with you in the action, and 
we will let you go home. Somby feigned gratefulness for their help and agreed to the 
arrangement. The officer took out a tape-recorder and some paper so that a signed statement 
could be made. But when formally asked the name of the snowmobile driver, Somby 
dramatically announced that the man in question was Leif Halonen, a member of the Nordic 
Sami Council and who had long criticized the hunger strike and other radical actions. 
Halonen was surely not the driver; the officer had been fooled. The man responded by 
suggesting another name, hoping he might get lucky with a stab in the dark. Somby laughed 
and they both ended up laughing. Somby said, “Okay, we're both liars. I tried to lie to you, 
and you tried to lie next. So I just have to be here in that jail.”53 Ten minutes later, a guard 
arrived at his cell to release him from the prison. 
This final interaction highlights the political tensions within the Sámi community. 
Established Sámi organizations like Norwegian Sami Association (Norgga Sámiid 
Riikasearvi - NSR) had originally “focused their demands...on cultural matters [as well as 
52 Ibid.
53 Niillas Somby, personal interview, 3 April 2013.
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social and economic improvements], in preference to land and water rights.”54 Following the 
successful Oslo hunger strike, such organizations, which had previously been ignored and or 
written-off as political extremists, were suddenly praised for their moderation and 
encouraged to voice their advice, even if their advice was not actually followed.55 The 
increasing politicization throughout Sápmi had even led to the 1979 creation of a new 
National Association of the Sami (Samenes Landsforbund) in Norway who insisted that Sámi 
people “should have respect and esteem for Norwegian authorities” and “rejected all actions 
in connection with the Alta affair.”56 Others, including men like Ole Henrik Magga, were 
inspired by slogan of “Show Sámi Spirit” (Čájehehkot Sámi Vuoiŋŋa – ČSV57) to reclaim 
their language and culture with pride, and to fight against the Hydroelectric project primarily 
with words through established Sámi organizations. Others still, like Niillas Somby, had 
interpreted the same phrase to entail more drastic action if necessary to prevent the flooding 
of Sámi lands. While a great many Sámi people did not approve of Somby's actions, he would 
soon find more sympathy from Indigenous activists elsewhere in the world. George Manual 
had, in June 1976, shown his willingness to challenge the more moderate elements within the 
Nordic Sami Council. Following his speech to the Ninth Nordic Sami Conference in Anár, he 
ended with a declaration of “ČSV” which, according to Manuel, was “met with cheers from 
the young and the very old, but met with stoney faced coldness from the middle-age Sami 
generation of conservatives.”58 Although the WCIP was not particularly radical in its protest 
54 Minde, “The Challenge of Indigenism,” 84n13, 86.
55 Ibid., 91.
56 Minde, “The Challenge of Indigenism,” 84n13.
57 According to Magga, ČSV was coined by Anders Guttormsen in 1972, who challenged his audience to fill 
the acronym with meaning, and over time it “became an absolute success” and was “used as a greeting and 
'words of struggle'... a symbol of Sámi willpower. Angell, 44.
58 GMD, 14 June 1976.
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tactics, Indigenous internationalism as a movement created a broad network where one might 
find like-minded allies outside one's own community.
5.5 A Plan of Escape
Somby's trial still loomed. He feared the maximum sentence and was convinced that 
if he stood trial, he would spend at least the next ten to twelve years in prison.59 If he was to 
escape the trial, he would need to escape the reach of the Norwegian police; that meant 
finding a place to go, someone to host him, and most importantly, a means of escape.
Somby's ultimate destination was at least partly the result of another personal 
connection made at Davvi Šuvva by his younger brother. Ánde, as mentioned, had also 
attended the festival as both a participant and an audience member.60 He had been greatly 
impressed by the hoop dances of Bill Brittain, a Cree man visiting from Canada, and it seems 
that Brittain was equally impressed with the younger Somby brother.61 In July 1982, Sol 
Sanderson (Cree), Chief of the Federation of Saskatchewan Indians, hosted a major 
international event called the World Assembly of First Nations in conjunction with the 
WCIP.62 Brittain was appointed to organize the cultural program for the event and, 
remembering him from Davvi Šuvva in 1979, invited Ánde Somby to joik.63 While he did not 
participate much in the conference part of the assembly, Somby learned more about the 
59 Hjorthol, 161.
60 Both Ánde Somby and his sister Marry Somby performed at Davvi Šuvva. Angell, 56, 61.
61 Angell, 70.
62 The WAFN was estimated to have been attended by at least 20,000 people. “The WAFN Gamble,” 
Saskatchewan Indian 12:6 (August 1982).
63 Ánde Somby, personal interview, 25 February 2013.
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situation of Indigenous peoples in Canada, and gained enormous respect for Tłı̨chǫ leader 
James Wah-Shee who was also in attendance.64 
When Ánde returned to Norway, he was happy to learn that his brother had been 
released, but Niillas seemed nevertheless morose: “He was so depressed because he felt that 
he didn't get the support from our own people for the sacrifice that he had done for the cause. 
As a little brother, I wanted to cheer up my sad big brother, so I said to him, 'Canada is a very 
good place to go to.'” Niillas agreed, but doubted whether he—someone with little 
knowledge of escape or evasion techniques—could really trick the Norwegian police who 
were undoubtedly keeping him under close watch after his release. Ánde, however, was 
confident; he recounted the story of the five secret police officers in the hotel lounge, and 
how they had not recognized him despite having searched his brother's house. “The 
Norwegian secret service,” he insisted, “they are not smart at all.”65 
The two brothers met with their sister Marry, and friend Bjarne Store-Jakobsen. 
Marry Ailonieida Somby had demonstrated her interest in Indigenous internationalism by 
applying to attend the 1981 WCIP General Assembly in Canberra, Australia.66 Bjarne Store-
Jakobsen was the editor of Sámi Áigi, a transnational Sámi newspaper where Niillas Somby 
had worked as a photographer. He had been personally involved with the second hunger 
strike in 1981, and had developed a romantic relationship with a Blackfoot woman in 
64 Ibid.
65 Ánde Somby, personal interview, 25 February 2013.
66 Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs Archives (hereafter NFAA), 26.8/54 Beskyttelse av innfodte 
folkeslag (Protection of indigenous peoples) fonds (hereafter BIF), Binder 7, Sandvik (Norwegian Writers' 
Association) to Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 11 April 1981.
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Canada.67 It seemed that Canada was a logical place to go, and Ánde suggested James Wah-
Shee as a potential host:
He was the person whom I trusted because I thought that he knew 
how the system was working and he seemed to be an honest 
character. So I thought that I could trust him, even though my notion 
was that he was not the most radical person that I could think of, but 
he was a very trustworthy person, so I decided to ask him for help.68
Wah-Shee was far from a radical—he had, in fact, successfully run for election in the 
Legislative Assembly of the Northwest Territories—but he had demonstrated his 
commitment to the idea of Indigenous internationalism (in part through his participation in 
the 1973 Arctic Peoples' Conference).69 The choice of Wah-Shee as a potential host for 
Niillas Somby, therefore, suggests that a sense of international Indigenous solidarity was 
more important than support for Somby and Martinsen's methods. 
If the destination had been picked, the escape itself remained to be planned. As Ánde 
recalls, Niillas exclaimed that they did not even have a passport to get him beyond the 
Norwegian border. At that point, Ánde reached into his backpack and pulled out a passport, 
the result of “a very strange story.”70 After news of explosion and arrest had calmed down, 
Ánde had returned to his law studies in Oslo. One night, Ánde was enjoying a party in his 
dormitory at Kringsjå, when he noticed a young man throw a passport over his shoulder. He 
67 Ánde Somby, personal interview, 25 February 2013.
68 Ibid. 
69 Indeed, Wah-Shee is credited as the primary inspiration behind the 1973 conference. He worked with Joe 
Jacquot, Robert Petersen and Angmalortok Olsen to organize the meeting. Inge Kleivan, “The Arctic 
Peoples' Conference in Copenhagen, November 22-25, 1973,” Études/Inuit/Studies 16:1-2 (1992), 228. It 
is possible that James Wah-Shee was already known to Ánde's relatives and friends. Wah-Shee's opening 
speech at the 1973 Arctic People's Conference so impressed the Sámi delegates that it was quoted at length 
in the Sámi newspaper Ságat. Minde, “The Challenge of Indigenism,” 83. 
70 Ánde Somby, personal interview, 25 February 2013. Nillas recalls that it was his sister Marry who found 
the passport. Niillas Somby, personal interview, 3 April 2013. 
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took little notice of it, except to comment to the girl sitting next to him that some people will 
go to great lengths to gain attention at a party. He had forgotten all about the incident by that 
summer, but when cleaning up before heading north to meet his brother, he had found the 
passport: “I thought, what shall I do about that? One can't trash a passport. And then I just put 
it in my bag and didn't think anything about that passport.”71 He had not even bothered to 
look closely at the passport when he pulled it out to show his brother, and to their surprise, 
the true owner of the passport had the same age as Niillas, and even a similar height and face. 
The most noticeable difference was that man in passport had blond hair, whereas Niillas had 
dark brown hair. There was no need to make any difficult alternations to the passport; they 
only required the help of a hairdresser, not a counterfeiter.72 Thus, the last obstacle to Niillas' 
escape was easily overcome. Ánde has long pondered the significance of this remarkable 
coincidence:
I have been thinking a lot about the sacred dimensions on the whole 
thing (...) who was the person who came to my party and threw this 
passport? Was he a real person or was he a spirit from the other side 
that came to this party? Because this passport turned to be so 
important, like it was made for the situation.73
For Niillas Somby, the escape also had a strong spiritual dimension. Not long before 
he was to leave, he travelled to meet Knuvtt Ovlla, “a traditional spiritual man” in the coastal 
village of Stuorravuonna.74 They had met before, but when Somby arrived, the Ovlla was 
very surprised to see him, having heard of his recent activities in the news. They sat down to 
talk, and Ovlla was troubled by a vision of a yellow knife. Somby was filled with a sense of 
71 Ánde Somby, personal interview, 25 February 2013.
72 Ibid.
73 Ibid.
74 Niillas Somby, personal interview, 3 April 2013; Hjorthol, 161.
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hope, and answered that he had a ticket to a place called Yellowknife. Ovlla laughed at this 
revelation, and promised that Somby would not be caught during the escape: “I know they're 
looking for you everywhere but they will not see you. You can just travel. I will close their 
eyes for them.”75 His prophecy would prove correct.
With some assistance from trusted friends, the plan moved ahead in early September, 
once the 24-hour daylight of the arctic summer had passed and darkness could conceal his 
night-time departure from police surveillance. His hair was bleached in Kárášjohka, where he 
also donned a dress suit. He travelled across the Finnish border, covertly switching cars in 
case he was being followed by police. Somby caught a night train to Helsinki, then a Trans-
Atlantic flight to Canada, and then another flight to Yellowknife.76 Believing their phones 
were likely tapped, friends and family called each other and discussed short fictional 
accounts of Somby's days (going fishing and so on) to mask his absence.77
Somby arrived in Yellowknife with a letter addressed to James Wah-Shee, in which 
Ánde thanked him for his pleasant company at a party in Regina a few months earlier, then 
introduced his brother Niillas and asked the Tłı̨chǫ leader to take care of him.78 Somby spent 
a few weeks in Yellowknife and even managed to meet some third-generation Sámi-
Canadians, whose grandparents had immigrated to herd reindeer in the Mackenzie Delta.79 
While these ethnic Sámi no longer spoke the Sámi language, Somby was able to 
75 Niillas Somby, personal interview, 3 April 2013.
76 Ánde Somby, personal interview, 25 February 2013. Finnish passport control was slightly suspicious of his 
identity, but Somby quickly reassured them. When he arrived in Canada, border guards only asked if he 
was attempting to import any meat into the country. Nillas recalls that James Wah-Shee was his sister 
Marry's contact. Niillas Somby, personal interview, 3 April 2013.
77 Ánde Somby, personal interview, 25 February 2013.
78 Ibid.
79 Niillas Somby, personal interview, 3 April 2013. For more on the story of Sámi reindeer herding in the 
North American Arctic, see Gerald T. Conaty and Lloyd Binder, The Reindeer Herders of the Mackenzie 
Delta (Toronto: Key Porter, 2003).
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communicate with them, suggesting he had at least some grasp of the English language 
which would only improve over time. Apparently, however, Wah-Shee felt he did not have 
the resources to support his surprise guest, so he reached out to the most logical source of 
assistance: The World Council of Indigenous Peoples. Were it not for the World Council, 
Somby's hopes for asylum might have been quickly dashed.
5.6 An Adoption
Wah-Shee arranged to send Somby to Marie Smallface-Marule at the WCIP 
headquarters in Lethbridge, Alberta in early October.80 Smallface-Marule organized an 
unofficial planning meeting, which included George Manuel and others, to decide how best 
to support the Sámi fugitive. First, they purchased him some “cowboy clothes,” as Somby 
had been wearing his traditional Sámi gákti around which attracted attention.81 Next, they 
flew him to Vancouver where he was met by George Manuel's son Arthur and others.82 In 
Vancouver, the entourage briefly worried when several police arrived to the apartment 
building where Somby was staying, though it turned out they were responding to a call 
regarding other tenants.83 While there was no indication that Canadian police knew of 
Somby's presence in the country, both he and his hosts were clearly concerned for his 
security. Soon, he was transported to Vancouver Island and the Tsartlip reserve on Brentwood 
Bay. There Somby stayed in the longhouse of Philip Paul, a close friend and advisor of 
George Manuel's, and a founding member of the Union of British Columbia Indian Chiefs (of 
80 Niillas Somby, personal interview; Lethbridge Herald, 26 November 1982. 
81 Niillas Somby, personal interview, 3 April 2013.
82 The exact date of this trip is unclear, but when Bjarne Store-Jakobsen travelled to Lethbridge to meet 
Somby in early November, he had already left for British Columbia. Lethbridge Herald, 26 November 
1982. 
83 Niillas Somby, personal interview, 3 April 2013.
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which Manuel had recently been the President).84 As representatives of the World Council, 
Marie Smallface-Marule and George Manuel were wary of becoming too directly involved in 
Somby's case. This was largely the result of legal concerns, but partly out of respect for the 
Sami Council. Aslak Nils Sarah, who had been elected WCIP Vice-President in May 1981, 
formally disassociated himself from Somby's actions and other members of the Sami Council 
(who had not been particularly supportive of the hunger strike) likely felt similarly.85 To 
support Somby indirectly, Smallface-Marule, Manuel and others relied on their personal 
network of contacts within the Indigenous community to take care of him. Despite their 
concerns, the World Council's staff and supporters did risk legal repercussions to assist a man 
they had never met before, solely on the basis of Indigenous solidarity.
Somby found the time he lived in that longhouse very rewarding. Every evening, Paul 
would visit and they would have “long talks about spirituality.”86 Somby was a relatively rare 
individual among his people to have such an interest, since the vast majority of Sámi were 
Christian. He credits his beliefs with a summer he spent at his grandfather's side nearby 
Buolbmat, and the conversations they shared. The knowledge he gained from his grandfather 
allowed him to speak on the same level with Paul.87 The rejection of Christianity is not 
inherent to the adoption of “decolonization” as a framework to approach Sámi politics. 
Although the main Sámi political organizations in Norway (members of the WCIP, via the 
Nordic Sami Council) were not officially Christian, many of their members were, which 
84 Ibid. Somby also spent some time living with the Lil'wat Nation near Mount Currie, BC, hosted by people 
who were closer to his own age and quite radical in their politics, but his recollection of the dates or length 
of his stay are fuzzy after so many years have passed.
85 Veli-Pekka Lehtola, The Sámi People: Traditions in Transition (Fairbanks: University of Alaska Press, 
2004), 77.
86 Niillas Somby, personal interview, 3 April 2013.
87 Ibid.
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undoubtedly contributed to Somby's distrust of those organizations and their leadership. A 
notable exception among prominent Sámi activists was Nils-Aslak Valkeapää, an enthusiastic 
spokesman for international Indigenous cooperation, who was also critical of the colonizing 
influence of Christianity. In Greetings from Lappland, he quotes an adage from Africa: “'The 
whites came to Africa with the Bible in their hands, when the blacks controlled the land. 
After a while, the blacks had the Bible in their hands and the whites had the land.' The same 
sort of thing can be said of Samiland and the Samis.”88 To a large degree, Somby shared this 
understanding of history, and it made him appreciate these conversations with Paul. He came 
away feeling much stronger spiritually and considered his time with Paul a great education. 
Only later did he come to realize that the conversations were partly an examination of his 
character and beliefs.89 Evidently, Somby passed the test and a special ceremony was later 
arranged for his adoption by several Indigenous nations.
 When it came time for Somby to be transported for his adoption ceremony, he 
travelled with five armed men in the back of a truck. As Somby recalls: “[I]f the police were 
going to stop us, they were going to shoot. So I was really really hoping we would not meet 
any police.”90 The ceremony was conducted on 27 November on the Secwepemc “Sugar 
Cane” reserve near Williams Lake, British Columbia, and attended by approximately 300 
people.91 Somby was formally adopted by the Nuxálk, the Haisla, the Mowachaht and the 
Tsilhqot'in peoples, but the ceremonial adoption was conducted by a hereditary Nuxálk chief, 
88 The photos featured in this edition of the book were all taken by Niillas Somby, and acknowledges a 
symbolic meaning in his demonstration and dismemberment. Nils-Aslak Valkeapää, Greetings from 
Lappland: The Sami – Europe's Forgotten People, translated by Beverly Wahl (London: Zed Press, 1983), 
4, 102.
89 Niillas Somby, personal interview, 3 April 2013.
90 Ibid.
91 Lethbridge Herald, 29 November 1982; The Globe and Mail, 31 May 1984.
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Nuximlayc (Lawrence Pootlass).92 It was no coincidence that Nuximlayc was a hereditary 
chief rather than an elected, state-recognized band-council chief. Robert Manuel, son of 
George Manuel and head of the Union of BC Indian Chiefs (UBCIC) at the time, stated that 
that his organization and band councils were “fearful of a backlash from the Canadian 
government if directly connected with helping the fugitive... [H]ereditary chiefs are in a 
better position to help Somby than elected tribal leaders, since hereditary chiefs are shielded 
from political and financial persuasion of the federal government.”93 At the ceremony, one of 
the elders in attendance gave Somby the adopted name of Pinquid, which roughly translates 
to “mountain goat warrior.”94 According to a later news report, his adoptive nations “pledged 
to treat him like a brother, to help him under all circumstances.”95
Members of Somby's broader support network were forced to weigh the need to 
ensure his security against a developing desire to use his adoption as a statement of 
Indigenous sovereignty (and solidarity) and a challenge to the authority of the Canadian state. 
This required a delicate balance between promoting the story to the media on the one hand, 
and, on the other hand, limiting the exposure of precise details as to Somby's whereabouts 
and his support network, and keeping control of the media attention so as not to draw 
unwanted police attention. The story was well covered by reporters at the Lethbridge Herald 
even after he had left the region, because Marie Smallface-Marule maintained a good 
92 Lethbridge Herald, 4 October 1984. Lethbridge Herald, 29 November 1982. The latter source reports that 
two Indigenous nations from Vancouver Island had already adopted Somby through band council 
resolutions passed in advance, but of the four nations listed later, only the Mowachaht are from Vancouver 
Island, so it is possible a fifth nations was also involved. Although Smallface-Marule's Kainai Nation did 
not formally adopt Somby, its council did make a formal resolution of “full support to the bands and tribes 
which have offered [him] political refuge and Indian status.” Lethbridge Herald, 26 November 1982.
93 Lethbridge Herald, 29 November 1982.
94 Lethbridge Herald, 30 November 1982. The name is elsewhere spelled Penquit, Punqwid and other 
variations. The Indigenous language the word belongs to is unclear.
95 “Native Son,” W5 [Television News Series], CTV (October 1984)
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relationship with the staff there and disclosed important information to them. In early 
interviews, she insisted on anonymity but the description of the informant as a female 
member of the Kainai nation leaves little doubt as to her identity.96 While no Canadian 
journalists were invited to attend the adoption ceremony, it was attended by Arvid Bryne, the 
New York correspondent for the Norwegian Dagbladet newspaper, and Sulo Lemet Aikio, 
with the Finnish Broadcasting Company, who filmed the proceedings.97 Nevertheless, the 
UBCIC was surprised that the story did not receive more national attention, given the 
advanced public announcement before the ceremony, which produced only a single small 
article in the Globe and Mail.98
Doug Sanders, long-time legal advisor to the National Indian Brotherhood and WCIP, 
offered his thoughts on the adoption to a journalist from the Lethbridge Herald in November 
1982. Sanders argued the adoption was a clear assertion of Indigenous rights, since the 
Canadian government was not asked to participate, nor was Canada's official Indian Act 
taken into account. He mentioned that previously, when local tribes had adopted Indigenous 
people with American citizenship, the Canadian government had not forced them to return to 
the United States.99 Sanders later added that (to his knowledge) Somby had “so far not 
broken any laws by being in Canada” since no visa was required of Norwegian citizens to 
96 Lethbridge Herald, 26 November 1982
97 Footage appears in Paul Anders Simma's film, Oaivveskaldjut / Give Us Our Skeletons!, (Brooklyn, NY : 
Icarus Films, 1999); Niillas Somby, personal interview; Lethbridge Herald, 26 November 1982.
98 Lethbridge Herald, 29 November 1982. The Globe and Mail, 27 November 1982.
99 Lethbridge Herald, 26 October 1982. Canada and the United States each have complicated histories 
regarding the rights of migration for Indigenous peoples, particularly as many reserves straddle the US-
Canada border. See Denise Evans, “Superimposed Nations: The Jay Treaty and Aboriginal Rights,” 
Dalhousie Journal of Legal Studies 4 (1995); and Bryan Nickels, “Native American Free Passage Rights 
Under the 1794 Jay Treaty: Survival Under United States Statutory Law and Canadian Common Law”, 
Boston College International & Comparative Law Review 24:2 (2001).
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enter Canada, and Somby still had time left in his six months of visitor status.100 Nonetheless, 
the immigration and passport section of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police in Calgary did 
begin a formal investigation of the matter.101 Just days after the adoption ceremony, Shane 
Houston (a Gangulu man from Australia who spent a year working for the World Council of 
Indigenous Peoples) was questioned by the police after he mentioned to a clerk, while 
submitting his application to extend his visa, that he was staying at the home of Marie 
Smallface-Marule. Although Houston had not personally seen Somby, he told them that he 
supported the right of Indigenous peoples to adopt whomever they wanted, and he later 
provided the local newspaper with a telexed pledge of support for Somby from an Australian 
Indigenous organization.102
In early December, Somby's wife Dagny travelled to Lethbridge with their children 
Anja (age eight) and Risten (age six) “in the hope [of] a Christmas reunion.”103 Upon her 
arrival at the nearby Calgary airport, she was questioned for more than six hours by 
immigration officials. According to Dagny, officials became suspicious when they found out 
where she was planning to stay while in Canada. She “gave them Marie's [Smallface-Marule] 
name and at once there were problems.”104 Smallface-Marule had been aware of their arrival 
100 Lethbridge Herald, 29 November 1982. It seems that both Sanders and the Canadian government were 
unaware that Somby had entered Canada using a false passport. At a later legal hearing, Somby reported 
that his passport had been stolen, along with other possessions, in Vancouver in December 1982. 
Lethbridge Herald, 15 November 1984.
101 Lethbridge Herald, 30 November 1982.
102 Lethbridge Herald, 2 December 1982. Shane Houston went on to become the Deputy Vice-Chancellor at 
the University of Sydney. Of his brief time working at the WCIP, Houston says: “I saw the common bonds 
between the lives of the 400 million Indigenous people around the world, and that cultural, spiritual and 
social values are shared by this international Indigenous family.” Chris Rodley, “Shane Houston Inside the 
Tent,” Sydney Alumni Magazine, July 2011 <http://sydney.edu.au/alumni/sam/july2011/shane-
houston.shtml>
103 Lethbridge Herald, 10 December 1982.
104 Lethbridge Herald, 10 December 1982.
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and helped secure a $1,500 bond from a friend which, together with a $500 bond from Dagny 
and a promise not to outstay her visitor's status, convinced authorities to let the family stay in 
Canada. A reunion was organized, and in early January, the family was happy to learn that the 
Norwegian government had made a formal statement that it would not request Somby's 
extradition to Norway.105 Moreover, the government's charges against him had been 
drastically reduced the previous November; instead of facing a maximum of 21 years in 
prison for arson, Somby was now charged with destroying government property which 
carried a maximum sentence of two years.106 John-Reier Martinsen had been convicted in 
court at Hammarfest, but received only a very minimal sentence and no actual time in prison, 
proving that Somby no longer needed to fear long-term incarceration.107 
5.7 Indigenous International Co-operation
Despite the reduced charges by the Norwegian government, and the mounting 
investigation by Canadian officials, the Sombys opted not to return to Sápmi. Eventually, the 
family was relocated again, this time to the reserve of the Dakelh nation of Lhoosk’uz.108 
Located directly south of Fort Fraser and west of Quesnel, British Columbia, at the southern 
end of the Nechako mountain range, the Lhoosk’uz made up a small, isolated community 
determined to maintain its independence. At that time, there was no road in whatsoever; 
access was by horse, foot, or air, or by snowmobile during the winter. There were only a 
105 Lethbridge Herald, 4 January 1982.
106 Lethbridge Herald, 26 November 1982; Kainai News 2 (October 1984)
107 Somby recalls that Martinsen was only sentenced to five months, time served. An article in the Lethbridge 
Herald states that Martinsen had pled guilty and been given a fourteen-month suspended sentence. Niillas 
Somby, personal interview, 3 April 2013. Lethbridge Herald, 7 November 1984.
108 Doreen Patrick, “Footprints in Stone: Kluskus Today” at Quesnel & District Museum and Archives 
<http://www.quesnelmuseum.ca/footprintsinstone/History/Kluskus.html>
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handful of houses on the reserve, and at the point that Somby and his family arrived, the 
community was deeply reliant on their environment for their survival: 
In the 1980s, the [Lhoosk’uz] became so frustrated with government 
policies and funding programmes that they gave back all funds except 
welfare payments for the elderly. They survived from 1980 to 1986 
without government funding before they rejoined the programmes.109
The Somby family lived in a home, outside the main village, with an older man and his 
teenage daughter. Without much money, they lived primarily on moose and fish, which 
Somby hunted and caught himself.110 He helped trap mink and other small fur-bearing 
animals to sell, which provided their only real source of monetary income for basic 
necessities.111
Such a drastic change in environment for the family surely proved challenging, yet 
Somby still refused to return to face Norwegian courts. The explanation for this difficult 
decision lies in Indigenous international co-operation. The Nuxálk and other nations had 
agreed to adopt and protect Somby, a rare honour. Now, these Indigenous nations were 
determined to use the case to demonstrate their sovereignty to the Canadian government. In 
Somby's own words, the Nuxálk people “claimed that they had the right to give asylum to 
whomever, because it's their land. And that became, then, the issue, to have a fight about that, 
because my fight was already over.”112 He felt that, if he had given up and gone home, it 
109 Dennis L. Thomson, “The Political Demands of Isolated Indian Bands in British Columbia,” Nationalism 
and Ethnic Politics, 5:3-4 (1999) 219-220. Thomson asserts that, “[u]ntil 1986 there was only one house on 
the reserve” but Somby remembers there being about ten.
110 Niillas Somby, personal interview, 15 October 2013. Somby recalls that there was a real shortage of food 
when he decided to go hunting again, after several failed attempts. While loading his gun at home, he 
accidentally shot a hole through the front door of the house where he was staying. He ran off in 
embarrassment, but luckily, he managed to find and shoot his first moose. With help from some friends and 
their horses, he brought the moose home to share with the whole community, and no one complained much 
about the bullet hole in the door.
111 Niillas Somby, personal interview, 3 April 2013.
112 Niillas Somby, personal interview, 3 April 2013.
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would have undermined those efforts. The thin international linkages which originated with 
the WCIP had provided an option for Somby in the summer of 1982, but his personal 
relationships strengthened these ties enormously, creating a united effort to defend 
Indigenous sovereignty. 
Through 1983, attention to Somby's presence had cooled. The Norwegian government 
had never made much comment about the case, likely hoping to avoid further negative 
international attention to the Alta Hydroelectric Project. The Canadian government seemed to 
lose interest as well. While media coverage had been scarce in 1982, it dropped off 
completely the following year. Somby asserts that Bob Manuel (Head of the Union of BC 
Indian Chiefs, and son of George Manuel), had struck a gentleman's agreement with External 
Affairs minister Allan MacEachern: so long as Somby was keeping a low profile, 
immigration officials were happy to avoid conflict.113 
The situation changed when Somby's sister became ill and his parents were having 
difficulties, which gave him increased reason to return home.114 Around the same time, W5, a 
Canadian television news magazine, requested an interview about Somby's presence in 
Canada. Before agreeing, Somby arranged a meeting with Nuxálk elders, and explained the 
situation. Some media attention would allow a public statement of Nuxálk sovereignty and a 
challenge to Canadian laws. If it came to Canadian courts, they might lose the case to grant 
asylum, but since Somby wanted to return to Sápmi anyway, it seemed worth the risk. The 
Sombys' moved from their home with the Lhoosk’uz to Nuxálk territory on the coast in the 
113 Niillas Somby, personal interview, 3 April 2013; Lethbridge Herald, 6 November 1984.
114 Niillas Somby, personal interview, 3 April 2013.
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spring of 1984.115 There, Dagny, Anja and Risten were also adopted in a second ceremony 
and given Nuxálk names.116
Somby's whereabouts were voluntarily made public, and immigration authorities were 
effectively dared to take action. The authorities responded to the challenge, asking Somby to 
report to an immigration office in Kamloops or Prince George for an interview. He again 
consulted the Nuxálk leadership, who asked him to stay; they would request a meeting with 
Immigration Minister John Roberts and proclaim, once again, their sovereign status.117 In a 
newspaper interview, Elected Chief Qwatsinas (Edward Moody) was explicit about the 
Nuxálk challenge to Canadian immigration laws: “The question is whether he, as one of our 
adopted people, can be deported.”118 For his part, Somby asserted his loyalty to his adopted 
nation, ''I would be undermining the tribal authority if I asked for a Canadian passport. If I 
need one, I'll ask for a Nuxálk passport.''119 Roberts took until the end of July to reply with a 
letter, again asking Somby to report for an immigration hearing, and in mid-August, Chief 
Nuximlayc announced that the Nuxálk nation refused to turn Somby over and “warned the 
federal Government not to interfere in its tribal customs.”120 The statement emphasized that 
the Nuxálk people had declared their position on citizenship “to the International World 
Community” in July in a statement to the United Nations Working group on Indigenous 
Populations.121
115 Niillas Somby, personal interview, 3 April 2013; “Native Son.” 
116 Kainai News 2 (October 1984). Lethbridge Herald, 4 October 1984.
117 Though the specifics of the occasion are somewhat unclear, several article mention that the Nuxálk nation 
had proclaimed their sovereignty in 1975, in response to the failure of the federal government to recognize 
their rights. They had made a similar proclamation at a potlatch ceremony in December 1981, a year before 
Somby's adoption. The Globe and Mail, 31 May 1984.
118 The Globe and Mail, 31 May 1984.
119 Ibid.
120 Union of B.C. Indian Chiefs Update, 7 (September, 1984); The Globe and Mail, 16 August 1984.
121 Union of B.C. Indian Chiefs Update, 7 (September, 1984);
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Late that summer, the W5 crew arrived for two days of filming, a tremendous 
opportunity not only for Somby to explain his case and the protests of the Sámi, but also for 
his hosts to publicly assert their own sovereignty. The show's anchor, Dennis Macintosh, 
introduces the story by acknowledging the global interest in Indigenous rights: “The struggle 
for Native rights is not an exclusively Canadian issue. Native people worldwide are fighting 
for self-government and financial independence. Sometimes that struggle crosses 
international boundaries.”122 W5 reporters interviewed Niillas and Dagny, Bjarne Store-
Jakobsen who was also visiting, and members of the Nuxálk nation, including Chief 
Nuximlayc.123 Much of Somby's interview relates more to the local struggle for Indigenous 
rights than his own actions in Norway. When asked, “Why Canada?” he answered, “Because 
it's Indian land... I respect Indian law.”124 The story featured video from his adoption 
ceremony with local Indigenous drummers singing, “We don't need your constitution! You 
will never steal all of our freedom.”125 It referenced the Nuxálk nation's declaration of 
sovereignty in 1975, their assertion of ownership of surrounding lands, and described the 
Sombys' adoption as a demonstration of their sovereign right to grant citizenship. In his 
interview, Bill Tallio of the Nuxálk Nation Council states that, “It's a way of demonstrating 
that we are going ahead with what we want to do for our people... to make sure our people 
survive. If a little act of adopting some people from another country is gonna help then we'll 
122 “Native Son.”
123 Ibid.
124 Ibid.
125 Ibid. Known as “The Constitution Song,” it was written in 1980 by participants in the “Constitution 
Express” who opposed elements of the patriation of the Canadian constitution. George Manuel described it 
as “a War Cry for our nations.” UBCIC, Constitution Express Digital Collection, Union of B.C. Indian 
Chiefs, 13th Annual General Assembly (28-30 October 1981) <http://constitution.ubcic.bc.ca/node/138> It 
continues to be sung in protest to this day. See “Idle No More - Constitution Song.” YouTube video, 4:09, 
posted by “Brandon Morrison” 12 January 2013, <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=gOwxD0YPNeo>
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have to do it.”126 Louise Mandell, a lawyer representing the Nuxálk nation, also asserts that 
Somby was given citizenship “as an exercise of [Nuxálk] sovereignty.”127 In this way, a Sámi 
man, theoretically uninvolved in the conflict between local Indigenous peoples and the 
Canadian states, was able to help draw attention to that conflict.
The W5 interview also enabled Somby to explain and encourage international interest 
in the Sámi fight for Indigenous rights. Somby only briefly describes the event that cost him 
his arm, the sight in one eye, and the hearing in one ear, but much of the story focuses on the 
Sámi people more generally. The reporter himself characterizes the history of 
Sámi/Norwegian relations as one of “colonization” and Bjarne Store-Jakobsen reinforces the 
comparison with Indigenous peoples from the Americas: “In the beginning, the Norwegians 
looked on us as savages and as people they would like to civilize. They tried to take away our 
culture and our language and our way of living... and tried to assimilate us into the 
Norwegian system.”128 Certainly, this history would have sounded very similar to anyone 
familiar with Canadian state policies towards Indigenous people. Somby's determination to 
protect Sámi culture and language is compared with the Nuxálk language schools set up for 
local children. Somby was explicit in the comparison: “I know people here are working for 
the very same thing that we are doing at home. They are struggling about having self-
determination here. And with me being here, it's just a part of that self-determination.”129 
Chief Nuximlayc seemed unworried by the potential for the Sombys' deportation, stating that 
the Sámi adoptee would always be Nuxálk, and “they can't take that away even if they put 
126 “Native Son.”
127 Ibid.
128 Ibid.
129 Ibid.
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him in jail... or send him back to his homeland in Samiland.”130 In just a fourteen-minute 
news story, Somby and his network of allies were able to publicize the fight of both the Sámi 
and Nuxálk people, and to demonstrate that, owing to their similar histories as colonized 
people, they were willing to collaborate in their struggles as part of a movement of 
Indigenous internationalism. According to Somby, after the television crew arrived, the local 
police also made an appearance and headed for his home. They were met by “at least a 
hundred people sitting around our house and that was a sign to police that they would not get 
Niillas for free.”131 Because Store-Jakobsen was there with a truck, Somby and his family left 
soon after the film crew, and made their way to Fort MacLeod, Alberta.132 There they stayed 
in Store-Jakobsen's mobile home, but also travelled to the nearby city of Lethbridge in their 
Sámi gákti. Much as Manuel and Marule had worried years earlier when they had encouraged 
the newly arrived Somby to dress in “cowboy” clothes, the traditional Sámi attire likely 
raised the attention of local police.133 In 1984, however, the attention was perhaps not 
altogether unwanted. While the trip to For MacLeod was intended to be a three-week 
vacation, Somby learned in late September that immigration officials were investigating his 
presence, and decided nevertheless to remain in town. On 1 October 1984, the police arrived 
and arrested Niillas and Dagny Somby.134 Dagny was quickly released on bail and she 
returned to the Nuxálk nation with her children, but Niillas was kept in prison and refused 
bail, despite the promises of Chief Nuximlayc that Somby would return for his hearing.135 He 
130 Ibid.
131 Niillas Somby, personal interview, 3 April 2013.
132 Ibid.
133 Louise Mandell, personal interview, 24 September 2013.
134 Lethbridge Herald, 5 October 1984
135 Lethbridge Herald, 10 October 1984
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was charged for not possessing a passport; for overstaying his visitor's status; for not 
declaring, upon entering the country, that he had an impaired driving charge in Norway at the 
age of eighteen; and for being “a political subversive.”136 The hearing itself was delayed, 
ostensibly in the search for a Sámi-speaking interpreter (originally requested by Somby), 
until 14 November.137 When Somby asserted that he would prefer to continue in English than 
prolong his time in prison awaiting the hearing, the adjudicator refused, suggesting that 
Somby might attempt to overturn a legal defeat by claiming that he had not understood the 
proceedings owing to the lack of an interpreter.138 
Somby and his allies brought as much media attention to the hearing as they could. 
Just like the W5 news story, the court case provided them with an opportunity to promote 
Indigenous sovereignty (on both sides of the Atlantic ocean) in the media, and to illustrate the 
similar political circumstances that defined Indigeneity. The support Somby received from 
around the world demonstrated the global solidarity of Indigenous peoples. Somby’s legal 
counsel Louise Mandell (the Union of BC Indian Chiefs' in-house lawyer) fought to ensure 
the hearing would be conducted in the open so that more people, including journalists could 
attend.139 Chief Nuximlayc commented publicly that Sir Alexander Mackenzie was adopted 
by the Nuxálk people who helped him complete his famous trans-continental trek in 1793.140 
Traditional Kainai Chief Shot Both Sides added that “Canada's first Indian senator,” James 
136 Kainai News, November 1984 (No. 2).
137 Kainai News, November 1984 (No. 1). 
138 Kainai News, November 1984 (No. 1). At any rate, a translator was found, but was rarely used during the 
hearing as Somby testified almost entirely in English. Lethbridge Herald, 15 November 1984
139 Lethbridge Herald, 12 October 1984. While Louise Mandell was being paid as the full-time counsel of the 
Union of BC Indian Chiefs, Somby's legal costs were being paid for by the Nuxálk nation. Lethbridge 
Herald, 6 November 1984.
140 Lethbridge Herald, 12 October 1984.
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Gladstone, “wasn't born an Indian but was adopted... by Crop Eared Wolf” of the Kainai 
nation.141 Clem Chartier, the recently elected President of the WCIP, announced that he had 
sent a telex to Immigration Minister Flora MacDonald, requesting Somby's release on bail 
while some kind of deal was negotiated.142 George Manuel's Secwepemc nation formally 
declared its support for Somby.143 Hans Pavia Rosing, an Inuit former member of the WCIP 
Executive Council, requested that the Government of Greenland grant Somby asylum.144 
While the hearing was being arranged, Somby asked the adjudicator to consider if he himself 
was truly a legal immigrant to the lands in which he lived.145 Somby also began another 
hunger strike, ostensibly to protest his being held without bail, but he also declared that it 
was largely to bring attention to the abuses of Indigenous people: “I'm trying to expose the 
colonizers and the treatment put on the indigenous people. It's very much the same as in other 
countries.”146 Despite limited access to Somby and the hearing, the Lethbridge Herald 
responded with news coverage and numerous editorials, one even comparing Somby to 
Poland's Lech Wałęsa and civil rights leader Martin Luther King.147
When the hearing was finally arranged, Mandell attempted to make the case that the 
141 Lethbridge Herald, 12 October 1984. For more on Gladstone, his life and his adoption, see Hugh A. 
Depsey, The Gentle Persuader: A Biography of James Gladstone, Indian Senator (Saskatoon, Sask: 
Western Producer Prairie Books, 1986).
142 Lethbridge Herald, 13 October 1984. It may be worth reminding the reader that Flora MacDonald had a 
positive relationship with George Manuel and had helped ensure CIDA's financial support for the World 
Council when she was Secretary of State for External Affairs. See previous chapter. A scathing editorial in 
the Lethbridge Herald later accused MacDonald of hypocrisy for her previous critiques of Liberal party 
policies towards Indigenous peoples, in comparison with her current refusal to comment on Somby's case. 
Lethbridge Herald, 1 November 1984.
143 Lethbridge Herald, 19 October 1984.
144 Lethbridge Herald, 22 October 1984.
145 Lethbridge Herald, 10 October 1984.
146 The hunger strike lasted from 16 to 23 October, at which point Chief Nuximlayc asked Somby to end it so 
that the adjudicator would “have a free hand and not make a decision under pressure.” Lethbridge Herald, 
17 & 23 October 1984.
147 Lethbridge Herald, 21 November 1984.
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Canadian government's wish to deport Somby was “in violation of fundamental principles of 
constitutional and international law.”148 There were precedents, including the 1867 Quebec 
Supreme Court decision in Connolly v. Woolrich, to show that “Indigenous laws and legal 
orders pre-existed and survived the assertion of crown sovereignty, affirming customary 
international law.”149 She called seven witnesses, including Somby, Bjarne Store-Jakobsen, 
George Manuel and Marie Smallface-Marule.150 Somby's testimony emphasized that the 
oppression of Indigenous people was similar around the globe, and called into question the 
legitimacy of the courts: “The Colonials are always trying to kill the indigenous peoples' way 
of living – that is our religions, our economics, our laws, our languages and our self-respect. 
There [sic] killing tools have always been the colonial churches, their war machines, their 
courts and legal systems – or rather their illegal court systems.”151 Manuel “reaffirmed 
Somby's statements about oppression of Indigenous peoples throughout the world” and 
described the history of Secwepemc interactions with Europeans.152 Piikani elder and 
researcher Albert Yellowhorn, also called to testify, used the opportunity to stress that 
Indigenous sovereignty had never been relinquished to the Canadian state, and to raise 
various doubts about the legitimacy of the Treaty 7 which dealt with the lands upon which 
the hearing itself was being conducted.153 In short, the hearing afforded Indigenous activists 
148 Kainai News, November 1984 (No. 2).
149 Louise Mandell, personal interview, 24 September 2013. John Borrows and Leonard Rotman briefly 
examine the Connolly v. Woolrich case, and argue that the judge “held that while European traders residing 
in the North West brought their own laws with them as their birthright, those laws did not automatically 
abrogate existing Aboriginal laws.” The decision “ensured [for a time] the continuity of indigenous law in 
the wake of a new legal and political order.” John Borrows and Leonard I. Rotman, “The Sui Generis 
Nature of Aboriginal Rights: Does it Make a Difference?” Alberta Law Review 36:1 (1997): 9-45.
150 Kainai News, November 1984 (No. 2).
151 Ibid.
152 Ibid.
153 Lethbridge Herald, 16 November 1984.
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not only media attention for Somby's immediate case, but an opportunity to publicly assert 
their sovereignty, and to demonstrate their shared experience of invasion and colonization, 
the basis of Indigenous internationalism.
Legal arguments were completed on 19 November, and the adjudicator delivered his 
decision, against Somby, one week later.154 Somby and his family were deported to Norway 
in early December. According to Mandell, the adjudicator did recognize the legitimacy of 
Nuxálk law, but argued Somby was also required to obey Canadian law: “He did not deal 
with the question of what happens when Nuxálk law and Canadian law move in conflict. (...) 
The Nuxálk Nation and Indian law were strengthened by its exercise and by the recognition 
of it by the adjudicator. But the Canadian institutions would not respect Indian law when it 
conflicted with Canadian law.”155 Mandell travelled to testify on Somby's behalf at the 
Norwegian trial but was not called as a witness. The prosecutor managed to convict Somby, 
but he was only sentenced to six months (time served) so he was not required to return to 
prison.156
5.8 Impact
 The impact of Somby's legal case on Canadian aboriginal case law seems limited at 
best. According to Mandell, the case was never seriously intended to be organized as a test 
case to set legal precedent about the right of Indigenous Nations to use and assert traditional 
adoption laws to defend against deportation orders issued by Canada.157 There was no time or 
154 Kainai News, November 1984 (No. 2); Union of B.C. Indian Chiefs Update, January 1985.
155 Union of B.C. Indian Chiefs Update, January 1985.
156 Louise Mandell, personal interview, 24 September 2013; Niillas Somby, personal interview, 15 October 
2013. Somby believes that the only reason he was convicted at all was because the head of the jury was the 
wife of a secret police officer.
157 Louise Mandell, personal interview, 24 September 2013, and personal correspondence, 14 February 2013.
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money to mount that kind of case, nor was a deportation hearing the appropriate venue, as the 
judge would not have been appropriately versed in constitutional principles. The point of the 
trial was to demonstrate that Indigenous peoples still demanded the right to exercise their 
own laws, asserting their own jurisdiction in a conscious way.158 While there was no 
expectation the judge would respond by granting a remedy, those involved felt it was worth 
formally presenting that idea in court.
Other impacts are, of course, manifold but hard to measure. For Somby himself, it 
was, as mentioned above, a deeply spiritual journey that left him feeling stronger and more 
committed to his cause. In a documentary film made later, Somby recalls of his time as a 
refugee: “It was a good time and I learned what is the most important thing in my life: that 
one must honour his ancestors.”159 Over the course of the protests, he had become more 
interested in an older historical case that he felt represented the oppression of the Sámi 
fighting for their rights. Over a century earlier, his relative, Mons Somby, had been convicted 
of leading a small insurrection against increased Norwegian government, church and 
business intrusions into Sámi society.160 Mons Aslaksen Somby and his co-accused, Aslak 
Jacobsen Hætta were executed by beheading in 1854, and while their bodies were buried near 
Alta, their skulls were shipped to Oslo and added to the collection of the Anatomical Institute 
at the Royal Frederick University (now the University of Oslo).161 Niillas Somby had known 
he was related to Mons Somby, but was surprised to learn that one of the elderly Sámi 
women who had participated in the occupation of the Prime Minister's office was descended 
158 Ibid.
159 Paul Anders Simma, Oaivveskaldjut / Give Us Our Skeletons! Author's translation.
160 Niillas Somby himself is unclear on his precise relationship to Mons Somby, but the Somby family is quite 
small. Niillas Somby, personal interview, 15 October 2013.
161 Paul Anders Simma, Oaivveskaldjut / Give Us Our Skeletons!
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from Aslak Hætta. “I didn't know it when I started that process that it was the same people 
behind that revolution also as it was in this... I mean, it was the same families.”162 Apparently, 
Niillas' sympathy for the dismemberment of his relative had grown since 1982; the 
Norwegian police had retained his severed arm as criminal evidence for his entire time 
abroad.163 Ánde Somby still remembers his brother's return to Sápmi, and waiting with 
journalists from the Nordic press as the plane landed:
And then he's on the stairs, because that was still the time when 
people when they came out of aeroplanes were walking down the 
stairs. So he comes down the stairs, and the press shouts, “Mr. 
Somby, what now?” And I was also very excited... what is he going to 
say now? (...) He held up his arm (...) and he said, “I lost an arm. 
Mons Somby lost his head. We were in the same fight. I want my arm 
back and I want Mons Somby's head back.”164
Rather than giving up after a failed battle with Canadian Immigration, Somby had renewed 
his resolve and moved on to a new fight. Inspired perhaps by the size and determination of 
the broad network of Indigenous peoples that had tried to protect him, the relatively small 
size of the Sámi people must not have felt like such a weakness anymore. Even if the 
established Sámi organizations did not approve of his actions, he knew he had allies that 
supported him around the world. Certainly, he was no longer the depressed older brother that 
Ánde had once worried about.   His new fight would prove more successful than his 
opposition to the hydroelectric project; the skulls of Mons Somby and Aslak Hætta were 
eventually returned by the University of Oslo and reburied with their bodies in 1997.165
For the Nuxálk and the other adoptive Indigenous nations, Somby's presence had 
162 Niillas Somby, personal interview, 3 April 2013.
163 Ánde Somby, personal interview, 25 February 2013.
164 Ibid. Somby's severed arm was eventually returned by police after his return to Sápmi.
165 Paul Anders Simma, Oaivveskaldjut / Give Us Our Skeletons!
209
given them an opportunity to present their case for sovereignty and challenge the Canadian 
government. Although they lost the case, they can rightly claim to have successfully defied 
the Canadian immigration authorities and protected an adopted member of their Nation and 
his family for close to two years. Like Somby, the Nuxálk nation refused to give up easily. In 
May 1985, Nuxálk representatives described the case before United Nations Human Rights 
committees, claiming that Somby had been illegally deported. 166
Sámi opinions on Somby's actions are unsurprisingly mixed. More conservative 
members of the Sámi political sphere had not been supportive of the hunger-strike, let alone 
the use of explosives. They had even been reticent to use their power on the World Council to 
draw international attention to the opposition to the Alta Hydroelectric Project. When “the 
question arose of tabling a resolution about the Alta affair at the WCIP General Assembly in 
Canberra in 1981,” Leif Halonen (of the Nordic Sami Council) had opposed the idea, 
suggesting that their problems were insignificant compared to those of Indigenous peoples in 
Central and South America: “[W]hen you look at everything as a whole, Alta seems like a 
little branch in the Brazilian jungle.”167 Somby's flight may have successfully drawn 
international attention to the Sámi protests, but it failed to actually stop the development; the 
power station was running by 1987.168 Yet as Ánde Somby sees it, his brother's story was 
important for the Sámi because it managed to “in such a practical way, prove the point that, 
166 The Globe and Mail, 19 April 1985.
167 Minde, “The Challenge of Indigenism,” 86. A resolution concerning the Alta project was made, 
nonetheless, at the Third WCIP General Assembly in Canberra (1981). SA, NSIF, Series Db (Organization) 
043, 16 (Ark 2.10.2.2), WCIP General Assembly Resolution: The Sami: Our Land is Our Life, May 1981.
168 Much later and much too late, former Prime Ministers Brundtland and Nordli who were responsible for the 
project would publicly acknowledge that it had been unnecessary. Gunnar Grendstad, Per Selle, Kristin 
Strømsnes, and Øystein Bortne, Unique Environmentalism: A Comparative Perspective (New York : 
Springer, 2006), 40n50.
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yes, also Indigenous peoples can have foreign policy.”169 Sámi activists have continued to be 
involved in Indigenous internationalism (both within and outside the Sami Council) long 
after the collapse of the World Council of Indigenous Peoples. In June 2013, Sámi delegates 
hosted a preparatory meeting in Alta to plan a 2014 World Conference of Indigenous 
Peoples.170 
Even the more personal international links established by Somby remained after he 
was deported. Over two decades later, Arthur Manuel was visiting Sápmi, and when he met 
Somby, asked why his friend had not returned to North America for a visit. Somby informed 
him that, as part of the deportation ruling, he had been given a lifetime ban by Canadian 
immigration. Manuel and those with him pointed out that “a lifetime in Canada in the justice 
system of Canada doesn't really mean lifetime.”171 Two weeks later, Somby was informed 
that not only had his mandatory exile lapsed long ago, but funding had been arranged for him 
and guests to visit as part of a government-run Indigenous artist exchange program; the 
Canadian state paid for his return trip.172
5.9 Conclusions
While most of this dissertation is focused on the formal political connections 
established by the World Council of Indigenous Peoples, Niillas Somby's story demonstrates 
that that the informal, personal, and cultural connections created through organized 
Indigenous internationalism were also capable of having a very real and practical effect on 
peoples' lives. Whatever the cultural or spiritual connection Somby may have developed with 
169 Ánde Somby, personal interview, 25 February 2013.
170 “Alta 2013,” Sámediggi <http://www.sametinget.no/Internasjonalt-arbeid/Alta-2013/Alta-2013-in-english>
171 Niillas Somby, personal interview, 3 April 2013.
172 Ibid.
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Philip Paul or the Nuxálk people, this encounter was made possible through channels of 
communication established by Indigenous internationalists like Marie Smallface-Marule, 
George Manuel, and Nils-Aslak Valkeapää. The World Council never became formally 
involved in Somby's case until after he was arrested—its leadership feigned ignorance to 
preserve an air of legality and possibly to maintain relations with the more moderate Nordic 
Sami Council—but it took what action was necessary to help facilitate the collaboration of 
others. As an organization, it was able to include a great range of Indigenous peoples, 
including the politically radical and the politically conservative, and both Christians and 
Indigenous spiritual traditionalists. While this openness must have presented challenges at 
times, in this case, it clearly the World Council to assist Indigenous people in more 
immediate and practical ways than at the level of international legal instruments.
As a case study, it is easier to use this episode to illustrate the significant impact of 
Indigenous internationalism rather than to the episode's own impact on the world. Somby's 
story has not been detailed in great depth by any publication, and possibly as a result, it is not 
widely known among Indigenous people in North America or Europe. Yet those who, in the 
mid-1980s, became aware of Somby's claim of asylum would certainly have had to rethink 
their understanding of Indigenous peoples. At the time, the television news program covering 
the story needed to explain to its viewers that Indigenous rights were not only a “Canadian 
issue,” and certainly, much of the population in Nordic countries might have balked at 
comparisons between the Sámi and the Indigenous peoples of the Americas. A few decades 
earlier, this type of solidarity between small groups of unconnected peoples would have been 
unlikely, to say the least. Cases like this challenge our expectations of simple dualistic 
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relationships between native and newcomer, colonizer and colonized, within a geographic 
boundary. Indigenous internationalism has complicated that dynamic by introducing a 
network of other “natives” who can contribute to the critique of the legitimacy of state power. 
Somby's hosts were able to support the Sámi struggle against the Alta Hydroelectric project 
by shielding him from severe prosecution by the Norwegian state. Since the international 
system often relies on states to protect not only their own citizens but also their nationals who 
make up minority groups abroad, Indigenous peoples have usually been left without strong 
allies beyond their borders. Had any nation state (like the Soviet Union) attempted to give 
Somby political asylum, Norway might easily have labelled such action cynical and 
illegitimate interference in its domestic affairs. Yet the solidarity expressed by the Nuxálk 
nation could hardly have been dismissed as such; their motivation was clearly based in a 
spirit of Indigenous internationalism. That Somby was able to support the Nuxálk assertion of 
sovereignty shows the sentiment ran both ways. Each party was able to see the similarity in 
their circumstance, and was willing to make sacrifices for the benefit of the other out of faith 
in their connection as Indigenous peoples. The World Council of Indigenous People, 
therefore, yielded results reaching beyond the international legal instruments it helped draft; 
it also helped construct a larger sense of global connectedness on the basis of political (and in 
some cases, a spiritual) Indigeneity.
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Chapter 6
Colonial and Cold War Contexts: 
Indigenous International Organizations 
on Nicaragua's Atlantic Coast
Early in January 1986, a group of Indigenous men, including Russell Means of the 
International Indian Treaty Council1 and Clement Chartier of the World Council of 
Indigenous peoples, boarded canoes in Puetro Limon on the Atlantic coast of Costa Rica.2 
With a number of Miskitu guerillas as their guides, their intention was to sneak across the 
border into Nicaragua to investigate and document the circumstances of the local Indigenous 
populations—the Miskitu, Mayangna (Sumu), and Rama peoples.3 Much of that population 
was embroiled in a complex conflict which pitted the Nicaraguan government—under the 
leadership of the left-wing Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN)—against a diverse 
array of adversaries, including supporters of the ousted Somoza dictatorship, various other 
local political factions, and the United States government. The Sandinistas' response to the 
growing Miskitu expressions of a distinct Indigenous identity (and the associated demands 
for Indigenous rights) ranged over time from grudging consent to outright hostility. Several 
1 Russell Means, an Oglala Lakota man, had helped the American Indian Movement's occupation of 
Wounded Knee. From 27 February to 5 May 1973 members of AIM seized control of the town of Wounded 
Knee, South Dakota (within the Oglala Pine Ridge Indian Reservation) and faced off with the United 
States Marshals Service. AIM gained great prominence from the well-publicized incident, as well as 
support from a variety of activists and celebrities.
2 Clement Chartier, Witness to resistance: Under Fire in Nicaragua (Ottawa: Baico Pub., 2010). Chartier's 
book contains an introduction and conclusion that are essentially memoir, along with a reprinting of his 
journal entries from the trip and transcribed interviews he conducted while in Nicaragua.
3 Although estimates varied greatly, the Miskitu were (and remain) the largest Indigenous group in 
Nicaragua by far, totalling well over 100,000. The Mayangna made up a fairly small minority of a few 
thousand, and the Rama number perhaps as few as one thousand. Bernard Nietschmann, The Unknown 
War: the Miskito Nation, Nicaragua, and the United States (New York: Freedom House, 1989), 15.
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local Indigenous organizations had taken up arms to defend themselves against increased 
intervention (both violent and otherwise) by the state, leading to allegations that they had 
allied with the US-supported “Contras” in opposition to the Sandinista government. The 
conflict was complex for several reasons. First, it involved a great number of involved 
parties: the FSLN; multiple Contra groups; multiple Indigenous peoples and organizations; 
the American government; and numerous international observers and volunteers. Second, it 
was very much framed by the polarizing effects of the Cold War. Third, the Miskitu people 
adopted the view of Indigenous self-determination espoused by the World Council, which (as 
described earlier) challenged the concept of nation-state sovereignty, but which could easily 
be confused as a simple demand of secession from Nicaragua. For these reasons, the struggle 
between the Sandinistas and local Indigenous peoples could represent a range of broader 
political conflicts depending on one's point of view. International observers (particularly 
those who crossed the line into participation) were deeply affected, though not necessarily 
blinded, by their preconceptions of the Sandinistas and of Indigenous peoples.
The clandestine trip was subject to a great deal of criticism within the international 
Indigenous movement, and this chapter will explain the source and the results of the 
controversy. Some, particularly on the Left, asserted these activists were being manipulated 
by the United States government as part of its Cold War effort to oust the Sandinistas, or at 
least, risked appearing so. Means and Chartier acknowledged that the conflict was a 
complicated one, but they argued that it proved the Cold War was largely irrelevant to the 
fight for Indigenous rights. Contrary to Lenin's claim that imperialism is merely “the highest 
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stage of capitalism,”4 they asserted that capitalists and communists were equally capable of 
colonial violence and the suppression of Indigenous peoples. As proud Indigenous 
internationalists, they believed their loyalty to Indigenous peoples (resisting internal 
colonization by the Nicaraguan state) took primacy over any Cold War concerns. 
This chapter will begin with some background history on the political mobilization of 
the Miskitu, Mayangna, and Rama peoples, and the multiple points of contact between them 
and the Sandinistas, the World Council and the Treaty Council. An examination of the history 
of international Indigenous involvement on Nicaragua's Atlantic Coast can be shown to have 
had an effect on the local Indigenous population, not only encouraging broad political 
organization but also helping to provide a specific discourse of inherent Indigenous rights to 
self-determination and sovereignty. The effect of this particular case of Indigenous 
international involvement, overlapping as it did with the geopolitical concerns of major 
world powers was perhaps more profound on the WCIP and the IITC themselves, and 
threatened to tear these organizations apart. As will be shown, the clandestine trip and its 
after effects demonstrate that the ideological divide created by the Cold War could not simply 
be ignored. The good offices provided by the World Council were one its greatest assets, but 
only so long as it was able to maintain an image of neutrality. The adherence of the WCIP 
and the IITC to anti-imperialism, however, did not guarantee neutrality, and the clandestine 
trip described in more detail below would undermine the best of intentions and even divide 
brothers.
4 Vladimir Ilʹich Lenin, Imperialism: The Highest Stage of Capitalism (London: Penguin, 2010).
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6.1 Indigenous Peoples in Nicaragua
The WCIP and AIM both had connections in Nicaragua long before 1986, even before 
the Sandinistas had come to power in 1979. The Alianza para el Progresso del Pueblo 
Miskito y Sumu (ALPROMISU) was founded in Bilwaskarma in 1973 following the collapse 
of its precursor, the Association of Agricultural Clubs of the Rio Coco (ACARIC).5 
ALPROMISU received a great deal of support from Miskitu pastors within the Nicaraguan 
Moravian Church, including Wycliff Diego. While Catholicism was also present on 
Nicaragua's Atlantic Coast, a significant majority of Miskitu were practising Moravians. 
Their Moravian faith may have disconnected the Miskitu people, to some degree, from the 
rest of Latin American's Indigenous movement, which was more apt to be either Catholic or 
non-Christian.6 It is unclear how ALPROMISU began to make international contacts, but the 
organization did send delegates to the 1975 World Conference of Indigenous Peoples, 
5 ACARIC was founded in 1967 and lasted until 1972 when it disbanded over financial problems. In 1973, a 
Miskitu Alliance was formed as a provisional organization until March 29-31 when a meeting of the 
Alliance met in Bilwaskarma and formally changed its name to ALPROMISU. Charles R. Hale, Resistance 
and contradiction: Miskitu Indians and the Nicaraguan State 1894-1987 (Stanford: Stanford Univ. Press, 
1996), 126. Hale's level of detail makes his account the most convincing, but others offer a variety of dates 
on the foundation of ALPROMISU. Eric Meringer gives the same date and location as Hale, but the US 
State Department claims it was founded in 1972, Bernard Nietschmann says 1974, Douglas Sanders says 
1972/3, yet cites Luis Carrion who suggested it was formed in Sin Sin in July 1974 at the instigation of a 
Peace Corps Volunteer, Mary Hamlyn. Eric Rodrigo Meringer, “The Local Politics of Indigenous Self-
Representation: Intraethnic Political Division among Nicaragua’s Miskito People during the Sandinista 
Era,” Oral History Review 37/1 (2010), 5; United States State Department, Dispossessed: The Miskito 
Indians in Sandinista Nicaragua (Washington, D.C.: The Department State publication, 1986); Bernard 
Nietschmann, The Unknown War, 28; Douglas Sanders, “Mosquitia and Nicaragua: An Incomplete 
Revolution” in Native power: the Quest for Autonomy and Nationhood of Indigenous Peoples, eds., Helge 
Kleivan et al (Bergen : Universitetsforlaget, 1985), 81; Luis Carrion “The Truth About the Atlantic Coast 
(Managua, 7 March 1982),” in National Revolution and Indigenous Identity: The Conflict between 
Sandinistas and Miskito Indians on Nicaragua's Atlantic Coast, eds. Klaudine Ohland and Robin 
Schneider (Copenhagen: IWGIA, 1983), 249.
6 Hale, 125-7. For more on the role the Moravian church during the conflict, see Susan Hawley, 
“Protestantism and Indigenous Mobilisation: the Moravian Church Among the Miskitu Indians of 
Nicaragua,” Journal of Latin American Studies 29:1 (Feb 1997).
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cementing its relationship with the World Council.7 One of the delegates, Mildred Levy later 
recalled “a feeling that you were among brothers” and was impressed that other Indigenous 
peoples had managed to preserve their traditions with such success.8 During the summer of 
1976, the World Council's President, George Manuel, and secretary, Rodrigo Contreras, went 
on a short tour of Latin America, including Nicaragua. In July, they met with ALPROMISU 
members in Managua and some Miskitu university students who asked about the possibility 
of independence and violent revolution for the country's Indigenous peoples.9 The visitors 
then proceeded to the Atlantic Coast where “their reception was astounding.”10 The roads 
were lined with people waiting to see Manuel.11 He later recalled that “it was very impressive 
to see the people waiting for our arrival along the roadside, not only adults but children as 
well.”12 When asked why they were so anxious to see him, they responded that Manuel was 
“the leader of the Indians of the world.” Contreras remembers their answer clearly: “George 
Manuel is our President. We are Indigenous.”13 The following spring, the first meeting of the 
WCIP regional committee for Central America and Mexico, Consejo Regional de Pueblos 
7 Mildred Levy (sometimes Mildred Wilson de Levy) and Amalia Dixon were sent representing the 
ALPROMISU, and Noel Patron represented the National Assembly of Sumo Communities. Joseph Henry 
Bryan, “Map or be Mapped: Land, Race, and Property in Eastern Nicaragua,” (Ph.D. Dissertation, 
University of California, Berkeley, 2007), 92. Sami Archives (hereafter SA), Nordic Sami Institute Fonds 
(hereafter NSIF), Series Db (Organization) 043, 4 (Ark 2.10.1), George Manuel, Report on the WCIP, 20 
January 1977.
8 Bryan, “Map or be Mapped,” 92.
9 Rodrigo Contreras, personal interview, 3 June 2010. SA, NSIF, Db 043, 4 (Ark 2.10.1), George Manuel, 
Report on the WCIP, 20 January 1977.
10 Rodrigo Contreras, personal interview, 3 June 2010.
11 Rodrigo Contreras, personal interview, 3 June 2010. SA, NSIF, Db 043, 4 (Ark 2.10.1), George Manuel, 
Report on the WCIP, 20 January 1977.
12 He also described an afternoon in Bilwi with three meeting with “from 140 to 200 persons in each.” SA, 
NSIF, Db 043, 4 (Ark 2.10.1), George Manuel, Report on the WCIP, 20 January 1977. 
13 Rodrigo Contreras, personal interview, 3 June 2010. By contrast, one Indigenous organizer, Amalia Dixon 
felt she had struggled to convince the local Indigenous population that the World Council meetings were 
valuable, “in spite of the numerous parallels she observed” between her people and other Indigenous 
peoples. Bryan, “Map or Be Mapped,” 92.
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Indígenas (CORPI), elected ALPROMISU member Armando Rojas as president. Miskitu 
activists would also appear at the second WCIP General Assembly in Kiruna, Sweden in 
August 1977. In May and June 1977, the World Council helped arrange for Rojas to travel to 
Canada for a fundraising tour, meeting with numerous funding agencies and Indigenous 
organizations.14 The following March, Marie Smallface-Marule submitted two successful 
grant applications to the Canadian Catholic Organization for Development and Peace 
(CCODP) on behalf of ALPROMISU for two of their projects.15 With the recommendation of 
the WCIP, Mildred Levy (by then, bearing the title External Affairs Secretary of 
ALPROMISU) was invited to a conference in Eastern Canada hosted by a local NGO in 
April 1979. Afterwards, she travelled to visit the WCIP Secretariat and informed them about 
the unfolding Nicaraguan revolution.16 ALPROMISU did not limit its activities to the World 
Council. The following September, Rojas and another Miskitu man, Armstrong Wiggins, 
attended the United Nations NGO conference on “Discrimination Against the Indigenous 
Populations of the Americas” in Geneva, Switzerland, organized by the International Indian 
Treaty Council.17
The Sandinistas' seizure of power from dictator Anastasio Somoza in 1979, however, 
14 Union of British Columbia Indian Chiefs Resource Centre (hereafter UBCICRC), WCIP Four-Year Report 
(1977-1981).
15 Details of these projects are not mentioned, though Smallface-Marule also gained a grant for Nilo 
Cayuqueo to travel through South America in preparation for the founding conference of a South American 
regional branch of the WCIP. UBCICRC, WCIP Four-Year Report (1977-1981).
16 UBCICRC, WCIP Four-Year Report (1977-1981). Roxanne Dunbar-Ortiz asserts that, during the 1980 UN 
Special Session on Development in New York, she attended a meeting in the UN auditorium organized by 
the National Indian Brotherhood with assistance from the Canadian government, to denounce the alleged 
“Sandinista genocide.” The WCIP Four-Year Report, published the following year, confirms that George 
Manuel and Smallface-Marule were indeed in New York at that time, but it makes no mention of them 
arranging a meeting, nor does it mention any attacks on Indigenous peoples in Nicaragua during this 
period. On the contrary, all sources indicate that the Sandinista-Miskitu relationship was relatively calm 
during the summer of 1980. UBCICRC, WCIP Four-Year Report (1977-1981). Roxanne Dunbar-Ortiz, 
Blood on the Border: a Memoir of the Contra War (Cambridge, MA.: South End, 2005), 55.
17 Roxanne Dunbar-Ortiz, Blood on the Border, 37-38.
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left ALPROMISU in a precarious position. Although its leaders had demanded improvements 
on the Atlantic Coast, Somoza had recognized them as legitimate representatives, met with 
them, and even appointed some of them to minor government positions.18 Perhaps feeling 
ALPROMISU had made some headway with the government, or perhaps defending their 
new privileges, these figures had opted against open support for the FSLN or even for the 
less radical opposition organization, Frente Amplio.19 After the Nicaraguan Revolution, their 
connections with Somoza left ALPROMISU members open to criticism from Sandinistas and 
their supporters, as well as a new generation of Miskitu activists who were studying in 
universities on the Pacific Coast. 
Along with the nationalization of industry and land reform, one of the earliest projects 
of the Sandinistas was the establishment of mass organizations throughout the country, 
following the Cuban model. Organizations like the Workers' Federation and the Farmers' 
Union were intended to unite the population along occupational lines rather than regional or 
ethnic ones. After some debate, they agreed to the formation of a separate organization, albeit 
one with minimal responsibility or authority, to represent the three Indigenous groups of the 
Atlantic Coast: the Miskitu, the Mayangna (Sumu), and the Rama.20 Some Indigenous 
students from Managua (especially Steadman Fagoth, Brooklyn Rivera, and Hazel Lau) 
mobilized against the leaders of ALPROMISU, whom the Sandinistas distrusted anyway 
because of their history of co-operation with Somoza. Thus, at a large assembly in Bilwi 
(Puerto Cabezas) in November 1979, the Sandinistas approved the creation of 
18 Meringer, 17.
19 Sanders, “Mosquitia and Nicaragua”, 82.
20 Although MISURASATA was to represent all three groups, the meeting was dominated by Miskitu and 
there were no Rama present at all. Philippe Bourgois, “Class, Ethnicity, and the State among the Miskitu 
Amerindians of Northeastern Nicaragua,” Latin American Perspectives 8:2 (Spring, 1981), 33n9 [22-39]
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MISURASATA, Miskitu, Sumu, Rama, Sandinista, Asla Takanka (all together), with Fagoth 
as its General Coordinator.21 As the Sandinistas strengthened and expanded their new 
government, MISURASATA achieved a number of successes. In April 1980, the FSLN 
allotted one seat of the Council of State22 to Fagoth so that his organization might be 
represented; another Miskitu, Brooklyn Rivera filled the role of General Coordinator, and 
other members, Armstrong Wiggins (formerly of ALPROMISU) and Hazel Lau, were 
assigned relatively prominent government positions as well.23
Perhaps more important was MISURASATA's impact on what was arguably the 
Sandinistas' most successful project: the Literacy Crusade. The massive project of literacy 
promotion was launched in March 1980, sent out over 90,000 brigadistas to teach in the 
countryside, and drastically reduced the country's illiteracy rate.24 Census data for the 
Atlantic coast suggested a regional illiteracy rate of 75%, but although Spanish literacy 
training some of the major urban centres (Bluefields, Bilwi, and Rama Cay) had already 
reduced these rates, members of the Miskitu population resented being taught Spanish.25 
According to anthropologist Charles Hale, the people of the Atlantic coast felt a longstanding 
distrust towards the Spanish-speaking population of the Pacific, resulting from their historic 
21 Sanders, “Mosquitia and Nicaragua”, 83.
22 Nietschmann, The Unknown War, 28. Sanders, “Mosquitia and Nicaragua”, 83-84. The Nicaraguan 
government was formally headed by a five member council, the Junta of the National Reconstruction 
Government (JGRN). The Council of State was initially set up with 33 seats, 12 of which were designated 
to the FSLN, but it was later increased to 47 seats.
23 Sanders, “Mosquitia and Nicaragua”, 83.
24 The precise change in illiteracy rates in disputed. The Sandinistas claimed a drop from 50% to 13 % in just 
five months, but others consider these statistics inflated. UNESCO awarded the Sandinistas the Soviet-
sponsored Nadezhda K. Krupskaya literacy prize in 1980 for the successful campaign. Ulrike Hanemann, 
“Nicaragua’s Literacy Campaign,” Paper commissioned for the EFA Global Monitoring Report 2006, 
Literacy for Life, UNESCO 2006/ED/EFA/MRT/PI/43 
<http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0014/001460/146007e. pdf>
25  Luciano Baracco, Nicaragua: The Imagining of a Nation: From Nineteenth-Century Liberals to 
Twentieth-Century Sandinistas (New York: Algora Pub, 2007), 146-7
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relationship.26
Because of their geographic isolation from the Pacific coast and their proximity to the 
Caribbean, the people of the Atlantic had, historically, fit within the British sphere of 
influence. In the 1680s, the British recognized Jeremy I as the King of the Miskitu and lawful 
ruler of Mosquitia. When Spain convinced the British to withdraw their presence from the 
coast in 1787, the Spanish made an unsuccessful bid to colonize the region, fought off by 
fierce Miskitu resistance. For the next three decades, the local Miskitu leadership maintained 
nearly complete political autonomy.27 Britain maintained its trade practices with the region 
and in the 1930s, would declare the Mosquito Coast a British protectorate.
The newly independent nation of Nicaragua and the United States denounced any 
assertion to Miskitu autonomy, historical or otherwise, as a sham to maintain a British 
presence on the Coast. In 1860, the British again renounced any claim to Nicaragua, but 
insisted in the Treaty of Managua, that an autonomous Mosquito Reserve be set up, and 
broadly ruled by the same lineage of Miskitu kings. This arrangement lasted for several 
decades until Nicaraguan President José Santos Zelaya launched a military occupation of the 
region (which he creatively termed a “reincorporation”) in 1894 and removed the Miskitu 
King from power. Although petitioned by Mosquito Chief Robert Henry Clarence, the British 
refused to intervene.28 Despite the formal reincorporation of the Atlantic Coast into 
Nicaragua, its isolation from the rest of the country's population on the Pacific Coast 
26 Hale, 83-86.
27 Hale, 39.
28 Hale, 41. It remains unclear to what degree the Miskitu leadership of the 1980s was aware of and 
influenced by this historical precedent for their leveraging of international connections against the 
Nicaraguan government.
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remained, and by 1905, many Indigenous communities did formalize their titles to local 
land.29 Throughout the twentieth century, the United States gained a prominent role in the 
economic and political life of the country (notwithstanding Augusto César Sandino's 
nationalist war against the US Marines in the 1920s) and dominated the economy of the 
Atlantic coast. Periods of American investment on the Atlantic Coast led to significant 
financial booms. Despite the regular downturns in the economic cycle, and the significant 
deforestation and other environmental damage resulting from extractive industry, Charles 
Hale demonstrates that many Miskitu would continue to look back on the “company times” 
as a golden age.30 It was quite common for those Miskitu involved in these industries to learn 
English as a second language, rather than Spanish. This history of English-speaking 
collaboration (or at least, co-optation) and Spanish-speaking occupation, suggests Hale, 
produced an “Anglo-American affinity” among the Miskitu, and a deeply felt fear of 
domination by Nicaragua's Spanish-speaking majority.31 Unlike the FSLN, who located 
“imperialism” in the United States, the Miskitu were likely to locate it in the Nicaraguan 
state.32
Because the Spanish-language literacy crusade could be taken as a harbinger of forced 
assimilation, MISURASATA was critical of the program. They successfully pushed instead 
for literacy training in Miskitu and English, and such a project began in the summer of 1980. 
Because Pacific-coast-based Sandinistas could not generally speak English, never mind 
Indigenous languages, the training was done by educated Miskitu, many of them Moravian 
29 Philip A. Dennis, “The Costenos and the Revolution in Nicaragua,” Journal of Interamerican Studies and 
World Affairs (August 1981), 288.
30 Hale, 69-70.
31 Ibid., 83-86.
32 Baracco, 640.
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clergy. According to Luciano Baracco, it was the effectively local control over the program 
which allowed MISURASATA to politically mobilize its support base.
Amongst the Miskitu, this project appears to have acted as a catalyst 
in the revitalization of the Miskitu collective memories of the 
Kingdom of Mosquitia and autonomy from mestizos. With the 
dissemination of such an alternative national myth, the Miskitu were 
transformed from the acquiescent group that they had been during the 
Somocista period into...a “proto-nationalist” group with aspirant ideas 
of nationhood of its own.33
The honeymoon period between Sandinistas and MISURASATA did not last long. 
During the summer of 1980, former members of Somoza's National Guard34 launched 
guerrilla attacks against the Sandinistas from their bases across the northern border in 
Honduras. These “Contras” were joined by a variety of the FSLN's political opponents and 
gained increased attention from the United States government following the election of 
Ronald Reagan in November 1980. Members of MISURASATA worked to prepare a 
proposal for a more prominent role for the organization. Dubbed “Plan 81,” the document 
suggested that MISURASATA should annex youth and women's groups on the coast, and that 
a National Indigenous Confederation should be set up as an umbrella organization to 
represent both MISURASATA and the few Indigenous peoples of the Pacific coast.35 
Moreover, there were the demands that a Council of Elders be set up as an advisory or 
legislative body, that MISURASATA should have more general control over the Atlantic 
coast, and that there be an “Indigenous seat” on the five-person National Council or junta. 
33 Baracco, 145-6 
34 The Nicaraguan National Guard was set up during the U.S. Occupation of Nicaragua (1912-1933) and 
served to keep all three generations of the Somoza dynasty in power. Dennis suggests the Miskitu may 
have been heavily recruited for the Guard, but has only anecdotal evidence. Dennis, “The Costenos and the 
Revolution in Nicaragua,” 291.
35 A complete version of Plan 81 is available in Ohland and Schneider, National Revolution and Indigenous 
Identity.
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Perhaps most threatening to the Sandinistas, the plan was set to be published along with a 
detailed map of “Indigenous territory” which included roughly 80% of the Atlantic coast 
region.36 MISURASATA intended to unveil both the plan and the map at a major celebration 
of the completion of the Atlantic Literary Campaign at the end of February 1981, but it was 
not to be. 
The Sandinistas, already on the defensive because of Contra attacks, were concerned 
that MISURASATA demands for Indigenous autonomy over such a vast territory were part of 
a larger plan for complete secession.37 If the plan were to be announced at such a large 
gathering of Miskitu, the FSLN leadership worried that the demands could not be easily 
rejected. Instead, they launched a preemptive attack on MISURASATA, arresting Steadman 
Fagoth and thirty-two other members of the organization's leadership in mid-February.38 
After the attempted arrest of leader Elmer Prado in Prinzapolka led to a firefight, many 
young Miskitu men began to gather weapons. Some would follow Fagoth when he was 
released and fled across the border to Honduras, and join his new paramilitary organization 
MISURA.39 By the summer of 1981, Brooklyn Rivera had fled to Costa Rica, Hazel Lau had 
denounced the Sandinistas, and Armstrong Wiggins had joined the Washington-based Indian 
36 A few details about “Mapa Polanco”, the missing map of Indigenous territory, can be found in Bryan, 
“Map or be mapped,” 160-166, and in Bernard Nietschmann, The Unknown War, 30-32. The map creation 
was supported by an $8,000 grant from the American Indigenous solidarity organization, Cultural Survival. 
Martin Diskin et al, Peace and Autonomy on the Atlantic Coast of Nicaragua: A Report of the LASA Task 
Force on Human Rights and Academic Freedom (Pittsburgh: Latin American Studies Association, 1986), 
10; Theodore Macdonald, “Nicaragua: National Development and Atlantic Coast Indians,” Cultural 
Survival Quarterly 5:3 (1981). <http://www.culturalsurvival.org/publications/cultural-survival-
quarterly/nicaragua/nicaragua-national-development-and-atlantic-coast  >
37 Luis Carrion, “Our Challenge is to Integrate Without Destroying (Barricada, 2 Sept 1981),” in National 
Revolution and Indigenous Identity, 200. Barricada was the official party newspaper of the FSLN.
38 Sanders, “Mosquitia and Nicaragua”, 86.
39 While other leaders were soon released, Fagoth was formally charged with spying for Somoza as a 
university student. When he was eventually released on bail, he fled to Honduras. Douglas Sanders, 
“Mosquitia and Nicaragua,” 86-88.
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Law Resource Centre to publicize the wrongdoings of the Nicaraguan government. In 
November 1981, President Reagan cleared $19 million for the CIA to conduct anti-Sandinista 
work, including hiring members of the Argentinian military to train anti-Sandinista 
guerillas.40 From then on, the Contra war took on a much larger form.41 
In late December, a group of Miskitu guerrillas called Los Astros crossed the Wangki 
River (which serves as the eastern border between Nicaragua and Honduras, a region densely 
populated with Indigenous people42) and launched the violent attacks in the frontier village of 
San Carlos, killing an entire squadron of Sandinista soldiers.43 In response to these “Red 
Christmas” attacks, the FSLN began the forced evacuation/relocation of at least 8000 Miskitu 
from communities along the river. They were moved to five new settlements known as Tasba 
Pri (Free Land) some 120 km from the border, and Sandinista soldiers attempted to hasten 
the removal by burning homes and killing cattle.44 The plan backfired; thousands of Miskitu 
40 Hale, 152-3.
41 On December 12, a bomb planted by Contra forces exploded on-board Nicaragua's Aeronica jet while it 
was parked at the Mexico City airport. Roxanne Dunbar-Ortiz, as well as the World Council's Lix Lopez 
and Ralph Eluska, were in the airport at the time and had been scheduled to take that plane to Managua for 
a UN Conference on Racism. Roxanne Dunbar-Ortiz, Blood on the Border, 119-122. Marie Smallface-
Marule, personal interview, 26 May 2011.
42 In Spanish, the river is known as the Rio Coco. In 1960, the International Court of Justice ended a 
territorial dispute between Honduras and Nicaraguan by firmly setting the border on Wangki/Rio Coco, 
dividing in half the large Miskitu based around the river. Nietschmann, The Unknown War, 25.
43 Hale asserts that Los Astros were a group of “about 60 young men who had become alienated from 
Steadman Fagoth's authoritarian practices” whereas Dunbar-Ortiz asserts the attack was carried out by 
“several thousand CIA-trained guerillas—mostly Miskitu Indians, followers of Steadman Fagoth.” Hale, 
241n2; Dunbar-Ortiz, Blood on the Border, 117-8. For more on Los Astros, see Bryan, 176-178 and 
Hawley, 127. For an account of the Red Christmas attacks, see Reynaldo Reyes and J.K. Wilson, Rafaga: 
The Life Story of a Nicaraguan Miskito Comandante (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1992), 43-
44.
44 The Sandinistas asserted that this was done for the protection of the Miskitu population and to facilitate 
border security, but it was generally perceived by the Miskitu as an act of collective punishment. Diskin 
gives an estimate of 8,500 people relocated to camps while Bernard Nietschmann suggests it was more 
than twice that many. Diskin et al, 11-12; Center for World Indigenous Studies, Chief George Manuel 
Library and Fourth World Documentation Project (hereafter CWIS), Bernard Nietschmann, “Nicaragua 
and the Indian Revolution,” (Center for World Indigenous Studies, 1986); Dunbar-Ortiz, Blood on the 
Border, 117-118.
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opted instead to flee across the border into Honduras, and the international response to the 
Sandinistas' action was largely negative. Several prominent members of the Reagan 
administration (including US ambassador to the UN, Jeanne Kirkpatrick; Secretary of State, 
Alexander Haig; and President Reagan himself) accused the Nicaraguan government of 
atrocities and even attempted genocide, and Steadman Fagoth began a tour of the United 
States in February to raise international support.45 Throughout 1982, rumours of the 
Sandinista attacks on the Miskitu spread along the Atlantic coast, buoying the popularity of 
MISURASATA (under the command of Brooklyn Rivera in Costa Rica) and MISURA (under 
the command of Steadman Fagoth in Honduras).46 These Indigenous guerrilla forces steadily 
increased in numbers and in weaponry, aided, no doubt, by substantial aid from the CIA.47
With hindsight, it seems doubtful that the Miskitu and other Indigenous peoples of the 
Atlantic Coast truly faced genocidal violence from the Sandinista government. Investigations 
by the OAS's Inter-American Commission on Human Rights and Americas Watch both 
denied any “policy of mass abuse or genocide.”48 Yet the Sandinista rhetoric did suggest an 
unwillingness to accept cultural diversity within the country, when they insisted that (at least 
45 Dunbar-Ortiz, Blood on the Border, 129-131. In April 1982, the French right-wing newspaper Figaro 
published a photograph of burning corpses which it claimed proved a Sandinista massacre of an 
Indigenous village across the border in Honduras. U.S. Secretary of State Alexander Haig claimed the 
photograph illustrated the “atrocious genocidal actions that are being taken by the Nicaraguan 
Government.” Later in the month, the French weekly Le Canard Enchaîné, pointed out that the image was, 
in fact, taken in 1978 and depicted “atrocities committed by Nicaraguan national guardsmen” under 
Somoza. Miami News, 2 Mar 1982. New York Times, 3 Mar 1982. See also: Martin Diskin, “The 
Manipulation of Indigenous Struggles,” in Reagan versus the Sandinistas: The Undeclared War on 
Nicaragua, ed. Thomas W. Walker (Boulder: Westview, 1987).
46 Hale, 145, 241. 
47 Following the 1982 Falkland War, training and supplies could no longer be provided via the Argentinian 
military, so the CIA provided support directly to the Contras. Fagoth's MISURA was allied with the US-
backed Somocist Fuerza Democrática Nicaragüense (FDN). Rivera's MISURASATA allied itself with the 
Alianza Revolucionaria Democrática (ARDE) Contra force in 1983, which also received substantial aid 
from the CIA; however, this alliance was broken off in 1984. Hale, 147.
48 Diskin et al, 13.
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since the revolution) there were no Indigenous peoples in Nicaragua, only Nicaraguans.49 
Whether the logic was one of nationalist determination of homogenous ethnic unity from 
coast to coast, or a Marxist-necessity to frame the revolution in terms of “mestizo 
proletarianism,” the suggestion that Indigenous peoples simply did not exist does seem to be 
reasonable cause for alarm on behalf of Indigenous Internationalists.50 Ironically, the 
statement by the left-wing Sandinistas mirrors the statement by the right-wing Minister of 
Agriculture in Pinochet's Chile, quoted in a 1980 report by George Manuel: “In Chile there 
are no Indians, only Chileans.”51 The support or hostility of Latin American governments 
toward Indigenous culture did not map neatly onto the Left-Right political spectrum. This 
disjuncture encouraged some Indigenous internationalists to believe they could fight for 
Indigenous rights without regard for Cold War sensitivities even when, like in the case of 
Nicaragua, major powers considered those sensitivities paramount.
6.2 International Indigenous Involvement in Nicaragua: WCIP
As mentioned, the World Council of Indigenous Peoples had developed connections 
within Nicaragua prior to the Sandinista revolution, and these connections continued after the 
formation of MISURASATA as well. While it might not have been MISURASATA's primary 
concern when it requested the creation of a National Indigenous Confederation in its “Plan 
81,” it may well have been prompted in part by the fact that the WCIP preferred to grant 
membership to national rather than sub-national organizations. Brooklyn Rivera was one of 
49 Roxanne Dunbar-Ortiz heard this explanation from Julio López, head of the FSLN's International Relations 
department in 1980. Dunbar-Ortiz, Blood on the Border, 64. Tomás Borge, FSNL Minister of the Interior, 
continued with this argument as late as 1985. Nietschmann, The Unknown War, 28.
50 For more on Sandinista mestizo nationalism, see Juliet Hooker, “'Beloved Enemies': Race and Official 
Mestizo Nationalism in Nicaragua,” Latin American Research Review, 40:3 (2005).
51 Library and Archives Canada (hereafter LAC), WCIP Fonds, 9349 (hereafter WCIPF), George Manuel, 
“The Mapuche of Chile and the Threat of Law 2568,” (24 January 1980), 8-9.
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two delegates from Nicaragua at the Third WCIP General Assembly in May 1981 (after the 
arrest of Fagoth, but before the Indigenous/Sandinista fighting had gotten underway) and a 
position paper put out by MISURASATA the following July quotes directly from a draft 
covenant of Indigenous rights circulated at the Assembly.52 Anthropologist Martin Diskin 
argues that many of MISURASATA's assertions and demands (their claims of original 
occupation and communal subsistence, and their proposal for a Council of Elders) were more 
the product of international Indigenous advocacy groups than accurate representations of 
Miskitu history and culture.53 Although Miskitu delegates participated in the WCIP since its 
founding, the World Council's level of involvement with Miskitu politics increased 
dramatically after 1981.
When the forced relocations near the Wangki River began, the WCIP immediately 
took special interest but its investigation yielded few concrete details, let alone a firm 
position. In its 1982 bulletin, CORPI suggested a clear link between European colonialism 
and modern liberal capitalism, and expressed its support for the victory of the Sandinistas' 
liberation struggle. It suggested that the “manipulation by counterrevolutionaries and 
mistakes committed by the revolutionary process” left the Indigenous communities of the 
52 MISURASATA “Proposal on Land-Holding in the Indigenous and Creole Communities of the Atlantic 
Coast,” in National Revolution and Indigenous Identity, 163. Sanders, “Mosquitia and Nicaragua,” 88. SA, 
NSIF, Db 043, 16 (Ark 2.10.2.2), Report by the Nordic Sami Council on the Third WCIP General 
Assembly in Canberra, April/May 1981 (Ohcejohka: Sámiráđđi, 1982).
53 Martin Diskin, “Revolution and Ethnic Identity: The Nicaraguan Case” in Conflict, Migration and the 
Expression of Ethnicity, eds. Nancie L.Gonzalez and Carolyn S. McCommon (Boulder : Westview Press, 
1989) and “Ethnic Discourse and the Challenge to Anthropology: The Nicaraguan Case.” in Nation-states 
and Indians in Latin America, eds. Greg Urban and Joel Sherzer (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1991), 
both quoted in Baron L. Pineda, Shipwrecked Identities Navigating Race on Nicaragua's Mosquito Coast 
(New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press, 2006), 210-211. In his analysis of Diskin's work, Pineda 
does not challenge the assertion that these ideas may have been the result of international influence, but 
argues that Diskin “implicity assumed that there existed a more authentic Miskito ethnic identity prior to 
the 1980s that became polluted and distorted by outside interference” rather than analyzing the ethnic 
discourse “on its own terms in order to understand how it worked within [the] society.”
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Atlantic Coast with “very difficult situations.... The counterrevolutionaries and the U.S. 
Government (...) have used the Indian brothers as cannon fodder to undermine the 
revolutionary process of the Nicaraguan people.”54 At the same time, the organization stated 
its support for 
...the real struggle of our Indian brothers of the Atlantic Coast of 
Nicaragua for their historical and cultural rights within a popular 
revolutionary process. In the meantime CORPI calls upon the 
Nicaraguan Government to start a true dialogue with the Indian 
communities in order to inspire their trust in the revolution and to 
find effective mechanisms of participation for Indian people in the 
construction of a just and equal society for everybody.55
Throughout his travels in 1983, WCIP President José Carlos Morales discussed the issue of 
Nicaragua with organizations like the Washington Office on Latin America (WOLA) and the 
Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (part of the Organization of American 
States).56 CORPI began an official investigation into the conflict in November of 1982, had 
trouble completing the report in a timely manner.57
54 “Bulletin from the Regional Coordinating Body of Indian People (CORPI),” Tiahuitoltepec, Oaxaca, 
Mexico, 11 October 1982, in The Indigenous Voice: Visions and Realities, 2nd edition, ed. Roger Moody 
(Utrecht: International Books, 1988), 116-118.
55 Ibid. Emphasis added.
56 At their meeting, Reynold Norton at the WOLA described Armstrong Wiggins and the Indian Law 
Resource Centre as taking the “intransigent” position that “there can be no political solution for Nicaragua 
and that by implication the only solution can be by arm [sic] struggle.” LAC, WCIPF, 9.22, “Executive 
Council Meeting Minutes,” (1-4 March1983), 15-16.
57 At the WCIP Executive meeting in March 1983, the issue of Nicaragua was deferred until the report could 
be completed. LAC, WCIPF, Vol. 9.22, WCIP Executive Council Meeting Minutes (1-4 March 1983), 50. 
In July, Diaz Gomez and Carlos Morales sent a telegram to the FSLN expressing the WCIP and CORPI's 
solidarity with the Nicaraguan revolution, and condemning the U.S. Intervention. While Nicaragua's 
Indigenous people were mentioned, their telegram contained no criticism of Sandinista actions. At the 
Executive council meeting the following August, CORPI Representative Foriberto Diaz Gomez reported 
that his organization had found it very difficult to send an investigator to Nicaragua. He reported that 
Morales and two others were supposed to meet with Nicaraguan government officials in August “to submit 
part of the report” but this meeting had been postponed until September. Diaz Gomez insisted that CORPI's 
final report would be ready in September 1983. LAC, WCIPF, Vol. 9.27, WCIP Executive Council Meeting 
Minutes (11-16 August 1983), 17. At the Executive Meeting in December, Carlos Morales claimed it was 
almost ready but insisted that CORPI needed to be “very careful in the elaboration of the final draft” 
because it could be “manipulated.” LAC, WCIPF, Vol. 1.7, WCIP Executive Council Meeting Minutes (9-
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At the September 1984 WCIP General Assembly in Panama, delegates made a 
decision that would have a substantial impact on the organization's relationship with 
Nicaragua. A young Métis man named Clement Chartier was elected President. At the time, 
Chartier was in his late thirties, full of energy and looking to a place to channel it. The 
previous year, he had acted as a national representative of Canada's diffuse Métis Nation for 
negotiations with the federal government, and then pushed unsuccessfully for the 
consolidation of the newly-formed Métis National Council (MNC) into a stronger, more 
cohesive body with a single national leader.58 Not only was his initiative rejected by the first 
MNC annual assembly (November 1983) but his position as the national representative was 
eliminated entirely.59 He continued to work within the MNC, and helped represent the 
organization at Canada's First Ministers' conference in 1984, but his interests were not 
limited to the national level. He had volunteered for the WCIP as early as 1978, attended the 
1981 General Assembly in Australia as a volunteer, joined a WCIP delegation to a Human 
Rights seminar in Managua, Nicaragua in 1981, and represented the World Council at the 
first meeting of the UN Working Group on Indigenous Populations (UN-WGIP) in 1982.60 
Chartier had been unhappy with his inability to communicate easily with Indigenous 
delegates from Latin America at a 1976 Habitat Forum (an adjunct to the UN Conference on 
Human Settlements) in Vancouver and at the Fourth Russell Tribunal in Rotterdam in 1979. 
He spent two months learning Spanish in Costa Rica following the 1984 First Ministers' 
13 December 1983), 116.
58 John Weinstein, Quiet Revolution West: the Rebirth of Metis Nationalism (Calgary: Fifth House Publishers, 
2007), 94-95. The Métis were formally recognized as one of Canada's aboriginal peoples in the country's 
1982 Constitution.
59 Weinstein, 95-96.
60 Chartier, Witness to Resistance, 4-6.
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Conference, without any particular career goal in mind, but it became useful almost 
immediately.61
At the 1984 WCIP General Assembly, South American delegates were unhappy with 
the Central American leadership and sought a Canadian to replace Costa Rican José Carlos 
Morales as WCIP president. Georges Erasmus, past president of the Dene Nation in Canada's 
Northwest Territories, was encouraged to run but declined to but his name forward.62 Chartier 
stepped forward, negotiated support from the North and South Americans and the Sámi, and 
easily won the vote.63 
It was at the General Assembly that Chartier became more supportive of 
MISURSATA's struggle, but not through the scheduled public discussions. In 1984, the 
organization's position as Nicaragua's delegate to the WCIP was temporarily usurped.64 
Earlier that year, a non-militarized organization, MISATAN (Miskitu Asla Takanka) was 
established by Miskitu leaders critical of those accepting CIA funds and sympathetic to the 
Sandinista government. Leading members included Oscar Hodgson and Dr. Mirna 
Cunningham. Hodgson quickly became the General Director of CORPI and refused to allow 
MISURASATA to attend the Central American organization's meeting in June 1984 “on the 
grounds that they are instruments of the CIA.”65 More importantly, Chartier recalls that 
61 Clement Chartier, personal interview, 23 September 2010.
62 Rodrigo Contreras, personal interview, 3 June 2010. David Ahenakew may have encouraged Erasmus to 
seek the position to remove any threat to his leadership of the Assembly of First Nations.
63 Rodrigo Contreras, personal interview, 3 June 2010. Contreras reports that the outgoing president, Jose 
Carlos Morales, was particularly bitter following the election and became quite critical of the WCIP 
thereafter.
64 Clement Chartier, personal interview, 23 September 2010.
65 “Miskitos to work with Sandinista Government,” The Globe and Mail, 29 June 1984. Although part-
Miskitu herself, Cunningham was kidnapped and assaulted by Miskitu guerillas during the Red Christmas 
attacks of December 1981 because she was working (as a doctor) for the Nicaraguan government. After her 
release, she worked more closely with the Sandinistas and was appointed government minister for 
Northern Zelaya (the Northern Atlantic Coast district) in 1984. She was elected to the UN Permanent 
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MISURASATA was removed from the WCIP because of a rule which barred any armed 
groups from membership.66 Yet while MISATAN delegates were Nicaragua's official 
representatives at the 1984 WCIP General Assembly, a four-person MISURASATA 
delegation did attend as observers, and approached Chartier after his election. They explained 
that MISURASATA had begun early negotiations towards a peace process with the FSLN, 
and that the first meeting would be in Bogota, Colombia in December later that year. Several 
countries had agreed to serve as observer-guarantors at the peace talks, and these delegates 
requested, on behalf of Brooklyn Rivera, that the WCIP serve as an observer-guarantor 
representing the world's Indigenous community.67 
Chartier's growing affinity toward MISURASATA should not be mistaken for an 
ideological opposition towards the FSLN. Even today, Chartier can still recall his elation 
upon hearing the announcement, very early in the morning in July 1979, that the Sandinistas 
had successfully overthrown Somoza. Yet, his experiences since then caused his sympathy 
for the FSLN to steadily give way to skepticism. In May 1981, he met Rivera at the WCIP 
General Assembly (Canberra), but it was only the following December at the UN Conference 
on Racism in Managua, that he began to hear stories about growing conflict between 
Indigenous peoples and the Sandinistas. He asked a trusted Miskitu elder and former 
ALPROMISU member, Mildred Levy, who told him in confidence that, “there was 
repression happening to the Indian peoples on the Atlantic coast, particularly along the 
Forum on Indigenous Issues in 2011. Holly Sklar, Washington's War on Nicaragua (Boston: South End 
Press, 1988), 103. Hodgson may also have been injured in this same attack. Reed Brody, Contra Terror in 
Nicaragua: Report of a Fact-Finding Mission, September 1984-January 1985 (Boston: South End Press, 
1985), 122-3.
66 Clement Chartier, personal interview, 23 September 2010.
67 Observer governments included Colombia (the host), Canada, France, the Netherlands, Mexico and 
Sweden. Clement Chartier, personal interview, 23 September 2010. Chartier, Witness to Resistance, 11.
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[Wangki River].” With the Red Christmas attacks later that month and the ensuing relocation 
of Wangki River communities, the conflict became far more violent. Chartier felt the WCIP 
needed “to defend Indian rights.... you can't sacrifice them at any cost.”68
Conflicting reports from the region made it difficult for the Council to adopt a firm 
position, so MISATAN delegates proposed a motion, supported by CORPI, to create a sub-
committee to examine the situation on Nicaragua's Atlantic coast. The General Assembly 
approved and charged the Committee on the Re-Unification of the Miskitu Family (CRMF) 
with the duties of supporting the Miskitu people's struggle for reunification; visiting 
Nicaragua, Honduras and Costa Rica to investigate the reality of the situation more 
thoroughly; and encouraging other international organizations (such as the Red Cross, as well 
as human rights and religious organizations) to support efforts at peace negotiations.69 The 
MISURSATA delegates informed Chartier that Brooklyn Rivera would soon be in 
Washington, D.C., and suggested they meet at the offices of the Indian Law Resource Center, 
which, as mentioned above, was hosting Miskitu exile Armstrong Wiggins. Chartier agreed, 
and at the meeting, committed to Rivera that the WCIP would indeed serve as an observer-
guarantor to the peace process.70 When the CRMF met for the first time in Ottawa in 1984, its 
members (Asuncion Ontiveros of CISA; Alejandro Rodriguez Swaby of CORPI; WCIP 
President Chartier and Vice-President Donald Rojas Maroto) learned of the invitation 
extended to Chartier for World Council members to participate as observers and they agreed 
68 Clement Chartier, personal interview, 23 September 2010.
69 LAC, WCIPF, Vol. 10.16, Donald Rojas (Maroto), “La situation de Nicaragua y la comision de 
reunification de la familia misquitia,” (1986), 2. Funding of USD $7,500 was received from the Norwegian 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs. NFAA, BIF, Binder 10, Letter from Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs to 
WCIP, 8 November 1982.
70 Rodrigo Contreras, personal interview, 3 June 2010.
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to do so. There was no objection by the Government of Nicaragua.71 Committee members 
attended all peace negotiation sessions. The committee met privately with members of both 
the Nicaraguan government and MISURASATA, as well as with members of the Colombian 
Government, including President Belisario Betancur, and Foreign Minister Augusto Ramírez 
Ocampo.72 
The first session of peace talks (8-9 December 1984, Bogota) produced few results. 
The Sandinista negotiator, Luis Carrion, opposed even the use of the term “Indigenous 
people” to describe the Miskitu, Mayagna and Rama (preferring “ethnic groups,” which 
would have eliminated any claim to special Indigenous rights).73 While the Sandinistas 
proposed an investigation of autonomy for the coastal region, it was not to be framed within 
the concept of Indigenous rights. Yet the government did eventually agree to adopt the term 
“Indigenous” and to meet again in the new year. A second session planned for 19-20 January 
was cancelled. Rivera had returned to the coast that month and claimed that the government 
had undertaken the aerial bombardment of villages. He himself was injured in one of the 
attacks and refused to attend any talks until the attacks stopped and government forces were 
withdrawn.74
A second round of negotiations did occur, however, on 26-27 March 1985, again in 
Bogota. The government again proposed to give MISURASATA a seat on its National 
Autonomy Commission but wanted a declaration that the conflict with Indigenous peoples 
“was an internal one, and would be resolved by Nicaraguans without external interference, 
71 LAC, WCIPF, Vol. 10.16, Rojas, 3.
72 Ibid.
73 Chartier, Witness to Resistance, 11.
74 Ibid.
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thereby excluding the government and WCIP observers as part of the process.”75 
MISURASATA countered by suggesting the creation of parallel government and Indigenous 
autonomy commissions which could attempt to find a compromise once their separate studies 
were complete. Both sides requested ceasefires, but Indigenous negotiators wanted the 
government to withdraw its forces, allowing MISURASATA to take responsibility for local 
security, while the government insisted instead on the registration of all armed combatants.76 
The WCIP Executive followed the negotiations with a formal statement, the Bogota 
Declaration, which lent
...their decided aid to the organization MISURASATA in its requests 
to the Nicaraguan authorities to reach a just recognition of the 
inalienable natural rights characteristic of the Miskito, Sumu, and 
Rama Peoples who have inhabited the Atlantic Coast of Nicaragua 
from time immemorial.77
Although the Bogota Declaration is primarily worded to support the peace negotiations, it 
seems clear that said peace must include Indigenous rights. Moreover, the statement 
suggested, at least in the eyes of Clem Chartier, the explicit recognition of MISURASATA as 
a legitimate Indigenous organization—a substantial shift from the World Council's earlier 
policy of refusing the group WCIP membership on the basis of its military nature.78 
75 Ibid. Two members of ALPROMISU, Armando Rojas Smith and Amalia Dixon, would play important 
roles on the Autonomy Commission. Meringer, 13.
76 Chartier, Witness to Resistance, 13.
77 CWIS, WCIP, “Bogota Declaration” (Bogota, 27 March 1985).
78 Chartier, Witness to Resistance, 69. This seems to have been prompted as a reaction to the work of Oscar 
Hodgson of MISATAN and CORPI. In early March 1985, Hodgson joined a Sandinista delegation to the 
UN Commission on Human Rights in Geneva, and made a statement “in the name of the WCIP...without 
the knowledge or consent of the WCIP.” When the WCIP responded in the Bogota Declaration, Hodgson 
“was instrumental in convincing the members of CORPI representing Mexico, Panama and Guatemala to 
join Misatan in issuing a Declaration of Santa Fe de la Laguna, which rejected the WCIP Bogota 
Declaration” and affirmed that MISATAN was the true representative of Nicaragua's Indigenous peoples. 
University of Manitoba Archives (hereafter UMANA) Walter Rudnicki Papers (hereafter WRP), Section V, 
Box 184, Folder 3, “Interim Report of the World Council of Indigenous Peoples' Commission on the 
Reunification of the Miskitu Family” (18 July 1985).
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The third session (20-21 April in Mexico City) finally produced clear results. The 
government put forward a more substantial proposal, recognizing the right of Indigenous 
communities to use the land and enjoy its resources (though not to own it outright). More 
immediately, both parties agreed to a joint communiqué which included the suspension of 
armed offensives and the release of several prisoners. Members of the CRMF would observe 
the prisoner exchange later that month in Bilwi. 
Before the next round of negotiations, however, a number of military incidents 
erupted between MISURASATA and the government, with both sides accusing the other of 
instigating the attacks and breaking the agreement. Talks broke down at the fourth round (25-
26 May 1985 in Bogota) because the government insisted on a cease-fire before the 
negotiation of Indigenous rights, whereas MISURASATA insisted on the reverse. Again, the 
Sandinistas pushed to remove any outside observers from the talks. The government refused 
the suggestion of mediation, resulting in the indefinite suspension of diplomatic contact 
between the two groups.79
For their part, the Sandinistas were less interested in negotiating with MISURASATA 
because they had begun negotiating with the more numerous and well-armed guerillas in the 
north, whose organization and resolve were faltering. On 17 May 1985, MISURA 
commander Eduardo Pantin negotiated a preliminary cease fire in Yulu on the northern 
Atlantic Coast, and the men under his command came to be known as MISURA Pro-
Dialogo. In June, the inhabitants at Tasba Pri were allowed to return to the Rio Coco.80 In 
September, MISURA was renamed KISAN (Kus Indian Sut Asla Nicaragua Ra – Indians of 
79 Chartier, Witness to Resistance, 15.
80 State Department, Dispossessed, 1.
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Nicaragua's Atlantic Coast), and Steadman Fagoth was removed from control and replaced 
by Wycliff Diego. The guerrilla leaders, however, were no more impressed with Diego than 
they had been with Fagoth, and further peace negotiations occurred, now under the name 
“KISAN Por la Paz.”81 As other Indigenous guerrilla groups negotiated for peace, the 
Sandinistas increasingly portrayed Rivera and MISURASATA as insignificant players whose 
demands to negotiate without a cease-fire could be safely ignored. 
In order to shore up international support and the perceived importance of 
MISURASATA, Brooklyn Rivera made a trip to Canada, followed by a tour of Europe with 
Chartier in the summer of 1985, with the support of the WCIP.82 Despite his friendship with 
Rivera, Contreras describes the problems created by the World Council's support for 
MISURASATA's leader: “I lost friends. I lost credibility. [The Canadian Catholic 
Organization for] Development and Peace didn't want to meet with us. They said we can 
meet them at the train station but not in our office.”83 Because a Nicaraguan delegation was 
also in Ottawa, Contreras encouraged a dialogue, but both Mirna Cunningham (MISATAN) 
and Rivera refused to even meet.84 In early June 1985, the CRMF met with Nicaraguan 
President Daniel Ortega and the Minister of the Interior, Comandante Tomás Borge to discuss 
the situation and tried unsuccessfully to encourage the resumption of dialogue. 
At the July meeting of the WCIP executive in Saskatoon, the CMRF presented its 
interim report. The analysis contained within demonstrates the difficult line committee 
members were trying to walk. First, it describes the conflicts throughout Latin America as the 
81 Reyes and Wilson, 148-168.
82 Rodrigo Contreras, personal interview, 3 June 2010.
83 Rodrigo Contreras, personal interview, 3 June 2010.
84 Ibid.
238
result of the “economic-political power-struggles of the developed countries” in which 
Indigenous peoples were “[c]aught between these two ideological poles” and “essentially 
forced to live under the presence of military and political systems foreign to Indigenous 
identity.” Nevertheless, the report acknowledged that non-Indigenous peoples in South and 
Central America had also been deeply exploited and that “in many ways their aspirations 
coincide with those of the Indigenous peoples. Their revolutionary objectives and the 
objectives of the Indian Peoples are capable of co-existing within a harmonious 
partnership.”85 It was essential, therefore, to demonstrate that “Indian movements are not a 
threat to liberationist struggles.” The report emphasized that the committee's goal was the 
reunification of Miskitu families would not be fully possible until hostilities ceased, which 
required a “just and peaceful solution to the conflict.” It suggested that MISURASATA had 
much broader support from the Indigenous peoples of Nicaragua than MISATAN, and that 
the Sandinistas had an obligation to negotiate with the former, but also recommended that 
CORPI should not formally recognize the membership of any Indigenous organization from 
Nicaragua until after peace negotiations were complete.86 The WCIP Executive agreed that 
the committee should increase its involvement in the efforts to resume peace talks, though 
members would later state that the possibility of funding Chartier and Rivera's European tour 
was never discussed.87
85 UMANA, WRP, Section V, Box 184, Folder 3, “Interim Report of the World Council of Indigenous 
Peoples' Commission on the Reunification of the Miskitu Family” (18 July 1985).
86 Ibid.
87 LAC, WCIPF, Vol. 10.16, Rojas, 3. At this same meeting, the Executive accepted the CRMF's 
recommendation that MISATAN should no longer be recognized as a legitimate representative 
organization. Chartier, Witness to Resistance, 69.
239
In accordance with this mandate, members of the CMRF met with Comandante Borge 
in Managua in July, August, October, and November, as well as with Comandante Campbell 
in Santa Fe. Finally, another round of talks was scheduled for December 1985.88 Chartier 
suggests that the Sandinistas refused to send a high level negotiator to the meeting as part of 
a strategy to “regionalize the conflict as one among Indian peoples themselves and not one 
between the Indian peoples and the State.”89
6.3 International Indigenous Involvement in Nicaragua: IITC
 Because the Somoza regime received support from the United States government, the 
International Indian Treaty Council and the FSLN shared a common enemy and quickly 
established friendly relations. Before the FSLN had come to power, one of its co-founders, 
Carlos Fonseca, wrote a letter of support for AIM during the 1973 siege at Wounded Knee.90 
This gesture left a positive impression on most of the AIM leadership, who were apt to side 
with the Sandinistas, with whom formal contact was established at a conference of liberation 
organizations in Havana, Cuba.91 In 1978, Russell Means described anti-Somoza forces, 
presumably including the Sandinistas, as “Nicaraguan Indians...fighting for their freedom,” 92 
Following the overthrow of Somoza, a number of IITC members accepted an invitation to 
visit Nicaragua in 1981, including its Atlantic coast, as “special guests of the Sandinista 
government” and publicly supported the FSLN upon their return to the United States.93 An 
88 LAC, WCIPF, Vol. 10.16, Rojas, 4.
89 Chartier, Witness to Resistance, 17.
90 Dunbar-Ortiz, Blood on the Border, 56.
91 Sanders, “Mosquitia and Nicaragua”, 81.
92 He further forecast that in the 1980s, South America would “erupt in violence that will make South Africa 
look like a weekend skirmish.” Gallup Independent, 14 April 1978.
93 University of New Mexico Center for South West Research (hereafter UNMCSWR), Tonantzin Land 
Institute Records, MSS 666, (hereafter TLIR), Box 21, Folder 2, American Indian Movement Press Release 
Information Package, 10 December 1981; Lucie Jamgotchia, “The Miskito Indians (1981-1989),” (MA 
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article in the IITC's Treaty Council News from July 1981 celebrated the FSLN triumph, and 
points out the many similarities between the Treaty Council and the Sandinistas, not least that 
“they, too, were fighting the most powerful country on earth—the US government of which 
Somoza was a puppet.”94 The article further asserted that the “Sandinistas are promoting the 
revival of their Indian heritage” (in part, by planting corn instead of importing wheat) and 
congratulates the Sandinista literacy campaign for empowering the Indigenous peoples of the 
Atlantic coast, ostensibly against religious domination:
Now the Miskitus have many books in their own language. 
Undoubtedly the various ethnic groups are now looking at their own 
history and heritage and will reawaken many “underground” and 
nearly extinct ceremonies and ideas. This has not made the hierarchy 
of the Moravian Church happy, nor the missionaries, who had 
virtually total power over the minds of the people for nearly two 
centuries.95
Considering the growing conflict between Sandinista nationalist ideology and the 
“reawoken” Indigenous identity of the Miskitu (owing both to the literacy program and to 
Moravian support for ALPROMISU), such a claim is rather ironic. The article's message fits, 
nonetheless, with the some of the key viewpoints espoused by the IITC and AIM, namely 
opposition to the US government, international alliance-building with left and non-aligned 
governments, and criticism of Christianity.96 
Throughout the 1980s, Bill Means (Russell Mean's brother) and other members of the 
International Indian Treaty Council maintained their support for the Sandinistas but became 
Thesis, Queens College, University of New York, 1983), 58.
94 UNMCSWR, TLIR, Box 21, Treaty Council News (July 1981).
95 UNMCSWR, TLIR, Box 21, Treaty Council News (July 1981).
96 UNMCSWR, TLIR, Box 21, Folder 2, American Indian Movement Press Release Information Package, 10 
December 1981.
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skeptical of MISURASATA, at least once the conflict began on the Atlantic Coast. In 
September 1981, Bill Means acknowledged that the IITC's relationship with the FSLN was 
“built years before the victory over the corrupt and brutal Somoza regime” and stated that 
members of the Treaty Council “knew and trusted the new Sandinista Government to look at 
Indian issues differently than the former Somoza Government.”97 From his point of view, the 
Indigenous peoples on the country's Atlantic Coast had been “isolated and totally colonized,” 
and were now “being used as pawns in the continued interventionist policies” of American 
corporate interests, and “manipulated” by the CIA, the Honduran military, and Somoza's 
former National Guard.98  At the UN Conference on Racism in Managua in December 1981, 
the IITC went so far as to refer to the WCIP (which apparently took a somewhat less 
supportive view of the Sandinistas) “as a tool of North American imperialism designed to 
destabalize [sic] progressive governments in Latin America.”99
“For years,” claims Russell Means in his autobiography, “the International Indian 
Treaty Council had been building up a status of most favored organization with the 
Sandinistas. Council leaders got free plane trips to Managua, where they were feted at 
receptions and treated like heads of state.”100 Means further asserts that his brother Bill 
followed the Nicaraguan government's dismissive attitude toward the veracity of Miskitu 
claims to Indigeneity because of a history of mixing with African slaves, whereas Roxanne 
Dunbar-Ortiz suggests the AIM leadership discounted them as “a few hundred Christianized 
97 UNMCSWR, Robert E. Robideau American Indian Movement Papers, MSS 577 BC, Box 23, Folder 15, 
William Means, “Our Work in the Future,” in [Report on the] International NGO Conference on 
Indigenous Peoples and the Land, Palais des Nations, Geneva, Switzerland, 15-18 September 1981.
98 Ibid.
99 LAC, WCIPF, Vol. 1.6 Douglas Sanders, “Another Step: The UN Seminar on Relations Between 
Indigenous Peoples and States” (20 February 1989)
100 Russell Means, Where White Men Fear to Tread (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1995), 463-464
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Indian communities controlled by missionaries.”101 The Treaty Council News notably 
described the Moravian church as being “more integrated with the Miskitus than is the case 
of any tribe in North America.”102 Such a close religious affiliation apparently cast them as 
highly suspect in the eyes of the IITC leadership.
In November 1984, Russell Means accepted an invitation from Indigenous lawyer Jim 
Anaya to attend the second round of negotiations in Bogota, Columbia as an observer, 
despite the objections of at least one IITC member, Clyde Bellecourt.103 At the talks, Means 
quickly developed great respect for Brooklyn Rivera. He was disappointed, however, that of 
Rivera's multitude of advisers only one, Armstrong Wiggins of the Indian Law Resource 
Centre, was Indigenous.104 The negotiations were unfruitful, and Means followed the talks 
with a press conference in San Jose, Costa Rica, along with Rivera and activists Glenn T. 
Morris and Hank Adams.105 Rivera announced that these men had “decided to support the 
struggle that Misurasata is waging in Nicaragua...to provide spiritual, material, political and 
physical help, and to give themselves to the Indian cause in Nicaragua, which is also the 
cause of other indigenous people in this hemisphere.”106 Means concurred that this would 
“begin the process of uniting red people of the Western Hemisphere” and called the conflict 
in Nicaragua “the foremost struggle for indigenous sovereignty in the world.” He equated the 
101 Means, 461-2. Dunbar-Ortiz, Blood on the Border, 56-57.
102 UNMCSWR, TLIR, Box 21, Treaty Council News (July 1981).
103 Means, 461-2.
104 Means, 462.
105 Hank Adams, a Nakota activist, had been a prominent member of both the National Indian Youth Council 
and the National Congress of American Indians. He had helped to organize protests over Indigenous 
fishing rights in Washington State's Puget Sound during the late 1960s and early 1970s. Washington. 
Washington Post, 25 November 1972; Chartier, Witness to resistance, 261. For more on Williams, see 
David Eugene Wilkins (ed.), The Hank Adams Reader: An Exemplary Native Activist and the Unleashing 
of Indigenous Sovereignty (Golden, Colo: Fulcrum, 2011). 
106 New York Times, November 11, 1985. 
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policies of his country to that of the Sandinistas: “I do not support the racist policies of the 
United States of America, the same as I do not support the racist policies of Nicaragua (...) I 
have a record of fighting against the imperialist monster my people live within.”107 Glenn 
Morris suggested that their support “should be considered pro-Indian rather than anti-
Sandinista” but in a written statement by the men, Sandinista rule was described as an 
“unconscionably racist, soulless Marxist experiment.” Perhaps most provocatively, Means 
assured the public that he would recruit between ninety to one hundred AIM warriors from 
North America and return to Nicaragua “with a shovel in one hand, a rife in the other and a 
pipe of peace in [his] heart, and it would depend on the Sandinistas what would be used.”108
The reactions of other AIM leaders to his comments surprised Means, particularly that 
of his brother. “Bill went bananas over that,” writes Means. “Worse, he wouldn't talk to me or 
return my calls.”109 In his autobiography, Means explains the “maelstrom of hatred” that 
awaited him in the United States by suggesting that the IITC had been seduced by the power 
and the glamour of their past relationship with the Sandinistas.110 He also provides another  
explanation, that AIM had traditionally been “on the far left of whatever white man's 
movement was most popular” and that any critique against the Sandinistas the “'darlings' of 
the left” conflicted with that position. Believing his compatriots had “sided with a 
government against Indian people,” Means opted to break off contact with those who were 
critical of his position on Nicaragua.111 Yet, despite his angry rhetoric, Means insists in his 
autobiography that as he returned home that November, he “still had faith in the purity of the 
107 Ibid.
108 Ibid.
109 Means, 463-464.
110 Ibid.
111 Ibid.
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Nicaraguan revolution... still believed that it was the revolution, the turning point for this 
hemisphere. Everyone in AIM believed it would be the first government to deal with us as 
human beings” but in hindsight, he sees this belief as shamefully “naive and stupid.”112
6.4 The Clandestine Trip
The following December (1985), Clem Chartier and other members of the WCIP 
accepted an invitation from the Nicaraguan government to visit the Atlantic Coast region. 
According to Chartier, the Sandinistas intended to demonstrate that “things weren't so bad” 
and counteract the negative publicity they were receiving.113 Unfortunately, the small plane 
which had been selected to fly them had repeated mechanical problems, making the flight 
impossible. The rest of the WCIP delegation returned home, but Chartier stayed on, and 
eventually accepted a ride on a chartered plane with Dr. Mirna Cunningham.114 He spent ten 
days in Bilwi, from December 20-30, but had little opportunity to leave the village owning to 
the perceived danger by the Sandinistas. Chartier was able to make only one day trip to a 
couple of nearby small villages accompanying Cunningham, but they were escorted by 
“about 200 troops” and he found the local elders unwilling to speak to him, presumably 
because of the military presence.115 Informed that his planned meeting with Comandante 
Borge on December 31 had been cancelled, Chartier flew to San Jose, Costa Rica to meet 
with WCIP Vice-President Donald Rojas Maroto and Brooklyn Rivera. The latter invited him 
112 Means, 466. Means appeared on the Larry King show on 26 December 1985 and discussed the issue of 
Nicaragua, explaining his intentions to return to the country.
113 Clement Chartier, personal interview, 23 September 2010.
114 Cunningham, a prominent Miskitu member of MISATAN, was made the Sandinista government's top 
official on the Atlantic Coast in June 1984. The Globe and Mail, 29 June 1984.
115 Ibid.
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on a clandestine trip into Nicaragua: “If you want to see what the Sandinistas don't want you 
to see, I'm heading in there in a couple of days and you're welcome to come along.”116 
Chartier's situation was reminiscent of one faced by George Manuel, years earlier, 
when he was still WCIP President. In May 1978, following a meeting of the World Council 
executive in Buenos Aires, delegates and other guests (including the First Secretary of the 
Canadian Embassy to Argentina117) took a four-day bus tour in the Northern Provinces of 
Chaco and Formosa. When the group arrived in Resistencia (capital of Chaco Province), their 
accommodation arrangements had been changed118 and their host told them that the chief of 
police had visited him and discouraged the visit to the Qom (Toba) community on the 
grounds that it “might give rise to subversive activities.”119 WCIP delegates were unable to 
convince the Colonel Zucconi, in charge of the area, to allow them entry. Manuel considered 
an attempt to evade police and military surveillance and reach the Indigenous community. 
Marie Smallface-Marule discouraged such a plan: 
She kept telling me if I defy the military people, I would not be the 
one to suffer, but after we left the country, the local people would 
face the consequences of torture and perhaps murder as a result of my 
actions. This was the only reason I did not defy the Army and sneak 
into the Indian community to meet their Indian leaders.120
116 Ibid.
117 There were approximately 40 people on the bus tour, including Michael Vechsler (First Secretary of the 
Canadian Embassy to Argentina), Harry Daniels, and Hans Pavia Rosing, Gordon Tootoosis, Anita Gordon, 
Marie Smallface-Marule, Jean Goodwill, Doug Sanders, Nilo Cayuqueo, Bill Brittain, and numerous other 
North and South American Indigenous dancers. George Manuel Diaries (herafter GMD), 26 May 1978.
118 Apparently, their new accommodations were in a home run by a politician, Francisco Manrique, who had 
held a political meeting on the reserve a few weeks earlier. LAC, R219 Department of External Affairs 
fonds (hereafter EAF), 45-13-3-7, Part I, Correspondence from Canadian Embassy in Buenos Aires to 
External Affairs Canada, 31 May 1978.
119 LAC, EAF, 45-13-3-7, Part I, Correspondence from Canadian Embassy in Buenos Aires to External Affairs 
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Chartier, however, received no such advice. Perhaps he felt his visit would be worth any risk 
it might post to local Indigenous people. Perhaps he felt that the violent conflict was already 
underway, and his presence posed no additional risk to the local population at all. He 
considered Rivera's proposal, and a little after midnight at a New Year's Eve party, told the 
Miskitu leader that he had decided to join the expedition.121
It was only when Chartier arrived on the coast of Costa Rica that he found out he 
would be joined by Russell Means, Hank Adams and Bob Martin, a free-lance journalist from 
Albuquerque, New Mexico.122 Russell Means had attempted to make the same trip into 
Nicaragua the previous November along with Adams, Martin and others, but was forced back 
by foul weather.123 This new group attempted to set out on 5 January but found that their boat 
engine was broken. In his trip diary, Chartier noted that “finally after a lot of hassle, we were 
able to make the necessary financial transactions and purchased a motor” but did not give 
details as to the nature of this “hassle.”124 That night, WCIP Vice-President Donald Rojas 
Maroto received a phone call from Rivera who asked, on behalf of Chartier, that the WCIP 
wire them $3,000 and instructed Rojas to wait for a call from Rodrigo Contreras (of the 
WCIP Secretariat in Ottawa) to arrange the transfer. When Rojas spoke with Contreras, the 
Vice-President indicated his concern that that any money transferred might be supporting 
MISURASATA and advised Contreras not to transfer the requested funds. The following day, 
Rojas met with Alejandro Swaby (CORPI sub-coordinator and member of the CRMF) and 
121 Clement Chartier, personal interview, 23 September 2010.
122 Clement Chartier, personal interview, 23 September 2010. David C. Beeder, “Nicaraguan: Means Faces 
Deportation,” Omaha World-Herald, 28 January 1986.
123 Russell Means, 464. The small group of MISURASATA supporters that had attempted to cross in 
November 1985 on a fact-finding mission included Means, Glenn Morris, Long Soldier, Hank Adams, 
Chancy Witworth, and Bob Martin.
124 Chartier, Witness to Resistance, 26.
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Domingo Lopez (CORPI Secretary) at the CORPI office, and the three agreed that no WCIP 
money should be transferred and that they should meet with Chartier at the earliest possible 
moment. Rojas communicated this message to Rivera later that day, demanding that Chartier 
present himself to the CORPI offices in San Jose. Chartier never arrived.125 For his part, 
Contreras remembers his discomfort with being “put in a terrible situation.”126 After receiving 
the first phone call requesting the transfer of funds for the boat engine from the WCIP offices 
in Ottawa by that afternoon, he spoke with both vice-presidents, Hayden Burgess in Hawaii 
and Donald Rojas in Costa Rica, asking their advice. Both opposed the transfer. When 
Chartier called the next day to ask why he had not received the transfer, Contreras explained 
that the banks had been closed, and Chartier demanded the transfer be sent immediately. 
Contreras went to the bank and transferred the funds. Rojas was angry, but Burgess was more 
understanding, recognizing Contreras' position as an employee responding to the request of 
an elected president.127 Chartier's unwillingness to consult with his fellow sub-committee 
members or with the rest of the WCIP executive created intense feelings of frustration in the 
organization that would not easily be forgiven.128
After the “hassle” with the engine, the first two days of the trip were spent in the 
village of Kwamwatla, then the group travelled north to Ariswatla for a day, then past 
Prinzapolka to Wounta for a day, then inland to visit Layasiksa and Kukalaya on 12 January. 
The next morning they made the long trip (by boat, by foot, and by horse) north to Lapan, 
followed by a walk up to the mountain village of Sukupin, and then still further north to Yulu. 
125 LAC, WCIPF, Vol. 10.16, Rojas, 10.
126 Rodrigo Contreras, personal interview, 3 June 2010.
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248
This put them close to Bilwi, three-quarters of the way of the coast of Nicaragua, and well 
over 400km from their starting point. The group then made the long trip back to Kukalaya on 
17 January, and on to Layasiksa the next day. On 20 January, they received information that 
their next destination, Wounta, was now guarded with over 100 Sandinistas and heavy 
artillery. This sudden build-up prevented the group's planned return to the coast, but 
encouraged them to leave Layasiksa, as their presence (escorted, as they were, by a unit of 
guerillas) was “endangering the village.”129 
At each of these villages, Bob Martin, who had some amount of training as an 
Emergency Medical Technician, gave some basic first aid to those in need, and catalogued 
their injuries and illnesses. Chartier recorded interviews with locals, as well as 
representatives of other communities who arrived to meet them.130 Those willing to speak 
with Chartier gave details of the violence and abuse that the Sandinistas had inflicted upon 
them, the food and other property destroyed, the difficulties of life during war time, and lists 
of community members who were dead and missing. 
The impression these men took from their meetings with the Miskitu contrasts sharply 
with those seen elsewhere. Notably, the Sandinistas attempted to deny that the peoples of the 
Atlantic Coast were Indigenous at all, but even those, like Roxanne Dunbar-Ortiz, who did 
consider the Miskitu to be Indigenous saw them as a very different group than the Indigenous 
peoples of North America:
The Miskitus were mixed culturally and by skin color and did not 
identify as tribes or clans, and nearly every one was a devout 
129 Chartier, Witness to Resistance, 175.
130 According to Means, they managed to visit nine villages and met with representatives of nineteen others. 
Means, 467-8. 
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Christian, many identifying first with the Moravian Church. They 
were a people, a nation, but not a tribe that desired Indian 
reservations such as those in the United States...131
Yet Means' description of his encounters is quite the opposite:
We saw a prosperous region that offers a peaceful, comfortable 
lifestyle in which to cultivate Indian values. We found no evidence 
that the Miskito people had traded their heritage for pie-in-the-sky 
promises from the Moravian Church. Instead, we saw that even those 
who professed belief in Christianity had adapted that European 
doctrine to their own traditional values. The church had been 
“Indianized” far more than the people had been Christianized.132
The different perceptions may be considered the result of differences in emphasis and 
are not necessarily mutually exclusive. They illustrate, however, the way in which ideologies 
were influencing the way international observers saw the local population. Dunbar-Ortiz 
balanced her support for Indigenous rights and her support for the Sandinista revolution by 
finding ways to explain why Nicaragua's situation was different from other Indigenous 
conflicts and could therefore be handled differently. Means, on the other hand, was 
committed to a staunch Indigenist perspective that minimized any differences between 
Indigenous peoples, and privileged Indigenous rights far above any other political concerns. 
Both sides were undoubtedly committed to Indigenous rights, but here, it seems either that 
their perceptions of the Miskitu were being influenced by their ideological concerns, or that 
they were adapting (consciously or unconsciously) their definitions of “Indigeneity” to fit 
with their beliefs about the Sandinistas.
Chartier's interviews confirm the importance some of the Miskitu placed on the 
WCIP's role. On 12 January, he spoke with two men who had paddled four hours from 
131 Dunbar-Ortiz, Blood on the Border, 260.
132 Means, 468.
250
Haulover to meet Brooklyn in Kukalaya. Chartier notes that the elder of the two “said he had 
been a leader in ALPROMISU and then with MISURASATA...Next morning, while seeing 
us off, the elder said 'Goodbye, you're our chief' acknowledging the WCIP.”133 According to 
Chartier's journal, an Indigenous combatant in Yulu nicknamed “Condor” said, “unsolicited, 
that I was most important to the resistance, as I was President of WCIP, i.e. their international 
president.”134 Most they met were enthusiastically happy for outside support—certainly, they 
must have seen that any international attention would likely aid their cause—though several 
were critical of Means' assertions that he would bring warriors from North America. There 
were plenty of local Indigenous people that wanted to fight, but they lacked arms and other 
supplies. One of the combatants mentioned that any actual soldiers from outside the country 
could enable accusations about the use of mercenaries, “and thus detract from their original 
legitimate war of resistance against the Sandinista invasion and repression of their 
communities and people.”135
On Thursday January 23, as Martin and Chartier played Frisbee at Layasiksa, they 
saw two planes circling overhead. The villagers, the fighters and their guests all fled the 
village to hide in the trees, and Chartier's diary mentions that they were ordered not to fire. 
Nevertheless, the planes (now joined by a third) began to dive and fire at those on the 
ground. The men managed to hide out in the woods until the planes were gone from sight, 
after which they took their remaining boat across the lagoon. Before they reached the 
opposite shore, the planes returned to drop bombs and strafe their boat. Chartier and Means 
manage to swim to shore, and pulled two of the injured men to safety as well. After the 
133 Chartier, Witness to Resistance, 103.
134 Ibid., 157.
135 Ibid., 157, 159, 206.
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planes left again, villagers came by in canoes and helped the group flee down river. The next 
day they tended to their wounded and travelled to a MISURASATA troop encampment, 
Yahbra Bila, to plan their escape.136 Regrouping again, they managed to evade the 
Nicaraguan army for over two weeks.
Meanwhile, Rodrigo Contreras, Georges Erasmus (National Chief of Canada's 
Assembly of First Nations) and Louis "Smokey" Bruyère (National Chief of the Native 
Council of Canada) made contact with the Nicaraguan embassy to request security for their 
fellow Canadian and leader.137 The Ambassador contacted his government through the 
Minister of the Interior, headed by Comandante Tomás Borge, and gained assurances that 
Chartier would be kept safe, although these assurances were not to be made public.138 The 
Nicaraguan Embassy publicly announced that, if caught in Nicaragua without permission, the 
men would be deported as illegal aliens, but warned that, if they were found to be involved in 
military operations as Means has threatened, “it would be another thing” and those involved 
would “suffer the consequences.”139
After days hiding in the jungle, the group finally found a plan of escape: a shallow 
136 Means, 470. Armstrong Wiggins reported that two civilians, Florentin Conrado and Julio Serapio, had died 
in the bombing. In a later article, locals asserted that only one local civilian, a 14-year-old boy, had died 
during the bombing.  New York Times, 25 January 1986 and 4 February 1986. Chartier's journal explains 
that two others died during the bombing. The boy, a “young warrior” named “Small Pico” whom Chartier 
had pulled from the water, suffered a “shattered left elbow and forearm, (hit twice), shattered left hip and 
gouged out left thigh.” They transported him downriver but then sent him back to a village so they had 
could be taken to the Red Cross “as a civilian casualty”. It seems he later succumbed to his injuries. Means 
himself sustained a “superficial flesh wound in the abdomen.” Chartier, Witness to Resistance, 177, 199, 
206, 230. One of the seriously injured men was another Miskitu, David Rodriquez, who had attended a 
1985 international Indigenous youth conference in Batoche, organized by Chartier for the 100th anniversary 
of the North West Rebellion. Rodriquez would later lose his leg as a result of his injuries. Weinstein, 108-9.
137 Bob Martin had managed to relay details of their situation, via radio, to the Associated Press. Chartier, 
Witness to Resistance, 222-231.
138 Rodrigo Contreras, personal interview, 3 June 2010 and personal correspondence, 22 February 2014.
139 Omaha World-Herald, 28 January 1986
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channel connected to a larger river that emptied into the Caribbean Sea.140 The channel, 
however, passed by a Miskitu village garrisoned with Sandinista troops. The locals provided 
a solution in the form of “an instant and noisy church service...while fishermen in their 
dugout canoes added to their own clatter to the singing.”141 With the noises of their 
movement masked by this larger racket, they made their way down the channel and out the 
mouth of the river where they could safely start their motor. The sight of a Nicaraguan naval 
vessel encouraged them to travel out into international waters instead of along the coastline. 
Twenty-two hours later, with little fuel remaining, they reached the Colombian island of San 
Andres. The wounded were quickly taken to the hospital by the police, while the others were 
taken to the police station for questioning. Eventually, the policed transferred the bedraggled 
men (some still barefoot) to the Cacique Tone luxury resort, full of Canadian tourists.142 After 
some food and rest, they returned to San Jose, Costa Rica to deliver a press conference on 10 
February.
6.5 Repercussions
Following the escape, Chartier returned home to Saskatchewan, then travelled to 
Ottawa where he met with World Council Vice-Presidents Hayden Burgess and Donald Rojas 
Maroto. He gave them an account of his trip, and they asked him not to share further 
information with the press or make any statement on behalf of the Council. “Under pressure, 
he could give an account of his tour, but should not give political opinions” which could do 
140 The number of wounded and the distances involved made escape by land particularly difficult. KISAN 
offered aid to facilitate an escape by land, “but the political implications for MISURASATA are too high, 
as KISAN would take full credit and publicity.” Chartier, Witness to Resistance, 234.
141 Weinstein, 108.
142 Ibid., 251.
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“further damage” to the organization.143 They reached a tentative agreement to have an 
emergency executive meeting from 24-28 February, later moved to 6-8 March so that more 
regional representatives could attend. 
Chartier travelled to Geneva to make an intervention at the UN Commission on 
Human Rights on behalf of the WCIP, but when he went to register, he was told that the 
WCIP office had made a formal request that he not be allowed to speak. Nevertheless, he was 
still the elected WCIP president, so he did manage to register and make a statement before 
the Commission which restated the Bogota Declaration and its support for peace 
negotiations. In his speech, he compared the violence of the socialist Sandinistas with the 
violence being perpetrated against the Indigenous peoples of the Revolutionary Front for an 
Independent East Timor by the US-backed Indonesian government, and stated his support for 
the efforts of the Kanak peoples of New Caledonia to push France for decolonization. 
Chartier suggested that these examples showed that right and left ideologies were unhelpful: 
“We cannot, and never will, fit into the current non-Indigenous ideologies and values which 
at this time are tending to polarize the world community.”144
Chartier's argument does not seem to have convinced his fellow members of the 
WCIP. On 6 March, the emergency Executive Council meeting was convened at the Hotel Le 
Grenil in Geneva, with Chartier presiding. The attending executive members included Vice-
Presidents Donald Rojas Maroto and Hayden Burgess; Nordic Sami Council delegate, Aslak 
Nils Sara; North American Delegate for the Native Council of Canada, Louis "Smokey" 
143  Chartier, Witness to Resistance, 267. LAC, WCIPF, Vol. 10.16, Rojas, 12.
144 “Address to the United Nations Commission on Human Rights” Forty-Second Session, Agenda Item 21 (3 
March 1986) in Chartier, Witness to Resistance, Appendix B, 321. 
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Bruyère; North American delegate for the Métis National Council, Sam Sinclair; South 
American Indigenous Council (CISA) delegates, Tomas Condori and Asuncion Ontiveros; 
CORPI delegate, Domingo Lopez; and WCIP coordinator and translator Rodrigo Contreras. 
The Nordic Sami Council sent three additional representatives, and three other Canadians 
also attended.145
Donald Rojas Maroto presented his report on behalf of the Nicaraguan sub-
Committee, which expressed their concerns about Chartier's trip. The report acknowledged 
the desperate situation in Nicaragua and a need for the WCIP to be aggressive, but insisted 
that the council, in order to be “a force of diplomatic pressure”, must maintain dialogue with 
governments. It argued that Chartier's trip has caused the organization “serious problems of 
international credibility—if we propose mechanisms for dialogue at official levels, it cannot 
be understood why we use other unofficial channels.”146 Rojas Maroto was concerned about 
newspaper reports that the WCIP was “directly or indirectly, supporting or seeking military 
support to fight against the Government of Nicaragua.” Statements comparing the 
Sandinistas to the Pinochet Regime in Chile or to Garcia in Guatemala were inflammatory 
and unhelpful: “...we cannot insult or say certain words against a government even if it is 
true, and on the other hand, say we want to talk to them. That is totally contradictory and puts 
us in difficult situations for the continued work of the commission.”147 This criticism, 
however, was based in the belief that the Sandinistas were negotiating in good faith, a 
postulate that Chartier was not willing to accept.
145 The Nordic Sami Council members were Lars Anders Baers, Oleff Smok and Helvi Nourgam. The 
Canadians were Yvon Dumont (Metis National Council), Rod Miller, and Charles Daniels. LAC, WCIPF, 
Volumes 10.14 and 10.15, WCIP Executive Council Meeting Minutes, 6-8 March 1986.
146 LAC, WCIPF, Vol. 10.16, Rojas, 14.
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Rojas Maroto also pointed to the fact that many funding agencies in North America 
and Europe were supporters of (or at least sympathetic to) the Sandinistas—the same 
agencies that were funding Indigenous organizations in Central and South America. He “had 
information” that these agencies were “questioning the continued financial support” of these 
organizations because the position of the WCIP suggested it was merely “another instrument 
of the U.S.” As Nicaragua was only one of many countries where Indigenous people were in 
very serious danger of violence, it was “necessary to review where our actions not only 
seriously jeopardize the financial security of our organizations but also the personal safety of 
our fellow leaders.”148 Domingo Lopez gave his own report of CORPI's meetings (1-3 
March) and stated that CORPI no longer recognized Chartier's presidency. Ontiveros 
explained that CISA considered Chartier's trip “an irrational act because the WCIP [was] not 
a guerrilla organization but a diplomatic one.”149 The South American organization had 
decided unanimously to request Chartier's resignation. Bruyère shared the concerns of the 
South and Central Americans, and “believed that the only honourable thing for Clem would 
be to remove himself as President.”150 Chartier was not without supporters; Sinclair stated his 
commitment to “his brother Metis” and the MNC, while accepting that Chartier had made a 
mistake that required “some action” by the Council, did not think his removal was 
justified.151 Chartier further submitted a letter from the National Congress of American 
Indians (NCAI) which, at the urging of Hank Adams, commended him for his efforts in 
148 LAC, WCIPF, Vol. 10.16, Rojas, 14.
149 LAC, WCIPF, Volumes 10.14 and 10.15, WCIP Executive Council Meeting Minutes, 6-8 March 1986.
150 Ibid.,
151 Ibid.,
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Nicaragua.152 Aslak Nils Sara was worried about the unity of the World Council if some 
regions refused to recognize Chartier's presidency, and asked to hear the president's 
response.153
Despite the urgings of his fellow executive members, Chartier refused to resign, 
arguing that “the General Assembly had elected him and only that assembly [could] remove 
him.”154 He asserted that no one's argument had convinced him to resign and that the WCIP 
Constitution did not allow for his removal by the executive. A recess until the following day 
did nothing to change his mind, nor did the continued pleas during the next morning's 
session. That afternoon, Aslak Nils Sara introduced a resolution that acknowledged the 
president could not be impeached, but which removed all duties and responsibilities from his 
office, effectively ordering him not to take any action unless approved by the Executive 
Council. The resolution was supported by all members of the executive (including Ossie 
Cruse via telex message) except Sinclair and Chartier himself. They then took time to express 
“their personal thanks to Clem Chartier for the personal sacrifices he [had] given to the 
WCIP...advocating on behalf of Indigenous peoples for Indigenous rights.”155 Contreras 
seems somewhat sympathetic to the president's motivations for the trip, but critical of the 
way in which he went. Chartier “didn't consult with anybody from his executive, and was 
152 LAC, WCIPF, Vol. 10.16, letter from Reuben A. Snake (President) and Suzan Shown Harjo (Executive 
Director) of the NCAI to Clem Chartier, 12 February 1986. It is unclear what effect these events had on the 
relationship between the NCAI and the WCIP, but a letter sent by the World Council to the Congress in 
May 1989 suggests contact had died off for a number of years, LAC, WCIPF, Vol. 5.5, letter from Carlos 
Johnson (WCIP) to Gail Chehak (NCAI). Sometime later, Chartier also received a letter from WCIP 
founder George Manuel who commended him for his decision to visit Nicaragua, comparing it to his own 
willingness to defy authorities while visiting Chile, Argentina, and Guatemala to promote Indigenous 
rights. Chartier, Witness to Resistance, 270.
153 LAC, WCIPF, Volumes 10.14 and 10.15, WCIP Executive Council Meeting Minutes, 6-8 March 1986.
154 Ibid.
155 Ibid.
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perceived to be acting in an authoritarian way.”156 It was bad enough that Contreras felt 
caught between left and right on the issue of Nicaragua, but feeling caught between the 
WCIP President and Vice-Presidents was too much for him. Although he attended the 
meeting in Geneva to translate (“...it was so amazingly painful. It was terrible!”), he resigned 
from his job with the Council afterwards.157 
On 27 February 1986, Russell Means held a special meeting with most of the 
AIM/IITC leadership in Oglala, South Dakota. Bill Means “delivered a scathing 
denunciation” of his brother and anyone else who opposed the Sandinistas. Those present 
eventually agreed not to criticize each other in the media, yet Vernon Bellecourt, absent from 
the meeting, held a press conference in Denver to denounce Hank Adams, Russell Means and 
others critical of the Sandinistas as “CIA agents and contras.”158 In September, Glenn Morris 
and Ward Churchill (two of Russell Means' most prominent supporters) were formally 
expelled from AIM and the IITC, though they continued to maintain their own independent 
Colorado AIM chapter. Bellecourt and Means continued to denounce each other publicly 
throughout the late 1980s and early1990s. Means himself briefly became involved with Sun 
Myung Moon's conservative and “rabidly pro-Contra” Unification Church, who sponsored a 
speaking tour so that he could share his experiences in Nicaragua. He became associated for 
a time with the American Libertarian party.159 On the contrary, Vernon Bellecourt maintained 
friendly relations with international leaders such as Daniel Ortega, Muammar Gaddafi and 
156 Rodrigo Contreras, personal interview, 3 June 2010, and personal correspondence, 22 February 2914.
157 Ibid.
158 Means, 477. Pōkā Laenui (Hayden Burgess) also asserts that sometime later, he learned that the “CIA had 
secured appointments with Mr. Hank Adams, prior to his travel to Nicaragua, for a meeting after he was to 
return to the U.S.” Pōkā Laenui, personal correspondence, 18 Feb 2011.
159 Means, 477-482.
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Hugo Chavez.160
As for the situation in Nicaragua, the immediate repercussions of the clandestine trip 
are unclear. Reynaldo Reyes, one of the more prominent generals of KISAN Por La Paz, 
argued that the government's aerial attacks near Layasiksa and other villages were “a serious 
violation” of their cease-fire that “endangered the truce.”161 It is unclear if Reyes was critical 
of the trip, but Miskitu lawyer Armando Rojas (formerly of ALPROMISU) was quite direct 
in his disapproval. Speaking in Saskatoon in late March, he told the crowd that the “military 
response only took place because Chartier was heading with rebels to take over a village” 
and any deaths were the responsibility of MISURASATA guerillas and their guests.162
The events did not, however, undermine the peace process with KISAN Por la Paz, 
which continued until more stable truce was achieved. In June 1987, the leaders of 
MISURASATA and KISAN came together in Rus Rus, Honduras to form a new united 
organization known as YATAMA (Yapti Tasba Masraka Nani Aslatakanka – Organization of 
the Children of Mother Earth).163 YATAMA continued to demand a willingness to accept 
Indigenous rights as a precondition for peace but entered into negotiations with the 
Sandinistas in October 1987. Despite intense pressure from the Honduran and American 
governments not to negotiate unilaterally with the Sandinistas, Indigenous leaders continued 
their talks through 1988.164 Meanwhile the government had slowly eased away from its hard-
160 Washington Post, 15 October 2007. New York Times, 17 October 2007
161 Stephen Kinzer, “In Nicaragua Town, the War Intrudes,” New York Times, 8 Feb 1986.
162 Armando Rojas also insisted that the Sandinistas would not have fired unless fired upon, but Chartier's 
audio recordings suggest this was not the case. Gary Taljit, “Chartier blamed for death of Nicaraguan 
Miskito Indian,” Saskatoon Star-Phoenix, 25 March 1986, in Chartier, Witness to Resistance, 218.
163 YATAMA's leadership was made up of Brooklyn Rivera, Wycliff Diego, Steadman Fagoth, and Charley 
Morales, a Mayagna man. Nietschmann, The Unknown War, 40.
164 Chartier attended these talks, independent of the WCIP, as did James Anaya, Glenn Morris, and 
representatives of the ILRC. Chartier, Witness to Resistance, 271-278. CWIS, Indian Law Resource Centre, 
“Report on the Nicaraguan Indian Peace Initiative: A Search for Indian Rights Within the Arias Peace 
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line position, and tried to come up with a peaceful solution to the conflict. The Sandinistas 
passed Law 28 (a statute giving some degree of political autonomy to the Atlantic Coast 
region, though not explicitly to Indigenous peoples themselves) and amended the 
Constitution to acknowledge the existence of Indigenous peoples and their languages 
(Articles 5, 8, 11 and 121), and to recognize collective forms of land ownership (Article 
89).165 
The Sandinistas were defeated by the National Opposition Union (UNO) in the 1990 
national election, and the new President Violeta Chamorro continued to work with YATAMA, 
negotiating the recognition of communal property. When the UNO approached these 
negotiations conservatively, it was actually the FSLN (as the primary opposition party) that 
helped push through legislation supportive of Indigenous lands. In advance of the 2006 
national election, YATAMA entered into an alliance with the Sandinistas and together they 
managed to secure a victory. The new government passed the Communal Property Regime 
Law (No. 445) which recognized the pre-existing right of Indigenous communities to land 
title and natural resources, and put local territorial government in the hands of community 
leaders.166
6.6 Conclusion
It is difficult to measure precisely the impact of organized Indigenous 
internationalism on Nicaragua, but it seems clear that it had an effect in at least two ways. 
Plan,” 4 April 1988.
165 Sandra Brunneger, “From Conflict to Autonomy in Nicaragua: Lessons Learnt,” Micro Studies (Minority 
Rights Group, 4 April 2007), <http://www.minorityrights.org/969/micro-studies/from-conflict-to-
autonomy-in-nicaragua-lessons-learnt.html>
166 Brunneger, 4. Chartier, Witness to Resistance, 282-3. 
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The participation of ALPROMISU members as founders of the WCIP and attendees of a 
variety of international conferences may well have encouraged the organization to continue 
its political movement beyond strictly economic goals. The warm welcome George Manuel 
received on the Nicaragua's Atlantic Coast as early as 1976 suggests that the Miskitu had 
already begun to see themselves, beyond their local ethnic identity, as part of a larger 
Indigenous “Fourth World.” The mobilization of MISURASATA as a more broadly Pan-
Indigenous organization seems to have taken inspiration from the organizations its leaders 
would have encountered at international Indigenous conferences. MISURASATA's decision 
to expand its claim on lands from standard notions of property and occupancy to a broader 
claim on traditional territory and resource rights resulted from its adoption of concepts of 
Indigenous rights espoused by the WCIP and IITC.167 Similarly, demands for autonomy and 
self-determination were undoubtedly based in the history of local Indigenous peoples, but 
they were expressed through the new discourse of international Indigenous rights as inherent 
and inalienable. The adoption of this discourse, sometimes referencing WCIP documents 
directly, came as a surprise to the FSLN leadership, and their negative reaction appears to 
have resulted in part from an inability (or unwillingness) to understand its logic. Although 
many state governments have had difficulty understanding the assertion of the Indigenous 
right to sovereignty without succession as promoted by the World Council, this is likely the 
most catastrophic example.
Much of the lessons from this episode, however, are related to the Cold War 
environment in which it took place. Setting aside the conflicting actions of the IITC and 
167 Diskin et al, 10.
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WCIP, the writings of academics with personal and academic affinity towards the Miskitu 
people demonstrate the impact of their ideological leanings. Martin Diskin, Roxanne Dunbar-
Ortiz and even Charles Hale espouse sympathy for the Sandinistas; their descriptions 
sometimes downplay grave human rights abuses by the Sandinista troops and they were 
perhaps too often willing to give the Nicaraguan government the benefit of the doubt when it 
apologized for its “mistakes.”168 Bernard Nietschmann, a professor of geography at UC 
Berkeley, studied the Miskitu prior to the revolution, and served as an adviser to Brooklyn 
Rivera throughout his negotiations with the Sandinistas. A proponent of the “Fourth World,” 
Nietschmann became increasingly hostile to the Nicaraguan government and did his best to 
seek US military support for the MISURASATA guerillas. In the early 80s, he was openly 
critical of his own government's hypocrisy, suggesting that the Reagan Administration had 
“no interest in backing—politically or militarily—a movement that seeks self-determination 
and liberation for indigenous peoples.”169 Yet by 1989, his book “The Unknown War” 
attempted to prove that Cuba had geopolitical aspirations in Nicaragua, which would be 
aided by the Sandinista government. He suggested the “Firebreak Nation Theory”: that 
“central state communism and indigenous nations are fundamentally incompatible” and 
therefore, Indigenous nations formed a “territorial and cultural firebreak to the spread of 
communism... In Latin America, communism has taken hold where there are no indigenous 
nations (Cuba and Grenada), and communism has been confronted and stymied where there 
are indigenous nations (Bolivia and Nicaragua).”170 The Sandinista conflict could represent 
168 For a review of writings on the subject and their political slants, see Phillip A. Dennis, “Review: The 
Miskito-Sandinista Conflict in Nicaragua in the 1980s” Latin American Research Review, 28:3 (1993), 
214-234.
169 Bernard Nietschmann, “Nicaragua Indians' Struggle,” New York Times, 3 Dec 1983.
170 Nietschmann, The Unknown War, 52-53. See also: Pineda, 197-198.
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different things to different people, depending on their ideological leanings, and this proved 
just as true for Indigenous internationalists as anyone else. The ideological divide of the Cold 
War clearly had a greater impact on the Treaty Council than on the World Council. While 
working for the WCIP, Contreras did his best to discourage this kind of rhetoric among 
NGOs, encouraging them to issue statements that were supportive of Indigenous rights and 
peace negotiations (i.e. without hawkishly demonizing the Sandinistas.)171 The IITC, on the 
other hand, was already deeply divided on the issue of Marxism. As early as the 1980, 
Russell Means had grown quite hostile to Marxism, influenced in part by his friend Ward 
Churchill, who was working on his edited volume critiquing the use of Marxism by 
Indigenous activists.172 Other members of the IITC, in contrast, had longstanding connections 
with revolutionary leftist liberation organizations from around the world.
Although there certainly were attempts (by both the Left and the Right) to manipulate 
the international Indigenous movement, it should not be assumed that these efforts were 
successful. Those Indigenous activists who supported the Sandinistas were, for the most part, 
not un-critical of the FSLN's policies on the Atlantic coast. Dunbar-Ortiz insists that 
members of the Left were “all very critical. We felt like we had the right to be. We had 
supported the Sandinistas. They were right here among us in the [San Francisco] Bay Area. 
(...) We knew them personally. It wasn't like a foreign country that... we would be much more 
cautious about criticizing...”173 Similarly, the majority of Indigenous activists like Chartier 
and Means who supported MISURASATA were not unaware (or supportive) of the CIA's 
171 Rodrigo Contreras, personal interview, 3 June 2010.
172 Ward Churchill (ed.), Marxism and Native Americans (Boulder CO: South End Press, 1984). Roxanne 
Dunbar-Ortiz, personal interview, 24 Sept 2010.
173 Roxanne Dunbar-Ortiz, personal interview, 24 Sept 2010.
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ideological reasons for funding the Contras to overthrow the Sandinistas. For the most part, 
they remained critical of American foreign policy in South America, but felt the defence of 
Indigenous peoples should come first, before broader Cold War concerns. Ultimately, both 
the Left and Right of the international Indigenous movement remained determinedly anti-
colonial at their root, but they differed on who to accuse of colonialism; the Left emphasized 
the international imperialism/colonialism of the United States, whereas the right emphasized 
the internal colonialism of the FSLN. Whether either side balanced these interests properly 
may remain in dispute, but they were not oblivious to their conflicted interests—rather, they 
made conscious decisions to act in one way or another despite the conflict.
On the other hand, the Cold War environment may well have increased the political 
influence of Indigenous international organizations. The Sandinistas were—due both to their 
political and economic weakness and to their socialist ideology—quite concerned about their 
image around the world, which left them open-minded to criticism, particularly from the 
Left. The FSLN's ties with the IITC and other international Indigenous activists like Dunbar-
Ortiz may well have discouraged the Nicaraguan government from acting more violently 
towards the Miskitu than they did; it seems likely that these “insiders” may well have helped 
shape the significant policy reversal towards the country's Indigenous peoples in 1984. For 
the Indigenous people of Nicaragua's Atlantic Coast, it may well have benefited their cause to 
have critical international attention (encouraging the Sandinistas to accept Indigenous rights) 
both from the FSLN's supporters and from those, like the US government, who were hostile 
to the revolution.. At the same time, the WCIP filled an important role as a truly non-aligned 
third party. The World Council sought to advocate for Indigenous rights without choosing a 
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side in the Cold War, and this gave the organization international credibility. Chartier agrees 
with Dunbar-Ortiz that the Sandinistas were concerned about their international reputation, 
which made criticism from credible sources like the WCIP that much more powerful. At the 
press conference following the narrow escape from Nicaragua in 1986, journalists 
approached Chartier and “basically said, 'If we were just hearing this from Russell Means 
we'd take it with a grain of salt' but with the information coming from myself and this Hank 
Adams who was also there, gave it credibility so they believed what we were saying.”174 
When word spread that Chartier was accompanying MISURASATA in Nicaragua, the 
government of Nicaragua threatened to request to have the WCIP stripped of its ECOSOC 
status. Ricardo Contreras and others pointed out to the country's ambassador that such action 
would only “further deteriorate [Nicaragua's] image... even requesting that.” They reminded 
him that the World Council was the “only organization willing to talk to you guys” while 
people like Russell Means were “saying they want to put bombs in your shorts.”175 By 
remaining open to discussion with all governments, members of the World Council felt they 
could carve out a niche for themselves where real progress for Indigenous peoples could be 
made. It was that position that they felt was at risk when Chartier joined Russell Means in 
Nicaragua. For the IITC, the ideological polarization that peaked among its members during 
the conflict in Nicaragua proved disastrous, but the Cold War affected the World Council in a 
different way. The WCIP had elected to be politically neutral in an international area which 
precluded neutrality. Just a few years earlier, George Manuel had toured Mexico's southern 
border, visiting Indigenous refugees from the conflict in Guatemala. His trip was not 
174 Clement Chartier, personal interview, personal interview, 23 September 2010.
175 Rodrigo Contreras, personal interview, 3 June 2010.
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officially sanctioned by either government and, in his words, his presence was “barely even 
tolerated.” He publicly described Guatemala as a “brutal military dictatorship” and accused 
the Mexican Immigration Service of “collaborating with the Guatemalan army”, destroying 
refugee encampments and deporting refugees to Guatemala where they faced “certain 
death.”176 Like Clem Chartier, George Manuel believed the suffering he witnessed there was 
evidence that the “struggle of the Indian” is North against South, not “the East against the 
West.”177 Yet the circumstances were different. Manuel's criticism was directed primarily at 
the right-wing regime of Rios Montt, and more importantly, his visit did not connect him 
with the Guatemalan guerrilla groups which might have altered the image of the World 
Council. Chartier did not feel his trip into Nicaragua compromised the organization's political 
neutrality, but the specific politics of the conflict, the paramilitary nature of his hosts, and 
with his decision to act without consultation all made his choice suspect. It was a harsh 
warning that while internationalism might yield positive results for Indigenous peoples, it 
provided new challenges of its own.
176 LAC, WCIPF, Vol. 19.11, George Manuel, “Open Letter to the People of Canada, “3 December 1982.
177 GMD, 28 October 1982.
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Chapter 7 Conclusions
7.1 The Conclusion of the World Council
Following the Seventh WCIP General Assembly in December 1993, the organization 
appeared to have a bright future. In May 1995, CIDA agreed to provide the WCIP with 
$990,000 for the following three years (1995-1998) of program support. The World Council 
organized a large conference in Arequipa, Peru in October 1995 to provide broad input on the 
Draft United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP).1 But the 
organization's finances were not particularly secure. In June 1995, the new WCIP President, 
Conrado Jorge Valiente  (Kolla, founder of Asociación Indígena de la República Argentina2), 
acknowledged that the World Council's financial structure “shows a dependency on CIDA, 
increasing the risk [to] the continuity of...operations.”3 Concerned about the financial 
viability of the organization, he asserted that administrative costs had been reduced.4 The 
Arequipa conference may have helped contribute to a substantial deficit for the World 
Council that year, despite the decrease in administrative costs.5 A routine financial risk 
assessment completed by CIDA in September 1996 described the World Council as being “in 
a relatively stable financial position” despite being “heavily dependent on CIDA funding.”6 
1 Library and Archives Canada (hereafter LAC), World Council of Indigenous Peoples Fonds 9349 
(hereafter WCIPF), Vol. 15:5, International Conference: Human Rights and Indigenous Peoples, Arequipa, 
Peru, 26-29 October 1995.
2 Norwegian Agency for Development Archives (hereafter NORADA), 443.1 Private Organizations Fonds 
(hereafter POF), DUH 1364, 83-3474 Støtte til kulture sentra og lederopplæring, fase I (Support for 
cultural centers and leadership training, phase I), Official Nomination of the Alternant Coordinator as 
Advisor of Indian Cultures at the Centro Cultural General San Martin, n.d.
3 LAC, WCIPF, Vol. 2.8, letter from Valiente to Irja Seurujärvi-Kari (Sami Council), 28 June 1995.
4 Ibid.; LAC, WCIPF, Vol. 15.2, letter from Roger Dumelie (CIDA, INGO Division) to Rodrigo Contreras 
(WCIP), 17 May 1995.
5 LAC, WCIPF, Vol. 15.2, WCIP Financial Statements, 31 March 1996.
6 LAC, WCIPF, Vol. 31.22, Mark Dillon (CIDA Financial Risk Assessment Unit), “WCIP Financial Risk 
Assessment Report (Stage 1),” 25 September 1996. According to Smillie et al, the INGO division was shut 
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Nonetheless, the organization was operating with a deficit of nearly $50,000 and “only had 
minimal reserves... for future operations.”7 Given this concern, the assessment suggested an 
in-depth review of the WCIP.8 In October 1996, CIDA requested an audit of the 
organization.9 In January 1997, the WCIP announced it had lost $10,000 to a Nigerian 
inheritance scam.10 
Early in 1997, CIDA announced it was cutting its funding, and the World Council was 
left in disarray. The previous June, Rodrigo Contreras, the WCIP Secretariat's Executive 
Director, had resigned from his position, asserting that “recent administrative measures” had 
forced him out.11 There was conflict on the Executive Council between President Valiente 
and Vice-President Clément Chartier, who did not trust each other.12 Lacking funds, a stable 
and experienced staff, or a harmonious Executive Council, the organization had little chance 
to survive. Although the WCIP head office in Ottawa was closed in the spring of 1997,13 an 
attempt was made, through the involvement of Wayne Kines (a non-Indigenous journalist and 
former Director of Communications at the United Nations Environment Programme) and 
Elijah Harper, to organize another meeting for the Executive Council in Norway.14 Harper, an 
down in 1995, but there is no indication that this had a serious impact on CIDA's relationship with the 
World Council. Ian Smillie et al, “Partners or Contractors? Official Donor Agencies and the Direct Funding 
Mechanisms: Three Northern Case Studies - CIDA, EU and USAID,” Occasional Papers Series No: 11; 
NGOs and Official Agencies: Partnership or Contracting in Development? Case Studies from Canada, the 
European Union and U.S.A. (Oxford: International NGO Training and Research Centre, February 2009), 
14.
7 Ibid.
8 Ibid.
9 LAC, WCIPF, Vol. 31.22, letter from Peggy Florida (CIDA) to Conrado Valiente (WCIP), 9 October 1996.
10 Lethbridge Herald, 25 January 1997. 
11 LAC, WCIPF, Vol. 5.22, letter from Contreras to WCIP Executive Council members, 28 June 1996.
12 Clement Chartier, personal interview, 23 September 2010; Wayne Kines, personal interview, 28 October 
2013; 
13 NORADA, Utenriksdepartementet, Folder 822.9, letter from Seurujarvi-Kari to Hugette Labelle 
(President, CIDA), 22 May 1997.
14 Wayne Kines, personal interview, 28 October 2013. 
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Anishinini leader who had only recently lost his seat as a Canadian Member of Parliament 
still had solid connections in the governing Liberal Party and it was hoped that his 
involvement could help secure the restoration of CIDA funding.15 The NORAD and CIDA 
agreed to cover the costs of the conference and the delegates' travel to Norway.16 After the 
members of the Executive had their meeting in Norway, they travelled to meet government 
representatives in Sweden, Finland and Denmark. From there, they continued onwards to 
New York to visit representatives at the United Nations headquarters, the United Nations 
Development Programme and UNICEF, and then to the offices of the World Bank in 
Washington.17 Ultimately, however, they were unable to regain the support of CIDA or any 
other organization, and the World Council of Indigenous Peoples ceased to exist.
7.1.1 Regional Imbalances
It seems unlikely, however, that the WCIP could have perished so easily had it 
retained the support of the world's wealthiest and strongest Indigenous organizations. This 
sudden end to the organization in 1997 was partly the result of its over-reliance on funding 
from CIDA leaving it financially vulnerable, but its collapse is better understood as a slow 
demise, the result of the fading interest and involvement of Indigenous groups from the “First 
World” or “Global North.” Despite the establishment of strong regional branches in Central 
and South America (CORPI and CISA, respectively) and the ongoing collaboration between 
Sámi peoples in Northern Europe, neither Australia and Aotearoa nor the United States and 
Canada ever managed to effectively coordinate their participation in the WCIP. Australia's 
15 Wayne Kines, personal interview, 28 October 2013; 
16 Wayne Kines, personal interview, 28 October 2013 and personal correspondence, 11 February 2014; 
NORADA, Utenriksdepartementet, Folder 822.9, letter from Peggy Florida (CIDA) to Roy Eriksson 
(Embassy of Finland) and Alex Winter (Embassy of Norway), 12 June 1997.
17 Wayne Kines, personal correspondence, 11 February 2014.
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participation was limited by the weakness of its national Indigenous organizations. North 
American participation was perhaps limited by the strength of its organizations nationally, 
compared with their power within the WCIP. This imbalance left the World Council weak, 
since these regions failed to become fully integrated into its basic structure. When the Sami 
Council began to lose interest in the WCIP, the World Council's basic purpose of 
international solidarity faltered. At the same time, a new centre of Indigenous 
internationalism was rising at the UN which avoided some of the structural issues that 
challenged the World Council.
7.1.1.1 Australia and Asia
In Chapter 3, we saw that Australia's representative at the Georgetown preparatory 
meeting (Gary Williams) was enthusiastic, but the youngest by far. At the time, the country's 
first nationwide Indigenous organization, the National Aboriginal Consultative Committee 
(NACC), had only recently been established by the government of Prime Minister Gough 
Whitlam.18 Although its members—and the Indigenous people it was intended to represent—
had high hopes for the organization, the NACC was not afforded much in the way of funding 
and was not particularly successful at making its voice heard.19 The organization was re-
organized by the succeeding government of Malcolm Fraser and renamed the National 
Aboriginal Conference (NAC). Ross Moore, a representative for the NAC, attended the 
Second General Assembly (Kiruna, 1977) and, following the organization's formal affiliation 
18 The NACC met for the first time in December 1973. Quentin Beresford, Rob Riley: An Aboriginal 
Leader's Quest for Justice (Canberra: Aboriginal Studies Press, 2006), 122.
19 Beresford, 122-123. The NACC, however, did manage to send a representative, Jim Stanley, to the WCIP 
founding conference in 1975. UBCIC Resource Centre, (hereafter UBCICRC), Ross (Jirra) Moore, A 
Report on the Organization of the 3rd General Assembly W.C.I.P., 27 April - 2 May 1981, Canberra, 
Australia (Canberra: National Aboriginal Conference, 1981), 8.
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with the WCIP in 1979, he organized the Third General Assembly (Canberra, April/May 
1981).20 It seems possible that increased NAC involvement with the World Council may have 
encouraged the Indigenous Australians to adopt a more radical stance, reminiscent of George 
Manuel's “Fourth World” philosophy. At the conference, the NAC presented a position paper 
which “stood in marked contrast to [its] previous ambiguous and moderate statements,” 
insisting that the Makarrata (treaty/agreement) being negotiated with the Australian 
government, “would only be signed if the... government recognised Indigenous 
sovereignty.”21 According to historian Julie Fenley, the NAC believed “that Indigenous 
sovereignty would be recognized in international law in the future,” and insisted that “it 
should negotiate ‘as an international entity’—that is, as a distinct, internationally recognised 
people—or ‘reserve in the makarrata the issue of our international status.’”22 Adam 
Shoemaker notes that the following September, Indigenous leaders who were denied access 
to the Commonwealth Heads of Government meeting in Melbourne “endeavoured to make 
private contact with Third World Commonwealth government officials.”23 In 1982, Ossie 
Cruse, a member of the NAC's Makarrata sub-committee and later a member of the WCIP 
Executive Council, joined Michael Anderson and former Prime Minister Gough Whitlam for 
a tour of Nigeria, Tanzania and Zimbabwe.24 The purposes of the trip were 
20 UBCICRC, Ross (Jirra) Moore, A Report on the Organization of the 3rd General Assembly W.C.I.P., 27 
April - 2 May 1981, Canberra, Australia (Canberra: National Aboriginal Conference, 1981), 9.
21 Julie Fenley, “The National Aboriginal Conference and the Makarrata: Sovereignty and Treaty 
Discussions, 1979–1981” Australian Historical Studies 42:3 (2011), 386-7. For more on the influence of 
the WCIP on Indigenous Australians, see Ravi de Costa, A Higher Authority: Indigenous Transnationalism 
and Australia (Sydney: University of New South Wales Press, 2006), 121-126.
22 Fenley, 387.
23 Adam Shoemaker, Black Words White Page: Aboriginal Literature 1929-1988, 2004 Edition (Canberra: 
Australian National University E Press, 1989), 1-2.
24 Sydney Morning Herald, 24 June 1982. Michael Anderson, “'That Word' Treaty: The Value of Historical 
Insights,” (Sovereign Union of First Nations and Peoples in Australia, 2009) 
<http://nationalunitygovernment.org/content/word-treaty>. Pastor Ossie Cruse is of Gunaikurnai and 
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...to make these former British colonies aware of our negotiations for 
a Treaty; secondly, to learn of their own experiences during the 
process of decolonisation; thirdly, to learn of all social, political and 
economic pitfalls associated with liberation; and fourthly, to win their 
support should we have any trouble from the Australian 
Government...25
The NAC was not only adopting an international view of Indigenous rights, it was also 
connecting its own demands with the decolonization process and with the Third-Worldist 
movement. In March 1984, the WCIP Executive Council passed a resolution authorizing the 
National Aboriginal Conference to raise funds for a South Pacific Regional organization. 
Furthermore, José Carlos Morales promised to participate in meetings with the Australian 
government to develop the regional organization.26
In the fall of 1984, when Minister for Aboriginal Affairs, Clyde Holding, suggested 
that Indigenous people should not become involved in sensitive international issues, NAC 
President Rob Riley responded that, on the contrary, “Indigenous populations have a 
community of interest which transcends their national affiliations.”27 Despite this growing 
radicalism, or perhaps because of it, the NAC collapsed in 1985 in a mess of internal struggle 
and external pressure by the Australian government. As the member elected to represent the 
Pacific Region, Ossie Cruse remained on the WCIP's Executive Council, but since the NAC 
had been formally disbanded, he had no organization behind him and could rarely attend 
Monaro descent, but one of his grandfathers was “an American Indian.” This personal history may also 
have played a part in his interest in Indigenous internationalism. “Looking for Blackfellas' Point,” 
(transcript), Hindsight, ABC Radio National, 13 March 2005. 
<http://www.abc.net.au/radionational/programs/hindsight/looking-for-blackfellas-
point/3440140#transcript>
25 In addition to private meetings with Julius Nyerere and Robert Mugabe, the group met with Indian and 
Saudi officials while they were en route, and capped off the trip with a visit to the World Council of 
Churches and the International Labour Organization in Geneva. Michael Anderson, “'That Word' Treaty.”
26 LAC, WCIPF, Vol. 10.10, Executive Council Meeting Resolutions, 26-30 March 1984
27 Beresford, 200.
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meetings. At an Executive Council meeting in September 1986, however, delegates were 
worried if that their organization's legitimacy might be called into question if there was no 
means for information to “filter down” from the international level to the grassroots 
Indigenous Australians.28 Another group—the National Federation of Land Councils—would 
later join the WCIP but it was surely a loss to the World Council for a committed member 
organization like the NAC, their main point of contact in Australia, to suddenly disappear.29 
The process of integration of the Pacific Region “suffered greatly” as a result of NAC's 
demise.30
At the Fifth WCIP General Assembly (1987), the planned “Pacific Region” was 
formally reorganized as the Pacific and Asia Council of Indigenous Peoples (PACIP) under 
the leadership of Pōkā Laenui of Hawaii. Since Laenui was also elected to the post of Vice-
President, Ossie Cruse continued to hold the post of PACIP representative on the Executive 
Council.31 Pōkā Laenui's continued participation was challenged by the apparent lack of 
commitment from the Executive Council to the Pacific and Asian region. He recalls that no 
funding was provided for eager Asian delegates to attend the 1990 General Assembly, 
whereas funding was provided to delegates from South and Central America.32 In response, 
Laenui boycotted the assembly altogether, submitting instead a strong worded statement 
which insisted that 
28 LAC, WCIPF, Vol. 10.17, Executive Council Meeting of the World Council of Indigenous Peoples (29 
September - 1 October 1986), Draft Minutes, Afternoon Session, 30 September 1986.
29 In fact, John Christopherson of the Northern Land Council was elected the English-language Vice-
President at the Sixth WCIP General Assembly (1990). LAC, WCIPF, Vol. 13.13, WCIP, Report, 
International Conference and VI General Assembly, 1990.
30 LAC, WCIPF, Vol. 10.18, Record of WCIP Executive Council Meeting, 16-18 March 1987.
31 LAC, WCIPF, Vol. 10.20, WCIP Executive Council Meeting Minutes (2-4 September 1987).
32 Pōkā Laenui, personal correspondence, 18 Feb 2011.
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the indigenous world is not limited to North, Central and South 
America, the Saami of Scandinavia, and a few folkloric specimens of 
the Pacific and Asia. The world is covered with indigenous peoples in 
dire need of support. Yet, this General Assembly has been planned as 
if only the indigenous peoples of Central and South America are 
deserving of assistance. The scarcity of indigenous representatives 
from the Pacific and Asia to the General Assembly is not an accident, 
but a direct result of the failure of those regions with the ability to 
assist, to do so.33
Laenui believes that the executive showed little desire “to truly develop the WCIP as a World 
Council. Instead, it would remain an 'international council' of indigenous peoples.”34 
7.1.1.2 North America 
George Manuel was unable to attend the Third WCIP General Assembly (1981) in 
Canberra, owing to his poor health. The election of José Carlos Morales as the new WCIP 
president was not the only change for Canadian Indigenous representation on the Executive 
Council; the conflict between Delbert Riley (Anishinaabe, President of the National Indian 
Brotherhood) and Harry Daniels (Métis, President of the Native Council of Canada) at the 
assembly helped ensure that neither of these organizations secured a seat on the WCIP 
Executive.35 Canadian participation continued, nonetheless through George Manuel's 
specially created role as an official WCIP ambassador, and through Mary Smallface-Marule's 
control of the WCIP Secretariat in Lethbridge. But following the move of the WCIP 
headquarters to Ottawa early in 1984, Marie Smallface-Marule had virtually nothing to do 
33 Pōkā Laenui, “Final Report of Poka Laenui (Hayden F. Burgess), Vice President 1987-1990 to VI General 
Assembly, Tromsø, Norway,” 2 August 1990, as quoted in Deirdre Cynthia Duquette, “The World Council 
of Indigenous Peoples: The Study of an International Indigenous Organization” (MA Thesis, University of 
Victoria, 1993), 75.
34 Pōkā Laenui, personal correspondence, 18 Feb 2011.
35 Brad Teeter, “Canadian Indian Leader Antics in Australia Embarrassing,” Lethbridge Herald reprinted in 
Kainai News (1 May 1981).
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with the organization.36 Moreover, the lack of a formal regional body to coordinate North 
American Indigenous organizations decreased the effectiveness of participation, relative to 
the Central and South American regions with strong branch organizations (CORPI and CISA, 
respectively).
At the 1982 World Assembly of First Nations, a large event organized by Sol 
Sanderson in cooperation with the WCIP, guests drafted a proposed charter for a North 
American Regional Council, but little action followed.37 In 1983, it was a CORPI 
representative, Floriberto Diaz Gomez, who voiced concerns about the lack of cooperation in 
the North American region: “We... feel that in North America, it is more difficult to get... 
unity.. It was in Canada where the idea of forming the WCIP started, but we see up to now... 
North America [has not] formed its own regional council, and this is something very 
important to us.”38 Because Mexico was officially represented by CORPI, the Central 
American Regional Council, the WCIP's North American region consisted of just two 
countries. Nevertheless, the creation of a regional organization did not come easily. 
36 The only exception was her role in organizing the Second International Indigenous Women's Conference 
(August 5 - 9, 1990) which received some assistance from the World Council and overlapped to some 
degree with the WCIP General Assembly in Tromsø. Very little has been written about this conference. The 
Chair was Maret Sara of the Sami Women's Association, but the committee included Priscilla Settee, 
Winona La Duke, Dorothy Davey and Victoria Tauli Corpuz. LAC, WCIPF, Vol. 11.22. The previous (first) 
conference was took place in Adelaide, Australia in July 1989. See Joanne Willmot (ed.), Finding Common 
Ground: First Indigenous Women's Conference, 7-18 July 1989, Conference Report (Adelaide, n.p., 1989). 
<http://www.samemory.sa.gov.au/webdata/resources/files/zpamb11771665ocr.pdf>
37 LAC, WCIPF, Vol. 29.21, WCIP Newsletter (December 1982). Sol Sanderson (Chakastaypasin 
Anishinabe) was Chief of the Federation of Saskatchewan Indian Nations from 1979 to 1986.
38 LAC, WCIPF, Vol. 9.27, WCIP Executive Council Meeting Minutes, 11-16 August 1983. Floriberto Diaz 
Gomez is a Ayüükjä'äy (Mixe) Anthropologist who helped found the Committee for the Defence and 
Development of the Mixe Natural, Human and Cultural Resources (CODREMI) in 1979. LAC, WCIPF, 
Vol. 18.9, Floriberto Diaz Gomez, Presentation at World Assembly of First Nations, “International Politics 
and Law,” July 1982.
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Sol Sanderson, leader of the Federation of Saskatchewan Indians (FSIN), replied to 
Gomez that he was also concerned about the lack of the regional organization. According to 
Sanderson, the Canadian Assembly of First Nations' David Ahenakew had delegated the 
responsibility for its establishment to him and Dave Monture.39 Among the challenges to 
coordination, Monture asserted that “the leaders are so busy that they do not even have time 
to meet...to cross the border and to shake hands.”40 Ahenakew himself would later 
acknowledge that a regional organization was “long overdue” and that the AFN shared 
“responsibility for not directing more time and effort to organizing a strong Regional 
Council.”41
Participation from Canada was likely encouraged by the election of the Métis 
National Council's Clément Chartier as president of the WCIP at the Fourth General 
Assembly (September 1984). Another draft charter for a North American Regional Council 
of Indigenous Peoples from the same month proposes an organization representing the 
Assembly of First Nations (AFN), the Métis National Council (MNC), the Native Council of 
Canada (NCC), and the National Congress of American Indians (NCAI).42 Each member 
would receive one vote within the organization (giving Canadian organizations a much 
39 LAC, WCIPF, Vol. 9.27, WCIP Executive Council Meeting Minutes, 11-16 August 1983. Dave Monture 
(Six Nations of the Grand River) had worked as a private contractor for both the WCIP and the National 
Indian Brotherhood under the leadership of George Manuel. The National Indian Brotherhood renamed 
itself the Assembly of First Nations in 1982 under the leadership of David Ahenakew (Nēhiyaw).
40 Ibid.
41 LAC, WCIPF, Vol. 4.16, David Ahenakew (AFN, National Chief) to WCIP Executive Council Meetings, 
15-18 April 1985.
42 LAC, WCIPF, Vol. 4.14, Draft, Charter, North American Regional Council of Indigenous Peoples, 
September 1984. The LAC fonds contain at least three drafts for such an organization, but this is the only 
one that is dated. The Assembly of First Nations represents is open to membership by all elected chiefs of 
First Nations bands recognized by the Canadian government, and so it exclusively represents “Status 
Indians,” those Indigenous people subject to Canada's Indian Act. The Native Council of Canada (and its 
successor, the Congress of Aboriginal Peoples), claims to represent First Nations people who do not have 
status (possible for a variety of reasons), and “Status Indians” living off reserve and are therefore may be 
poorly represented by elected band chiefs living on reserve.
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greater share of the power) but the organization would have two chairpersons, one Canadian 
and one American.43 At a planning meeting in July 1985, however, delegates representing six 
organizations were highly critical of this draft regional charter and of the WCIP charter.44 
Instead they agreed on a draft “Protocol for Organizing the North American Region” in 
which they expressed solidarity for one another and agreed to convene meetings as 
required.45 An addendum to the protocol, established a Technical Working Group to facilitate 
the exchange of information among the signatories.46 It is unclear what action the Technical 
Working Group ever took. 
Representatives of the Canadian organizations participated in several WCIP 
Executive Council meetings during 1986, and in May 1987, the WCIP newsletter announced 
the establishment of a North American Regional Council (NARC) by the Assembly of First 
Nations, the Native Council of Canada and the Métis National Council.47 The NCC's Louis 
“Smokey” Bruyère was elected the first chairperson, joined on NARC's executive committee 
by Georges Erasmus (AFN) and Sam Sinclair (MNC).48 The notable absence of the National 
43 Likely in preparation for this structure, George Manuel successfully passed a resolution to adapt the World 
Council's charter to allow for two regional representatives from North America (one from each country) at 
a WCIP Executive Council meeting in December 1983. LAC, WCIPF, Vol. 10.6, WCIP Executive Council 
Meeting Resolutions, 9-13 December 1983.
44 LAC, WCIPF, Vol. 4.14, North American Regional Council Meeting Minutes, 9 July 1985. Representatives 
of the AFN, NCC, NCAI, FSIN, the Union of B.C. Indian Chiefs (UBCIC) and the Prairie Treaty Nations 
Alliance (PTNA) were all in attendance, along with Chief Mike Leach of the Lillooet Nation. A 
representative of the Métis National Council were unable to attend. The Prairie Treaty Alliance was 
formed, as its name suggests, by Indigenous nations from the Canadian prairies who held treaties with the 
Crown, largely in protest against the structure of the National Indian Brotherhood/AFN and its interaction 
with Canadian First Ministers Conferences organized following the 1982 Constitution Act.
45 LAC, WCIPF, Vol. 4.14, Protocol for Organizing the North American Region, 20 July 1985. Only the AFN, 
BCC, PTNA and the NCAI agreed to this protocol.
46 Ibid. The membership of the Technical Working Group included Rudy Ryser (NCAI), Dave Monture 
(AFN), Marc Leclair (MNC), Anita Gordon Murdoch (PTNA), and Robert Groves (NCC).
47 LAC, WCIPF, Vol. 29.22, WCIP Newsletter (May 1987). The Newsletter actually refers to the organization 
as the North American Regional Chapter but all further references describe it as a “Council.”
48 Ibid.
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Congress of American Indians from the organization was addressed at the Executive 
Committee meeting of the WCIP in July. The delegates adopted a motion accepting the 
structuring of NARC with only three members because “the National Council of American 
Indians...has not been at all active in the work of the WCIP over these last three years and... 
has not been in communication with the WCIP although many attempts have been made to 
maintain such communication.”49 During their time in control of the NCAI, President Joe 
DeLaCruz (1981-1984) and Vice-President Ralph Eluska (1981-1983) had shown 
considerable interest in the World Council and served as American representative at 
Executive Council meetings.50 DeLaCruz's successor, Reuben Snake, appears to have shown 
little interest in the WCIP. Perhaps his past-involvement with the American Indian Movement 
encouraged him to be skeptical of the WCIP.51 Snake's only notable appearance in the WCIP 
fonds is a letter expressing support for Chartier's actions in Nicaragua (based on a report that 
Hank Adams delivered to the NCAI) and expressing regret that he could not attend the 
emergency session of the WCIP Executive Council meetings in Geneva.52 It is possible the 
World Council's handling of that situation disappointed him to the point that he rejected the 
49 LAC, WCIPF, Vol. 10.19, WCIP Executive Council Meeting Minutes, 10 July 1987. The minutes of a prior 
Executive Council meeting also note the NCAI's “limited communication and apparent disinterest... to 
relate to the WCIP.” LAC, WCIPF, Vol. 10.18, Record of WCIP Executive Council Meeting, 16-18 March 
1987.
50 DeLaCruz's Quinault origins in the Pacific Northwest may have given him added sense of connection with 
George Manuel, who spent much of his adult life in Vancouver. DeLaCruz was also a board member of the 
American Indian Law Center (1977) alongside WCIP Secretary-General Sam Deloria. Philip S. Deloria, 
“The American Indian Law Center: An Informal History,” New Mexico Law Review 24:2 (Spring 1994), 
297-299. For more on DeLaCruz, see his obituary, Seattle Times, 18 April 2000. Tundra Times, 19 October 
198.
51 Reuben Snake (Ho-Chunk) had been elected Was Vice-Chairman at AIM's first national meeting in 1970. 
Doland L. Fixico, Indian Resilience and Rebuilding: Indigenous Nations in the Modern American West 
(Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 2013), 140. For more on Snake, see his biography: Reuben Snake 
and Jay C. Fikes. Reuben Snake, Your Humble Serpent: Indian Visionary and Activist (Santa Fe, N.M.: 
Clear Light Publishers, 1996). 
52 LAC, WCIPF, Vol. 5.5, letter Reuben Snake (NCAI, President) to Clem Chartier (WCIP), 12 February 
1986.
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organization altogether. The WCIP made at least one attempt to renew relations with the 
NCAI in May 1989, once Snake had left office, but it appears to have been unsuccessful.53 
Pōkā Laenui, who served two terms as WCIP Vice-President, was perhaps technically an 
American citizen, but it was an identity he categorically rejected.54 As such, there was no 
elected Executive Council member representing the NCAI after 1984.
World Council documents provide no clear evidence as to why the NCAI stopped 
participating. It seems understandable that involvement in the North American Regional 
Council—where their organization would have been greatly outnumbered by multiple 
Canadian organizations—might not have been appealing. Moreover, the organizational 
structure of the World Council provided Indigenous groups from Latin American countries an 
overwhelming majority of votes, which must have felt problematic to many delegates from 
outside that area. As a delegate from Australia warned at the Sixth General Assembly, “[a]t 
present the representation of delegates is 54 to central and South America and 24 delegates 
for the rest of the world. This imbalance has to be addressed if we are to further participate in 
this forum.”55 Even for Canadian Indigenous organizations, it seems participation in the 
53 LAC, WCIPF, Vol. 5.5, letter from Carlos Johnson (WCIP) to Gail E. Chehak (NCAI), 25 May 1989.
54 Following a controversial trial in 1977 in which Laenui, a lawyer, asserted that the U.S. occupation of 
Hawaii was illegal, he declared before a Federal District Court that he was not a U.S. citizen. Poke Laenui, 
personal interview. Laenui's position points out the flexibility of the World Council, in that, unlike many 
other Indigenous peoples, he did seek complete independence for Hawaii (though expressly on the basis of 
territory, not ethnicity.) Indigenous Hawaiians were also not subject to “internal colonization” like most 
other Indigenous peoples. Hawaii was quite obviously “geographically separate... from the country 
administering it,” the requirement for inclusion as a colony according to the “UN General Assembly 
Resolution Defining the Three Options for Self-determination General Assembly Resolution 1541,” 
A/RES/1541(XV). For more on Laenui's historical argument, see Bradford W. Morse and Kazi A. Hamid, 
“American Annexation of Hawaii: An Example of the Unequal Treaty Doctrine,” Connecticut Journal of 
International Law, 5 (1989-1990), which relies extensively on the writing of Pōkā Laenui (refered to in the 
article by his English name, Hayden Burgess).
55 LAC, WCIPF, Vol. 13.12, John Cristopherson [sic] (Northern Land Council), “Regional Report: Australia,” 
WCIP Sixth General Assembly, 8-12 August 1990.
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World Council became more struggle than it was worth. The Assembly of First Nations 
continued to send delegates to WCIP Executive Council meetings into the early 1990s, but 
then their participation appears to taper off.56 Executive Council meetings in January 1991 
and June 1992 included multiple representatives from Canadian's national Indigenous 
organizations, but meetings in September 1993 and October 1995 each included only a single 
representative of the Native Council of Canada (in the latter case, its successor organization, 
the Congress of Aboriginal Peoples). A letter from the AFN in April 1992 raised non-specific 
administrative concerns about the WCIP without much detail and threatened to withdraw 
from the World Council altogether.57 According to Contreras, North Americans “lost interest 
because the Council was not really necessary for them. They were doing very well on their 
own....They really didn't need the Council.”58 While the North American and Pacific regions 
had never formed solid umbrella organizations, this was not true of the Nordic region. Sámi 
political organizations had formed a regional body, the Nordic Sami Council, in 1956. Their 
participation in the World Council had, therefore, always been a coordinated effort, but their 
willingness to support the organization was also fading.
7.1.1.3 Sami Council
The Sixth WCIP General Assembly in 1990 was a turning point for Sámi involvement 
in the World Council. A number of conflicts within the Sámi community came to a head at 
that meeting in Tromsø. One division was between two prominent delegates. Leif Halonen, a 
56 LAC, WCIPF, Vol. 11.7, WCIP Executive Council Meeting Report, 23-27 January 1991; LAC, WCIPF, 
Vol.11.9, Lista de Participantes A La Reunion Ejecutiva Del CMPI, 1-2 June 1992; LAC, WCIPF, Vol. 
11.13, WCIP Executive Council Meeting Minutes, 9-12 September 1993; LAC, WCIPF, Vol. 12.2, WCIP 
Executive Council Meeting Minutes, 30 October - 1 November 1995.
57 LAC, WCIPF, Vol. 4.22, letter from Ovide Mercredi (AFN, National Chief) to Donald Rojas (WCIP, 
President), 16 April 1992.
58 Rodrigo Contreras, personal interview, 3 June 2010.
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long-time member of the Nordic Sami Council, disagreed with Aslak Nils Sara (who had 
long represented the NSC on the WCIP Executive) over the leadership and direction of the 
World Council.59 Halonen was distrustful of the motives of most WCIP presidents after 
George Manuel, suspicious that personal status or even financial corruption had become 
dominant motivations for candidates.60 In March 1987, he apparently made critical comments 
to a Costa Rican Indigenous newspaper about the presidency of Donald Rojas.61 Later that 
year, there were rumours circulating that the Nordic Sami Council might quit the WCIP 
altogether.62 Halonen was similarly concerned about corruption within the development work 
the WCIP was doing in Central and South America. He wanted to get elected as WCIP 
President and either sort the organization out, or shut it down.63 There was also disagreement 
about the direction of the NSC, particularly its commitment to the WCIP. Halonen had 
encouraged the NSC to seek its own NGO credentials at the United Nations Economic and 
Social Council (ECOSOC) as other Indigenous groups had, whereas Sara believed it should 
continue to work through the World Council.64 Halonen felt ECOSOC status would help the 
NSC assert its influence directly, whereas Sara apparently felt like such a move would 
amount to a betrayal of the WCIP.65 Halonen's side won out, and the NSC attained ECOSOC 
59 Ole Henrik Magga, personal interview, 5 April 2013.
60 Leif Halonen, personal interview, 5 April 2013.
61 LAC, WCIPF, Vol. 3.06, Voz del Indio: Organio Oficial de Los Pueblos Indios de Costa Rica, No. 10 (Feb-
Mar 1987)
62 At an Executive Council meeting in Ottawa, Lars Anders Baer made it clear that the rumours were not true. 
LAC, WCIPF, Vol. 10.20, WCIP Executive Council Meeting Minutes, 2-4 September 1987.
63 Leif Halonen, personal interview, 5 April 2013.
64 Doug Sanders noted that, despite the nine Indigenous NGOs invited to participate at the United Nations 
Seminar on the Effects of Racism and Racial Discrimination on the Social and Economic Relations 
Between Indigenous Peoples and States (Geneva, 16-20 January 1989), the Sámi were effectively 
unrepresented. This may help account for the NSC's decision to seek its own NGO status. LAC, WCIPF, 
Vol. 1.16, Douglas Sanders, “Another Step: The UN Seminar on Relations Between Indigenous Peoples 
and States,” 20 February 1989.
65 Leif Halonen, personal interview, 5 April 2013. CISA attained its own ECOSOC Roster status in 1983. 
LAC, WCIPF, Vol. 9.27, WCIP Executive Council Meeting Minutes, 11-16 August 1983.
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roster status in 1989.66 Because Sara represented the NSC internationally but was not actually 
a member, he may have had less pull in that organization, but his long term involvement with 
the World Council seems to have made him more popular with its members. Another member 
of the NSC, Lars Anders Baer, had run for WCIP President at the Fifth General Assembly 
(1987) in Lima, Peru, but lost to Donald Rojas (Boruca from Costa Rica). At the General 
Assembly in Tromsø, Halonen announced his candidacy despite his rift with Sara.
The other internal Sámi conflict that became apparent in Tromsø was more general 
but no less hostile. The divisions between more conservative and more radical factions that 
developed during the Alta affair lingered on, and the latter groups were sharply critical of the 
Norwegian Sami Association (Norgga Sámiid Riikasearvi – NSR) and its relationship with 
the Norwegian government. As Ole Henrik Magga recalls, a government minister was asked 
a question about the level of Sámi representation within the WCIP and whether that would 
make a difference for Norway's financial support. When the minister answered in the 
affirmative, critics accused both the NSR and the Norwegian government of trying to buy 
votes from “poor Indians from South America” for Sámi representation on the WCIP 
Executive Council, or rather, threatening to withdraw funding if Sámi delegates were not 
elected.67 Magga does not believe that was the case, but acknowledges that Sámi involvement 
would logically have influenced Nordic support for the World Council.68 This is undoubtedly 
true. As mentioned in Chapter Four, the Nordic Council senior officials that met in 1979 had 
66 Kristina Maud Bergeron, “Global Activism and Changing Identities: Interconnecting the Global and the 
Local—the Grand Council of the Crees and the Saami Council,” in Indigenous Peoples and Autonomy: 
Insights for a Global Age, eds., Mario Blaser, Ravi de Costa, Deborah McGregor, and William D. Coleman 
(Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 2010), 115.
67 Ole Henrik Magga, personal interview, 5 April 2013.
68 Ibid.
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agreed to support the WCIP largely because it was the international organization to which 
Sámi groups had connected themselves.69 If Sámi participation weakened, so would the 
Nordic commitment to provide funding. Magga recalls that the hostilities created a 
particularly bad climate at the assembly, and afterwards, “work from the Sámi side was not 
so enthusiastic anymore.”70 He confesses that after the embarrassing conflict of the General 
Assembly and following his election as the first president of the newly created Sámediggi 
(the Sami Parliament of Norway), he no longer had “the energy to follow the World 
Council.”71 He did not realize how weak the WCIP was until after it had collapsed. Halonen 
lost the election, despite the promised support of Australian delegates. Aslak Nils Sara 
continued to represent the Nordic Sami Council—which became simply the Sami Council 
(Sámiráđđi) after the inclusion of Russian organizations in the early 1990s—and did not give 
up his commitment to the WCIP. In a report to the 1992 international Sami Conference in 
Helsinki, he lists the many successes of the WCIP and offers what sounds like a desperate 
plea for continued Sámi involvement in the World Council: “a coordinated action is 
imperative as opposed to independent personalized criterias [sic] which only end up 
confusing the process... Other Indigenous peoples need Saami solidarity!”72 After his 
retirement from the World Council that year, Irja Seurujärvi-Kari took over as the Sami 
Council representative. According to Leif Halonen, she continued Sara's determined support 
69 Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs Archives (hereafter NFAA), 26.8/54 Beskyttelse av innfodte 
folkeslag (Protection of indigenous peoples) fonds (hereafter BIF), Binder 6, Minutes of Nordic Council 
Senior Officials Meeting for the Promotion of Indigenous Peoples' Interests, Oslo, 6 December 1979.
70 Ole Henrik Magga, personal interview, 5 April 2013.
71 Ibid.
72 LAC, WCIPF, Vol. 3.10, Aslak Nils Sara, Report to Saami Conference, June 1992.
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for the WCIP, but her enthusiasm does not seem to have been shared by all members of the 
Sami Council.73
7.1.2 United Nations
As North American and Sámi organizations lost interest in the World Council, the 
organization became increasingly associated with just the Central and South American 
regions, and its international presence waned. At the Seventh General Assembly (Guatemala 
City, December 1993), the WCIP greatly expanded its number of regional branches to 
include the Andes, the Amazon, the Southern Cone, Central America, Mexico, the Caribbean, 
Sápmi, North America, Australia, and Aotearoa.74 Even if a North American branch 
organization had grown into a solid body like the Sami Council, this new structure would 
have effectively strengthened the power of Central and South American delegates over the 
World Council. In 1994, Douglas Sanders, a law professor associated with the World Council 
in its early days, asserted that in the 1990s, the WCIP's “activity has been confined largely to 
Central America and parts of South America. It has not been very active at the [United 
Nations] Working Group in recent years.”75 Although the WCIP had long been focused 
primarily on the Central and South American regions, partly explained by the “chronic abuse 
of human rights” suffered by Indigenous peoples there, the collapse of participation from the 
wealthiest and, arguably, strongest member organizations did not bode well for the World 
Council.76 Rodrigo Contreras, the staff member who was employed by the World Council for 
73 Leif Halonen, personal interview, 5 April 2013.
74 Duquette, 78. LAC, WCIPF, Vol. 2.8, letter from Contreras to Seurujarvi-Kari, 2 February 1994.
75 Douglas Sanders, “Developing a Modern International Law on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples: Report 
for the Canadian Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples.” (Unpublished Manuscript), 22 December 
1994.
76 Rodrigo Contreras, personal interview, 3 June 2010.
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the greatest span of time, describes this faltering involvement from North America, the 
Pacific and Sápmi as “the real demise” of the WCIP.77
There is, however, a slightly more optimistic explanation for the decreasing level of 
interest in the WCIP from Indigenous peoples and organizations: the creation of the United 
Nations Working Group on Indigenous Populations (UN-WGIP). The apparent drift away 
from the World Council might be seen instead as a drift toward the UN-WGIP, created by the 
UN Economic and Social Council in 1982 under the supervision of the Sub-Commission on 
Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities. The UN-WGIP's five members 
(each a member of the Sub-Commission, each representing one region of the world) were 
expected to meet for as much as five days prior to the Sub-Commissions sessions to examine 
issues related to Indigenous peoples and help bring about new standards for Indigenous 
rights.78 In the Working Group's initial sessions, Indigenous peoples' access was limited to 
those few Indigenous international organizations with ECOSOC consultative status (like the 
WCIP), a standard requirement for all UN organizations and bodies. As groups both with and 
without consultative status found this rule restrictive, a motion was passed by UN-WGIP 
members to allow far broader participation from Indigenous peoples and organizations.79 The 
growth of participation was enormous, from just a handful to nearly 1,000 representatives 
attending the UN-WGIP meetings.80 This expansion was greatly aided by the establishment 
77 Ibid.
78 Augusto Willemsen-Díaz, “How Indigenous Peoples’ Rights Reached the UN,” in Making the Declaration 
Work: The United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, eds. Claire Charters and 
Rodolfo Stavenhagen (Copenhagen : IWGIA, 2009), 26.
79 Willemsen-Díaz, 26-27; Asbjørn Eide, “The Indigenous Peoples, the Working Group on Indigenous 
Populations and the Adoption of the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples,” in Making the 
Declaration Work, 34.
80 Willemsen-Díaz, 28.
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of a special voluntary fund created by the United Nations General Assembly in 1985. 
Contributions to the fund from various national governments made it possible for hundreds 
of Indigenous peoples without other sources of income to attend the annual sessions of the 
Working Group.81
The WCIP itself was very supportive of the UN-WGIP. The World Council sought 
financial support from the UN Voluntary Fund for individuals otherwise unable to afford the 
costs of attending the Working Group.82 Leif Dunfjeld of the WCIP's Geneva Office helped 
run training sessions for Indigenous delegates to prepare them in advance of the Working 
Group sessions.83 In 1986, when the United Nations' financial problems required the 
cancellation of the meeting of the Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and 
Protection of Minorities (and the Working Group along with it), the World Council co-
sponsored an alternative workshop for Indigenous peoples (and the official members of the 
Working Group) so that the important discussions could continue.84
The slow “defection” of Indigenous peoples toward the Working Group is only 
logical. The meetings were more regular and supported by the substantial resources of the 
UN, and even the costs of attendance were relatively secure. Without the funding 
requirements from CIDA or other state-backed development agencies, the participants were 
free to focus on political topics rather than economic development issues. The involvement 
of the United Nations created, at least in theory, greater potential to draft real international 
81 Ibid., 29.
82 Duquette, 100.
83 LAC, WCIPF, Vol. 10.13, Hayden F. Burgess (Pōkā Laenui), “Report on the United Nations Working 
Group on Indigenous Populations,” 1985.
84 LAC, WCIPF, Vol. 7.3, “Quadrennial Report of the WCIP to ECOSOC, 1984-1987”; NFAA, BIF, Binder 
20, Leif Dunfjeld, “Rapport til Nordisk Sameråd Fra World Council of Indigenous Peoples Liasonkontor i 
Genev,” 24 July 1986.
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law rather than simply make pronouncements like an NGO. Moreover, because of the 
openness to participation, Indigenous peoples did not need to join national or regional 
organizations in order to participate; they could represent themselves directly. Asian and even 
African peoples attended the meetings in far greater numbers than had ever attended the 
World Council's General Assemblies. The creation of the UN Permanent Forum on 
Indigenous Issues (UNPFII, 2000-Present), and the UN Expert Mechanism on the Rights of 
Indigenous Peoples (EMRIP, 2007-Present) has further encouraged direct participation by 
Indigenous peoples at the United Nations. Both the Assembly of First Nations and the 
National Congress of American Indians have attained Special Consultative Status to allow 
them greater access to UN bodies. Two of the eight Indigenous experts appointed to the first 
session of the UNPFII had previously represented their regions on the World Council.85
A transition from the World Council to various UN bodies suggests the failure of 
George Manuel's dream for the WCIP to gain the special “permanent non-member observer” 
status of the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) or the Vatican, but such an aspiration 
was hardly realistic. Unlike the International Indian Treaty Council, the WCIP was never 
intended to represent a single people the way the PLO does. The Vatican represents a single 
global spiritual community and holds sovereignty over the Vatican City, whereas the WCIP 
represented a diverse category of peoples and claimed no sovereignty at all. Structurally, the 
WCIP had more in common with the United Nations itself than it did with any UN member. 
85 These included the first chair of the UNPFII Ole Henrik Magga (Sami Council) and Fortunato Turpo 
(Comisión Jurídica de Los Pueblos de Integración Tahuantinsuyana – COJPITA). Magga was regularly 
involved with the WCIP, whereas Turpo joined the Executive Council in 1994. LAC, WCIPF, Vol. 2.10, 
WCIP Executive Council Personal Information Sheet on Fortunato Turpo, 6 December 1994. James Anaya, 
Indigenous Peoples in International Law, Second Edition (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), 
236n14. 
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Sam Deloria attended the CORPI founding meeting in January 1977, but soon became 
dispirited with the WCIP and did not “see much hope for a truly representative organization 
coming out of it... ”86 Deloria “saw what it would take to do what we aspired to do and 
realized that it was not going to happen.”87 
If, however, the primary goal of the WCIP was to publicly challenge the concept of 
absolute sovereignty for nation states vis-a-vis the rights of Indigenous people to self-
determination, then it did achieve at least some success, partly through its support for UN 
bodies. The UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples may not be enforceable, but 
its endorsement by states around the world does indicate recognition of specific rights of 
Indigenous peoples, including the right to self-determination. Despite his early 
disappointment, Deloria is willing to give the World Council credit for its contribution to 
some positive changes within international forums. He believes that, “by goading the 
international community and the Treaty Council to get moving” and “showing that 
Indigenous peoples were not lacking in organizational skills,” the WCIP “started something 
that other people finished.”88 In a similar vein, Pōkā Laenui believes that the WCIP “was 
probably the most significant voice in the early development of the [UNDRIP]” not only 
because of the World Council's participation in the sessions of the UN Working Group on 
Indigenous Populations, “but also because of the influence that we had at the ILO in bringing 
forward the ILO Convention 169, which pushed the UN in the right direction.”89 The World 
Council cannot be credited alone with the creation of the UN Working Group on Indigenous 
86 Sam Deloria, personal interview, 23 March 2012.
87 Ibid.
88 Sam Deloria, personal interview, 23 March 2012, and personal correspondence, 29 January 2013.
89 Pōkā Laenui, personal correspondence, 18 Feb 2011.
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Populations, much less the completed UNDRIP, but it advanced the development of both 
though its direct participation, and perhaps more importantly, as a source of motivation. The 
WCIP provided evidence that Indigenous peoples had the will and the ability to participate at 
the international level, and it encouraged Indigenous peoples to actively demand the 
continuation of the process of decolonization through the recognition of their right to self 
determination.
7.2 Conclusion
7.2.1 Globalization
The question of whether Indigenous internationalism and the World Council of 
Indigenous Peoples are emblematic of the process of globalization naturally depends on the 
definition of globalization in use. Returning to Jan Aarte Scholte's summary of definitions 
from the introduction, Indigenous internationalism clearly fits within some and not others.90 
Undoubtedly, the WCIP was an international organization, encouraging local and national 
Indigenous organizations to cross state borders and connect with others. This was true both 
for the members themselves (attending General Assemblies and establishing regional 
organizations) and for non-members like Niillas Somby or participants in Indigenous cultural 
exchanges. Indigenous internationalism has little to do with “globalization as liberalization” 
except as a hostile reaction to the actions of multinational corporations within Indigenous 
territories.91 
90 Jan Aart Scholte, Globalization: A Critical Introduction, First Edition (Basingstoke: Mac Millan Press, 
2000), 54-64.
91 For example, see Center for World Indigenous Studies, Chief George Manuel Library and Fourth World 
Documentation Project (hereafter CWIS), WCIP, “Transnational Corporations and their Effect on the 
Resources and Lands of Indigenous Peoples,” September 1981.
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The issue of “universalization” or homogenization is a more difficult one to address. 
Organizations like the WCIP fought for the rights of Indigenous peoples to preserve their 
distinct languages and cultures, and to reject efforts at forced assimilation by the state. At the 
same time, Indigenous internationalism does run the risk of ignoring substantial social and 
historical differences between different peoples and overemphasizing their similarities under 
the category of Indigenous peoples. Chadwick Allen points out that the WCIP's “narrative 
tactics,” including the construction of the “Indigenous People” identity might be considered 
part of Gayatri Spivak's conception of “strategic essentialism,” a temporary tactic used to 
fight oppression.92 Allen further notes Frantz Fanon’s suggestion that “that the construction of 
essentialist forms of ‘native’ identity is a legitimate, indeed necessary stage in the emergence 
from the process of ‘assimilation’ imposed by colonial regimes to a fully decolonized 
national culture.”93 Yet, while the WCIP and its members certainly did use this tactic on 
occasion—emphasizing the overlap in Indigenous spiritualities or their relationship with 
nature—the organization's primary definition was always strictly political. It is hard to 
imagine how an organization which derived its policy from large general assemblies of 
Indigenous peoples from all over the world could have achieved a uniform definition of 
Indigenous peoples based on cultural or social characteristics. Even within one country, the 
variety of communities, cultures, and lifestyles is frequently too great to find a definition of 
Indigeneity that pleases everyone.94 The primary aims of the WCIP, accordingly, were to 
92 Chadwick Allen, Blood Narrative: Indigenous Identity in American Indian and Maori Literary and Activist  
Texts (Durham: Duke University Press, 2002), 198.
93 Bart Moore-Gilbert, as quoted in Chadwick Allen, 198. Moore-Gilbert further quotes Chinua Achebe, who 
insists anti-colonial ideas like négritude, “African personality,” and “the African way to socialism” are 
“props we have fashioned at different times to help us get on our feet again.” Bart Moore-Gilbert, 
Postcolonial Theory: Context, Practices, Politics (New York: Verso, 1997), 178.
94 For the example of the United States, for instance, see Eva Marie Garroutte, Real Indians: Identity and 
Survival of Native America (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2003)
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ensure the rights of Indigenous peoples to practice their cultures and spiritualities regardless 
of their content. The World Council had little need for homogenizing cultural universalism 
either in theory or in practice.
Similarly, whether Indigenous internationalism and the World Council fit within the 
category of “globalization as modernization/westernization” is also problematic. All of the 
prominent members of the WCIP and the IITC had adopted at least some elements of modern 
western culture. All spoke at least one European language. Many had not just a western 
education, but a high-level of western post-secondary education. At the same time, both 
organizations were ideologically opposed to the basic tenets of globalization as modernism, 
which Scholte describes as the spread of capitalism, rationalism, industrialism, 
bureaucratism, individualism around the world.95 Certainly, there was some degree of 
“Calibanism” (using the tools of the West against the West) employed by Indigenous 
internationalist organizations but how much of this tactic was acceptable and how much 
would erode the strength of the movement was a matter of debate.96 From the use of nations 
states for its membership structure to the use of Robert's Rules of Order in its meetings, the 
World Council chose not to “reinvent the wheel” in organizing itself. At general assemblies, 
delegates formally represented secular voluntary political organizations (many of them state-
recognized and even state-funded), not Indigenous nations or peoples directly. Adopting 
these “modern” Western structures allowed the WCIP to work efficiently in its opposition to 
modernization and colonialism. Nor was the World Council's membership restricted to a 
“traditional” or cultural understanding of Indigeneity. Peoples that had embraced Christianity, 
95 Jan Aart Scholte, Globalization: A Critical Introduction, Second Edition (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 
2005), 16. 
96 For more on “Calibanism,” see footnote 27 on page 82 above.
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peoples that now spoke only Western languages, peoples that had intermarried with 
Europeans, and peoples that no longer lived exclusively from the resources of their own 
lands could all be accepted as Indigenous, according to the strictly political definition set out 
by the World Council. Some Indigenous activists—particularly but not exclusively the young 
and radical—were skeptical about this degree of “westernization” within an organization 
which purported to be Indigenous.97 Even Sam Deloria's emphasis on the representativeness 
of formal organizations with democratic elections versus “grassroots” organizations with 
self-appointed “representatives” might indicate an acceptance of Western rational and 
democratic values.98 Nevertheless, the goals of the World Council remained not just anti-
colonial in the sense of national liberation and the creation of new independent states, but 
anti-colonial in opposition to the basic system of sovereign nation states. Although Scholte 
argues that “'Tribes', 'ethnic groups', 'indigenous peoples' and 'minorities' only redraw the 
map of nations: they do not contradict the nationality principle as such,” in the case the 
WCIP, this is clearly untrue.99 The World Council did not simply challenge the lines drawn on 
the map by colonial powers, it challenged the inherent meaning behind those lines. In this 
way, its challenge to the international community was, despite its use of Western tools, even 
more radical than the initial aim of the IITC for Sioux nationhood.
 Finally, the World Council's place within Scholte's accepted definition of 
“globalization as deterritorialization or the spread of supraterritoriality” is equally 
contradictory. One the one hand, the World Council encouraged international (rather than 
97 For more on this tension, see page 99-100 above.
98 On the contrary, however, it would be arrogantly Eurocentric to suggest that the West has a monopoly on 
either rationality or democracy.
99 Scholte, Globalization,  Second Edition, 234.
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global) cooperation between Indigenous peoples so that each could secure their own self-
determination over their own territory. As an organization, it hardly rejected territorialism, 
since all the members identified themselves strongly with a particular territory. On the other 
hand, the WCIP was supraterritorial, not just in its use of teleconferencing for Executive 
Council meetings, but in the supraterritorial nature of the movement. Much like the women's 
movement or the Third World solidarity movement, the World Council connected different 
peoples based not on their proximate location but on their common history of oppression. By 
refusing a region-specific definition of Indigeneity (like a limit, for instance, to the Western 
Hemisphere) the World Council disconnected that word from any geographic connotations. 
In this sense, it fostered a sense of global Indigeneity that transcended space. Thus, ironically, 
the WCIP used a word whose basic meaning is “connected to a place” to describe a category 
of people without reference to space. Indigenous internationalism promotes the 
supraterritoriality of a certain kind of territorialism.
This mix of local and global elements required proponents of Indigenous 
internationalism to straddle both their own communities and the international forums in 
which they participated. The collapse of the World Council might be partly attributable to the 
difficulty of that challenge. Demonstrating the importance of regional and global solidarity to 
one's people or national organization was not easy for World Council delegates. When 
regional bodies failed to solidify (as was the case for North America or the Pacific), the 
participation of even strong national organizations was placed at risk. Although the logic of 
international representation might be apparent to peoples seeking respite from violence or 
extreme poverty, those in (relatively) more comfortable conditions may have needed more 
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convincing. Participation in local, national and international organizations leaves one 
vulnerable when any one of these organizations collapses, as Australia's Ossie Cruse learned. 
Scholte notes that “[G]lobalization has contributed to a growth of hybrid identities and 
overlapping communities in contemporary world politics... The resultant hybridization 
compels a person to negotiate several national and/or nonterritorial affiliations within the 
self.”100 This holds especially true for Indigenous internationalist leaders like George Manuel 
who had to balance his Secwepemc ethnicity, his political role within the Neskonlith Indian 
Band, his leadership of the provincial Union of British Columbia Indian Chiefs organization 
and the federal National Indian Brotherhood, his efforts at establishing a North American 
regional branch organization, and his involvement in the World Council of Indigenous 
Peoples. It is no less true, however, for a man like Niillas Somby who could simultaneously 
consider himself Sámi, Nuxálk and Indigenous. Indigenous internationalism, therefore, not 
only created an additional category of identity (Indigenous) it also helped enable Indigenous 
people to adopt additional overlapping and parallel identities. At the same time, the point 
should not be overstated, particularly when talking about the consciousness of individuals. 
On a personal level, Indigenous internationalism became an important part of life for a 
relatively small number of Indigenous people, and even they likely placed their own 
particular cultural/ethnic/national identities ahead of any global Indigenous identity. As some 
scholars of globalization have already noted, “some people see the world as their village” but 
“most see their village as the world.”101
100 Scholte, Globalization,  First Edition, 160-161.
101 Scholte, Globalization,  First Edition, 59.
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7.2.2 The World Council of Indigenous Peoples and the Movement of 
Indigenous Internationalism
7.2.2.1 The WCIP and the Politics of Indigenous Rights
The history of the WCIP sheds light on Indigenous politics and Indigenous rights, on 
the process of decolonization, and on the nature of international organizations. Those men 
and women who led the World Council conceived of Indigenous politics and Indigenous 
rights as a complex set of issues, all of which were grounded in their right to self-
determination but leaving space for a variety of interpretations of that right. The focus on 
self-determination was intrinsic to their identification as Indigenous because they defined 
Indigeneity as the situation of those peoples who were denied the right to self-determination. 
Many of the peoples represented had other social, cultural, and spiritual characteristics in 
common, but the basic quality shared by all peoples represented by the WCIP was explicitly 
political: a history of invasion and oppression. This definition was largely inspired by the 
decolonization of Africa and Asia. Key individuals like Marie Smallface-Marule and Jimmie 
Durham recognized that that same process, or at least a variation on that process, could 
continue elsewhere around the world.
Although the personal histories of every WCIP representative and executive council 
member cannot be accounted for, there are nevertheless clear similarities between many of 
the individuals involved that separated them both from the rest of their communities and 
from the past leaders of their communities. As Chapter Three showed, this (loosely defined) 
generation of Indigenous activists was particularly influenced by life in the metropole and 
access to post-secondary education. These experiences helped inspire people from small 
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communities to see their situation in a broader context, both geographically and politically. 
This growing level of national (and increasingly international) awareness and political 
consciousness helped create the opportunity to organize a global movement of Indigenous 
peoples which had never existed previously. The establishment of the World Council of 
Indigenous Peoples helped to organize that movement and effectively mobilize the numerical 
advantages, the intellectual strengths, and the political commitment of the world's Indigenous 
peoples. Those that became involved were generally excited about the chance to advance the 
cause of their own people and to lend support to others. Like the cooperation between Clem 
Chartier and Brooklyn Rivera, the movement of Indigenous internationalism could make its 
supporters feel like they were part of a larger fight and more powerful than they might have 
previously imagined. With a World Council of Indigenous Peoples, the oppression and 
violence that Indigenous peoples faced might not be fully eradicated, but at least it would not 
go unnoticed. As mentioned above, the multiple overlapping identities required balancing for 
those involved, but also created a variety of new opportunities for interaction and support. 
Despite not being a member of the WCIP, Niillas Somby was able to rely on the network of 
Indigenous activists that the organization had helped create, and to contribute, in his own 
way, to the struggles of other Indigenous peoples. Moreover, the World Council's efforts in 
political negotiations and its contributions to the development of international Indigenous 
law helped, and will continue to help, Indigenous peoples.
7.2.2.2 The WCIP as an International Organization
The structure of the World Council was a source of debate throughout the life of the 
organization. Owing partly to the prominent role of Canada's National Indian Brotherhood 
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during the formation of the World Council and the affiliations of the other delegates at the 
Georgetown preparatory meeting, the organization opted to allot memberships based on 
nation-state of origin. This was done for the sake of simplicity; to follow the logical 
progression from national organizations to an international one; to encourage the 
representation of all Indigenous peoples; and to recognize the de facto framework of 
international law. Moreover, the majority of Indigenous peoples represented by the World 
Council were not seeking to secede entirely from the nation states within which they resided. 
The organization was more concerned with challenging the basic concept of complete 
sovereignty for nation states rather than challenging any individual state's claim to that 
sovereignty. Therefore, the use of existing nation-states as an organizing structure was not 
deemed especially problematic. It was, however, subject to later criticism both from outside 
the organization and from within. It undoubtedly influenced the organization's actions in that 
it created a vastly greater number of votes for Indigenous peoples in Central and South 
America. Likewise, the creation of regional sub-branches produced particularly strong 
organizations in Central and South America that were unmatched in North America, the 
Pacific, or Asia. Although the World Council might have focused its attention on these 
regions anyway because of the oppression of Indigenous peoples there, the organization's 
membership structure likely ensured that it would. 
As described in Chapter Four, the WCIP's funding sources did affect its actions, 
particularly because the overwhelming majority of its funding came from a single source, the 
Canadian International Development Agency. The early leadership and staff of the World 
Council and its branch organizations did their best to resist CIDA's push to balance political 
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advocacy with greater amounts of development work, but over time, the latter became a large 
part of the WCIP's focus. This work included not just economic development but health 
promotion, education partnerships, and other projects. The World Council's more political 
work continued, nonetheless, though it occasionally faced substantial challenges, particularly 
during the polarized Cold War era, which it was ill-prepared to overcome. The disputes 
within the WCIP that followed Clem Chartier's clandestine trip across the Nicaraguan border 
demonstrate that although Indigenous internationalism encouraged people to view the world 
outside the lens of the US-Soviet conflict, Cold War ideological divisions were strong 
enough to make that perspective difficult, if not impossible. Nonetheless, the organization did 
contribute to substantial political accomplishments. From its very founding, the WCIP helped 
create a sense of global Indigeneity and an associated movement of international Indigenous 
solidarity. The WCIP directly contributed to this movement through projects and meetings, 
but its effects extend beyond the organization itself into the network of international 
Indigenous activists that came to see themselves as linked by a common identity. The World 
Council raised general awareness about Indigenous peoples' rights, but also helped draw 
important International attention to specific cases of oppression, such as those in Chile, 
Argentina, Guatemala and Nicaragua. It also helped achieve a number of more tangible 
successes for Indigenous peoples, including the revised International Labour Organization's 
convention on Indigenous peoples, and the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of 
Indigenous Peoples. In some ways, the increased presence and power of Indigenous peoples 
at the United Nations was responsible for the collapse of the World Council, but it could also 
be seen as one of the World Council's greatest legacies. 
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7.2.3 Final Thoughts
The movement of Indigenous internationalism as conceived by the WCIP should 
change the way we think about Indigenous peoples and the way we think about 
internationalism. Indigenous peoples are influenced by their ancestral cultures, their 
languages and their lands, but they are also cognisant of and take inspiration from broader 
historical and political shifts like the process of decolonization. Moreover, they not only take 
inspiration from that process, they can and should be framed as part of the global process of 
decolonization. Especially when leaders and protests invoke the conception of Indigeneity or 
Indigenous rights, they are no less global figures or events simply because they demand 
rights over specific and limited territories. All global shifts are comprised of countless local 
yet interconnected people and actions, and the movement of Indigenous internationalism is 
no different. Indigenous history, particularly in the 20th century, must recognize this bigger 
picture.
Similarly (or perhaps conversely), the history of decolonization and internationalism 
must not leave out the Indigenous peoples movement and organizations like the WCIP. Not 
only can the World Council be considered a legacy of African decolonization, it is also a 
rejoinder to it. Indigenous internationalism challenged any assertion that colonization was 
something that happened only from overseas, or that decolonization was complete when 
these transoceanic links were severed. Moreover, it argued that true decolonization does not 
come about when the colours on the map change, but when the very meaning of the colours 
is questioned. The World Council of Indigenous Peoples encourages us to think differently 
not only about the relationship between peoples and states, but also about the relationship 
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between peoples and international organizations—two areas of history that are rarely 
combined. International organizations are commonly divided between international 
governmental organizations (organizations of nation-states, like the United Nations) and non-
governmental organizations (organizations of individuals, like Amnesty International), but in 
which category does an organization of peoples or nations without states belong? And how 
do nations without states interact with international organizations like the United Nations? 
These questions merit further research.
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Appendix A
List of Acronyms
AIM (American Indian Movement)
AFN (Assembly of First Nations)
ALPROMISU (Alianza para el Progresso del Pueblo Miskito y Sumu)
CIDA (Canadian International Development Agency)
CISA (Consejo Indio de Sud America)
CORPI (Consejo Regional de Pueblos Indígenas / Coordinadora Regional De Pueblos 
Indios)
ECOSOC (United Nations Economic and Social Council)
FSLN (Frente Sandinista de la Liberación Nacional)
IIITC (International Indian Treaty Council)
INGO (International Non-Governmental Organization)
IWGIA (International Work Group for Indigenous Affairs)
KISAN (Kus Indian Sut Asla Nicaragua Ra)
NAC (National Aboriginal Conference)
NAIB (North American Indian Brotherhood)
NARC (North American Regional Council)
NCAI (National Congress of American Indians)
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NCC (Native Council of Canada)
NGO (Non-Governmental Organization)
NIB (National Indian Brotherhood)
NORAD (Norwegian Agency for Development)
NSC (Nordic Sami Council)
MISATAN (Miskitu Asla Takanka)
MISURA (Miskitu, Sumu, Rama)
MISURASATA (Miskitu, Sumu, Rama, Sandinista, Asla Takanka)
MNC (Métis National Council)
PACIP (Pacific and Asia Council of Indigenous Peoples)
TANU (Tanganyika African National Union)
UBCIC (Union of British Columbia Indian Chiefs)
UN-WGIP (United Nations Work Group on Indigenous Populations)
WCIP (World Council of Indigenous Peoples)
YATAMA (Yapti Tasba Masraka Nani Aslatakanka)
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Appendix B
List of WCIP General Assemblies
Year Dates Location President and VPs Elected
1st General Assembly
(Founding Conference)
1975 October 27-31 Tseshaht First Nation 
(near Port Alberni, Canada)
President: George Manuel
Secretary General: Sam Deloria
2nd General Assembly 1977 August 27-28 Kiruna, Swedish Sápmi President: George Manuel
3rd General Assembly 1981 April 22-May 2 Canberra, Australia President: José Carlos Morales Morales
VP: Melillan Painemal
VP: Aslak Nils Sara
4th General Assembly 1984 September 23-30 Panama City, Panama President: Clem Chartier
VP: Donald Rojas Maroto
VP: Pōkā Laenui
5th General Assembly 1987 July 11-16 Lima, Peru President: Donald Rojas Maroto
VP: Conrado Jorge Valiente 
VP: Pōkā Laenui
6th General Assembly 1990 August 8-12 Tromsø, Norwegian Sápmi President: Donald Rojas Maroto
VP: Conrado Jorge Valiente 
VP: John Christopherson
7th General Assembly 1993 Dec 6-10 Xelajú (Quetzaltenango), 
Guatemala
President: 
Conrado Jorge Valiente 
VP: Noelí Pocaterra
VP: Clem Chartier
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